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ABSTRACT 
It is well known that in the early stages of legal development in Commonwealth jurisdictions, 
when these countries were still colonies of the British Empire, there was uniformity in their 
laws as the English common law was received by these countries and applied by their 
judiciaries with little or no modifications. As time passed, with the shift towards independence 
in these former British colonies, some Commonwealth countries have diverged from the 
English common law by providing for judicial solutions that are perceived to best fit their 
individual circumstances, values and needs. In other words, there has been a break up of 
Commonwealth common law. 
Whilst there has been much academic discussion on this phenomenon in relation to for 
example, tort and contract, hardly any has been written on private international law. 
Accordingly, it is the purpose of this thesis to address the paucity of academic writing on this 
subject matter by undertaking a comparative study of two areas of private international law, 
namely the doctrine of forum non conveniens and tort choice of law in Australia, Canada and 
Singapore, with the relevant English common law positions as the key reference point. 
Specifically, this thesis began by establishing the existence as well as the nature and extent 
of the break up of forum non conveniens and tort choice of law in our selected 
Commonwealth jurisdictions. It is then argued that one reason for this phenomenon is that 
there are differences in the judicial treatment of policies, concepts and other wider 
considerations relevant to these areas of private international law in these countries. 
Subsequently, the issue of how these jurisdictions should respond to this phenomenon was 
examined and we concluded that the prospects for the harmonisation of jurisdictional and tort 
choice of law rules at the global, regional and Commonwealth level has been largely 
unpromising. Accordingly, it is argued that the way forward is for our selected Commonwealth 
jurisdictions to develop their own rules on these areas of private international law with their 
own social, economic and political circumstances in mind. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1. OBJECTIVE OF THE THESIS: ANALYSING THE BREAK UP OF COMMONWEALTH 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The Commonwealth is an "association of independent states", made up of former dominions 
of the British Empire. These jurisdictions share the "same legal culture, the common lawn2 as 
exported from England during the "process of colonial expansion"3 in the early days of the 
British Empire. The English common law can therefore be said to have "laid the foundation 
stones"4 for the legal regimes in these countries. 
Initially, the "notion that the common law might branch in different directions in different 
jurisdictions within the [British] Empire was anathema"5 in Commonwealth jurisdictions. The 
English common law was applied by Commonwealth judiciaries with little or no modifications, 
as judicial attempts to form independent views on legal issues based on the individual 
jurisdiction's unique "circumstances, needs and values"6 were hardly ever made. These 
Commonwealth judgments were thus seen as mere "elaborations on English solutions"7 or 
"exercise[s] in conformity"8 with the English common law position. Accordingly, at that point in 
time, it is "rationally arguable that there [was] only one common law"9 in Commonwealth 
jurisdictions since case law in these countries was largely derived from English judicial 
precedents. 
One key explanation for this situation was the presence of the Privy Council as the "final court 
of appeal for the commonwealth"10 which meant that its decisions were binding on the local 
Dale, The Modern Commonwealth, Commonwealth Law Series (London: Butterworths) (1983), at 33. 2Orucu, Critical Comparative Law: Considering Paradoxes for Legal Systems in Transition Vol. 4.1 Electronic Journal of 
Comparative Law (June 2000), at 5.2. 3 ibid. 
4 ibid. 
'Clarke, The Privy Council, Politics and Precedent in the Asia-Pacific Region (1990) 39 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 741, at 741-742. 6 Mason, Australian Contract Law (1988) 1 Journal of Contract Law I. 7 ibid. 
e Cooke, Divergences 
- 
England, Australia and New Zealand (1983) New Zealand Law Review 297, at 298. 9 ibid, at 297. 
10 Martin, Diverging Common Law-Invercargill goes to the Privy Council (1997) 60 Modern Law Review 94, at 95. 
1 
courts as a matter of stare decisis. Sitting at the apex of this "legal hierarchy, "" it was well 
placed to "enhance legal uniformity within the Commonwealth outside the United Kingdom 
. 
n12 
Furthermore, as the Privy Council was hesitant to decide contrary to English authorities "even 
when local factors might dictate a different approach, "13 Commonwealth courts, which took 
appeals to the Privy Council considered "themselves bound to follow judgments of the House 
of Lords on matters governed by the common law. "14 One must also note that underlying 
these legal explanations may be a prevailing psychological view that British laws were 
superior to those of other lands due to the dominance of Britain in the world then. There was 
thus "harmonisation of law on a Commonwealth... scale"15 at this point in time. 
After the end of the Second World War, there was a shift towards "self government and 
independence in most of the former British colonies"16 and this eventually led to the 
"dissolution of the British Empire into today's Commonwealth. "17 One inevitable consequence 
of this occurrence was the abolition of the right of appeal to the Privy Council in an increasing 
number of Commonwealth jurisdictions. Free from the control of the Privy Council, the highest 
courts in these Commonwealth countries started to develop their own common law regimes 
"along divergent lines"18 from the English common law. Put another way, the break up of 
Commonwealth common law had begun. 
It is now clear that the previous Commonwealth subservience to English ready-made 
solutions has been shaken off as prominent members of the judiciaries in a number of 
Commonwealth countries have stated judicially and extra judicially that it is time to seize 
control over their own legal destiny as they have a responsibility to "aim at [judicial] solutions 
best fitting the particular national way of life and ethos. "19 In other words, there is now 
" Hiller, The Law-Creative Role of Appellate Courts in the Commonwealth (1978) 27 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 85, at 107. 
'Z ibid. 
13 Martin, supra, n. 10, at 95. 
1' Beckman, Divergent Development of the Common Law in Jurisdictions which Retain Appeals to the Privy Council (1987) 29 
Malaya Law Review 254, at 255. 
's Hiller, supra, n. 11, at 86. 16 Beckman, supra, n. 14, at 255. 
Clarke, supra, n. 5, at 742. 18 Beckman, supra, n. 14, at 255. See also, Orucu, The United Kingdom as an Importer and Exporter of Legal Models in the Context of Reciprocal Influences and Evolving Legal Systems, in UK Law for the Millennium Comparative Law Series, No. 19 (1998), 206 
- 
243, at 217-224. 19 See for example, Cooke, supra, n. 8, at 297. See also, Mason, supra, n. 6, Tolofson v Jensen, [ 1994] SCR 1022, Pfeffer v 
Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503. 
2 
awareness on the part of these Commonwealth courts that their social, economic and political 
circumstances as well as the cultural values and "community expectations"20 shared by their 
people may require that they depart from certain areas of the English common law. 
Even the Privy Council itself has abandoned its role as the "unifier of commonwealth law"21 
with its acknowledgement that there is room for "divergent views in different commonwealth 
jurisdictions"22 as they may adhere to different "policy considerations"23 based on the local 
court's "perception"24 of the individual country's conditions. It has also declared that 
"uniformity in certain areas of the [common] law"25 is not "compelling"26 and that the "ability of 
the common law to adapt itself to the differing circumstances of the countries in which it has 
taken root is not a weakness, but one of its great strengths. 27 
In short, Commonwealth common law can no longer be said to be a "uniform whole. "28 
Although "English law is still exporting ideas and principles to... members of the common law 
ily, *29 it is important to note that in these modern times, Commonwealth judiciaries now 
"enjoy the luxurious advantage of freedom to ransack the case-lawn30 in England so as to 
cherry-pick the particular rules and approaches that they desire. 
While the break up of Commonwealth common law has been documented particularly in 
relation to tort and contract law, 31 research on this phenomenon in relation to Commonwealth 
private international law has been lacking. The key objective of this thesis is thus to address 
the paucity of academic writing on this subject matter by undertaking a comparative study of 
two areas of private international law, namely the doctrine of forum non conveniens and tort 
choice of law in Australia, Canada and Singapore, with the relevant English common law 
positions as the key reference point. 
20 Martin, supra, n. 10, at 98. 21 Orucu, supra, n. 2, at 5.2. 
u Invercargill City Council v Hamlin [1996] 2 WLR 367, at 378. 23 ibid. 
24 ibid. 
u Clarke, supra, n. 5, at 298. 26 ibid. 
27 Invercargill, supra, n. 22, at 376. 28 Cooke, supra, n. 8, at 298. 
2' Orucu, supra, n. 18, at 220. 30 Cooke, supra, n. 8, at 297. 31 See for example, Mason, supra, n. 6, Finn, Commerce, the Common Law and Morality (1989) 17 Melbourne University Law 
Review 87, Cooke, supra, n. 8, Martin, supra, n. 10. 
3 
2. SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
Ideally, an analysis of the break up of Commonwealth private international law should involve 
a comprehensive comparison of private international law regimes in every Commonwealth 
jurisdiction. However, bearing in mind the restrictions placed upon a thesis such as this, one 
would have to confine the study to a number of specific topics in private international law as 
well as to a few selected Commonwealth jurisdictions. 
2.1 SELECTED AREAS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
2.1.1 Forum non convenJens 
In Commonwealth countries, a court can take jurisdiction over a dispute so long as the 
defendants are served with a claim form in accordance with the relevant legal rules on this 
matter. 32 That, however, is not the end of the process as that court has the discretion to 
decline jurisdiction by granting a stay of proceedings. One situation where such power can be 
exercised is where the doctrine of forum non conveniens is satisfied; i. e. where the 
"appropriate forum for trial is abroad or that the local forum is inappropriate. "33 
There are a number of reasons why forum non conveniens has been selected for our 
discussion of the break up of Commonwealth private international law. 
1. First, the "topic of declining jurisdiction in private international law is one of enormous 
practical importance. "34 One consequence of the rapid globalisation of trade and 
commerce and thus the world economy is the rise In the frequency of cross-border 
disputes. Such litigation is said to have become "to some extent a commodity which 
prospective claimants shop for amongst the potentially available national legal 
32 For more details on these rules, see for example, Chapter 12, North, Fawcett, Cheshire and North 's Private International Law (London: Butterworths) (13'" ed., 1999). 
" Fawcett, General Report, in Fawcett (ed), Declining Jurisdiction in Private International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 
(1995), 1-70, at 2. 
'a ibid. 
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systems"35 thus bringing about a situation where the "scope for conflict between the 
courts of different countries is much increased 
.. 
36 One of the key techniques adopted 
by Commonwealth judiciaries to address this is the discretion to decline jurisdiction in 
accordance with the doctrine of forum non conveniens. If there were significant 
diversity in relation to this doctrine in Commonwealth jurisdictions, its effectiveness in 
resolving the above issues would have to be questioned. 
2. Secondly, there is clearly diversity in relation to this doctrine in Commonwealth 
jurisdictions. The most famous divergence of them all is of course the High Court of 
Australia's decision to reject the English common law'clearly more appropriate forum' 
test37 for a 'clearly inappropriate forum' test. 38 However, that is not the only 
Commonwealth departure from the English common law position on this matter. Even 
though most Commonwealth jurisdictions have adopted the English common law 
'clearly more appropriate forum' test, as this is a broad and discretionary approach, 
divergences have been generated by the decisions of Commonwealth judges on 
specific aspects of that test. 
3. Thirdly, another reason why the doctrine of forum non conveniens is chosen for this 
study is that it is an area of Commonwealth private international law where the 
common law is still applicable. In particular, the English common law doctrine of 
forum non conveniens has not been completely removed by the drive towards the 
harmonisation of private international law in Europe. This is because the European 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters is generally not 
applicable to defendants who are not domiciled in a Member State. 39 In these 
circumstances, it is up to the English common law rules to determine jurisdiction. 
33 International Law Association London Conference (2000), Committee on International Civil and Commercial Litigation, Third 
Interim Report: Declining and Referring Jurisdiction in International Litigation, http: //www. ila- 
c r&Wf/Civil%20&%20Commercial%2OLitieation/CommLitiiontion pdf#se-, ireh-%22Third%20Interim%20Report%3A°'o20 
eclining%20and%20Refeninn%201urisdiction%20in%201ntemational%20Litigation%22, at [1]. 36 ibid. 
37 Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd [ 1987] AC 460. 38 Voth v Manildra Flour Mill Pry (1990) 171 CLR 538. 39 Article 4, Brussels l Regulation. 
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Similarly, in Australia, Canada and Singapore, forum non conveniens is still 
predominantly a common law doctrine. 40 
2.1.2 Tort choice of law 
In relation to an action in tort with a number of foreign elements, one of the private 
international law issues arising is: what is the law applicable to that dispute? This question is 
answered by examining a jurisdiction's tort choice of law rules. In general, Commonwealth 
courts look at the lex for!, the lex loci delicti or a mixture of the two laws to determine the 
applicable law. 
On the reasons why tort choice of law has been chosen as a case study for this thesis: 
1. Like the position for forum non conveniens, this topic is considered by some to be of 
some practical significance. Specifically, tort choice of law is seen as essential to the 
facilitation of litigant mobility across jurisdictions. By providing for tort choice of law 
regimes that encourage the free movement of persons, wealth and skills, it has been 
argued that "suitable conditions of interstate and international commerce"41 would be 
promoted. 
2. Tort choice of law is again one area of private international law where the common 
law is still relevant. For England, even though the British Parliament has legislated on 
tort choice of law by providing for the Private International (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Act 1995, the English common law rules on tort choice of law are still preserved for 
certain torts, most notably, the tort of defamation. 2 In addition, English tort choice of 
law has not been replaced by a European convention or regulation as is the case for 
40 In British Columbia, Yukon and Saskatchewan, the common law doctrine offorum non conveniens has been replaced by 
section 11 of the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act. According to the Uniform Law Conference of Canada, the 
purpose of this section is to codify the Canadian common law doctrine of forum non conveniens as provided for in Amchem 
Products Inc. v. British Columbia (Workers' Compensation Board) [1993] 1 SCR 897. 
41 See for example, Yntema, Objectives ofPrivate International Law (1957) 35 Canadian Bar Review 721, at 741. 42 Section 13, Act. 
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contract choice of Iaw. 43 It is perhaps a matter of time before the proposed European 
Council Regulation on Non-contractual Obligations is settled and adopted by the 
European Parliament" but even so, not all torts will fall within its scope. 45 Torts that 
are not covered by the Regulation will have to be addressed under the 1995 Act or 
the English common law tort choice of law regime. As is the case in relation to the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens, tort choice of law in Australia, Canada and 
Singapore is still governed by the common law. 
3. Most importantly, Commonwealth tort choice of law is an excellent example of the 
break up of Commonwealth private international law as its development has been in 
"a state of continual revolution x46 Tort choice of law has been described as raising 
"one of the most vexed questions in the conflict of laws"47 and as such, it is 
unsurprising that different Commonwealth judiciaries have formulated different 
answers to it throughout the history of its development. 
2.2 SELECTED COMMONWEALTH JURISDICTIONS 
In this thesis, we will examine the break up of Commonwealth private international law in 
Australia, Canada and Singapore with the English common law positions on forum non 
conveniens and tort choice of law as the key reference points. It is of course necessary for an 
analysis of this phenomenon that we use the English common law as the primary basis of 
comparison as it is the source of the private international law rules in these jurisdictions. 
However, our choice of Australia, Canada and Singapore for this study requires some 
explanation. 
43 European Council Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome 1980). µ For the latest documents on the proposed Rome II Regulation, see for example, Report on the Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the Law Applicable to Non-contractual Obligations A06-211/2005, (26 June 2005) 
and the Amended Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Regulation on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual 
Obligations COM(2006) 83 final, (21 February 2006). 
`s See Article 1(2), Amended Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Regulation on the Law Applicable to Non- Contractual Obligations COM(2006) 83 final, (21 February 2006). 
46 Briggs, The Conflict of Laws (Oxford: Oxford University Press) (2002), at 174. 47 Boys v Chaplin [ 1968] 2 QB I (CA) per Lord Denning. 
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2.2.1 Reasons for selecting Australia, Canada and Singapore as the Commonwealth 
jurisdictions for this thesis 
Why have we selected Australia, Canada and Singapore for this thesis? Australian and 
Canadian decisions have been cited by academics in their discussion of the break up of 
Commonwealth common law. 48 They have observed that there is a "growing awareness"49 in 
these jurisdictions to "match the common law to [their own] circumstances, needs and 
values"50 which has resulted in a "growing divergence of [their] common law from that of 
England. "51 Accordingly, it will be interesting to see whether these comments are equally 
applicable to Australia and Canada's private international law regimes. 
In general, the High Court of Australia has effected a considerable number of divergences 
from the English common law rules on forum non conveniens and tort choice of law. Canada, 
however, provides a mixed picture. On the one hand, there is a clear Canadian departure 
from the English common law tort choice of law regime. On the other hand, the Supreme 
Court of Canada has endorsed the English common law'clearly more appropriate' forum test. 
As for Singapore, her judiciaries have adopted the English common law approaches on forum 
non conveniens and tort choice of law. In all, these three Commonwealth countries provide a 
good balance of jurisdictions which have contributed, to varying extents, to the break up of 
Commonwealth private international law. 
2.2.2 Canada and Australia: federations 
It is important to note that Australia and Canada are federations whereas this is obviously not 
the case for Singapore and England. As such, one question that must be posed here is: is the 
use of these Commonwealth jurisdictions appropriate for a comparative study such as this 
when they are so different in terms of their political structure? 
48 See for example, Cooke, supra, n. 8, Mason, supra, n. 6, Orucu, supra, n. 2. 49 Finn, supra, n. 31, at 89. 50 ibid. 
51 ibid, at 90. 
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In particular, for the purposes of private international law, "a country is any territorial unit 
having its own separate system of law, whether or not it constitutes an independent state 
politically. "SZ Thus, in the conflicts context, each of the states or provinces in Australia and 
Canada is treated as a separate jurisdiction. Traditionally, common law private international 
law regimes in Australia and Canada did not distinguish between disputes on an intra-national 
or international basis; the same private international law rules were applicable regardless of 
whether the dispute involved for example Ontario and British Columbia or Ontario and 
Singapore. However, in recent years, the view that federations are ultimately "one country 
and one nationn53 began to emerge in the Australian and Canadian courts and a number of 
English common law rules on private international law were criticised for their inability to 
tackle issues arising from disputes within a federation. A division between international and 
intra-national cases was thus introduced to certain areas of private international law in these 
jurisdictions. 
Some may say that a comparative study such as ours should be confined to the analysis of 
federal or non-federal Commonwealth countries due to the introduction of this distinction 
between international and intra-national disputes. It is obviously not possible to do the former 
as England is not a federation and for our analysis of the break up of Commonwealth private 
international law, it is essential that we include a comparison with the English common law. 
However, if we restricted our discussion to non-federal Commonwealth jurisdictions, we would 
be removing from our analysis an enormous source of Commonwealth diversity in relation to 
private international law since the Australian and Canadian judiciaries are clearly limiting the 
influence of English judicial precedents on their decisions on private international law. 
Furthermore, it is the view of this author that differences in the political status of these 
countries do not necessarily render our comparative study impossible or ineffectual for the 
following reasons: 
52 Clarkson, Hill, Jaffey on the Conflict of Laws (London: Butterworths LexisNexis) (2" ed., 2002), at 4. s' Breavington v Godleman (1988) 169 CLR 1, at 78. 
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1. First, the utilisation of such political reasoning in the Australian and Canadian 
decisions on private international law is a relatively recent trend. Accordingly, the 
comparison of private international law rules in the days before the emergence of this 
consideration in the courts of these countries will not be affected by the fact that 
Australia and Canada are federations. 
2. Secondly, a direct comparison between our selected Commonwealth jurisdictions can 
still be made with regards to disputes which occur on an international basis. A dispute 
involving an Australian or Canadian state and a foreign jurisdiction such as France 
would involve the same broad considerations as a cross-border dispute involving 
England and Singapore. 
3. Thirdly, even though England has strong legal and historical ties to Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland, the English common law does not provide for any special rules 
for intra-UK disputes. For example, it has been said that an English court will treat a 
"tort committed in Scotland or Ireland in precisely the same way as it would one 
committed in China or Peru. 54 For Australia and Canada, there has been a transition 
from the English common law view, that such political considerations play no part in 
the formulation of the relevant private international law rules, to one where such 
matters necessitate a division between international and intra-national disputes for 
the purposes of their private international law regimes. As such, this is a good 
example of the break up of Commonwealth private international law. Furthermore, it 
is an excellent illustration of how Commonwealth jurisdictions have utilised their own 
individual circumstances (in this case, their political context) to break away from the 
relevant English common law position on private international law. 
In all, we do not see the political nature of these Commonwealth jurisdictions, Australia and 
Canada as presenting significant methodological difficulties to our comparative study. 
54 Briggs, supra, n. 46, at 178. 
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As a final note, we will not be examining the private international law rules in the Canadian 
province of Quebec as it is a civil law jurisdiction, unlike the rest of the Canadian provinces 
which have inherited the English common law. 
3. STRUCTURE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE THESIS 
To examine the break up of Commonwealth private international law in a structured and 
analytical manner, this thesis will be divided subsequently into three parts with three broad 
questions corresponding to each of these sections. They are as follows: 
Part I: What is the nature and extent of the break up of Commonwealth private international 
law in our selected jurisdictions? 
Part ll: What are the explanations from the case law for the break up of Commonwealth 
private international law in our selected jurisdictions? 
Part III: How should our selected Commonwealth jurisdictions react to the break up of 
Commonwealth private international law? 
We will now elaborate on each of these questions in the following subsections. 
3.1 PART I: WHAT IS THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE BREAK UP OF 
COMMONWEALTH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN OUR SELECTED 
JURISDICTIONS? 
Specifically, Chapters 2 and 3 of our thesis will address the break up of Commonwealth 
private international law in relation to the doctrines of forum non conveniens and the tort 
choice of law regimes in Australia, Canada and Singapore with reference to the English 
common law positions on these areas of private international law. By looking at the relevant 
case law in these jurisdictions, we will ask whether there has, in fact, been a break up of 
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these areas of Commonwealth private international law. We will also analyse the nature and 
extent of this break up. One important point to note here is that, for the purposes of our 
discussion, this phenomenon will be deemed to have occurred so long as there is a departure 
in our selected Commonwealth jurisdictions from the relevant English common law position 
on tort choice of law and forum non conveniens. 
To undertake a comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon, the language of 'divergences' 
and 'convergences' will be employed in this thesis. The word 'divergence' is particularly apt 
for our research as it connotes a movement apart in different directions from a common point 
as well as the degree by which things deviate or spread apart. In other words, we can 
examine the extent to which a Commonwealth jurisdiction has departed from the English 
common law position on tort choice of law and forum non conveniens, the common point for 
our analysis. As for the word 'convergence, ' it is for situations subsequent to the divergence 
where there has been a shift back towards the English common law. In addition, for 
Commonwealth countries which have not diverged from the relevant English common law 
approaches on our selected areas of private international law, we can describe them as 
having maintained their uniformity with the English common law. 
With the use of this terminology, we will be able to plot out the movements of the relevant law 
in these countries in reaction to the English common law as time goes by. All this will allow us 
to analyse in a critical manner, the nature and extent of the break up in relation to our 
selected areas of Commonwealth private international law. Our findings on this aspect of our 
analysis will be summarised in Chapter 4. 
3.2 PART II: WHAT ARE THE EXPLANATIONS FROM THE CASE LAW FOR THE BREAK 
UP OF COMMONWEALTH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN OUR SELECTED 
JURISDICTIONS? 
The explanations as to why some judiciaries of our selected Commonwealth jurisdictions 
have decided to formulate certain rules with regards to their doctrines of forum non 
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conveniens and tort choice of law in divergence from the English common law will be 
examined in Chapters 5 and 6 of this study. If there has been a shift back towards the 
relevant English common law positions on these matters, the reasons for such convergence 
would be tackled as well. Similarly, we will also look at why certain Commonwealth 
jurisdictions have maintained their uniformity with the English common law position in relation 
to these areas of private international law. 
To answer this second question of our thesis, a critical analysis of the principles, policies, 
concepts and other wider considerations that have had an impact on the decisions of our 
selected Commonwealth courts on forum non conveniens and tort choice of law is required. 
Examples of such considerations include: discouraging forum shopping, ensuring uniformity 
of judicial outcome, the historical influence of English judicial precedents and the globalisation 
of litigation. 
In order to conduct a systematic and thorough study of the considerations relevant to our 
selected areas of private international law, each of these matters will be examined in their 
own designated sub-sections. Specifically, we will be looking at the judicial treatment of these 
considerations in each of our selected Commonwealth jurisdictions. For example, do the 
courts in these countries consider the protection of a litigant's right of access to local courts to 
be a significant factor in their decisions on forum non conveniens? Is there a divergence of 
opinion in our selected judiciaries as to the weight accorded to the policy of ensuring 
uniformity of judicial outcomes for their tort choice of law regimes? What is the compromise 
reached between the policies of certainty and flexibility in relation to the forum non 
conveniens and tort choice of law approaches in our selected jurisdictions? 
To assist us in our analysis, these explanations will be grouped as follows: 
a) Policy explanations 
b) Structural explanations 
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c) Historical and comparative explanations 
d) Contextual explanations. 
A brief description of these categories will now be provided. 
a) Policy explanations 
In this section, we will examine "jurisprudential policyi55 explanations, i. e. considerations that 
influence the courts in determining "what qualities are most desirable"-56 for their private 
international law rules. Examples of such policies in relation to private international law 
include: discouraging forum shopping, protecting the litigant's right of access to the courts, 
justice, certainty, flexibility and ensuring uniformity of judicial decisions. As the treatment of 
these policy considerations are affected by a particular Commonwealth judiciary's "beliefs on 
jurisprudential desiderata"57 and may thus differ across Commonwealth jurisdictions, in 
particular from that of the English courts, this is a possible explanation for the divergences 
from the English common law doctrine of forum non conveniens and tort choice of law in our 
selected countries. 
b) Structural explanations 
This category is an acknowledgement that private international law in a jurisdiction does not 
exist in isolation. It can interact with domestic substantive law. For example, a country's 
domestic law on tort may influence the formulation of its tort choice of law regime. It can also 
interact with public international law as concepts traditionally employed in public international 
law may be imported into private international law. One example is the concept of comity. In 
addition, private international law consists of three components, namely jurisdiction, choice of 
law and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Since these three topics are 
ss Fawcett, Policy Considerations in Tort Choice of Law (1984) 47 Modem Law Review 650. 36 ibid. 
57 ibid. 
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intertwined with one another, in that together they form the system that litigants will normally 
go through for the resolution of their cross-border disputes, the nature of the legal rules in one 
of these areas of private international law may have an impact on that of another. As the 
judicial treatment of these considerations can differ from Commonwealth jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction, this is a possible explanation for some of the divergences in our comparative 
study. 
c) Historical and comparative explanations 
In this category, we will be looking at the historical influence of English judicial precedents on 
our selected Commonwealth countries. To elaborate, one possible explanation for the refusal 
of Commonwealth courts to depart from the English common law in relation to our selected 
areas of private international law is that they are of the view that there should be uniformity in 
their laws with that under the English common law. 
We will also examine the impact of comparative law on the doctrines of forum non conveniens 
and tort choice of law in our selected jurisdictions. If a number of common law judiciaries 
have provided for divergences from the English common law on these areas of private 
international law, this may be an explanation for the decision of our selected judiciaries to do 
so likewise. 
d) Contextual explanations 
In our above discussion of the break up of Commonwealth common law, we have observed 
from the academic writing on this phenomenon, that one reason for its occurrence is that 
Commonwealth judiciaries have taken a greater interest in their own individual circumstances 
in the formulation of their common law rules. This category is thus to examine such 
explanations in relation to our study of the break up of Commonwealth private international 
law. In particular, we will see whether the judiciaries in Australia, Canada and Singapore have 
reacted to their social, economic and political contexts in the relevant decisions on forum non 
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conveniens and tort choice of law. Specifically, we will look at whether social and economic 
circumstances such as the globalisation of litigation and the increase in the mobility of 
persons, wealth and skills have been taken into account by these Commonwealth courts. We 
will also examine whether political considerations, such as the fact that Australia and Canada 
are federations, have been utilised by the courts in these countries to justify any divergences 
from the English common law in relation to our selected areas of private international law. 
Aside from examining the considerations relevant to our selected areas of private 
international law on an individual basis, we will also be looking at the interaction that goes on 
between them in each of our selected jurisdictions in a separate section. For example, some 
of our selected Commonwealth courts may regard the litigant's right of access to their judicial 
system as an important factor and may thus accord less weight to the policies of discouraging 
forum shopping and equal justice between litigants in relation to their forum non conveniens 
approaches. The social, economic and political context of a jurisdiction may be the reason 
why some of our chosen Commonwealth courts have adhered to certain policies and 
concepts while others have not. Arguably, if there were differences in the nature of this 
interaction between considerations in our selected jurisdictions, this might be an explanation 
for the break up of our selected areas of Commonwealth private international law. 
It is important to note that throughout this whole inquiry, our focus is on the explanations that 
can be drawn out from the relevant cases. Obviously, the reasons explicitly provided for by 
the judges in relation to the formulation of their doctrines of forum non convenlens and tort 
choice of law regimes will be utilised in this comparative study. In addition, we will be breaking 
down the judgments themselves to tease out other possible explanations implicit from them to 
conduct our analysis. Accordingly, it should be clear that we are engaging in a doctrinal 
analysis of the break up of Commonwealth private international law in that this study is limited 
to the relevant cases on forum non conveniens and tort choice of law. In other words, we are 
not looking at wider sociological explanations such as the differences in the mindsets and 
backgrounds of the judges in our selected jurisdictions or the general social, economic and 
political climate of these jurisdictions aside from those that have been invoked by the judges 
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in the cases themselves. This limitation is imposed on this study because Commonwealth 
private international law has an abundance of case law. To conduct a proper and 
comprehensive analysis of the reasons in the cases for the break up of Commonwealth 
private international law in relation to forum non conveniens and tort choice of law is, itself, a 
major undertaking and space constraints do not allow for a wider examination. It is hoped that 
others can build upon the explanations established in this thesis to provide for a complete 
answer to the question of why there has been a break up of Commonwealth private 
international law. 
V 
Concluding remarks on our discussion of the explanations from the relevant case law for the 
break up of our selected areas of Commonwealth private international law will be provided in 
Chapter 7 of this thesis. 
3.3 PART III: HOW SHOULD OUR SELECTED JURISDICTIONS REACT TO THE BREAK 
UP OF COMMONWEALTH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW? 
Finally, in Chapter 8, we will address the question: if there was a break up of Commonwealth 
private international law in relation to forum non conveniens and tort choice of law, how 
should Australia, Canada and Singapore react to this phenomenon? Should they allow it to 
persist; that their courts "should develop [conflict of law] rules which vary according to their 
context? n58 Or should they participate in the harmonisation of these areas of private 
international law? 
To answer these questions, we will undertake a critical analysis of the advantages and 
disadvantages associated with diversity in Commonwealth private international law as well as 
the advantages and disadvantages arising from the harmonisation of private international law, 
with specific reference to our selected Commonwealth jurisdictions and areas of private 
international law. We will also attempt to paint a realistic picture of the obstacles that may 
"' Briggs, supra, n. 46, at 178. 
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hamper the success of the harmonisation of forum non conveniens and tort choice of law 
rules on a global, regional and Commonwealth scale. 
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PART I: WHAT IS THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE BREAK UP OF 
COMMONWEALTH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN OUR SELECTED 
JURISDICTIONS? 
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CHAPTER 2: THE BREAK UP OF COMMONWEALTH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW IN RELATION TO THE DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As was mentioned in Chapter 1, the purpose of this chapter is to work out whether there has 
been a break up of Commonwealth private international law in relation to the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens in our selected jurisdictions and that, if this phenomenon has occurred, what 
is the nature and extent of this break up. 
A cursory glance at the forum non conveniens tests in Australia, Canada, England and 
Singapore would reveal that there has indeed been a break up of this particular area of 
Commonwealth private international law, as the Australian courts have provided for an 
approach that inquires as to the inappropriateness of the local forum, whereas the English 
common law 'clearly more appropriate forum' test has been endorsed by the Canadian and 
Singaporean courts. On closer scrutiny, it is interesting to note that divergences from the 
English common law doctrine of forum non conveniens have also occurred in Canada and 
Singapore albeit not in relation to the 'clearly more appropriate forum' test itself. Instead, 
these departures are with regards to the application of that approach, such as the structural 
framework used by the courts to work out where the more appropriate forum is. It is thus 
arguable that the extent to which the doctrine of forum non conveniens in one of our selected 
jurisdictions has diverged from that of the English common law may not necessarily be the 
same as that of another. 
To analyse the break up of Commonwealth private international law in relation to the doctrine 
of forum non conveniens in a critical and structured manner, the following framework will be 
utilised. We will first examine the divergences from and convergences with the English 
common law doctrine of forum non conveniens in our selected Commonwealth jurisdictions 
having regard to the following analytical points of comparison: 
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a) Structure of the tests (set out in 2.2 of this chapter); 
b) Formulation of the tests (set out in 2.3 of this chapter); 
c) Situations to which the tests are applicable (set out in 2.4 of this chapter); 
d) Factors taken into account under the tests (set out in 2.5 of this chapter); 
e) Weight attached to particular factors under the tests (set out in 2.6 of this chapter); 
f) Difficulty in satisfying the tests (set out in 2.7 of this chapter); 
g) Forum non conveniens in a federation (set out in 2.8 of this chapter). 
Subsequently, these findings will be utilised to determine the nature and extent of the break 
up of this particular area of Commonwealth private international law in relation to our selected 
jurisdictions. 
It should be noted that our analysis in this chapter is on the general aspects of the doctrine of 
forum non convenfens. While there are divergences that can be identified in relation to the 
application of the doctrine to specific circumstances such as where there are parallel or 
related proceedings abroad or where the dispute in question involves a non-exclusive 
jurisdiction clause, it is simply not possible to explore these situations within the space 
constraints of this thesis. 
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2. EXAMINING THE VARIOUS DIVERGENCES AND CONVERGENCES IN RELATION TO 
THE DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS 
2.1 THE OVERALL PICTURE 
Before we begin our comparative study, it is important that we first provide for a general 
historical account of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in our selected jurisdictions so as 
to set the scene for our subsequent discussion. 
Although the doctrine of forum non conveniens is well entrenched in Scottish, and American 
law, 2 its adoption under the English common law was a relatively modern development. 
Before 1974, a stay of proceedings was seldom granted in England due to the application of 
the principles provided for by Scott LJ in St Pierre v South American Stores Ltd3 that: 
"[i]n order to justify a stay, two conditions must be satisfied... a) the 
defendant must satisfy the court that the continuance of the action would 
work an injustice because it would be oppressive or vexatious to him or 
would be an abuse of the process of the court in some other way; and (b) 
the stay must not cause an injustice to the plaintiff. "4 
With the emphasis of this test on oppression and vexation, it is clear that forum non 
conveniens was not part of the English common law then. Similarly, this was the position in 
Australia, 5 Canada6 and Singapore. 7 In other words, these jurisdictions were in conformity 
with the English common law at this point in time. 
After 1974, in a number of English cases8 culminating in the landmark case of Spiliada 
Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd, 9 there was a gradual shift in the English common law 
1 See for example, Longworth v Hope (1865) 3M 1049. 2 See for example, Gulf Oil Corp v Gilbert 330 US 501 (1946). 3 [1936] 1 KB 382. 
4 ibid, at 398. 
s See for example, Maritime Insurance Co Ltd v Geelong Harbour Trust Commrs (1908) 6 CLR 194. 
See for example, Empire Universal Films Ltd v Rank [1948] OR 235. 7 See for example, Sea Breeze Navigation Co SA v The Hsing An [1972 
- 
1974] 1 SLR 532. 
8 The Atlantic Star [ 1974] AC 436, MacShannon v Rockware Glass Ltd [1978] AC 795, The Abidin Daver [ 1984] AC 398. 
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towards the adoption of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. These cases inevitably "set off 
a chain reaction"10 in our selected jurisdictions as their initial uniformity with the St Pierre 
approach became divergences from the Spillada test. This was because the lower courts of 
these jurisdictions were still bound by their superior courts' adoption of the St Pierre 
approach. Despite this legal barrier, lower courts in these jurisdictions were quick to indicate 
their support of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in this context. " The scene was thus 
set for the penultimate courts in these countries to address the question of whether there 
should be an endorsement of the English common law doctrine of forum non conveniens. 
In particular, the Supreme Court of Canada72 and the Singapore Court of Appeal13 responded 
by adopting the English common law doctrine of forum non conveniens which inquires as to 
whether there is a clearly more appropriate forum elsewhere in comparison to the local forum. 
Having said that, it is important to note that not all aspects of the English common law 
doctrine were adopted by these courts as there are still differences in the manner in which the 
Spiliada test is applied in Canada and Singapore. On the other hand, in Oceanic Sun Line 
Special Shipping Co Inc V Fay14 and Voth v Manildra Flour Mill Pty, 15 the High Court of 
Australia provided for a departure from the Spiliada test as well as the St Pierre approach by 
adopting a "clearly inappropriate forum"16 test. 
In light of the above overview of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in our selected 
jurisdictions, it should be clear that the break up of this area of Commonwealth private 
international law has taken place primarily in reaction to the introduction of that doctrine in the 
English case of Spiliada. Accordingly, the following discussion of our analytical points of 
comparison will be undertaken with specific reference to this situation. 
9 [1987] AC 460. 
10 North, Fawcett, Cheshire and North's Private International Law (London: Butterworths) (13ih ed., 1999), at 335. 
'For Australia, see for example, Ranger Uranium Mines Pty Lid v BTR Trading (Qld) Pty Ltd (1985) 34 NTR 1, In the 
Marriage of Takach (1980) 47 FLR 441, The Courageous Coloctronis [1979] WAR 19. For Canada, see for example, Skagway 
Terminal Co v The Daphne (1987) 42 DLR (4'") 200, United Products Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1988] 5 WWR 181, 
Paterson v Hamilton (1991)115 AR 73. For Singapore, see for example The Vishva Apurva [1992] 2 SLR 175. 12 Amchem Products Inc v Workers Compensation Board [ 199311 SCR 897. 13 Brinkerhoff Maritime Drilling Corporation v PTAirfast Services Indonesia [1992] 2 SLR 776. 
'4 (1988) 165 CLR 197. 
's (1990)17l CLR 538. 
16 ibid, at 556. 
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2.2 STRUCTURE OF THE TESTS 
Even though the doctrine of forum non conveniens is at its roots a discretionary approach in 
that it is up to the judiciary to determine whether there is another more appropriate forum 
elsewhere to resolve the dispute in question or whether the local forum itself is inappropriate, 
a systematic framework can be imposed upon it so as to structure that discretion. However, 
as will be seen below, not all our selected jurisdictions have opted for that approach. 
English common law and Singapore 
As was laid down by the House of Lords in Spiliada, the basic principle behind the English 
common law doctrine of forum non conveniens is that a stay will be granted "where the court 
is satisfied that there is some other available forum, having competent jurisdiction, which is 
the appropriate forum for the trial of the action, i. e. in which the case may be tried more 
suitably for the interests of all the parties and the ends of justice. "" It is however important to 
note that the above principle is not the specific formulation of forum non conveniens that is 
applied by the English courts. Instead, Lord Goff has held in Spiliada that the test is a two- 
stage process. 
1. First, the defendant must show that "there is another available forum which is clearly 
or distinctly more appropriate than the English forum. "18 To ascertain the existence of 
such a forum, the courts will examine the various factors which connect the dispute 
with England and other jurisdictions. These include "factors affecting convenience or 
expense"19 and other factors such as the choice of law for the dispute in question or 
the residence of the parties. 
2. Secondly, once this requirement is satisfied, the court will normally grant a stay 
unless the claimant can establish that there are "circumstances by reason of which 
17 Spiliada, supra, n. 9, at 476. 
18 ibid, at 477. 
"ibid. at478. 
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justice requires that a stay should nevertheless not be granted 
. 
-20 For this inquiry, the 
court will take into account "all the circumstances of the case. n21 
On this particular point of comparison, the Singapore Court of Appeal has endorsed the two- 
stage structure of the Spiliada test. 22 
Canada and Australia 
In Amchem Products Inc v British Columbia (Worker's Compensation Board), 23 the Supreme 
Court of Canada adopted the basic approach in Spillada: to ascertain the "existence of some 
other forum more convenient and appropriate for the pursuit of the action and for securing the 
ends of justice. n24 However, this endorsement was not extended to the structure of the 
Spiliada test itself. In particular, Sopinka J held that there is: 
"no reason in principle why the loss of juridical advantage should be 
treated as a separate and distinct condition rather than being weighed with 
the other factors which are considered in identifying the appropriate 
forum. "25 
There is therefore no need for the "existence of two conditions. "26 This led Sopinka J to 
provide for a one-stage test which places the onus on the defendant to show that there is a 
"more appropriate jurisdiction based on the relevant factors. "27 Under this approach, both 
connecting factors as well as juridical advantages available to the parties will be examined 
together in determining whether a stay of proceedings should be granted. 
20 ibid. 
21 ibid. 
22 Brinkerhoff Maritime Drilling Corp v PTAirfast Services Indonesia supra, n. 13, Eng Liat Kiang v Eng Bak Hern [ 1995] 3 
SLR 97, Oriental Insurance Co Ltd v Bhavani Stores Pte Ltd [1998] SLR 253, PT Hutan Domas Raya v Yue Ku Enterprises 
(Holdings) Ltd [2001 ] SLR 49. 
23 (199311 SCR 897. 
24 ibid, at [36]. 
u ibid, at [37]. 26 ibid. 
27 ibid, at [38]. 
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One preliminary point to make here is that Sopinka J may have misinterpreted the second 
stage of the Spiliada test. In particular, the loss of juridical advantage is not treated as a 
separate and distinct condition under the English common law. Instead, the focus of the 
second limb of the Spiliada test is on the justice of the situation: whether justice requires that 
a stay should not be granted. Admittedly, legitimate juridical advantages to the claimant may 
be relevant to the application of this test but that would only be so in situations where 
substantial justice is not done in the alternative forum. 
As was mentioned above, the High Court of Australia has opted for a divergence from the 
basic principles underlying the English common law doctrine of forum non conveniens by 
emphasising the appropriateness of the local forum. In relation to the structure of their test, 
the High Court has held that it is a one-stage process in that the onus is on the defendant to 
show that the Australian court is clearly inappropriate for the resolution of the dispute and that 
"connecting factors"28 as well as the "legitimate personal or juridical advantage[s]n29 available 
to the parties are relevant factors in the application of this test. 
We now go on to examine the precise nature of the Canadian and Australian divergences 
from the two-stage Spiliada structure by examining the similarities and differences between 
the two frameworks. 
1. Under the English common law scheme, there is a clear divide between factors 
examined at the first and second stage of the process. Under the first limb of the 
SpUlada test, the courts will look at connecting factors as opposed to the second 
stage of the test where the courts will consider all the circumstances of the case. As 
Lord Goff has commented in the case of De Dampierre v De Dampierre, 3° there are 
"factors which cannot evenly be weighed "31 as "one class of factors"32 may be 
relevant as "connecting the dispute with a particular forumn33 whereas "another class 
2 Voth, supra, n 15, at 565. 
29 ibid. 
30 [ 1988] AC 92. 
;1 ibid, at 109. 32 ibid. 
33 ibid. 
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of factorsn34 may point to injustice arising in the alternative forum. He thus saw it as 
necessary that the doctrine of forum non conveniens be structured so "as to 
differentiate between these two classes of factors, and to decide how each should be 
approached in relation to the other. "35 Accordingly, one difference between the 
Spiliada structure and the Amchem and Voth frameworks is that there is no such 
division of factors for the latter. Under these two flexible one-stage approaches, all 
relevant factors to the dispute will be balanced against one another. 
2. On the one hand, under the English common law structure, there is a shift of onus 
from the defendant to the plaintiff once the former has established that the alternative 
forum is clearly more appropriate than the English courts. The role of the claimant 
and the defendant with regards to the test is thus clearly delineated in that the 
defendant has to rely on connecting factors to establish a clearly more appropriate 
forum whereas the claimant has to depend on considerations of justice to persuade 
the courts not to grant the stay. On the other hand, there is no such clarification of the 
litigants' role in establishing forum non conveniens under the Australian and 
Canadian structures. 
3. Although connecting factors often constitute the most important consideration in the 
court's discretion to stay proceedings in both Australia and Canada, the structure of 
their one stage test does not inform us as to whether and when other considerations 
will be decisive. In contrast, the two-stage Spiliada test is explicit about this point. 
Even though there might be a preponderance of connecting factors pointing towards 
an alternative forum, if there were exceptional circumstances where justice would not 
be served, a stay would be refused. 
It is therefore clear from the above that there is a difference in views between the English 
common law and the Australian/Canadian position as to how the flexibility inherent in a 
doctrine of forum non conveniens should be structured. The Canadian courts prefer a flexible 
34 ibid. 
33 ibid. 
27 
framework for their doctrine of forum non conveniens where they simply ask the question: is 
there a more appropriate forum elsewhere? The relevant question for the Australian approach 
is of course: whether the Australian forum is clearly inappropriate? In contrast, one can 
observe that the Spiliada framework provides for a more methodical approach with different 
factors relevant at different stages of the inquiry and the role of the parties in persuading the 
courts to grant or refuse a stay of proceedings clearly defined under each stage of the test. 
2.3 FORMULATION OF THE TESTS 
In granting a stay of proceedings, there are many ways to determine whether the local forum 
or another alternative forum is appropriate for the resolution of the dispute in question. One 
could inquire as to whether there is a clearly more appropriate forum elsewhere in 
comparison to the local forum or one could limit the test to whether the local forum itself is 
clearly inappropriate. These approaches could also be combined in that both would have to 
be established for the courts to decline jurisdiction. 36 
Generally, a stay of proceedings would be granted by the judiciaries in England, Canada and 
Singapore if there were a clearly more appropriate forum elsewhere. In contrast, the High 
Court of Australia has held that the Australian test is whether the local court is clearly 
inappropriate for the determination of the dispute. 
To ascertain the nature of the Australian divergence on this point of comparison, it is 
necessary that we first determine what the differences between the two approaches are. 
1. First, in order to obtain a stay under the 'clearly more appropriate forum' test, the 
defendant must show that there is an alternative forum elsewhere which is competent 
to hear the plaintiffs suit since the emphasis of this approach is on the 
appropriateness of that foreign forum. As the Voth test focuses only on the 
appropriateness of the Australian forum, members of the High Court of Australia have 
36 Article 22, Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. (October 
1999). 
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admitted that "circumstances could well exist in which the local court was a clearly 
inappropriate one notwithstanding that there was no other tribunal which was 
competent to entertain the particular proceedings. "37 
That being said, there have been cases where Australian lower courts have held that 
the defendant must "identify some appropriate foreign tribunal to whose jurisdiction 
the defendant is amenable and which would entertain the particular proceedings at 
the suit of the plaintiff"38 even though this would go against the statements of the High 
Court in Voth. According to these decisions, if this condition were not satisfied, there 
would be no need to ask whether the Australian forum in question were clearly 
inappropriate 39 
2. Secondly, under the Voth approach, a stay might be refused even if "an available 
foreign tribunal were the natural or more appropriate forum. "4° So long as the local 
court is not clearly inappropriate, it does not matter that there is a clearly more 
appropriate forum elsewhere, the Australian courts will not grant a stay of 
proceedings. 41 The High Court of Australia has commented that this situation is 
probably rare especially since the "considerations relating to the suitability of the 
alternative forum are relevant to the examination of the appropriateness or 
inappropriateness of the selected forum "42 In other words, the more appropriate the 
foreign forum is, the more likely the local forum will be inappropriate. 43 Conversely, 
the inappropriateness of the local forum is not the focus of the Spiliada inquiry and it 
is thus insufficient to convince the English courts to decline jurisdiction. There must 
be another clearly more appropriate forum elsewhere. 
" Voth, supra, n. 15, at 558. 38 Schmidt V Won [ 1998] 3 VR 435. 39 See also, Conagra International Fertiliser GY Lief Investment Pry Ltd (1997) 141 FLR 1245. 
40 Voth, supra, n. 15, at 558. 41 See for example, WFM Motors Pty Ltd v Maydwel (Unreported, New South Wales Supreme Court of New South Wales 
Equity Division, 23 April 1992) where the finding that the Hong Kong courts would be a "highly suitable forum for the 
disposition of the disputes between these parties" was not enough to amount to a conclusion that the New South Wales court was 
clearly inappropriate. 
uVoth, supra, n. 15, at 558. 43 See for example, Amery v Coopers & Lybrand Actuarial Services Pry Ltd (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, 19 
February 1999) where "there are so many factors connecting this litigation with Singapore by comparison with those connecting 
the litigation with Victoria that Victoria is clearly an inappropriate forum. " 
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3. Thirdly and most importantly, the principles behind the Australian approach are that of 
oppression and vexation; concepts which have been abandoned by the English, 
Singaporean and Canadian courts in the formulation of their forum non conveniens 
principles. To elaborate, the Voth test is effectively an endorsement of the judgment 
of Deane J in the earlier High Court of Australia case of Oceanic Sun where he held 
that a stay would be granted if the defendant could establish that the local Australian 
forum was so inappropriate for the resolution of the dispute in question that "their 
continuation would be oppressive and vexatious "4° It is important to note that this is 
not the old English common law St Pierre test. Instead, it is based on the approach in 
The Atlantic Star, 45 the English case that commenced the relaxation of the St Pierre 
approach with a liberal definition of oppression and vexation. In particular, Deane J 
held that "'oppressive' should, in this context, be understood as meaning seriously 
and unfairly burdensome, prejudicial or damaging while vexatious should be 
understood as meaning productive of serious and unjustified trouble and 
harassment. "46 
From the above analysis, it is clear that the High Court of Australia does acknowledge most of 
these differences between the 'clearly inappropriate forum' test and the 'clearly more 
appropriate forum' test but is careful to limit their impact by stating that: 
"[t]he 'clearly inappropriate forum' test is similar to and, for that reason, is 
likely to yield the same result as the 'more appropriate forum' test in the 
majority of cases. The difference between the two tests will be of critical 
significance only in those cases... probably rare. "a7 
In other words, even though they do concede that in terms of the formulation of the test itself, 
there is an Australian divergence from the English common law position, they are of the view 
that these differences are unlikely to occur. However, this conclusion does not appear to be 
M Oceanic Sun, supra, n. 14, at 248. 45 [1974] AC 436. 
46 Oceanic Sun, supra, n. 14, at 247. 47 Voth, supra, n. 15, at 558. 
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supported in subsequent Australian cases. As will be seen below, the nature of the Voth test 
especially its utilisation of the language of oppression and vexation has had a significant 
impact on the range of factors taken into consideration in the application of that test. 
2.4 SITUATIONS TO WHICH THE TESTS ARE APPLICABLE 
Running parallel to forum non conveniens is the doctrine of forum conveniens that a court 
would take jurisdiction over a particular dispute if "the local forum [were] the appropriate 
forum (or an appropriate forum) for trial or that the forum abroad [were] inappropriate. . 48 From 
this definition, one can observe that the former is a "negative doctrine concerned with 
declining jurisdiction"49 whereas the latter is "positive"50 as it has to do with the assumption of 
jurisdiction. Despite these differences, the nature of the two doctrines is similar in that both 
examine the suitability of forums with reference to connecting factors, juridical advantages 
and considerations of justice. In addition, it should also be noted that even after jurisdiction 
has been assumed by the courts under forum conveniens, it is still possible for them to 
decline it under their forum non conveniens tests. However, this will seldom arise as a matter 
of practicality. 
Traditionally, the doctrine of forum non conveniens is applicable where jurisdiction is taken as 
of right: where a claim form can be served on a defendant present within the local forum or 
where a defendant has submitted to the jurisdiction of the local court. In contrast, the doctrine 
of forum conveniens is used to determine whether service of a claim form out of jurisdiction 
can be made. This distinction is still preserved in Englands' and Singapore. 2 However, in 
relation to Australia and Canada, it has been eroded as the courts in these jurisdictions have 
extended the use of their doctrine of forum non conveniens to a specific category of service 
ex juris cases. 
to Fawcett, General Report, in Fawcett (ed), Declining Jurisdiction in Private International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press) (1995), 1-70, at 6. 49 ibid. 
50 ibid. 
11 Rule 6.20, Civil Procedure Rules. (England). 
32 Order 11, Rules of Court. (Singapore). 
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To elaborate, there has been a shift in Australia and Canada towards the removal of judicial 
permission as a prerequisite to the service of process out of jurisdiction. This is in contrast to 
England and Singapore where no such occurrence has taken place. Take for instance, Part 
10 of the New South Wales Supreme Court Rules 1970. There is no need to obtain leave 
from the courts prior to the service of originating process on a defendant not present in 
Australia. Instead, it is up to the defendant pursuant to the requirement in Part 10, rule 6A(2) 
of the Supreme Court Rules (NSW) to apply for the setting aside of the service on the ground 
that "the service of the originating process is not authorised by these rules"53 or more 
importantly, for the purposes of our discussion that the New South Wales Court "is an 
inappropriate forum for the trial of the proceedings. "54 It is interesting to note that even though 
the Supreme Court Rules (NSW) provided for an 'inappropriate forum' test, a "less 
emphatic"55 expression in comparison to a 'clearly inappropriate forum, ' the High Court of 
Australia has pointed out in Renault v Zhang56 that the "same concepts and considerations 
necessarily inform the test of 'inappropriate forum' in par (b) of Pt 10, r6A(2) as inform the 
clearly inappropriate forum test adopted in Voth"5' and that "they inform it in the same way. "58 
A Canadian example is provided by Rule 17.06 of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure which 
allows for service ex juris without leave from the Ontario courts. Under this rule, it is up to the 
party who has been served with an originating process to apply for an order staying the 
proceedings. 59 In these circumstances, the doctrine of forum non conveniens is used to 
decline jurisdiction as jurisdiction has already been taken by the courts. 
Having said that, it is important to note that not all provinces, states and territories in Australia 
and Canada have dispensed with the requirement for prior leave in relation to service ex 
juris. 60 For this category of cases, the doctrine of forum conveniens is applicable. In other 
words, the creation of these two categories of service out of jurisdiction cases in Australia 
33 Part 10, Rule 6A(2Xa), Supreme Court Rules (NSW). 
54 Part 10, Rule 6A(2Xb), ibid. 
ss Renault v Zhang (2002) 187 ALR 1, at [24]. 
56 ibid. 
37 ibid, at [25]. 
se ibid. 
39 Rule 17.06(1), Rules of Civil Procedure. (Ontario). 
60 For Australia, leave is still required for service out of Western Australia and the Australian Capital Territory. For Canada, 
leave is still required for service out of Alberta and Newfoundland. 
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and Canada has resulted in an expansion of the situations to which forum non conveniens is 
relevant to in these two jurisdictions. Not only is forum non conveniens applicable to 
jurisdiction taken as of right in these countries, it has also been extended to the situation 
where service out of jurisdiction can be made without prior permission from the courts. This is 
of course in divergence from the position in England and Singapore. 
2.5 FACTORS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT UNDER THE TESTS 
A number of factors are taken into consideration by our selected Commonwealth judiciaries in 
the application of their individual doctrine of forum non conveniens. In particular, they are: 
factors which connect the dispute to the countries in question, legitimate juridical advantages 
available to the parties in the relevant forums, considerations of justice and public interest 
factors. 
2.5.1 Connecting factors 
All the courts in our selected jurisdictions will consider in the application of their doctrine of 
forum non conveniens, connecting factors such as the residence of the parties, the location of 
the evidence and witnesses or the law applicable to the dispute in question. However, this 
does not mean that these factors are regarded in the same manner by these judiciaries. Most 
notably, there are differences between the Australian courts and the rest of our selected 
judiciaries as to how connecting factors are to be treated within their doctrine of forum non 
conveniens. 
In particular, as the Voth test inquires as to whether the Australian forum in question is clearly 
inappropriate, the High Court of Australia has held that the test "focuses on the advantages 
and disadvantages arising from a continuation of the proceedings in the selected forum rather 
than on the need to make a comparative judgment between the two forums. "s' What this 
means is that the Australian courts in examining the connecting factors relevant to the dispute 
61 Voth, supra, n. 15, at 558. 
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are compelled into "focusing upon the connections between the action and the Australian 
forum"62 instead of examining forum non conveniens "from a truly transnational perspective 
and comparing the entitlements of both the Australian and foreign forums to try the action. "63 
The latter is of course the position under the 'clearly more appropriate forum' test. Indeed, it 
was held by the majority Justices in Renault v Zhang that the application of the Voth test "was 
not a question of striking a balance between competing considerations. "64 Instead, "it was the 
task of the [defendants] to demonstrate that a trial in the [local forum] would be productive of 
injustice. "65 
It is important to note that the operative word here is 'focusing. ' The High Court is not stating 
that the inquiry with regards to connecting factors is limited to those with Australia. Obviously, 
an Australian court "cannot merely consider the strength of the factors connecting the 
proceedings to Australia"66 as these factors are but the converse of those which link the 
proceedings to another forum. In short, the Australian courts will examine the same range of 
connecting factors as the English, Canadian or Singapore judiciaries. The difference is that 
the Australian courts will pay much more attention to connecting factors that establish that the 
Australian forum is clearly inappropriate. 
2.5.2 Legitimate juridical advantages to the parties 
English common law and Singapore 
In relation to legitimate juridical advantages, Lord Goff has held that the mere fact that the 
plaintiff has such an advantage in proceedings in England cannot be decisive in relation to the 
second stage of the Spflfada test. Hence, an application for a stay of proceedings cannot be 
rejected based on the existence of this factor alone. This is because "an advantage to the 
plaintiff will ordinarily give rise to a comparable disadvantage to the defendant; and simply to 
62 Garnett, Stay of Proceedings in Australia: A 'Clearly Inappropriate' Test? (1999) 23 Melbourne University Law Review 30, at 
36. 
63 ibid. 
64 Renault, supra, n. 55, at [78]. 65 ibid. 
66 Brereton, Forum Non Conveniens in Australia: A Case Note on Voth v Manildra Flour Mills (1991) 40 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 895, at 898. 
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give the plaintiff his advantage at the expense of the defendant. n67 Lord Goff also stated in the 
later case of Connelly v RTZ Corporation68 that the general principle with regards to such 
advantages is that if a more appropriate forum elsewhere had been located, the claimant 
would have to "take that forum as he finds it, even if it is in certain respects less 
advantageous to him than the English forum "69 He would have to "accept lower damages 
, 
"70 
a less generous system of discovery as compared to the English model, the unavailability of 
financial assistance abroad, a shorter limitation period or different systems of court procedure. 
Ultimately, the laws of other jurisdictions "may display many features which distinguish"71 
themselves from English law such that English lawyers may find them "less advantageous to 
the plaintiff"72 but that in itself is not "enough to refuse a stay. "73 
This is also the position for Singapore as in Oriental Insurance Co Ltd v Bhavani Stores Pte 
Ltd, 74 Yong Pung How CJ stated that after the first stage of the Spiliada test is satisfied, the 
"mere fact that the plaintiff has 
... 
a legitimate advantage for proceeding in Singapore is not 
decisive and the interests of all the parties and the ends of justice must be taken into 
consideration. "75 
Canada 
In Amchem, as was mentioned above, Sopinka J held that juridical advantages are not to be 
highlighted as a separate condition. Instead, they are to be examined with the other factors 
which are considered in identifying the appropriate forum. However, this does not mean that 
no significant weight can ever be attached to such factors. In particular, Sopinka J added that: 
"[t]he weight to be given to juridical advantages is very much a function of 
the parties' connection to the particular jurisdiction in question. If a party 
67 Spiliada, supra, n. 9, at 482. 
"[1998) AC 854. 
69 ibid, at 872. 
70 ibid. 
71 ibid. 
'2 ibid. 
73 ibid. 
74 (1998] SLR 253. 
75 ibid, at [11). 
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seeks out a jurisdiction simply to gain a juridical advantage rather than by 
reason of a real and substantial connection of the case to the jurisdiction, 
that is ordinarily condemned as forum shopping. On the other hand, a party 
whose case has a real and substantial connection with a forum has a 
legitimate claim to the advantages that that forum provides. "76 
Some Canadian provincial courts have interpreted the above statements in Amchem as 
providing that "any loss to the plaintiffs of a juridical advantage is just one of the many factors 
to be weighed"77 in the forum non conveniens inquiry and that "if more weight were given to 
the loss of the juridical advantage than to other factors, the forum [non] conveniens doctrine 
would become virtually useless since plaintiffs will ordinarily select that forum which offers 
them the most favourable advantage. "78 
Other Canadian lower courts have pointed out that Sopinka J did not require the Canadian 
courts to establish that the dispute has the most real and substantial connection to the 
jurisdiction in question. All that is required is that the case has a real and substantial 
connection with a forum. The latter position was eventually confirmed by the Supreme Court 
of Canada case of Holt Cargo Systems Inc v ABC Containerline N V79 On the facts of the 
case itself, even though the courts acknowledged that the "dispute is but weakly connected to 
Canada, n80 the fact that the claimant's in rem rights in Canada "could [not] subsist in one form 
or another under Belgian bankruptcy laws "81 was still regarded as a "distinct legal 
advantage"82 to the claimant in "having [his] claim determined by the Federal Court of 
Canada. "83 This was because the plaintiff could not be regarded as forum shopping for his 
claim arose "in the normal course of litigation"TM by the arrest of the Belgium ship in Canadian 
territorial waters and accordingly, his "claim had a 'real and substantial connection' with 
76 Amchem, supra, n. 23, at [37]. 
n Cortese (Next Friend of) v. Nowsco Well Service Ltd. (1999) 234 AR 142, at [21]. See also, Ioannides v. Calvalley Petroleum 
Inc 2006 CarswellOnt 4581, at [51]. 7e Barclays Bank plc v Inc Inc (1999) 242 AR 18, at [58]. See also, Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Co v Lindblom (1999) 234 AR 
333, Hodnett v Taylor Manufacturing Industries Inc (2002) 22 CPC (5'h) 360, Marchand (Guardian ad litern o) v. Alberta Motor 
Assn Insurance Co. (1994) 71 WAC 178, Nissho Iwai Co v Shanghai Ocean Shipping Co(2000) 185 FTR 314. 
79 [2001] 3 SCR 907. 
80 ibid, at [93]. My italics. 8' ibid, at [95]. 82 ibid. at [17]. 87 ibid. 
84 ibid. 
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Canadian maritime law. "85 In other words, if the courts did not regard the litigant as forum 
shopping, a real and substantial connection would be established. One must point out that the 
reasoning of the courts here appears to be circular as a person would normally be regarded 
as forum shopping if there were no real and substantial connection between the subject 
matter of the dispute and the jurisdiction itself. 
Generally, the `real and substantial connection' test has been satisfied in cases where 
claimants choose to litigate in the defendant's home jurisdiction as the courts have held that 
the defendant cannot contend that he is being forced to litigate in "a distant forum with which 
he or she has no connection. "86 In such circumstances, the claimant is "entitled to the juridical 
advantages that are associated with that forum"87 and this is so even if he is "foreign [and] 
has no special claim to the juridical advantages of [that forum]. "88 A real and substantial 
connection has also been found in cases where the plaintiff "pursues his claim in the forum 
where the defendants have assets. "89 
The real and substantial connection test relating to juridical advantages would also be 
satisfied if jurisdiction simpliciter were established. What is jurisdiction simpliciter? For the 
service of a claim form out of a Canadian province where leave from the court is not required, 
it has been held that jurisdiction simpliciter i. e. a real and substantial connection between the 
litigant/dispute and the Canadian forum in question must be established before jurisdiction 
can be taken by the Canadian courts. 90 In particular, some Canadian provincial courts have 
stated that once this test is satisfied, significant weight would be accorded to the fact that the 
claimant would be deprived of juridical advantages available to him in the Canadian forum in 
question if a stay of proceedings were granted. For example, in Elawar v Federation des 
Clubs de Motoneigistes du Quebec Inc, 91 Timms J of the Ontario Supreme Court opined that 
Sopinka J "confirms the existence of the 'real and substantial connection' test as fundamental 
as ibid. 
86 RPCInc v Fournell (2003) 33 CPC (5'")174, at [391. See also, Catch v Ramirez (2000) 48 OR (3d) 515, Chuang v Schafgen 
2001 WL446959. 
87 RPCInc, ibid, at [39]. Be Jan Poulsen & Co v Seaboard Shipping Co (1995) 10 BCLR (2d) 175, at [35]. 89 See for example, Asaf Husain Jafferey v Sohai Hydrie 2004 SKQB 111, at [ 15]. 9p See for example, Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savoye [1990) 3 SCR 1077, Hunt v. T& Nplc [ 1993) 4 SCR 289, Muscutt v Courcelles (2002) 60 OR (3d) 20. 
91 (2001) 57 OR (3d). 
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to jurisdiction and to the question of juridical advantages"92 and that "[w]ithout one, the other 
falls. 43 Accordingly, as jurisdiction simpliciter has not been established by the claimant, he 
considers that the "overall juridical advantage to the plaintiff to a suit in Ontario [is a] 
somewhat mixed factor. "94 Similarly, in Aimtronics Corp v Fattouche, 95 the British Columbian 
courts held that since jurisdiction simpliciter has been shown by the claimant; that there is a 
"real and substantial connection between the subject matter of both actions and British 
Columbia, "96 the plaintiff has a "legitimate claim to the advantages British Columbia 
provides. j, 97 
There is some support for this position in the Supreme Court of Canada case of Unifund 
Assurance Co v Insurance Corp of British Columbia98 where Bastarache J held that as the 
respondent had a real and substantial connection to Ontario thus satisfying the jurisdiction 
simpliciter requirements, it had "a legitimate claim to, and it is reasonable to expect that it will, 
take advantage of the inter-insurer indemnification scheme which Ontario provides. "99 It is 
important to note that Bastarache J was in dissent in Unifund in that the majority Justices 
were of the view that there was no real and substantial connection between the dispute and 
Ontario. Accordingly, they did not address the issue of whether jurisdiction should be declined 
under the Canadian doctrine of forum non conveniens. Bastarache J however thought that 
there was a real and substantial connection thus leading to his analysis of juridical 
advantages in relation to the declining of jurisdiction. 
In short, the Canadian treatment of juridical advantages would clearly be a departure from the 
English common law position as the latter would not attach any importance to the existence of 
juridical advantages even if the party's action had a real and substantial connection to the 
jurisdiction in question. Instead, the focus of the Spiliada test is on the possible injustices that 
flow from the deprivation of such advantages. 
92 ibid, at [371. 93 ibid. 
94 ibid, at [40]. 
" (2002) 6 BCLR (0) 336. 
% ibid, at [44]. 97 ibid. 
98 (2003) 227 DLR (0) 402. 
"ibid, at [138]. 
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Australia 
The point made above in relation to connecting factors in the Australian context is relevant 
here as well as the High Court of Australia has held that the decision to grant a stay on Voth 
principles does not "turn upon an assessment of the comparative procedural or other claims 
of the foreign forum "'0° Instead, the focus is on the legitimate juridical advantages available 
to the claimant in Australia. However, when it came down to the actual application of the test 
to the facts of Voth itself, it is interesting to note that the procedural rules in Missouri and New 
South Wales were compared. For example, the High Court of Australia stated that "there is 
evidence that the rules as to the awarding of damages by way of interest are less 
advantageous to a plaintiff in Missouri than in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. a10' 
Again, this inconsistency can be explained away by the observation that the High Court did 
not wish to exclude all comparison of legitimate juridical advantages available to the parties in 
the different forums. They were simply providing for an emphasis on the advantages that 
establish that the Australian forum in question is clearly inappropriate. 
More importantly, for the purposes of this subsection, the High Court of Australia has held in 
Voth that "relevant connecting factors"102 and "legitimate and juridical"103 advantages would 
provide "valuable assistance"104 to the application of the 'clearly inappropriate forum' test. In 
addition, legitimate juridical advantages were considered to be of "diminished importance"105 
in relation to "competing connexions of the respective forums with the subject-matter of the 
proceedings. "106 Accordingly, the decision of the High Court of Australia here would appear to 
concur with the position under the English common law that mere legitimate juridical 
advantages available to one party in the local forum would not be sufficient to convince the 
courts to refuse a stay of proceedings. 
10° Voth, supra, n. 15, at 558. 101 ibid, at 571. 102 ibid. at 565. 
10" ibid. 
104 ibid. 
14n ibid, at 571. 106 ibid. 
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However, lower Australian courts have adopted "a liberal viewn107 of the role of legitimate 
juridical advantages in the application of the Voth test by attaching significant weight to this 
factor in a number of cases. Stays of proceedings have thus been refused on the grounds 
that the claimant would be deprived of juridical advantages available to him in the Australian 
forum in question if the action were to proceed in an alternative forum. 108 Take for example, 
Diethelm and Co Ltd v Bradley. 109 The fact that "damages recoverable in Thai courts by the 
plaintiff against the defendant... may be far less than those available"10 in the Australian 
courts was regarded as a juridical advantage to the claimant which in turn contributed to the 
Supreme Court of New South Wales' decision not to grant a stay of proceedings. In Nicholas 
Pertsch v PT John Holland Constructions Indonesia, "' even though both claimant and 
defendant to the dispute had their own juridical advantages available to them in the forums 
that they wished to sue in, it was held that the claimant's juridical advantages in Queensland, 
the local forum, would be accorded more weight as it was his right to invoke the jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court of Queensland. 112 This is unsurprising as the nature of the Voth test does 
compel the Australian courts to focus on factors that indicate whether the Australian forum in 
question is clearly inappropriate for the dispute and the fact that the claimant has certain 
juridical advantages in that Australian court is a strong indicator towards the appropriateness 
of that forum. 
In all, it is clear that the weight attached to juridical advantages under the Australian doctrine 
of forum non conveniens is greater than that in relation to the English common law doctrine. 
The Australian treatment of juridical advantages is also different from the Canadian position 
due to the requirement that there must be a real and substantial connection between the 
dispute and the jurisdiction in question before juridical advantages available to the litigant in 
that forum can be considered under the Amchem test. 
107 Garnett, supra, n. 62, at 46. 108 See for example, CE Heath Underwriting & Insurance (Australia) Pry Ltd. v Barden (Unreported, Supreme Court of New 
South Wales, Rolfe J, 19 October 1994), In the Marriage of Gilmore (1993) 16 Fam LR 285, Astra AB v Delta West Pty Ltd. (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria Industrial Property Jurisdiction, 5 December 1994), Bannerton Holdings Pty Ltd v 
Sydbank Soenderjlland (Unreported, Federal Court of Australia, 9 February 1996), Talacho v Talacho (Unreported, Supreme 
Court of Victoria 26 March 1999). 
'" (Unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales, 6 Feb 1995). 110 Ibid. 
:: ' [2001] QSC 127. 
1ý= ibid, at [55]. 
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2.5.3 Considerations of justice 
English common law and Singapore 
In relation to the second limb of the Spiliada test, 113 even though Lord Goff made no attempt 
to define 'justice' itself, he did refer to Lord Diplock's comments on the concept in The Abidin 
Daver114 that: 
"[t]he possibility cannot be excluded that there are still some countries in 
whose courts there is a risk that justice will not be obtained by a foreign 
litigant in particular kinds of suits whether for ideological or political 
reasons, or because of inexperience or inefficiency of the judiciary or 
excessive delay in the conduct of the business of the courts, or the 
unavailability of appropriate remedies. "15 
It has been commented that the "emphasis here is on the avoidance of bias, a basic level of 
judicial competence, and the court process not taking an unduly long time. "116 Provided there 
is cogent evidence for such allegations, the second stage of the Spiliada test would be 
satisfied by the claimant if he could establish that the foreign court did not "meet these basic 
criteria of natural justice. ""7 Similarly, the Singapore courts would take into account such 
considerations of natural justice under the second stage of the Spiliada test if there were 
evidence for such criticisms of the foreign court. 118 
In addition, Lord Goff has held that if the deprivation of legitimate juridical advantages 
available to the claimant in England resulted in substantial injustice, the English courts could 
refuse to grant a stay of proceedings. The application of this approach can be observed in the 
"3S pIIiada, supra, n. 9, at 478. 14 [ 1984] AC 398. 
15 ibid, at 411. 16 Beaumont, Great Britain, in Fawcett (ed) Declining Jurisdiction (Oxford: Clarendon Press) (1995), 207-233, at 211. 117 ibid. For a recent example, see Total E&P Soudan SA v Philippe Henri Edmonds, Andrew Stuart Groves White Nile Limited (2006] EWHC 1136 (Comm), at [27]. 118 See for example, Ang Ming Chuang v Singapore Airlines Ltd [2005] 1 SLR 409, at [67]. 
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cases of Connelly and Lubbe v Cape p/c119 where it was held that substantial justice would 
not be done if the unavailability of financial assistance to the claimant in the forum abroad 
meant that the case could not be tried at all. This approach has been endorsed by the 
Singapore Court of Appeal in Brinkerhoff Maritime Drilling Corporation v PT Airfast Services 
Indonesia120 as well. 
Canada 
As was mentioned above, when Sopinka J examined the second stage of the Spiliada test in 
Amchem, he held that it treated the loss of a juridical advantage as a separate condition. He 
did not appear to see this limb of the test as one which examines whether there are any 
exceptional reasons of justice which requires the local courts to hear the case. More was said 
on this issue by Binnie J in the later case of Holt Cargo where he held that the relevant 
circumstances to the identification of the natural forum included the "potential loss to the 
plaintiff of a juridical advantage sufficient to work an injustice"121 and that "any injustice to the 
plaintiff in having its action stayed must be weighed against any injustice to the defendant if 
the action is allowed to proceed. 022 However, it is interesting to note that on the facts of the 
case itself, he did not examine whether the deprivation of the juridical advantage available to 
the claimant in Canada would be unjust. Instead, he applied the approach adopted by 
Sopinka J in Amchem that such juridical advantages will be considered under the Amchem 
inquiry so long as there is a real and substantial connection between the dispute and the 
Canadian forum in question. Accordingly, one can observe that in such cases, there is no 
need to determine whether the deprivation of the juridical advantages in question will result in 
substantial injustice. 
As for considerations of natural justice, some Canadian provincial courts have taken into 
account such factors in the application of their forum non conveniens test. For example, a 
stay was refused in the Ontario case of Crown Resources Corp SA v. National Iranian Oil 
120 [2000] 2 Lloyd's Rep 383. 
[1992] 2 SLR 776, at 786 in relation to limitation periods. 121 Holt Cargo, supra, n. 79, at [91]. 
:u ibid. 
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Co123 on the grounds that the claimant would not "receive a fair hearing in an Iranian court 
. 
"124 
Australia 
It was held in Voth that the decision of whether a forum is clearly inappropriate does not 
require the formation of subjective views about either the merits of [the foreign] forum's legal 
system or the standards and impartiality of those who administer it025 by the Australian 
judiciary as they are not to sit in judgment "upon the ability or willingness of the courts of 
another country to accord justice to the plaintiff in the particular case. "126 Accordingly, this can 
be considered to "represent a clear departure"127 from the position in the rest of our selected 
jurisdictions. 
However, some lower Australian courts have not taken such a stance. In particular, they have 
held that a submission that the foreign court's procedure is inefficient or untimely must be 
"approached with considerable caution and in the absence of cogent evidence, Australian 
courts will not sit in judgment on the capacity or willingness of the courts of another country to 
provide justice to the plaintiff. 028 In other words, these Australian judiciaries were of the view 
that such factors could be considered under the Voth inquiry if there were strong evidence for 
such injustice. 
In relation to legitimate juridical advantages, as the Australian courts have attached significant 
weight to such factors in relation to the application of their doctrine of forum non conveniens, 
there is no need for them to rely on a substantial justice approach. 
2.5.4 Public interest factors 
123 2005 CarswellOnt 4383. 
124 ! bid, at [44]. See also, Semi Tech Corp v Enterprise Capita! Management Inc 1999 CarswellOnt 2296. US Voth, supra, n. 15, at 558. 116 ibid, at 559. 127 Brereton, supra, n. 66, at 898. 128 Seereederei Baco Liner GmbH v A! Aliyu (Unreported, Federal Court of Australia, New South Wales District Registry, 18 
May 2000. ) My italics. See also Nicholas Pertsch v PTJohn Holland Constructions Indonesia [2001 J QSC 127. 
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It can be observed that the matters we have dealt with in the above subsections are private 
interest factors as they are to do with convenience from the perspective of the litigants in 
question. It is clear from the U. S. case of Gulf Oil Corp v Gilbert129 that both private and public 
interest factors are considered in the American doctrine of forum non conveniens. The 
question which thus arises here is: to what extent can the courts of our selected jurisdictions 
in applying their doctrine of forum non conveniens take into account public interest factors 
such as "administrative difficulties from court congestion; local interest in having localized 
controversies decided at home; interest in applying familiar law; avoidance of unnecessary 
problems in conflict of laws or in the application of foreign law; unfairness of burdening 
citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty. a130 
English common law and Australia 
Under the Spiliada inquiry, there is no reference to public interest factors at any stage of the 
process. Even an examination of the underlying principles of the Spiliada doctrine is futile as 
they simply state that the location of the clearly more appropriate forum is to be made with 
regards to the interests of the parties and the ends of justice. Guidance comes instead from 
an earlier case, MacShannon v Rockware Glass Ltd. 131 In that case Lord Diplock stated that 
"the administration of justice within the United Kingdom should be conducted in such a way as 
to avoid any unnecessary diversion to the purposes of litigation, of time and efforts of 
witnesses and others which would otherwise be spent on activities that are more directly 
productive of national wealth or well being. "132 However, the rest of the Law Lords chose not 
to support his view. They did not consider that such "matters of general policy should play any 
part"133 in the exercise of their discretion to grant a stay of proceedings. Further confirmation 
came in Lubbe v Cape where Lord Bingham held that "public interest considerations not 
related to the private interests of the parties and the ends of justice have no bearing on the 
decision which the Court has to make. "'34 
'29 330 US 501 (1946). 
30 Fawcett, supra, n. 48, at 14. 
" [1978] AC 795. 
'32 ibid, at 813-814. ý" ibid, at 822 per Lord Salmon. 134 Lubbe, supra, n. 119, at 394. 
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However, it is essential that we recognise that public interest considerations do "operate 
under the surface in English law. "135 To illustrate, on "delays arising from the import of 
litigation, n136 it has been pointed out that the English courts have "never used the fact the 
courts are already crowded"137 as a reason for granting a stay "where the dispute is 
essentially foreign. "138 Instead, the public interest concern here is that such foreign litigation 
should instead be encouraged for its benefits to the English economy as an invisible export. 
This is in contrast to the "emphasis placed in the United States on the clogging of local courts 
by foreign litigants. "139 In short, in relation to the rules and principles expressly applied by the 
court, public interest factors do not form part of the Spiliada inquiry. It is only if we delved 
deeper into the hidden policy considerations behind the decisions of the English courts that 
we could infer the use of such factors. 
Similarly, in Australia, clear statements have been made by the Australian courts on the role 
of public interest considerations in relation to their doctrine of forum non conveniens. In 
Oceanic Sun, Deane J examined the private and public interest distinction as established by 
the Supreme Court of the United States in Gulf Oil Corp v Gilbert and concluded that matters 
of public interest are not to be taken into account by the Australian courts in declining 
jurisdiction. 140 It was also held in James Hardie Industries Pty Ltd v Grigor'41 that the fact that 
limited resources was available for the administration of justice in New South Wales would not 
be considered under the Australian forum non conveniens test. 142 
Canada 
"s Fawcett, supra, n. 48, at 15. 
. 36 Fawcett, Trial in England or Abroad: The Underlying Policy Considerations (1989) 9 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 205, at 
224. 
137 ibid. 
13* Fawcett, supra, n. 48, at 15. 
" ibid, at 16. 
'40 Oceanic Sun. supra, n. 14, at 250-251,253-254. 
: 4_ (1998)45 NS W LR 20. 
ibid, at 41. 
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In Holt Cargo, Binnie J held that public interest factors could be considered by the Canadian 
courts under the Amchem inquiry. Holt Cargo involved the question of "whether a maritime 
law proceeding by a US creditor against a Belgian ship in a Canadian court ought to have 
been stayed in deference to a Belgian court dealing with the subsequent bankruptcy of its 
Belgian ship-ownern143 and it was recognised by the Supreme Court of Canada that such 
international bankruptcies have a "public aspect, because it is in the public interest to facilitate 
the speedy resolution of the fallout from a financial collapse "144 Even though "Amchem was a 
purely private piece of litigation, 045 Binnie J held that this did not stop the courts from 
considering such factors when applying the Amchem test. In contrast, it is clear that the 
English courts do not consider such factors in the Spiliada inquiry, at least not explicitly. 
Singapore 
The position in Singapore is unclear as the Singapore Court of Appeal does not appear to 
have made any specific comments on the question of whether public interest factors can be 
taken into account under the Singapore doctrine of forum non conveniens. 
2.6 WEIGHT ATTACHED TO PARTICULAR FACTORS UNDER THE TESTS 
As the above analysis is on the legalistic and structural aspects of the respective doctrines of 
forum non conveniens in our selected jurisdictions, it is easy to forget that these principles 
are discretionary and that the court's decision to grant a stay of proceedings is very much 
dependent on how specific factors are viewed. Regardless of the differences between the 
structure and formulation of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in our selected 
jurisdictions, if the courts of these countries attached considerable significance to a foreign 
applicable law, it would be more likely than not that a stay of proceedings would be granted in 
all these jurisdictions. Conversely, if a particular factor were viewed differently by two 
Commonwealth courts that have provided for similar doctrines of forum non convenlens, a 
stay of proceedings might be granted in one jurisdiction but not in another. 
143 Holt Cargo, supra, n. 79, at [I]. 
"4 ibid, at [90]. 145 ibid. 
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Therefore, it is the purpose of this subsection to examine a number of factors commonly 
relied upon by the English, Singaporean, Canadian and Australian courts in the application of 
their forum non conveniens doctrine so as to establish that at this level of analysis, one can 
also observe divergences from the English common law position. They are as follows: choice 
of law (examined in 2.6.1 of this chapter); delays (2.6.2 of this chapter). 
2.6.1 Choice of law 
English common law, Singapore and Australia 
One factor taken into account under the first limb of the Spiliada test is the "law governing the 
relevant transaction 
. 
046 The importance to be attached to the question of governing law 
"varies greatly from case to case"147 and the English courts have generally indicated that it is 
very much dependent on the ease in which a court can apply another country's law. 
In particular, if the English courts had no difficulties applying a foreign law as the relevant 
legal issues were straightforward or that English law were similar to the foreign law on these 
issues, the fact that the applicable law was not English law would not be accorded much 
weight in determining whether a stay should be granted. 148 Unsurprisingly, the position would 
be the same if the choice of law were English and the foreign courts had no problems 
applying it for the reasons stated above. 149 On the other hand, if foreign judges had to apply 
legal concepts unfamiliar to them under an English choice of law, this might indicate to the 
English courts that that foreign jurisdiction might not be clearly more appropriate. This is 
because in such circumstances, 15° the English courts are of the view that "a court applies its 
own law more reliably than does a foreign court. "151 Conversely, "where a dispute involves 
146S 
147 supra, n. 
9, at 478. 
'48 Mercurypic v Communication Teesystems Ltd [ 1999] 2 All ER (Comm) 33, at 42. 
149 See for example, The Rothnie [1996] 2 Lloyd's Rep 206. 
19 See for example, Nima SARL v The Deves Insurance Public Co Ltd (The Prestrioka) [2003] 2 Lloyd's Rep 327. 
uo See for example, Charm Maritime Inc v Kyriakou and Mathias [ 1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep 433, Du Pont v Agnew [ 1987] 2 Lloyd's 
Rep 585. 
u' Collins (ed), Dicey, Morris and Collins on The Conflict of Laws (London: Sweet and Maxwell) (14th ed., 2006), at para. 12- 029. See for example, The Eteftherta [ 1970] P 94, at 105. 
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addressing complex questions of foreign law, this is a strong pointer towards the relevant 
foreign court as the appropriate forum. 052 
Likewise, this approach has been adopted by the Singapore courts in relation to both 
situations involving foreign law' 53 and Singapore law'54 as the applicable substantive law. 
Similarly, even though the formulation of the Voth approach is very much different from that 
of the Spiliada test, there are statements laid down by the High Court of Australia providing 
that the applicable substantive law is a "very significant factor in the exercise of the court's 
discretion n155 although "[a]n Australian court cannot be a clearly inappropriate forum merely 
by virtue of the circumstance that the choice of law rules which apply in the forum require its 
courts to apply foreign law as the lex causae. "156 From the lower Australian court cases, the 
importance of this factor appears to be dependent on the ease in which judges can apply the 
foreign law in question as well. 757 
Canada 
In reaction to the decision in Amchem, Canadian courts have laid down an array of factors to 
consider in the application of the Canadian doctrine of forum non conveniens. Unsurprisingly, 
the applicable substantive law to the dispute in question is always included in that list. 
However, it is important to note that not all provincial courts attach the same significance to 
this factor in determining whether another alternative forum is clearly more appropriate. 
152 Tryg Baltica International (UK) Ltd v Boston Compania De Seguros SA [2004] All ER (D) 439, at [42]. See also, 
Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka AS v Nomura International plc [2003] ILPr 320. 
's' See for example, The Hooghly Mills Co Ltd [ 1995] 1 SLR 773, Oriental Insurance Co Ltd [ 1998] 1 SLR 253, Lehman 
Brothers Special Financing Inc v Hartadi Angkosubroto [ 1999] 2 SLR 427, PTHutan Domas Raya [2001 ]2 SLR 49, Ang Ming Chuang v Singapore Airlines Ltd [2005] 1 SLR 409. 134 See for example, Asia-Pacific Ventures II Ltd v PT Intimutiara Gasinda [2002] 3 SLR 326. Iss Voth, supra. n. 15, at 566. 
'36 Renault, supra, n. 55, at [81]. 
'57 See for example, Adeang v The Nauru Phosphate Royalties Trust (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, 8 July 1992), 
Discovision Associates v Distronics Ltd (1997) 39 IPR 140, GNB Battery Technologies Ltd v Nichicon (Singapore) Pte Ltd (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, 23 June 1994), Nicholas Pertsch v PT John Holland Constructions Indonesia [2001 ] 
QSC 127, Aloysius Amwano v Nauru Phosphate Royalties Trust [2005] FCA 1804, In the Marriage of YN& C YChong (1991) 
15 Fam LR 629, Green v Australian Industrial Investment Ltd (1989) 90 ALR 500, The Al Aliyu [2000] FCA 656, Raveh v 
KPMG Legal (A Firm) [2001] WASC 288, African Minerals Ltd v Pan Palladium Ltd [2002] NSWSC 1150. 
48 
To illustrate, the applicable law is regarded by some lower Canadian courts as "just one 
factor to be considered along with all others in the determination of the (Amchem inquiryj. "158 
Even if the choice of law in question were that of a foreign jurisdiction, there was a dominant 
view in these cases that the Canadian courts would have no problems applying that law 
regardless of whether it was the law of another Canadian province'59 or that of a jurisdiction 
outside of Canada altogether. 180 
On the other hand, there are cases where Canadian courts have regarded the applicable 
substantive law as a particularly important factor "depending upon the circumstances. "161 
Most notably, in the application of the Amchem test in Shell Canada Ltd v C/BC Mellon Trust 
Co, 162 Fraser J endorsed the principle that it is preferable that the dispute should be tried in 
the country whose law governs the contract. He thus held that "the need to interpret and 
enforce Canadian law through a Canadian court is 
... 
the paramount factor to be 
considered"163 in a forum non conveniens inquiry. It has also been held in some cases that 
the factor would be particularly significant if there were "problems of language and 
translation"16' in proving the foreign law or if the foreign law were codified and was 
significantly different to the laws of the relevant Canadian province. In these circumstances, 
"it is more appropriate that [the foreign law] be interpreted and applied by [the foreign 
court]. "165 One can observe that this is the same approach adopted by the English, Australian 
and Singaporean courts. 
One interesting comparative point to note is that the applicable substantive law is categorised 
as a connecting factor under the English common law, Singaporean and Australian doctrine 
158 Trepanier v Kloster Cruise Ltd (1995) 23 OR (3d) 398, at [27]. See also, Wong v Wong (1995) 8 BCLR (3d) 66, Barclay's 
Bank plc v Inc Inc (1999) 242 AR 18, Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Co of Canada v Wainoco Oil & Gas Co [2004] ILR I- 
4334. 
139 See for example, Domstar Inc v Commonwealth Insurance Co (1997) 48 CCLI(2d) 270, Elawar v Federation des Clubs de 
Motoneigistes du Quebec Inc (2001) 57 OR (3d) 232, at [27], Toronto Dominion Bank v Hudye Soil Services Inc 2000 MBQB 
122, Negrych v Campbell's Cabins (1987) Ltd. [ 1997] MJ No. 284, Pasareno v Pasareno 2000 SKQB 41. 160 See for example, JP Capital Corp (Trustee o) v Perez (1995) 36 CBR (3d) 57, Loewen Group Inc v Continental Insurance Co 
of Canada (1997) 44 BCLR (3d) 387, Cytoven International N. V. v Cytomed Peptos (1994) 58 CPR (3d) 163, Multiactive Software Inc v Advanced Service Solutions Inc (2003) 48 CPC (50) 125, Cresbury Screen Entertainment Ltd v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce 2004 BCSC 349. 161 Ruggeberg v Bancomer SA [ 1998] OJ No. 538, at [45]. 162 (2003) 349 AR 276. 
ibid, at [41 ]. My italics. See for example, Hyundai Auto Canada v Bordeleau (2002) 60 OR (3d) 641, Kvaerner US Inc v 
Amec E&C Services Ltd 2004 BCSC 635. 16' Ruggeberg, supra, n. 161, at [44]. i65 ibid. 
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of forum non conveniens. Interestingly, some Canadian lower courts have held that the 
application of a foreign law by the judicial system providing for that law is a juridical 
advantage and that the defendant would be deprived of it if the local Canadian court in 
question were to apply that law. 166 Conversely, the claimant might be regarded as being 
deprived of a juridical advantage if the foreign court were to apply Canadian law. 167 All this is 
still subject to the ease in which the local court can apply that law. If it can be easily proven 
and applied in the Canadian court in question, Canadian courts have held that there would be 
"little juridical disadvantage n168 to the relevant litigant. 
2.6.2 Delays 
English common law 
One argument constantly raised under the second limb of the Spiliada test is that if a case 
were to proceed to the alternative forum and the "trial would be delayed for many years, "'ss 
this would amount to a "denial of justice"10 to the claimant. This line of reasoning was 
successful in The Vishva Ajay"' where "a substantial body of evidence"172 indicated that 
"many actions do not reach trial in less than 10 years and that it would be wholly exceptional 
for an action to come on for trial in less than six years. "13 Accordingly, "delay of this 
magnitude" t74was regarded as a denial of justice and thus the stay was refused. 
As the delay in the Vishva Ajay was for an exceptional period of time, one must query as to 
the extent of the delay which would satisfy the justice limb of the Spiliada test in less extreme 
cases. Of some help to our discussion here are the statements of the court in Vishva Ajay 
where they pointed out that "it is in the interests of justice that actions should come to trial at 
166 See for example, Cook v Parcel, Mauro, Hultin & Spaanstra (1996) 136 DLR (4ih) 414, Progressive Holdings Inc v Crown 
Life Insurance Co (2000) 9 WWR 79, Butchart v EMC Corp of Canada (2001) 148 OAC 297. 167 See for example, Cresbury Screen Entertainment Ltd v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce 2004 BCSC 349. 
Butchart v EMC Corp of Canada (2001)148 OAC 297, at [ 12]. See also, Na v Renfrew Security Bank & Trust (Of (shore) Ltd (2003) 16 BCLR (0) 345, RMMaromi Investments Ltd v Hasco Inc (2004) 3 CPC (6'") 324. 169 Vishva Ajay [1989] 2 Lloyd's Rep 558, at 560. 170 ibid. 
"' [1989] 2 Lloyd's Rep 558. ýn ibid. at 560. 173 ibid. 
174 ibid. 
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a time when the witnesses can reasonably be expected to have some recollection of the 
events in question. "175 In The Rothnie, 176 a clearer picture of the law was provided as it was 
held that it is only if the plaintiffs could show that "they [would] not be able to receive 
substantial justice""' in the alternative forum as a result of the delay that the stay would be 
refused at this stage. It was also pointed out in Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka AS v 
Nomura International plc 18 that delays of a certain magnitude are "capable of being a breach 
of Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights "179 but as the delay in the Czech 
Republic courts was not "dramatically greatern180 than the "delays which would affect major 
commercial litigation in England, "t81 there was no substantial injustice. 
Accordingly, the mere fact that there will be some delay in the dispute proceeding to trial in 
the foreign jurisdiction is not sufficient to convince the English courts to refuse a stay of 
proceedings at the second stage of the test. It is only in extreme situations where substantial 
justice would not be done such as where the delay would affect the quality of the evidence 
presented to the courts for litigation or its extent would amount to a breach of the European 
Convention on Human Rights that a stay would not be granted. 
Canada 
In Semi Tech Corp v Enterprise Capital Management Inc, 182 one of the rare Canadian cases 
on delays, even though the New York courts would not be able to hear the action on its 
merits by a certain date such that the "respondents would be deprived of a juridical 
advantage of a more timely determination of insolvency proceedings, "183 the Canadian courts 
did not regard the extent of the delay there as causing a "Injustice. n184 Ultimately, they 
1" ibid. 
176 [1996] 2 Lloyd's Rep 206. 
.n ibid, at 208. ý" [2003] ILPr20. 
79 ibid, at [16]. 
80 ibid. 
181 ibid. 
182 1999 W1,33191083. 
'83 ibid, at [ 12]. t 94 ibid. 
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considered the New York courts to be 'efficient and timely"185 and that they would not 
"tolerate delay or not be able to deal with it on a reasonably forthwith basis. "186 
Australia 
In the case of CE Heath Underwriting Insurance (Aus) Pty Ltd. v Bardens, 187 in response to 
the claimant's assertion that "there will be delay if the matter is heard in the English court, "188 
Rolfe J simply pointed out that he would "proceed on the basis that whether the matter is 
heard in those Courts or in this Court it will proceed efficiently... and will be heard as soon as 
"189 reasonably possible by the Court in which it is listed. 
Interestingly though, it was held by the Federal Court of Australia in Seereederei Baco Liner 
GmbH v Al Aliyut90 that the inefficiency and "untimeliness"191 of the Guinean court could be 
considered in the Voth inquiry but submissions of such criticisms "must be approached with 
considerable caution. In the absence of cogent evidence, Australian courts will not sit in 
judgment on the capacity or willingness of the courts of another country to provide justice to 
the plaintiff in a particular case as noted earlier in these reasons. "192 As evidence on whether 
there would be delays in the plaintiffs action in the Guinean court was "far from cogent, "193 
this would fall "short of establishing any substantial likelihood of injustice or incompetence to 
the detriment of [Seereederei Baco Liner] in the Guinea Court System if the case were to be 
heard in that forum. "194 One can easily observe that language similar to that of the substantial 
justice test under the English common law was employed in this case. 195 
Singapore 
' ibid. 
186 ibid. 
1: 7 (Unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales Commercial Division, 19 October 1994). 
Ibid. 189 ibid. 
190 [2000] FCA 656. 
191 ibid. 
192 ibid 
193 ibid. 
194 ibid. 
193 See also, Australian Power and Water Pry Ltd v Independent Public Business Corporation of Papua New Guinea (Unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Equity Division, 19 December 2003). 
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In Oriental Insurance, Yong Pung How CJ stated that even if there were evidence of 
"substantial delayn196 in the Indian courts, "this consideration, though valid, was not so 
weighty as to merit a stay of proceedings. "197 Furthermore, he went on to opine that 
"ultimately, any delay which might be occasioned by a stay 
... 
would not represent a 
substantial injustice to the respondents. "198 In other words, he seems to be stating that delays 
can never be raised by claimants to satisfy the second limb of the Spiliada inquiry. '9 This is 
clearly not the approach under the English common law. 
2.7 DIFFICULTY IN SATISFYING THE TESTS 
Above all, the key issue litigants are most concerned with in relation to the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens is the difficulty involved in obtaining a stay of proceedings in our selected 
jurisdictions. In this subsection, we will examine the tests in Canada, Australia, Singapore 
and England to determine whether it is more difficult for a defendant to establish forum non 
conveniens in England as opposed to defendants in the rest of these countries. 
Generally, with regards to England, Singapore and Canada, the default position is that the 
local proceedings will go ahead in the forum that the claimant chooses to bring his action in 
unless the defendant can establish that that the alternative forum is clearly more appropriate. 
Obviously, the word 'clearly' would indicate that the threshold for these tests is high. 
As the formulation of the forum non conveniens tests for these three jurisdictions are 
identical, it can be argued that it is equally difficult for a defendant to obtain a stay of 
proceedings in any of these three jurisdictions. Besides a reminder that the 'clearly more 
appropriate forum' test is ultimately discretionary, it is also important, to recall that under the 
Canadian doctrine of forum non conveniens, significant weight can be attached to the juridical 
advantages relied upon by a litigant so long as there is a real and substantial connection 
between the forum and the dispute in question. In contrast, juridical advantages would only 
1% Oriental Insurance, supra, n. 74, at [44]. 197 ibid. 
ibid, at [45]. 199 See also, Ma/a Shukla vJayant Amritanand Shuk/a [2002] 3 SLR 295. 
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be taken into account by the English and Singapore courts if the deprivation of these 
advantages resulted in substantial injustice to the claimant. From this difference, it is 
arguable that it is easier for a claimant in Canada to convince the courts to refuse a stay of 
proceedings. 
As for Australia, it is the same starting position for the Australian doctrine of forum non 
conveniens in that the claimant's choice of an Australian forum to litigate his dispute will be 
supported by the Australian courts unless the defendant can establish that that forum is 
clearly inappropriate. It is however more difficult for a defendant to obtain a stay of 
proceedings under the Voth principles in comparison with the tests in Canada, Singapore and 
England as the test from this approach would only be satisfied if the local proceedings were 
shown to be oppressive or vexatious. 
2.8 FORUM NON CONVENIENS IN A FEDERATION 
Even though the relationship between Scotland, England and Ireland is analogous to that of a 
federation, the English courts have not modified the Spiliada test to take note of this situation. 
Likewise, in Canada, regardless of whether the dispute is inter-provincial or international in 
nature, it is still the Amchem principles which are applicable. 200 The fact that the case is inter- 
provincial may affect the weight accorded to particular factors relating to the dispute201 but 
that is in relation to the Canadian court's exercise of its discretion and not with regards to the 
Canadian doctrine of forum non conveniens itself. In contrast, a distinction has been drawn 
between intra-Australian and international disputes in relation to this area of private 
international law. 
In particular, where the question arises with regards to an intra-national dispute as to which 
Australian forum is appropriate for the dispute in question, we must first look at the statutory 
criteria encapsulated by two pieces of legislation namely, the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross- 
20° See for example, Frymer v Brettschneider (1994) 28 CPC (3d) 84, Dairy Producers Co-Operative Ltd v Agrifoods International Cooperative Ltd [1994] 7W WR 596, Burton v Global Benefit Plan Consultants Inc (1999) 543 APR 60, Skrdla v Graham [1999] BCJ NO. 1169, Guarantee Co of North America v Crossley Carpet Mills Ltd (2000) 181 NSR (2d) 197, Skylink Express Inc v All Canada Express Ltd (2001) 17 CPC (58)380, Caspian Construction Inc v Drake Surveys Ltd 2003 MBQB 86. 201 See for example, 679927 Ontario Lid v Wall (1997) 71 CPR (3d) 512. 
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vesting) Act 1987 (Cth) and the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992. (Cth). Before we 
examine the nature of these statutory approaches, it is important that we address the 
situation where the intra-national dispute in question falls outside the scope of these statutes. 
There is some uncertainty under Australian private international law as to whether Voth is 
applicable to such circumstances. Some Australian courts have held that "the decision in 
Voth... is of application only to situations where the competing courts are a court within 
Australia and a court outside of Australia. 202 Others however adopt a more cautious 
approach by providing that the "Voth principle was and applicable where persons were 
served within the jurisdiction"203 and that where the 1987 and 1992 Acts do not apply, the 
Voth test is still relevant even though the application for a stay is for that of another Australian 
forum. Having said that, it must be noted that the frequency of such situations is low and that 
most cases would fall within the ambit of the two Acts. 
2.8.1 Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 
Section 5(2) of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 as enacted in the various 
Australian States and Territories would provide for the transfer of proceedings from one 
Supreme Court to another if conditions under one of three categories of cases, namely 
related proceedings under section 5(2)(b)(i), jurisdiction only by reason of cross vesting under 
section 5(2)(b)(ii) and transfers in the interests of justice under section 5(2)(b)(iii), were 
satisfied. Generally, it has been held that: 
"the principles of forum non conveniens, applied in circumstances where 
the competition is between an Australian and a non-Australian court, have 
no role to play in the resolution of application made under the legislation or 
in its interpretation. Legislation prescribes the criteria whereby such 
"ZOa applications are to be determined. 
202 Balescope Pty Ltd v Pegasus Leasing Ltd (1991) 63 SAS R 51, at 56. 20; Schmidt v Won [1998] 3 VR 435. See also McEntee v Connor (1994) 4 Tas R 18 and Julia Farr Services Inc v Hayes (Unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Court of Appeal 28 April 2003). 204 Bankinvest AG v Seabrook (1988) 14 NSW LR 711, at 726. 
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Nevertheless, one can observe that the principles of forum non convenlens albeit not in the 
form provided for by the High Court in Voth has been used in the interpretation and 
application of some of these statutory criteria. 
a) Related proceedings 
Under section 5(2)(b)(i) of the Cross-vesting Act, where proceedings between the same 
parties or concerning the same subject matter are pending in different superior courts and the 
proceeding to be transferred arises out of or is related to the other proceeding, if the 
Australian Supreme Court in question were of the view that it would be more appropriate that 
the relevant proceeding be determined by that other Supreme Court, that Supreme Court 
must transfer the proceeding to the other Supreme Court. 
One can easily observe that this statutory test is not phrased in the same language as the 
Voth test. As was held by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in the case of Bankinvest 
AG v Seabrook, 205 the "questions posed by Spiliada and the legislation are the same"206 as 
both are concerned with "what court is more appropriate and what court is pointed to by the 
interests of justice. "207 Accordingly, the "criteria laid down by Lord Goff.. 
. 
for the application of 
principles of principles of forum non conveniens [would] broadly correspond to the criteria 
designated by the Act 
. 
'208 The statutory test under section 5(2)(b)(i) of the Cross-vesting Act 
is clearly different from the Voth test as the plaintiffs argument based on Oceanic Sun that 
"there is a prima facie presumption that the court, the jurisdiction of which was properly 
invoked, should exercise it"209 and that it is "up to the person moving to transfer to show some 
positive basis on which it could be contended that the entitlement of the other party to the 
exercise of jurisdiction should be displaced, "21° was firmly rejected by the Justices in 
Bankinvest. 
203 (1988) 14 NSWLR 711. 
206 ibid, at 728. 207 ibid. 
208 ibid. 
209 ibid, at 726-727. 210 ibid, at 727. For the application of this statutory criteria, see for example, Straightline Boring Ply Lid vE&K Trenching & Boring Pry Ltd (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, 27 May 1999), Challenger Group Holdings Lid v Concept Equity Pty 
Ltd (Unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales Equity Division, 27 April 2005). 
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b) Exercise of cross-vested jurisdiction 
In order to discuss the test applicable under section 5(2)(b)(ii) of the Cross-vesting Act, we 
must first examine what cross-vesting is. In particular, the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross- 
vesting) Act 1987 provides for the cross-vesting of the personal jurisdiction of each State 
Supreme Court in every other State Supreme Court. What this means is that each State 
Supreme Court can now exercise jurisdiction over a defendant who is amenable to the 
jurisdiction of any other State Supreme Court thus significantly widening the reach of the 
court in question. 
As for section 5(2)(b)(ii) itself, a litigant would only be able to rely on this section to transfer 
the proceedings in question if he could satisfy a number of conditions. First, under section 
5(2)(b)(ii)(A), the proceedings sought to be transferred must have been instituted as a result 
of "cross-vested jurisdiction, that is to say, jurisdiction which the forum can only exercise 
because of the cross-vesting legislation °Z" If the forum can "exercise the jurisdiction.., by 
reason of its accrued or inherent jurisdiction, "212 this requirement will not be satisfied. 
Secondly, the courts must go on to determine whether the proceedings in question will 
involve the "application, interpretation or validity of a law"213 of another State or Territory. 
Thirdly, they must then consider the interests of justice. 214 Having regard to the above 
considerations, the court must then determine whether it is more appropriate that the relevant 
proceedings be determined by another Supreme Court. 215 
In contrast, there is no cross-vesting scheme in the United Kingdom and Canada. As for the 
test under this section, it can be observed once again that the statute is providing for a 'more 
appropriate forum' test instead of the 'clearly inappropriate forum' test under Voth. Most 
notably, it was held in Bankinvest by the New South Wales Court of Appeal that "the relevant 
matters and considerations are essentially the same as were specified by the House of Lords 
211 Nygh, Conflict of Laws in Australia (Sydney: Butterworths) (6i6 ed., 1995), at 89. See for example, Kontis v Barlin (1993) 115 
ACTR 111. 
212 Nygh, ibid, at 89-90. 217 Section 5(2)(bxii)(B), Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987 (Cth). 214 Section 5(2Xb)(iiXC), ibid. 
215 For the application of the statutory criteria, see for example, Toren Fishing & Trading Pty Ltd v McKenzie Family Nominees Pty Ltd (1995) 125 FLR 229. 
57 
in The Spiliada. "216 In particular, it was said that the "two considerations of 'more appropriate' 
and the 'ends' or 'interests' of justice are used in the same sense by Lord Goff'21 in Spiliada. 
c) Transfer in the interests of justice 
Section 5(2)(b)(iii) provides for a residual category which operates "where the requirements 
of subcl. (i) and subcl (ii) are not satisfied. "218 Under this section, the phrase more 
appropriate' is not used. Instead, where it is "otherwise in the interests of justice that the 
relevant proceeding be determined by the Supreme Court of another State or Territory, "219 
the "first court shall transfer the relevant proceeding to that other Supreme Court. "22° 
Initially, there was some confusion under Australian law in relation to the test applicable to 
such questions of transfer. On the one hand, in the Supreme Court of New South Wales case 
of Bankinvest 221, the search under section 5(2)(iii) was said to be for the more appropriate 
court in the interests of all the parties and the ends of justice; 222 an approach analogous to 
the Spiliada inquiry. This approach was endorsed by the Supreme Courts of 
Victoria, 223Northern Territory224 and Tasmania 225 On the other hand, the Supreme Courts of 
the Australian Capital Territory226 and Western Australia227 have adopted a test that examines 
inconvenience and injustice in the forum and is therefore similar to the test under Voth. In 
particular, in the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory case of Waterhouse v 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 228 Kelly J examined the decision in Bankinvest and 
216 Bankinvest, supra, n. 205, at 730. 217 ibid. 
218 ibid. 
219 Section 5(2XbXiii), Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987 (Cth). 
uo ibid. 
221 For the application of the Bankinvest test in New South Wales, see for example, Amor v Macpak Pty Ltd (1989) 95 FLR 10, 
James Hardie v Barry (Unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales Court of Appeal, 4 December 2000). 222 Bankinvest, supra, n. 205, at 730. 223 See for example, Code v Allco New Steel Pty Ltd (Unreported, Victoria Supreme Court, 28 November 1990), Reicher v 
Reicher Holdings Pty Ltd (Unreported, Victoria Supreme Court, 14 February 1991), DG v Commonwealth Serum Laboratories (Unreported, Victoria Supreme Court, 18 May 1992), Lintergroup Ltd (in liq) v Price Waterhouse (1992) 9 ACSR 346, Bridge 
and Marine Engineering Pty Ltd v Taylor (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Commercial and Equity Division, 8 March 
2002). 
224 See for example, Midland Montagu Australia Ltd v O'Connor (1992) 2 NTLR 86 and Toren Fishing & Trading Ply Ltd v 
McKenzie Family Nominees Pry Ltd (1995) 126 FLR 229. 
22-5 See for example, Anagnostis and Sty! v Davies Brothers Ltd (Unreported, Supreme Court of Tasmania, 12 September 1989), 
McEntee v Connor (Unreported, Supreme Court of Tasmania, 27 April 1994). 226 See for example, Baffsky v John Fairfax and Sons Ltd (1990) 97 ACTR 1, Kontis v Bar/in (1993) 115 ACTR 11. 22' See for example, Mullins Investments Pty Ltd v Elliot Exploration Co Pty Ltd (1990) 1 WAR 531, Platz v Lambert (1994) 20 MVR 362. 
22a (1989) 86 ACTR 1. 
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pointed out that by using the phrase 'in the interest of justice' twice in section 5(2), first as 
one requirement under section 5(2)(i, ) to establish that the other Supreme Court is more 
appropriate and secondly as the key requirement under section 5(2)(iii), the legislature may 
have wanted to provide for "a difference between the relevant considerations applicable in 
respect of paragraphs (i) and (ii) and those applicable in respect of paragraph (iii). n229 In his 
view, the omission of the words 'more appropriate' in relation to the second category of cases 
is an indication that such a test is inapplicable here. Instead, he regarded the section as 
providing for a narrower ground for an order of transfer in that such an order would only be 
made "if having made all due allowance for the plaintiffs' right to bring their actions in this 
Court with such forensic advantages as may attend on that course, the expense and 
inconvenience which would fall upon the defendant will result in real injustice to it. "230 
Thankfully, the High Court of Australia has provided for a uniform interpretation of this section 
for the various Australian States and Territories. In the recent case of BHP Billiton Ltd v 
Schultz231, the High Court first made clear that even though an application for transfer under 
the Cross-vesting Act "will often involve evidence and debate about matters of the same kind 
as arise when a court is asked to grant a stay of proceedings on the ground of forum non 
conveniens, there are differences between the two kinds of application "232 as the Cross- 
vesting Act is "intended to operate and to be applied in a different juridical context. n233 They 
thus held that in the context of the Act, the courts are not concerned with "the problem of a 
court, with a prima facie duty to exercise a jurisdiction that has been regularly invoked. a234 
Rather, the court is "required by statute to ensure that cases are heard in the forum dictated 
by the interests of justice. "235 In such circumstances, it Is unnecessary that the first court be 
established to be a 'clearly inappropriate' forum. It is instead "both necessary and sufficient 
that, in the interests of justice, the second court is more appropriate 
. 
*236 In other words, the 
229 ibid, at 16. 270 ibid, at 17. 231 [2004] HCA 61. 
232 ibid. at [8]. 233 ibid, at [12]. 234 ibid, at [ 14]. 23$ ibid. 
236 ibid. 
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High Court of Australia has endorsed the approach of the New South Wales Court of Appeal 
in Bankinvest. 237 
A few points of comparison can be made at this stage. It can be observed that the test 
adopted by the Australian courts for this category of cases is again very similar to the 
Spiliada test. Hence, one can read this as a move towards the English common law approach 
in the Australian federation context. However, from a wider perspective, there is an Australian 
divergence from the English common law scheme as a distinction has been drawn between 
intra-Australian cases, where this statutory scheme providing for the transfer of proceedings 
is applicable, and international disputes. For the former, the Australian courts apply a test 
similar to the Spiliada approach. As for the latter, they use the Voth test. In contrast, it is the 
same English common law Spiliada approach that is applied to both disputes within the 
United Kingdom and those involving jurisdictions outside of the United Kingdom. 
2.8.2 Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 
It is important to note that the above scheme would only apply if the Supreme Court of a 
State in Australia were the court of issue. It does not apply to lower Australian courts. In such 
circumstances, we have to look at the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992. (Cth) 
Essentially, this piece of legislation permits the originating process of State and Territory 
courts to be served anywhere in Australia with regards to any cause of action arising 
anywhere in Australia. The jurisdiction of the State or Territory in question is thus extended to 
wherever the defendant may be in Australia. 238 Therefore, for the purposes of the Act, 
Australia is transformed into a single jurisdiction for the service of initiating State or Territory 
process. 
Where such process has been successfully served by the claimant, under section 20 of the 
Service and Execution of Process Act, the person served with the process can apply to the 
court of issue for an order staying the proceeding. To determine whether such a stay of 
237 For subsequent application of the approach in BHP Billion Ltd, see for example, MC v The State of South Australia [2006] ACTSC 9. 
239 See for example, Kontis v Barlin (1993) 115 ACI'R 11, at 18. 
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proceedings should be granted, the test provided in the Act is that the court must be "satisfied 
that a court of another State that has jurisdiction to determine all the matters in issue between 
the parties is the appropriate court to determine those matters "239 This discretion is to be 
exercised with the help of a number of factors stipulated in section 20(4) of the Act and it is 
notable that the claimant's invocation of the court's jurisdiction is not one of the listed factors. 
With the section directing the inquiry at the appropriateness of the other court rather than the 
inappropriateness of the local court, it is clear that the Voth test is not relevant here. Rather, 
the test appears to be similar to the Spiliada approach. 
3. EXAMINING THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE BREAK UP OF COMMONWEALTH 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN RELATION TO THE DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON 
CONVENIENS 
From the above discussion, it is clear that there has been a break up of Commonwealth 
private international law in relation to forum non conveniens in our selected Commonwealth 
jurisdictions as it can be observed that divergences from the English common law position on 
this subject matter have been generated by the decisions of the Australian, Canadian and 
Singaporean courts. However, it is important to note that not all of our selected countries 
have departed from the English common law to the same extent. 
At one extreme, there has been an obvious departure from the English common law doctrine 
of forum non convenfens in Australia as the High Court of Australia has rejected the 
formulation of the English common law test, the 'clearly more appropriate forum' approach, 
for the 'clearly inappropriate forum' test. Unsurprisingly, this has resulted in other 
divergences from the English common law doctrine in relation to the other analytical points of 
comparison selected for this chapter. That being said, there has been a shift towards the 
English common law forum non conveniens approach in the federation context as the High 
Court of Australia has rejected the use of the Voth test by adopting a test analogous to the 
English common law Spiliada approach for the relevant statutory provisions. 
239 Section 20(3), Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth). 
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Even though the Canadian courts have endorsed the basic principles underlying the English 
common law doctrine of forum non conveniens by adopting the 'clearly more appropriate 
forum' test, they too have played their part in the break up of this area of Commonwealth 
private international law albeit to a lesser extent in comparison to the Australian position. In 
particular, Canadian courts have provided for divergences from the English common law in 
relation to the structure of the forum non conveniens test as well as the sub-rules within the 
doctrine itself such as the ones on juridical advantages and public interest factors. Even 
though such departures from the English common law are not in relation to the nature of the 
forum non conveniens test itself, they are equally important to our study of the break up of 
Commonwealth private international law as at the end of the day, they do have an impact on 
the results of the case, i. e. a litigant may find it easier to obtain a stay of proceedings in the 
Canadian courts in comparison to the English courts due to, for example the Canadian rules 
on juridical advantages. 
At the other extreme, Singapore has largely maintained its uniformity with the English 
common law doctrine of forum non conveniens. Like the Canadian judiciaries, the Singapore 
courts have adopted the English common law 'clearly more appropriate forum' test but unlike 
the rejection of the two-stage Spiliada structure by the Supreme Court of Canada in Amchem, 
the Singapore courts have endorsed that framework. However, that is not saying that the 
Singapore doctrine of forum non conveniens is identical to that of the English common law as 
it is still possible to observe some divergences from the relevant English common law position 
in the Singapore context. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
1. There is an Australian/Canadian divergence from the English common law/Singapore 
doctrine of forum non conveniens in that the latter provides for a more structured 
approach with different factors relevant at different stages of the inquiry. The role of 
the parties in persuading the courts to grant a stay of proceedings is also clearly 
defined under the English common law structure. In contrast, the Australian and 
Canadian courts prefer a more general and flexible framework for their doctrine of 
forum non conveniens. 
2. The formulation of the Australian doctrine of forum non conveniens inquires as to 
whether the Australian court in question is clearly inappropriate. This is obviously a 
divergence from the English common law approach which examines whether there is 
a clearly more appropriate forum elsewhere. More importantly, the Australian doctrine 
is premised on the concepts of oppression and vexation and these are principles 
which have been rejected by the English courts in relation to the Spiliada test. In 
contrast to the Australian position, the Singapore and Canadian courts have chosen 
to adopt the 'clearly more appropriate forum' test with no reference to oppression and 
vexation whatsoever. 
3. The situations to which the doctrine of forum non conveniens are applicable in these 
jurisdictions have been expanded. Not only is forum non conveniens relevant in 
Australia and Canada to situations where a claim form can be served on a defendant 
within the jurisdiction, the doctrine is also applied to circumstances where service ex 
juris can be made without leave. The doctrine of forum non conveniens in Singapore 
and England, on the other hand, is restricted to the former situation. 
4. In relation to the factors taken into account by the judiciaries in our selected 
jurisdictions in the application of their individual doctrine of forum non conveniens, all 
will consider connecting factors in the exercise of their discretion. However, one 
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important Australian divergence from the English common law position is that the 
Australian courts will focus their inquiry on connecting factors which indicate that the 
Australian forum in question is clearly inappropriate. In contrast, Canada and 
Singapore have adopted the same balanced approach as the English common law in 
examining the factors connecting the dispute to both the local forum and the 
alternative forum from a trans-national perspective so as to determine which of the 
fora in question is clearly more appropriate. 
5. As for juridical advantages, at one end of the spectrum, the English and Singapore 
courts will not consider this factor in the exercise of their discretion unless the 
deprivation of such advantages in the alternative forum results in substantial injustice 
to the claimant. In the middle, the Canadian doctrine of forum non conveniens 
requires a real and substantial connection between the dispute/litigant and the forum 
before that litigant can rely on the juridical advantages available to him in a particular 
forum. At the other end of the spectrum, juridical advantages are freely considered in 
the Australian courts without any restrictions attached to them. 
6. Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens in England, it is clear that considerations 
of natural justice will be taken into account by the English courts under the second 
stage of the Spillada test to determine whether a stay of proceedings should be 
refused. This is also the case in Singapore and Canada. In contrast, the High Court of 
Australia has held that such factors will not be examined under the Voth inquiry. 
7. English judges have stated explicitly that public interest factors are not to play any 
part in the exercise of their discretion to decline jurisdiction on forum non conveniens 
principles. Similarly, the Australian courts have ignored such considerations in the 
application of the Voth test. On the other hand, the Canadian courts have diverged 
from the English common law position by providing that such factors can be taken 
into account. The position in Singapore on this point of comparison is still unclear. 
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8. Even though the formulation of the doctrine of forum non conveniens may be the 
same in some of our selected jurisdictions, the courts of these countries may attach 
different weight to the relevant factors. To illustrate, even though there is a significant 
Australian divergence from the English common law position in terms of the 
formulation of their forum non conveniens tests, it is interesting to note that the courts 
of both jurisdictions have attached significant weight to the law applicable to the 
dispute in question depending on the circumstances of the case. In contrast, although 
Canada has adopted the 'clearly more appropriate forum' test, the applicable 
substantive law is regarded as a mere factor with no special weight attached to it in a 
considerable number of Canadian cases. Singapore, on the other hand, is in 
agreement with the English common law both in relation to the formulation of its 
doctrine of forum non conveniens as well as the weight attached to the applicable 
law. 
9. Generally, litigants are much less likely to obtain a stay of Australian proceedings 
under the Voth principles in comparison to the situation in Canada, Singapore and 
England due to its emphasis on the inappropriateness of the local Australian forum. 
As Canada has a more relaxed approach towards juridical advantages unlike the 
English common law and Singapore position, it is arguable that the defendant's 
burden in satisfying the 'clearly more appropriate forum' test in Canada is more 
onerous as contrasted with the English common law and Singapore doctrine even 
though all three have adopted the same formulation for their forum non conveniens 
tests. 
10. With regards to the doctrine of forum non conveniens in the context of a federation, it 
is still the same Spiliada test that governs disputes involving England and other 
jurisdictions within the United Kingdom. Likewise, in Canada, the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens is applicable regardless of whether the dispute is inter-provincial or 
international in nature. In contrast, the Australian common law rules on jurisdiction for 
intra-national disputes have been superseded to a large extent by statute. Where 
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such legislation is applicable, it is the statutory criteria within them that determine 
whether jurisdiction should be declined. Interestingly, it is not the 'clearly 
inappropriate forum' test that is applicable. Instead, the Australian courts have held 
that the relevant statutory test is analogous to the Spiliada test. 
11. From the divergences and convergences we have observed in this chapter, it is clear 
that there has been a break up of Commonwealth private international law in relation 
to forum non conveniens in our selected jurisdictions. The Australian courts have 
contributed to this phenomenon to a very large extent as it has rejected the very 
formulation of the English common law doctrine of forum non conveniens. Even 
though the Canadian judiciaries have adopted the English common law 'clearly more 
appropriate forum' test, they have played a part in relation to this phenomenon by 
diverging from the English common law two-stage structure as well as providing for 
different sub-rules within the doctrine of forum non conveniens itself. The Singapore 
doctrine of forum non conveniens, on the other hand, is almost identical to the 
English common law Spiliada test. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE BREAK UP OF COMMONWEALTH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW IN RELATION TO TORT CHOICE OF LAW 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As was the case for our study of forum non conveniens in the previous chapter, there has 
been a break up of Commonwealth private international law in relation to tort choice of law in 
our selected jurisdictions. To illustrate, the Canadian and Australian courts have abandoned 
the traditional English common law Phillips v Eyre' approach, that there must be "actionability 
by the law of the forum and the law of the place of the tort, q2 
for a lex loci delicti rule. 3 In England as well, the Introduction of the Private International 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 has significantly limited the scope of the English 
common law tort choice of law regime. 4 In contrast, the English common law still has its 
adherents as the Singapore Court of Appeal has held that "the applicable choice of law rule in 
Singapore with respect to torts committed overseas is that laid down in Phillips v Eyre. "5 One 
can thus say that there is diversity in Commonwealth tort choice of law regimes. 
To examine the break up of this particular area of Commonwealth private international law, 
the structure utilised in our comparative analysis of forum non conveniens will be adopted 
here as well. The divergences and convergences in relation to key stages of the tort choice 
of law process will first be examined. They are as follows: 
2.1 Characterisation: unknown foreign torts 
2.2 Identifying the place of commission of the tort 
2[18701LR6QB1. 
North, Fawcett, Cheshire and North's Private International Law (London: Butterworths) (131" ed., 1999), at ti09. For Australia, see Pfeiffer v Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503, Renault v Zhang (2002) 187 ALR 1. For Canada, see Tolofson v Jensen [1994] 3 SCR 1022. 4 Section 13,1995 Act. Note the difficulties arising from the interpretation of Section 10 of the 1995 Act in relation to the 
abolition of the English common law tort choice of law regime. On this point, see Briggs, Choice of Law in Tort and Delict 11995] LMCLQ 519. 
Porno v SC Marine Pie Ltd [1999] 4 SLR 579, at [36]. 
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2.3 Tort choice of law rule 
2.4 Exception to the tort choice of law rule 
With these findings, we will then work out the nature and extent of the break up of 
Commonwealth tort choice of law regimes in our selected jurisdictions. 
Before we begin our comparative study, a few preliminary points must be noted. First, the 
focus of this chapter is on torts committed outside of the local forum. While a separate tort 
choice of law regime may be applicable to torts committed within the forum, it is simply 
beyond the scope of this thesis to examine this. Secondly, even though the 1995 Act is not a 
common law tort choice of law regime, for the sake of completeness, it is important that we 
address the changes that it has made to tort choice of law in England. Thirdly, Australia and 
Canada have provided for tort choice of law regimes that differ, depending on whether a tort 
is committed on an intra-national or international basis. In contrast, even though England has 
strong legal and historical ties to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, the English common 
law does not provide for any special rules in relation to intra-UK disputes. Likewise, this is the 
position under the 1995 Act. 6 
2. EXAMINING THE VARIOUS DIVERGENCES AND CONVERGENCES IN RELATION TO 
TORT CHO/CE OF LAW 
2.1 CHARACTERISATION: UNKNOWN FOREIGN TORTS 
For tort choice of law rules to apply, the local forum's courts must first decide that the dispute 
in question is one relating to tort in accordance with its own private international law rules. In 
most cases, it will be clear to the courts that the claim is tortious in nature. 7 However, one 
area where difficulties have arisen is the classification of foreign torts which are conceptually 
unknown to the forum's courts. 
6 Section 9(7), 1995 Act. 
For a discussion of the possible overlaps between tort and family law/contract law, see for example, North, Private International Law Problems in Common Law Jurisdictions (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) (1993), at 158-164. 
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2.1.1 English common law and Singapore 
Traditionally, there was no need to characterise unknown foreign torts as 'torts' for the English 
common law tort choice of law regime as such torts would fall foul of the lex fori limb of the 
Phillips v Eyre rule 
.8 In recent years, however, doubts have been cast upon that position 
because of the decision in Red Sea Insurance Co Ltd v Bouygues SA. 9 In that case, even 
though under the first limb of the double actionability rule, the lex fori did not recognise any 
direct liability between the insurers and the parties alleged to be negligent, the Privy Council 
held that a flexible exception could be used to apply the lex loci delicti on its own. 
Some have argued that one implication of this decision is that there is no need to show that 
the claim is a tort under domestic law in order for the double actionability rule to apply. 
"[C]lassification in foreign law will have to be taken into account, in order not to rule out in 
limine the exception to the lex for!. "10 Nonetheless, one must remember that there is still a 
presumption against unknown foreign torts as the lex for! limb of the double actionability rule 
has not been abolished by the English courts. Accordingly, the characterisation of such torts 
as 'torts' for the purposes of tort choice of law is contingent on the courts' discretion under the 
exception. It is thus important for us to work out the prevailing judicial attitudes towards them. 
In commenting that it is not the intention of Lord Wilberforce to limit the flexibility of the 
exception by restricting its operation to the lox for!, Lord Slynn in Red Sea Insurance stated 
that "the fact that the forum is being required to apply a foreign law in a situation where its 
own law would give no remedy will be a factor to be taken into account when the court 
decides whether to apply the exception. "" Similarly, in Pearce v Ove Arup Partnership Ltd, 12 
Roch U, in applying Dutch law with the flexible exception, held that the case at hand did not 
involve a wrong which is conceptually unknown in English law thus indicating that the result 
See for example, Briggs, The Conflict of Laws (Oxford: Oxford University Press) (2002), at 181. "It follows from the lex fora limb that the only claims which can succeed are those in respect of torts known to English domestic law. " [1995] 1 AC 190. 
Yen, Tort Choice of Law beyond the Red Sea: Whither the Lex Fort? (1997) 1 Singapore Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 91, at 103. 11 Red Sea, supra, n. 9, at 206. 12 [1999] ILPr 442. 
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might be different if that were so. 13 On the other hand, in Chagos Islanders v The Attorney 
General, 14 it was held obiter that if the "tort of breaching a constitutional right"15 existed under 
Mauritius law, it would not be "impossible for the [Red Sea] exception to be made out"16 even 
though there was "no comparable tort"17 in England and the claim would thus fail under the 
first limb of the double actionability rule. In all, one can only say that it is unclear whether 
unknown foreign torts would be caught by the English common law tort choice of law regime. 
In relation to the Singapore position, the Singapore Court of Appeal has accepted the Phillips 
v Eyre rule and the Red Sea flexible exception as part of Singapore law in the case of Parno v 
SC Marine Pte Ltd. 78 Therefore, at least in principle, Singapore courts can adjudicate on 
unknown foreign torts as the formulation of the rules by the Privy Council in Red Sea does 
allow for that possibility. However, as there has been no discussion of unknown foreign torts 
in the Singapore courts, we simply do not know whether a Singapore judge will refuse to 
apply the flexible exception when such torts are involved. 
2.1.2 England: Part 111 of the 1995 Act 
It is clear that the 1995 Act can be applied to foreign torts, unknown under English domestic 
law. This is because, under section 9 of the Act, characterisation is to be made "for the 
purposes of private international law"19 thus indicating that English courts would have to "give 
effect to a law which is not in accordance with the law of England"20 as "this is what private 
international law is about. "21 This was confirmed by Aikens J in the case of Trafigura Beheer 
BV V Kookmin Bank Co22 where he stated that English courts "should examine relevant 
issues to decide whether they will be characterised as "relating to tort" not only by reference 
to English legal concepts and classifications, but by taking a broad "internationalist" view of 
t ibid, at [68]. [2003] EWHC 2222 (QB). 
IS ibid. at [422]. 16 ibid, at [423]. 17 ibid. 
18 Parno, supra, n. 5, at [36]. 9 Section 9(2), 1995 Act. 
20 HL Paper 36 (1995), Pail 1, at 8 per Lord Mackay (the Lord Chancellor then). 21 ibid. 
22 [2006] EWHC 1450 (Comm) 
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legal concepts. "23 He thus held that the word 'tort' under section 9 of the 1995 Act is to be 
a construed broadly, so as to embrace non-contractual civil wrongs that give rise to a 
remedy. "2a 
One question however remains unanswered: how do we determine which unknown foreign 
tort would fall within the scope of the 1995 Act? Section 9 of the Act does not provide us with 
much information as to the criterion that is to be applied during the characterisation exercise 
except that it is a "matter for the courts of the forum n25 Likewise, the Law Commissions did 
not provide for any clarification of this question but they did state that the tort of invasion of 
privacy was an example of such unknown foreign torts. 26 In Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3), 27 
however it was held obiter by the English Court of Appeal that, as a privacy claim is 
"shoehorn(ed) 
... 
into the cause of action of breach of confidence, "28 a recent development in 
English substantive law29, it is not "treated as a tort 
. 
"30 This is because "a claim for breach of 
confidence falls to be categorised as a restitutionary claim for unjust enrichment. "31 In other 
words, as a privacy claim is "found under English substantive law, which gives it a non- 
tortious characterisation, "32 the courts were of the view that the 1995 Act was not applicable 
to this case. 
In the recent case of Trafigura Beheer BV v Kookmin Bank Co, Aikens J had to determine 
whether the acts of Trafigura in depriving Kookmin of a security interest in cargo was tortious 
for the purposes of the 1995 Act. As a "matter of English law classification, "33 Kookmin's claim 
was a matter relating to contract whereas under Korean law, it was a "non-contractual civil 
n34 wrong. In his reasoning, Aikens J commented that: 
2' ibid, at [68]. 14 ibid, at [70]. 23 Section 9(2), 1995 Act. 26 Explanatory Notes to Clause 1(4) of the Draft Bill, set out in Law Corn No. 193 (1990), at 35. 27 [200513 WLR 881. 
28 ibid, at [96]. 29 See for example, Campbell v MGNLtd [2004] 2 AC 457. 10 Douglas, supra, n. 27, at [96]. 31 ibid, at [97]. 32 North, Fawcett, supra, n. 2, at 620. 
"Trafigura, 
supra, n. 22, at [73]. 34 ibid, at [74]. 
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"even if an analysis using English legal concepts and classification would not 
characterise an issue as "relating to tort", the English court must take 
account of legal concepts and classifications in any other relevant system of 
law. How this is to be done in each case must depend on the relevant facts 
and issues. "'s 
As Aikens J was of the view that he could not "ignore the way Kookmin puts its claim in 
Korean law and simply look at the matter through the eyes of English law, n36 he held that the 
security claim was one relating to tort. One can thus observe that the characterisation of the 
issue as a 'tort' by the foreign legal system is an important consideration in Aikens J's 
decision. One question, however, remains unanswered: in what circumstances, will the 
foreign classification of the claim as a tort be ignored by the English courts? This was not a 
point addressed by Aikens J. 
2.1.3 Australia and Canada 
Initially, when the Phillips v Eyre rule was still the tort choice of law rule in Australia and 
Canada, there was uniformity in these countries with the English common law position with 
regards to unknown foreign torts due to the effect the lex fori limb of that rule has on such 
torts. In recent years, with the rejection of the English common law tort choice of law rule for 
the lex loci delicti rule in Australia and Canada, characterisation has been brought into the 
open rather than subsumed within the first limb of the Phillips v Eyre rule, as is still the case 
under the English common law. Having said that, as no relevant case appears to have been 
decided in these two jurisdictions on torts conceptually unknown to Australian and Canadian 
domestic law, we cannot say for sure that such torts would be caught by their respective tort 
choice of law regimes. 
as ibid. at [68]. 36 ibid, at [74]. 
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2.2 IDENTIFYING THE PLACE OF COMMISSION OF THE TORT 
For all our selected jurisdictions, as the lex loci delicti is an essential component of their tort 
choice of law regimes, identifying the place where a tort is committed is necessary. Generally, 
the tests formulated by the judiciaries in Australia, Canada and England to achieve this 
objective are similar in that they are all discretionary and thus flexible approaches. The 
difference is in the wording of the individual tests and the factors that the courts can consider 
in the application of these approaches. 
The English 1995 Act however, provides an interesting contrast to the common law tort 
choice of law regimes as it identifies the applicable law "directly and without involving the 
fictional place of the tort or delict. "37 However, as was pointed out by Cheshire and North, this 
is not as "radical"38 as it seems. All the Act does is to fuse the rules on locating the place of 
commission of the tort and the relevant tort choice of law rule into a single rule. Put another 
way, in determining the applicable law itself, it is inevitable that the tort be localised in some 
manner. 
2.2.1 English common law 
To determine where a tort is committed for choice of law purposes, the English common law 
position is provided for by the case of Metall und Rohstoff AG v Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette 
Inc. 39 where the general test enunciated by the Privy Council in Distillers Co. (Biochemicals) 
Ltd v Thompson40 for the purposes of assuming jurisdiction was endorsed. This approach 
requires the courts to "to look over the series of events... and ask... where in substance did 
this cause of action arise. "41 As this test is phrased in such an open-ended manner, courts 
have "considerable room to manoeuvre as a consequence of which it is impossible to lay 
down hard and fast rules. "42 
"Caw Corn No. 193 (1990), at para 3.6. 39 North, Fawcett, supra, n. 2, at 630. 79 [1990] 1 QB 391, at 446. 40 (197 1] AC 458. 
41 ibid, at 468. See Base Metal Trading Lid vShamurin [2005] 1 WLR 1157 for a recent endorsement of this approach. 42 Clarkson, Hill, Jaffey on the Conflict of Laws (London: Butterworths LexisNexis) (2"d ed., 2002), at 260. 
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2.2.2 Australia 
Even though the Distillers substance test was endorsed by the High Court of Australia in Voth 
v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd43 in a choice of law context, it is interesting to note that the 
majority Justices in that case interpreted the Distillers approach as requiring the courts to 
ascertain "the place of the act of the part of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause 
of complaint; "44 it is "some act of the defendant, and not its consequences, that must be the 
focus of attention. "45 In comparison, the English common law Distillers test does not provide 
for any limitations to the factors that the courts can take into account when determining the 
locus delicti. Accordingly, the Australian interpretation of the Distillers substance test is clearly 
a departure from the English common law position at this point in time. 
Subsequently, however, this interpretation was rejected by the High Court of Australia in Dow 
Jones & Company Inc v Joseph Gutnicki where the majority Justices stated, "[a]ttempts to 
apply a single rule of location... have proved unsatisfactory. 47 One can thus observe a 
convergence with the English common law position with the court's decision that the question 
should simply be "where in substance did this cause of action arise. "48 
2.2.3 Canada 
The Moran test 
Initially, in Moran v Pyle National (Canada) Ltd, 49 Dickson J examined the English common 
law approach in Distillers and stated that it hinted at a 'real and substantial connection' test. 
Specifically, he regarded a "tort as having occurred in any country substantially affected by 
the defendant's activities 
... 
and the law of which is likely to have been in the reasonable 
43 (1990) 171 CLR 538, at 566-569. u ibid, at 567. 4s ibid. 
46 (2002) 194 ALR 433. 
47 ibid, at [43]. 48 ibid. 
49 [1975] 1 SCR 393. 
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contemplation of the parties. "50 Before Tolofson v Jensen, 51 it was assumed that the Moran 
test was the approach for tort choice of law even though it was formulated in a jurisdictional 
context. 52 
In comparison, the wording of the Moran test is more specific in that it requires the courts to 
locate countries which are substantially affected by the defendant's activities. The Distillers 
test on the other hand, is more vaguely phrased in that it simply inquires as to where in 
substance the tort is committed. As the focus of the Moran test is on the consequences of the 
defendant's activities rather than his actions, judicial discretion is curtailed, as the Canadian 
courts are limited in the factors they can take into account. In contrast, the English common 
law approach has no such restrictions. 
Furthermore, as more than one country can be affected by the defendant's activities in a 
substantial manner, the application of the Moran test may result in the "cumulative application 
of the law of two countries. "53 As North has pointed out, this can be justified by "expansionist 
attitudes to the assumption of jurisdiction"54 but not in relation to the location of the tort in a 
choice of law context. There, we are to identify a law that would determine the substantive 
issues between the parties in relation to the tort. Accordingly, "there can only be one place of 
wrong. n55 In contrast, under the general wording of the Distiller test, it is quite unlikely that 
courts will identify two or more locations of the tort in determining the applicable law. It is thus 
clear that that the Moran test is in divergence from the English common law Distillers 
approach at this point in time. 
The Tolofson approach 
Subsequently, in Tolofson v Jensen, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the English 
common law Phillips v Eyre rule and held that "as a general rule, the law to be applied in torts 
50 ibid, at [I I]. 51 [1994] 3 SCR 1022. 32 North, supra, n. 7, at 149. 53 ibid. 
54 ibid. 
55 Nygh, Davies, Conflict of Laws in Australia (Sydney: LexisNexis Butterworthsx7'h ed., 2002), at 421 
75 
is the law of the place where the activity occurred "56 However, where an "act occurs in one 
place but the consequences are directly felt elsewhere... it may well be that the consequences 
would be held to constitute the wrong. "57 In short, the place of the tort is either the place of 
injury or the place of the wrongful activity and it is up to the courts to determine which is 
applicable in a particular fact situation. 
One difference between the Tolofson and Distillers approaches is that the former restricts the 
location of the tort to the place of the act and its consequences whereas there are no such 
limitations for the Distillers substance test. In practical terms, however, it is unlikely that the 
English common law test will be applied to identify the place of commission of the tort in one 
other than these two locations. Instead, one can say that the two approaches are similar in 
that they both provide the courts with a high degree of discretion in working out the situs of 
the tort. 
Even though the Tolofson approach has been accepted by most lower Canadian provincial 
courts5s as the test for determining the place of commission of a tort for tort choice of law 
purposes, Goldenberg J in Prebushewski v Dodge CityAuto59 has commented that there are 
still doubts as to whether the Moran test "will be confined to the negligent manufacture of 
products, or whether it will be applied to other cases of negligence or even perhaps to other 
torts. "60 In other words, there is still some uncertainty in relation to the Canadian rules on 
determining where a tort is committed. 
2.2.4 England: Part Ill of the 1995 Act 
It is stated in the Law Commissions Report which the 1995 Act is based on that "there is a 
fiction in identifying any particular country as the place of the tort or delict. n61 Rules which 
's To1oßon, supra, n. 51, at [43]. 37 ibid. 
se See for example, Barclays Bank plc v Inc Inc (1999) 242 AR 18, Integral Energy & Environmental Engineering Ltd v Schenker of Canada Ltd (2001) 293 AR 327 but see Ostroski v Global Upholstery Co[1996] ACWS (3d) 990 where the Moran 
test was applied in a post Tolofson case. 39 (1999] Sask R 76. 
60 ibid, at [8]. 61 Law Com No. 193 (1990), at para. 3.6. 
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directly locate the applicable law were thus preferred by the Law Commissions. These rules 
are provided for by section 11 of the Act. 
Under section 11(1), if all the events constituting a tort occurred in a single jurisdiction, that 
country would provide the applicable law. If these events were scattered across jurisdictions, 
we would have to look at section 11(2) of the Act. In particular, for torts involving personal 
injuries or death or torts in respect of damage to property, under section 11(2)(a) and (b), we 
have to first work out the place where the "individual was when he sustained the injuryn62 or 
"where the property was when it was damagedi63 in order to apply the law of that jurisdiction. 
For all other cases, section 11(2)(c) requires the courts to work out the "country in which the 
most significant element or elements"6" of the events constituting a tort occurred before they 
can apply the law of that country. 
At the outset, one structural point must be made before we enter into a detailed comparison 
of the individual sub-rules under the 1995 Act and the approaches adopted by the rest of our 
selected jurisdictions. For these countries, a single, usually flexible, general rule is used to 
locate the place of commission of a tort. Section 11(2), on the other hand, employs two 
different rules: a place of injury/damage rule and a 'most significant element' rule. 
a) Sub-rules 11(2)(a) and (b): place of Injury/damage rule 
It can be seen from the above that sub-rules 11(2)(a) and (b) provide for a place of injury or 
damage rule for torts involving personal injury, death or property damage. This is a "simple, 
though sometimes arbitrary, rule"65 and it is in stark contrast with the English common law 
Distillers substance test which provides for a high degree of judicial discretion. In the 
application of this statutory rule, judges can only rely on the place where the injury or damage 
occurred in working out the place of commission of torts involving personal injury, death or 
property damage, whereas under the English common law approach, there is no such 
62 Section 11(2)(a), 1995 Act. 
Section 11(2)(b), ibid. 
Section 11(2Xc), ibid. 6s Briggs, supra, n. 8, at 187-188. 
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limitation. In other words, for such torts, the English common law test "leaves a margin of 
appreciation to the judgei66 to determine where they are committed. In particular, it has been 
observed that for personal injury cases, "in almost every instance, the [English] court was 
able to assemble the facts so that damage and the act complained of were located in a single 
place. "67 
b) Sub-rules s11(2)(c): most significant element rule 
Section 11(2)(c) provides for a flexible sub-rule that "leaves it to the courts to work out a 
solution"68 to the problem of locating the place of the tort as no definition of 'significant' is 
provided by the Act itself. It has been held by the English courts in the cases of Morin v 
Bonhams & Brooks Limited69 and Protea Leasing v Air Cambodge Co Ltd7° that no reliance 
should be placed on the English common law in applying section 11(2)(c). Instead, the 
section requires "an analysis of all the elements constituting the tort as a matter of law, and a 
value judgment regarding their 'significance. '"'1 
Similar to the Distillers substance test and the Tolofson approach, the section 11(2)(c) "test is 
inherently vague and therefore permits considerable manipulation by the courts. "72 However, 
despite this similarity, there are still a number of differences between these approaches. 
1. First, the test can only take into consideration, elements of events which constitute 
the tort and these are normally the "acts and consequences that make up the tort. "73 
As seen above, the Tolofson test is similarly restricted. The English common law 
Distillers test, on the other hand, has no such limitations although it would be rare for 
the English courts to make use of factors other than these considerations. 
" ibid, at 179, 67 ibid. 
68 North, Fawcett, supra, n. 2, at 634. 69 (2003] EWCA Civ 1802. 
70 (2002] All ER (D) 224. 71 Morin, supra, n. 69, at [ 16]. See also, Dornoch Ltd v The Mauritius Union Assurance Company Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 389, at [47]. Trafigura, supra, 22, at (77]. 72 Clarkson, Hill, supra, n. 42, at 272. 73 North, Fawcett, supra, n. 2, at 634. 
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2. Secondly, as was pointed out by Moore Bick J in Protea Leasing, section 11(2)(c) 
provides for a more flexible approach in comparison to the Distillers substance test as 
it is "one which might yield different answers in different cases even in relation to the 
same kind of tort. n74 This flexibility is not shared by the English common law approach 
as it is used to "promote rule-creation for specific torts. "75 This appears to be the case 
for the Australian and Canadian tests as well. Accordingly, as a result of this 
difference, the section 11(2)(c) test is effectively the most flexible approach in our 
comparative study. 
2.2.5 Singapore 
No discussion of a general rule for working out the place of commission of a tort was made in 
the Singapore cases on tort choice of law. As such, we do not know what the Singapore 
approach is. The localisation of torts in these cases appears to have been made in a knee- 
jerk reaction to the tort in question without the application of any legal tests. 76 
2.3 TORT CHOICE OF LAW RULE 
2.3.1 The overall picture 
As there has been considerable activity in the evolution of the tort choice of law rule in our 
selected Commonwealth jurisdictions, a brief historical summary of these developments will 
first be provided before we embark on a detailed comparative examination of them. 
The starting point for the English common law tort choice of law rule is in the judgment of 
Willes J in Phillips v Eyre where he held that: 
74 Protea Leasing, supra, n. 70, at [78]. 75 Hams, Choice of Law in Tort 
- 
Blending in with the Landscape of the Conflict of Laws? (1998) 61 Modem Law Review 33, at 39. 
76 See for example, Coh Chok Tong v Tang Liang Hong [1997] 2 SLR 641, at [78]. 
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"[a]s a general rule, in order to found a suit in England for a wrong alleged 
to have been committed abroad, two conditions must be fulfilled. First, the 
wrong must be of such a character that it would have been actionable if 
committed in England... Secondly, the act must not have been justifiable 
by the law of the place where it was done. . 77 
For most of the twentieth century, Australian, 78 Canadian79 and Singaporean8° judges applied 
the above approach as their tort choice of law rule in uniformity with the English common law. 
Nevertheless, it has been pointed out that the scope of application of the Phillips v Eyre rule 
"has never been clear and it has been subjected to endless scrutiny and speculation though 
the words themselves have been regarded with the veneration appropriate to the words of a 
statute n8' It is thus unsurprising that a closer scrutiny of the relevant cases would reveal that 
divergences have occurred in relation to the interpretation of that rule in some of our selected 
jurisdictions. Furthermore, in recent years, Australia and Canada have departed from the 
Phillips V Eyre rule by adopting a lex loci delicti rule. Likewise, the 1995 Act has introduced a 
similar tort choice of law rule as well. In sharp contrast, the Phillips v Eyre rule is still good law 
in Singapore. 
Accordingly, we can examine the development of the tort choice of law rule in our selected 
Commonwealth jurisdictions at two different stages; first, before the rejection of the Phillips v 
Eyre rule, the divergences and convergences in relation to the interpretation of that rule and 
secondly, the divergences and convergences in relation to the Phillips v Eyre rule itself. 
77 Phillips v Eyre, supra, n. 1, at 28-29. 
'r There have been Australian lower court cases which applied the Phillips v Eyre rule before its endorsement by the High Court 
of Australia in Koop v Bebb (1951) 84 CLR 629 such as Potter v Broken Hill Pty Ltd. [ 1905] VLR 612 and Varawa v Howard Smith Ltd [ 1910] VR 509. 79 Clear endorsement of the Phillips v Eyre rule was provided for by the Supreme Court of Canada in Mclean v Pettigrew [ 1945] 2 DLR 65. Before this, there have been earlier lower court cases which adopted the same approach such as O'Connor v Wray 193012 DLR 899 and Can. Nat'l SS Co v Watson [1939] 1 DLR 273. 8"R JSneddon v AC Shafe [ 1947] 1 MLJ 197. 81 Sykes, A Textbook on the Australian Conflict of Laws (Sydney: The Law Book Company Limited) (1972), at 222. 
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2.3.2 Divergences and convergences in relation to the interpretation of the Phillips v 
Eyre rule 
In this subsection, the second limb of the Phillips v Eyre rule as well as its juridical nature will 
be used to illustrate the divergences and convergences that have occurred in relation to the 
interpretation of that tort choice of law rule in our selected jurisdictions. 
a) The second limb of the Phillips v Eyre rule 
English common law 
Two interpretations of the second limb of the Phillips v Eyre rule have been made by the 
English courts. First, in Phillips v Eyre, it was held that that limb required that the act be not 
justifiable by the lex loci delicti. Subsequently, in Machado v Fontes, 82 Lopes and Rigby LJJ 
read that statement as providing that the act complained of must not be "innocenti83 in the 
country where it was committed. If the act were contrary to the law of that country, though 
giving rise to no civil liability there, it would not be "justifiablei84 for the purposes of the second 
condition. In Boys v Chaplin85 however, the position in Machado was rejected and instead, 
Lord Wilberforce provided the second interpretation for this sub-section which is to consider 
both limbs of the test as requiring actionability. 86 
Australia 
Since the beginning of the 20th century, Australian courts have criticised the Machado 
interpretation of the Phillips v Eyre rule in cases such as Varawa v Howard Smith Ltd, 87 Koop 
V Bebb88 and Anderson v Eric Anderson Radio & TV Pty Ltd. 89 Although, these judicial 
statements were strictly obiter, it seems clear that Machado would not be followed if a dispute 
ex [1897] 2 QB 231. 
93 ibid, at 233 per Lopes IJ, at 235 per Rigby U. 9` ibid. 
" [1971] AC 356. 86 ibid, at 387-389. B' [1910] VR 509, at 523-524. 8'0 951) 84 CLR 629, at 642-643. B9 (1965) 114 CLR 20, at 40. 
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required a resolution of the interpretation of the second limb of the Phillips v Eyre rule for the 
Australian context. 9° Interestingly, the High Court of Australia In Koop v Bebb has held that it: 
"may be the true view that an act done in another country should be held to 
be an actionable wrong in Victoria if, first it was of such a character that it 
would have been actionable if it had been committed in Victoria, and 
secondly, it was such as to give rise to a civil liability by the law of the place 
where it was done. "91 
In other words, the High Court may have interpreted Phillips v Eyre as providing for a double 
actionability rule a few years before Boys v Chaplin. In particular, Lord Wilberforce mentioned 
the above quote from Koop v Bebb in the process of formulating the double actionability rule 
in Boys v Chaplin and though he did not explicitly state that the inspiration for his 
interpretation came from the High Court of Australia, one would submit that it forms, at least 
part of it. 92 In subsequent Australian cases 93 however, the Australian courts have held that 
"the plaintiff may succeed in his action if the defendant's conduct was actionable merely in the 
abstract under the lox loci delicti, even though there was in fact, in the circumstances of the 
case, no liability of any kind under that law. "94 It should be noted that this is not the case 
under the English common law position. 95 
In short, the Machado interpretation was probably not part of Australian law at this point in 
time. In addition, the Australian courts may have interpreted Phillips v Eyre as providing for a 
double actionability rule; a position that would only be reached by the English common law in 
the later case of Boys v Chaplin. 
Canada 
"This 
view is supported by the comments of Kelly J in Carleton v Freedom Publishing Co Ply Ltd (1982) 63 FLR 326, at 341 - 342 where he stated that "[i]n my opinion, Koop v Bebb left open the question considered by Cussen J in Varawa's case whether Machado v Fontes remains good law... it is, in my opinion, possible to say that the weight of authority in Australia is against its 
acceptance even though it has not been formally rejected. " 91 Koop v Bebb, supra, n. 88, at 643. 92 Boys v Chaplin (HL), supra, n. 85, at 388-390. 93 See for example, Eric Anderson Radio supra, n. 89, Hartley v Venn (1967) 10 FLR 151. 
'4 Law Commission Working Paper No. 87 (1984), at para. 2.16. 
" ibid, at para. 2.19. 
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In contrast to the Australian position, the Machado interpretation was endorsed by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in the case of Mclean v Pettigrew. 96 Accordingly, there was no 
Canadian divergence from the English common law position on this point of comparison at 
this point in time. 
After the House of Lords' rejection of the Machado interpretation of the Phillips v Eyre rule for 
a double actionability rule in Boys v Chaplin, the Canadian courts continued to apply the 
former approach as they were still bound by the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Mclean. The scene was thus set for a debate in the Canadian courts on two questions, first, 
whether they should adopt the English common law interpretation in Boys v Chaplin and 
secondly, whether the Mclean authority would be an obstacle to the adoption of the double 
actionability rule. Unfortunately, the bulk of the discussion was centred upon the latter as 
most courts simply assumed that there should be convergence. It was only in Grimes v 
Cloutiers' that the courts speculated obiter that the double actionability rule may not 
anecessarily afford the most desirable basis for resolving choice of law issues in tort cases. "98 
We now turn to examine the judicial resolution of the Mclean authority. 
Initial judicial reaction was tentative as lower courts "felt compelled by the constraints of the 
Supreme Court of Canada decision"99 to apply the Machado interpretation10° even though 
their reluctance was made clear by their express support for the English common law 
approach. 101 Eventually, judicial discontentment with Mclean would reach a climax with the 
case of Grimes v Cloutier where the Ontario Court of Appeal avoided the authority of Mclean 
by confining it to its factual matrix. They held that, in situations where the "two defendants live 
in the jurisdiction of the place where the tort occurred, "102 the rule in Boys v Chaplin would 
apply. In contrast, if neither party lived in the jurisdiction where the accident took place, the 
Ontario courts would be bound by the Mclean decision. 
%[ 1945] 2 DLR 65. 
"(1989) 61 DLR (4m) 505. 99 ibid, at [58]. 
"North, 
supra, n. 7, at 152. 100 See for example, Going v Reid Brothers Motor Sales Ltd (1982) 136 DLR (3d) 254, Lewis v Leigh (1986) 12 OAC 113, at 122. 
101 See for example, Going, ibid, at [ 106]. 102 Grimes, supra, n. 97, at [30]. 
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Later Ontario cases extended the scope of the decision in Grimes by providing that, so long 
as the residence of either one of the parties was that of the place of the tort, the Boys v 
Chaplin interpretation would operate. 103 However, this was then limited by the Ontario Court 
of Appeal in Williams v Osei-Twum104 which restricted the relevant factual inquiry to the 
residence of the parties. In particular, the courts held that other factors such as the residence 
of third party insurers were unhelpful in determining whether to apply Mclean. 
Hence, in effect, the Ontario courts have interpreted Grimes as providing for a two-tiered test, 
an initial factual analysis of the residence of the parties directly involved in the dispute 
followed by the application of either the Machado or the Chaplin interpretation. One point to 
note is that it is unclear as to whether courts of other provinces in Canada had adopted this 
approach. In particular, the British Columbia courts had been ambivalent as to its 
application. 105 
In comparison, there is no need for a preliminary examination of the residence of the parties 
under the English common law tort choice of law rule. For cases that do not fall on the Mclean 
side of the Grimes v Cloutier framework, it can be observed that the Ontario courts have 
adopted the double actionability rule. Conversely, the lex fora would be the applicable law if 
the actions of the defendant were at least punishable in the place where it was committed. 
The English courts have of course rejected this interpretation of the Phillips v Erye rule. 
Singapore 
Unlike the hostility of the Australian judiciaries towards the Machado interpretation of the 
Phillips v Eyre rule, Singapore courts have remained silent in this debate. In RJ Sneddon v 
AG Shafe, 106 the only Singapore tort choice of law case before the modification of the Phillips 
v Eyre rule in Boys v Chaplin, Brown J made no mention of the Machado interpretation. He 
103 See for example, Prefontaine Estate v Frizzle (1990) 71 OR (2d) 385, Buchar v Weber (1990) 71 DLR (4ih) 544. 1°1(1992) 99 DLR (4ih)146. 103 See for example, Vo v Millard (1994) 49 ACWS (3d) 461. 10'[1947] 1 MLJ 197. 
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did not even have to apply the Phillips v Eyre rule as no tort choice of law issue arose in the 
case itself due to a further finding that there was no tort in the first place. 107 
After Boys v Chaplin was decided, Singapore tort choice of law was slow in keeping up with 
the rapid developments in the Commonwealth world. When the Singapore courts examined 
the tort choice of law rules for torts committed abroad in 1996, academic curiosity was 
momentarily piqued by the judgement of Chao Hick Tin J in Frans Banbang Siswanto v 
Coutts108 where the lex loci deliciti was applied. Confusion was then generated by the later 
case of Goh Chok Tong v Tang Liang Hong109 where adherence to the Phillips v Eyre rule as 
modified by Boys v Chaplin was maintained. 10 As Yeo had pointed out, this was a "conflict 
between two High Court decisions""' and that it was "clearly open to the Court of Appeal... to 
consider what is the best position to adopt for Singapore, in the light of recent developments 
in England and the Commonwealth. 12 The Singapore Court of Appeal13 did deliberate on 
this issue and it opted for the English common law rule in Phillips v Eyre as well as the 
interpretation of that rule in Boys v Chaplin. 
b) The juridical nature of the Phillips v Eyre rule 
English common law and Singapore 
One interpretation of the Phillips v Eyre rule is that it functions as a "preliminary or 'threshold' 
rule which defined the circumstances in which the forum could assume jurisdiction" 114 thus 
leaving "another rule, to govern choice of law. "15 Generally, the threshold interpretation 
attracted the most support in Australia and Canada. In England, it was only examined late in 
the development of the Phillips v Eyre rule in the case of Boys v Chaplin. In particular, in that 
case, Lord Diplock in the English Court of Appeal suggested the use of the threshold 
107 ibid, at 201. 108 (Unreported, Singapore High Court, S/N 110/1996,9 November 1996). 
i0[1997]2SLR641. 
ibid, at [74]. 
Yeo, Private International Law: Recent developments in Singapore (1997) 1 Singapore Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 560, at 587. 112 ibid. 
13 Parno, supra, n. 5, at [36]. 14 Nygh, Davies, supra, n. 55, at 418. 13 North, supra, n. 7, at 156. 
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interpretation. ' 16 However, when the dispute went up to the House of Lords, Lord Wilberforce 
rejected that approach altogether. ' 17 It is thus obvious that this interpretation has not since 
featured much under the English common law. 
In Singapore, no mention of this interpretation was made till the case of Goh Chok Tong in 
1997. In that case, the Singapore High Court examined the various interpretations placed 
upon the juridical nature of the Phillips v Eyre rule and commented that "such 
characterisations are unnecessary in practice. "118 Despite this dismissal, they went on to 
support Lord Wilberforce's rejection of the threshold interpretation. In addition, it should also 
be noted that the Singapore Court of Appeal in Parno has indicated that the "applicable 
choice of law rule in Singaporen19 is provided for by Phillips v Eyre. 
Australia 
In comparison to the English common law and Singaporean position, the threshold 
interpretation of the Phillips v Eyre rule was raised at an early stage in the Australian courts in 
the cases of Eric Anderson Radio120 as well as Hartley v Venn. 121 In both cases, it was held 
that the Phillips v Eyre rule was a threshold rule and that on the facts of the case, it was 
satisfied. They then moved on to apply the lex fori to the substantive issues in question. At 
this point in time, there was no mention of the threshold approach in the English courts. 
Eventually, the threshold interpretation was raised and rejected by the English courts in Boys 
v Chaplin. In Breavington v Godleman, '22 the High Court of Australia made clear their 
preference for the interpretation of Phillips v Eyre as a choice of law rule. 123 Curiously, this 
was not followed in subsequent cases. 124 Most notably, Dawson J has held in the High Court 
16 Boys v Chaplin (CA) [1968] 2 QB 1, at 38-39. 1 17 Boys v Chaplin (HL), supra, n. 85, at 385-387. 111 Goh Chok Tong, supra, n. 109, at [76]. 119 Parno, supra, n. 5, at [36]. My italics. 120 Eric Anderson Radio, supra, n. 89, at 23. 121 Hartley v Venn, supra, n. 93, at 155. 
'u (1988) 169 CLR 1. ý23 ibid, at 110. Ju See for example, Gardner v Wallace (1995) 184 CLR 95, Thompson v Hill (1995) 38 NSWLR 714. 
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case of Gardner v Wallaoet25 that the Phillips v Eyre rule was only a threshold test, 126 in 
sharp contrast to the decision of the House of Lords in Boys v Chaplin. It should also be 
noted that there was uncertainty as to whether the lex fori127 or the lex loci delicti128 would be 
applied after the threshold rule was satisfied. In the end, this interpretation was rejected 
conclusively only at the start of this century when the High Court of Australia abandoned the 
English common law Phillips v Eyre rule. 129 
Canada 
In Canada, the threshold interpretation was first raised by Lieff J in Gagnon v Lecava/ier130 
where he held that the Phillips v Eyre rule "sets down the necessary conditions which must 
exist before an action can properly be entertained" 131 by the Canadian courts. However, the 
strength of the authority is doubtful as both counsel in the case were in agreement on the 
threshold interpretation and Lieff J simply concurred with that view. 132 As it was held that the 
Phillips v Eyre rule was not satisfied on the facts of the case and thus the Canadian courts 
had no "jurisdiction to entertain"133 the action, Lieff J did not examine what the choice of law 
rule would be once the threshold was met. 134 As mentioned above, at this point in time, this 
interpretation of the Phillips v Eyre rule was not even examined by the English courts. 
After the rejection of the threshold interpretation in Boys v Chaplin, there was some 
uncertainty as to whether this was the case as well in the Canadian courts. 135 Interestingly, in 
Tolofson v Jensen when the Supreme Court of Canada examined the judgment of Willes J in 
Phillips v Eyre, they commented obiter that the first limb "is strictly related to jurisdiction"136 
125 (1995) 184 CLR 95. 
126 ibid, at 98. 
'_' See for example, Gardner, ibid. 128 See for example, Arrowcrest Group Pry Ltd v Advertiser News Weekend Publishing Co Pty Ltd (1993) 113 FLR 57, Wilson v Nattrass (1995) 21 MVR 41. 
Pfeil er, supra, n. 3, at [24] 
- 
[26]. X30 (1967) 63 DLR (2d) 12. 
tbid, at [10]. 132 ibid. 
133 ibid, at [12]. 134 It was only in the later case of Ang v Trach (1987) 57 OR (2d) 300 that Canadian courts applied the lex fort as the substantive law after the threshold was met. 
'3s For cases supporting the threshold interpretation, see for example, Northern Alberta Rail Co vK&W Trucking Co Inc (1974) 62 DLR (3d) 378, Ang v Trach, ibid. For cases rejecting it, see for example, Interprovincial Co-operatives Ltd v The Queen 11976] 1 SCR 477, Mason v Mason (1988) 46 DLR (4'") 333, Grimes v Cloutier, supra, n. 97. 36 Tolofson, supra, n. 51, at [26]. 
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and the second, they would "normally think of as dealing with choice of law. "137 Their 
observation seems odd, as this was not the threshold approach adopted by lower Canadian 
courts in previous cases. All along, the Canadian provincial courts in support of such an 
interpretation have held that the entire Phillips v Eyre rule was a threshold rule. 
In spite of this confusion, the threshold interpretation has been rejected by the Supreme Court 
of Canada in Tolofson along with the Phillips v Eyre rule. 
2.3.3 Divergences and convergences in relation to the Phillips v Eyre rule 
In this section, we move on to examine the Australian and Canadian divergences from the 
Phillips v Eyre rule when their respective judiciaries abandoned it for the lex loci delicti. In 
addition, the English statutory tort choice of law rufe will be analysed as well. 
English common law and Singapore 
To reiterate, under the English common law, a "double limbed choice of law rule"138 is applied 
by the English courts for torts committed abroad. Derived from Phillips V Eyre and modified by 
Boys v Chaplin, the rule requires that the claim be actionable "as a tort according to English 
law, subject to the condition that civil liability in respect of the relevant claim exists as between 
the actual parties under the law of the foreign country where the act was done. "139 In short, 
the applicable law is the overlap between the lex loci delicti and the lex fora. 
As was mentioned above, the Singapore courts have adopted the English common law 
Phillips V Eyre rule. However, it must be noted that in the recent case of Ang Ming Chuang V 
Singapore Airlines Ltd140, Woo Bih Li J, a High Court judge stated that if he were "not bound 
by the doctrine of precedent, [he] would have departed from the double actionability rule for 
137 ibid. 
38 North, Fawcett, supra. n. 2, at 610. 39 Boys v Chaplin, supra, n. 85, at 389. 140 [2005] 1 SLR 409. 
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the reasons"141 provided by the Supreme Court of Canada in the case of Tolofson In favour 
of the lex loci delicti. "12 In addition, he pointed out that "Told/son was not drawn to the 
attention of [the Singapore] Court of Appeal"143 and that they may "consider it time to depart 
from the double actionability rufe. °"4 Accordingly, there is a distinct possibility that this 
Singapore conformity with the English common law Phillips v Eyre rule may not be maintained 
in future cases. 
Canada 
After decades of Canadian adherence to the English common law tort choice of law rule, in 
1994, the Phillips v Eyre rule was abandoned by the Supreme Court of Canada in Tolofson v 
Jensen and replaced by the lex loci delicti for both inter-provincial and international torts. 145 
Clearly, this is a Canadian divergence from the English common law position. 
However, despite the removal of the lex for! from the Canadian tort choice of law rule, it is 
important to note that the application of the two approaches may often generate the same 
result. To elaborate, it can be observed from tort choice of law cases that most claimants 
bring their action in a particular forum when the lex for! is more advantageous to their claim as 
compared to the lex loci delicti. 146. However, if they brought their claim in England or 
Singapore, as the double actionability rule would provide for the application of the law that is 
common to both jurisdictions, the "claimant [could] never succeed to a greater extent than is 
provided for by the less generous of the two systems of law concerned. "147 
Take for example, Boys v Chaplin. The claimant wanted to avoid a particular rule of Maltese 
law which prevented the recovery of damages for non-pecuniary losses, in contrast to English 
law which allows for such heads of damages. However, as their claim for non-pecuniary 
damages would not be recoverable under Maltese law, the plaintiffs' claim was not actionable 
141 ! bid, at [50]. 142 ! bid, 
143 ibid. 
144 ibid, 
us Tolofson, supra, n. 51, at [43]. 
"6 Usually, the forum will have higher caps on damages, less restrictions on the types of losses one can bring an action for or longer limitation periods as compared to the law where the tort was committed thus attracting the litigant to the forum. 147 Law Commission Working Paper No. 87 (1984), at para. 3.9. 
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under the second limb of the double actionability rule. Effectively, this meant that the Maltese 
rule in relation to the non-existence of a specific head of damages was applied. ' 48 Likewise, if 
the double actionability rule were applied to the cases of Pfeiffer v Rogerson149 and Renault v 
Zhang, 150 the end result would still be the application of the rule that the claimant wanted to 
avoid i. e. the lex loci delicti. Hence, at least in relation to claimants who engage in such forum 
shopping, the lex fori will not play any part under both tort choice of law rules unless an 
exception is used to apply that law. 
Accordingly, it is only if an action were brought in the English courts when the lex loci delicti is 
more favourable to a litigant's claim that the application of the double actionability rule would 
generate a different result from the lex loci delicti rule. 151 Since this situation is rare, one could 
argue that in practical terms, the two tests are likely to produce the same result in the majority 
of cases. Nonetheless, it is important to note that significant differences lie in the policy 
objectives that the two tests are attempting to meet. This will be dealt with in greater detail in 
Chapter 6. 
England: Part III of the 1995 Act 
As was mentioned above, to work out the applicable law under section 11 of the 1995 Act, we 
have to localise the tort in question before applying that jurisdiction's law to the legal issues at 
hand. As this involves identifying the place where the tort is committed, the tort choice of law 
rule under the 1995 Act is effectively a statutory lex loci delicti rule. 
Structurally, the Canadian tort choice of law rule is different from the section 11 tort choice of 
law rule under the 1995 Act as the rules identifying the place of the tort and the tort choice of 
law rule itself are separate from one another. In contrast, the 1995 Act fuses these two rules 
"' lt was only with the application of an exception to the double actionability rule that the claimants were able to recover their 
non-pecuniary losses in Boys v Chaplin. Another example is provided by Johnson v Coventry Churchill International Ltd[ 19921 3 All ER 14 where the lex loci delicti, German law was effectively applied as there was no liability under that law. 
'" (2000) 203 CLR 503. 
150 (2002) 187 ALR 1. 151 See for example, Red Sea Insurance where the favourable law to the counter-claimants was the lex loci delicti instead of the lex fora. In that case, the lex fori would be the effective applicable law as it was the lowest common denominator between the lex fort and the lex loci delicti. This situation arose, in contrast to Boys v Chaplin and Johnson, only because the claimants brought the defendants to court in relation to the dispute but the defendants counter claimed on a tort choice of law issue. 
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into a single test. In practical terms, however they are the same as both sets of rules 
effectively apply the law of the place where the tort is committed. Accordingly, the 
observations made above on the lex loci delicti and the double actionability rule are relevant 
here as well. 
Australia 
After Boys v Chaplin was decided, 152 the High Court of Australia had to address the question 
of whether the double actionability rule was part of Australian tort choice of law in the case of 
Breavington v Godleman. In particular, a majority of the Justices applied the lex loci delicti to 
the substantive issue but the manner in which they came to that result differed drastically. 153 
However, despite this uncertainty, it is clear from the case itself that most members of the 
High Court of Australia have rejected the English common law Phillips v Eyre rule. Oddly 
enough, in the later cases of McKain vRW Miller154 and Stevens v Head 
'115 the double 
actionability rule was once again adopted by the High Court of Australia. In other words, an 
Australian convergence with the English common law tort choice of law rule has taken place. 
It was only at the beginning of this century that the English common law Phillips v Eyre rule 
was abandoned by the High Court of Australia in the cases of Pfeiffer v Rogerson and 
Renault v Zhang and replaced by the lex loci delicti for both inter-state and international torts. 
Accordingly, it can be observed that the lex loci delicti is now the tort choice of law rule in 
Australia, Canada and England with regards to the 1995 Act. However, there is one important 
difference between the lex loci delicti rules in these countries that we have to take note of. In 
the recent High Court of Australia case of Neilson v Overseas Projects Corporation of Victoria 
Ltd, 156 the majority Justices have held that the Australian lex loci delicti rule for international 
torts is "not to be confined to reference to what the forum classifies as the domestic law of 
132 There were lower Australian court cases which have endorsed the double actionability rule. See for example, Corcoran v Corcoran [1974] VR 164, Borg Warner (Australia) Ltd v Zupan [1982] VR 437. In contrast, some have refused. See for 
examp] e, Carleton supra, n. 90. 133 The issues in the case was first, whether the applicable law was to be found in a common law choice of law rule or in the 
provisions of the Australian constitution and secondly, whether the common law rule should follow the traditional choice of law 
rule in Phillips v Eyre or whether a new choice of law rule should be formulated for intra-Australian torts. 134 (1991) 174 CLR 1. 
55 (1993) 176 CLR 433. 36 [2005] HCA 54. 
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that jurisdiction: the law that that foreign jurisdiction would apply in case having no element 
foreign to it but otherwise identical with the facts under consideration. "157 Instead, the 
applicable law is "the whole of the law of that place"158 including its tort choice of law regime. 
In other words, renvoi is part of the Australian tort choice of law rule. 159 
In comparison, it is unclear whether renvoi is applicable to the Canadian tort choice of law 
rule as the point has not yet arisen in the Canadian courts. It is however clear from section 
9(5) of the 1995 Act that that the applicable law as determined by section 11 of the Act refers 
to the domestic law of the country in question. It does not refer to its private international law 
rules. Similarly, it has been said that there is no place for the doctrine of renvoi in relation to 
the English common law tort choice of law rule. 16° 
2.4 EXCEPTION TO THE TORT CHOICE OF LAW RULE 
2.4.1 English common law and Singapore 
Under the English common law, it was accepted by a majority of the House of Lords in Boys v 
Chaplin that there should be an exception to the double actionability rule. However, no 
consensus was reached on its formulation. Lord Hodson and Lord Wilberforce preferred a 
significant relationship test based on the American Second Restatement. 161 Lord Pearson, in 
contrast, wanted an exception specifically designed to discourage forum shopping if the law of 
the forum were effectively the applicable law. 162 In subsequent cases, however, English 
judges have adopted Lord Wilberforce's definition of the exception despite the lack of a clear 
majority in the House of Lords for his approach. 163 Most notably, the Privy Council in Red Sea 
Insurance has held that: 
'57 ibid. at [102]. 158 ibid. 
159 It is unclear from Neilson as to whether renvoi in the Australian context is single or total renvol. Five Justices namely, Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Heydon, Gummow and Hayne JJ were of the view that it was unnecessary to determine this issue. Callinan J preferred a single renvoi doctrine whereas McHugh J rejected renvoi altogether in his judgment. 160 Law Commission Working Paper No. 87 (1984), at para. 2.18. 161 Boys v Chaplin, supra, n. 85, at 378 per Lord Hodson, at 389-393 per Lord Wilberforce. 
. 62 ibid, at 406. 163 See for example, Church of Scientology of California v Metropolitan Police Comr (1976) 120 Sol Jo 690, Pearce, supra, n. 12, Kuwaiti Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co [2002] 2 WLR 1353. 
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"a particular issue between the parties to litigation may be governed by the 
law of the country which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant 
relationship with the occurrence and with the parties"'64 
and that this exception can be used to apply the lex fori or the lex loci delicti individually. 165 
Once again, the Singapore Court of Appeal has indicated its support of the English common 
law position by endorsing the flexible exception provided for in Red Sea Insurance in the case 
of Parno. 166 
2.4.2 Australia 
When the question whether there should be an exception to the Australian tort choice of law 
rule first arose in the High Court of Australia in the case of Breavington, no resolution of this 
issue was possible due to conflicting judgments from the various Justices. Subsequently, 
when the double actionability rule was endorsed by the High Court of Australia in Stevens v 
Head and McKain v Miller, it was held that this rule was to be applied with no exceptions 
whatsoever. 167 As the two cases involved inter-state torts, it was unclear as to whether a 
flexible exception would be applicable to international torts. Australian lower courts have 
opted to extend the decision in McKain and Stevens to international cases. 168 The lack of a 
flexible exception in Australia at this point in time is clearly a departure from the English 
common law position. 
The opposition of the High Court towards an exception to the Australian tort choice of law rule 
was maintained in Pfeiffer and Renault. In particular, Pfeiffer is authority that there is no 
flexible exception to the /ox loci delicti rule with regards to inter-state torts. As for international 
torts, the flexible exception was also rejected by the Australian courts in Renault. However, 
164 Red Sea, supra, n. 9, at 206. 
"s See In the Matter of T&N Ltd v in the Matter of the Insolvency Act 1986 [2005] EWHC 2990 for a recent discussion of the flexible exception. 166 Parno, supra, n. 5, at [36]. For the application of the flexible exception by a Singapore court, see for example, Ang Ming Chuang supra, n. 140. 1b7 McKain, supra, n. 154, at 38 
- 
39, Stevens, supra, n. 155, at 453. 168 See for example, James Hardie & Co Ply Ltd v Hall (1998) 43 NSWLR 554. 
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this did not mean that no exception was available to the Australian tort choice of law rule for 
international torts. In particular, they pointed out that the purpose of the first limb of the 
double actionability rule when it was introduced in The Halley169 was to refuse the application 
of a foreign law in circumstances where it is deemed to be manifestly contrary to public 
policy. Since "[p]ublic policy reservations 
... 
cannot be contained in closed categories 
, 
WO 
they held that such issues should be confronted directly under a public policy exception. 
It can be observed that the existence of an exception to the lex loci delicti in Australia is 
dependent on whether the tortious dispute in question is inter-state or international in nature. 
In contrast, the English common law does not distinguish between these two situations. 
Accordingly, in relation to inter-state torts, there is clearly an Australian divergence from the 
English common law position as there is no exception available in these circumstances. As 
for international torts, the Australian public policy exception is obviously different from the 
English common law flexible exception. In particular, the similarities and differences between 
the two exceptions are as follows: 
1. On the one hand, the flexible exception is used to identify the law which has the most 
significant relationship to the issue in question. In applying this exception, the courts 
are concerned with the connections between the dispute and the jurisdictions in 
question or if they adopt the governmental interest analysis approach, the purpose of 
the relevant legal rules to work out which law has the most interest in the dispute. On 
the other hand, the public policy exception would be applied only if the "foreign law 
[were] manifestly incompatible with public policy. ""' The courts would thus consider 
the nature of the foreign law and whether it goes against the public policy of the 
forum. 
2. Secondly, the public policy exception can only be invoked to apply the lex fora "in 
cases where foreign law is manifestly incompatible with public policy. "172 Essentially, 
'69 (1868) LR 2 PC 193. 
, 70 Renault, supra, n. 150, at (53). 
"' North, Fawcett, supra, n. 2, at 124. 
'n ibid. 
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the Australian courts are looking for infringements of fundamental concepts such as 
morality, human liberty or even the interests of the country as a whole. The public 
policy exception is thus unlikely to be used against a foreign law, as the foreign 
judiciary will deem it as a criticism of their laws. Furthermore, a distinction is drawn 
between "all-pervadingn13 and "merely local" 174 rules of public policy and the latter 
will not be applied under the public policy exception. There is thus a high threshold 
that must be surmounted before the lex fori can be applied under the public policy 
exception. 
Even though the threshold for the flexible exception is high; it is only applied when 
the connecting factors of the case are overwhelmingly in favour of applying another 
law and it is not as high as the threshold for the public policy exception. As Kirby J 
has pointed out, "public policy was not the criterion"15 in the application of English 
law under the exception in Boys v Chaplin. Specifically, the Maltese law in question 
would not fall foul of English public policy and the claimant would only be able to 
obtain the meagre compensation of 53 pounds. 
3. Thirdly, under the public policy exception, the lex fori is the only law that can be 
applied to replace the lex loci delicti. The exception cannot be used to apply any 
other law. In contrast, the starting point for the English common law rules is different 
as it provides for the application of a combination of the lox for! and lex loci delicti. 
Hence, it is not surprising that the flexible exception can be used to apply either the 
lex fori or the lex loci delicti on its own. Furthermore, it may be used to apply a law 
"which is neither the forum nor the place of the wrong. "176 Although there is no 
authority supporting this view, the flexible exception with its emphasis on connecting 
factors does appear to allow this stance. In contrast, a third country's law can never 
be applied under the public policy exception. 
173 ibid. 
'74 ibid. 
ý7s Renault, supra, n. 150, at [ 122]. 176 North, Fawcett, supra, n. 2, at 613. 
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It is thus interesting to view the comments of Kirby J in Renault v Zhang. At first, he doubted 
that all issues addressed by the flexible exception could be adequately subsumed in 
considerations of public policy. "' However, as he believed that in most cases the same result 
that comes with the use of the flexible exception could be reached by the public policy 
exception as well, he chose not to dissent on this point. In light of the analysis above, this is 
questionable. "Public policy will only exclude the lex loci delicti where applying such law 
would be repugnant to public morality or standards of justice. P178 It cannot be applied to the 
classic scenario of the Australian tourists who meet with a car accident while on holiday in a 
fortuitous foreign land. 
It should also be noted that in relation to the English common law double actionability rule, 
litigants can rely on a public policy exception to apply the lax fori. 179 However, there is seldom 
any need for recourse to this exception in the English courts as it is easier for litigants to 
make use of the flexible exception to achieve the same result. 
2.4.3 Canada 
After Boys v Chaplin was decided, the Ontario courts developed a unique two-tiered tort 
choice of law regime to avoid the earlier ruling of the Supreme Court of Canada in Mclean. In 
relation to factual scenarios that do not fall on the Mclean side of the tort choice of law 
regime, the Ontario courts have held that a flexible exception is applicable to the double 
actionability rule. 180 However, on the other side of this framework, the Ontario courts are still 
compelled to apply the test provided for in Mclean, the Machado interpretation of the Phillips V 
Eyre rule. There is no flexible exception to the Phillips v Eyre rule in this situation as Machado 
and Mclean were decided before the introduction of an exception in Boys v Chaplin. 
In relation to Mclean, it can be argued that the same result will be reached by the application 
of the flexible exception, as it is often the case where both parties are from the local forum, 
'n Renault, supra, n. 150, at 1122]-[1231. 
"8 Duckworth, Case Note: Regie Nationale des Usines Renault SA v Zhang, Certainty or Justice? Bringing Australian Choice of Law Rules for International Torts into the Modern Era [2002] 24 Sydney Law Review 569, at 578. Kuwaiti Airways Corp, supra, n. 163. Grimes, supra, n. 97, at [38]. 
96 
the lex fori will be applied to replace the double-limbed choice of law rule. 181 Hence, it is 
possible to say that the divergence as created by the lack of a flexible exception in Mclean is 
not as stark as it seems. However, on closer scrutiny, two differences can be discerned from 
a comparison of the two tests. Under the flexible exception, courts are to locate the law which 
"has the most significant relationship with the occurrence and the parties"182 in relation to the 
particular issue in question. The factors that can be considered by the courts are not limited to 
the parties' residence. Furthermore, the application of the lex for! is also dependent on the 
issue in question183 and under the Mclean scenario, regardless of the relevance of the 
applicable law to the dispute in question, so long as the factual requirements are met, the lex 
for/ will be applied subject to whether the claim in the locus delicti is justifiable. 
Subsequently, when La Forest J rejected the Phillips v Eyre rule and replaced it with the lex 
loci delicti, he held that "there is little to gain and much to lose in creating an exception to the 
lex loci delicti in relation to domestic litigation. "184 It can be observed that this is the position 
under Australian law as well. However, he did concede that there might be an exception for 
international torts although he failed to specify what exactly it is. 185 
Some Canadian provincial courts have held that, where there is a real and substantial 
connection between the action and the forum, it would be appropriate to apply the lex fori 
instead of the lex loci delicti. 186 This approach appears to be similar to the English common 
law flexible exception. Others have stated that a public policy exception is available where the 
application of the foreign law violates some fundamental principle of justice. 187 This is the 
approach that the Australian courts have taken in relation to international torts. Also, a 
1e' This was the suggestion made in Vo v Millard, supra, n. 105, at [10] where the courts held that they were bound by Mclean Y Pettigrew on the facts of the case at hand and even if Boys v Chapin was to be applied, "this is likely a case in which the court 
would ultimately apply the flexibility rule. " 
'82 Red Sea, supra, n. 9, at 206. 183 In Boys v Chaplin, if the issue in question is on the standard of driving, it can be argued that the connection to Malta would 
not be as weak, as it can be said that Maltese law would be interested in the standard of driving on their streets. 1'4 To%fson, supra, n. 51, at [67]. For Canadian provincial courts' endorsement of this position, see for example, Bezan v Vander Hoojt (2004) 45 CPC (5th) 203, Soriano (Litigation Guardian of) v Palacios [2004] OJ No. 2178. yes Tolofson, ibid, at [67]. 
See for example, Hanlon v Sernesky (1998) 38 OR (3d) 479, Lebert v Skinner Estate (2001) 53 OR (3d) 559. 187 See for example, Britton v O'Callaghan (2002) 57 OR (3d) 644. 
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number of Canadian lower courts have held that they have a discretion to depart from the lex 
loci delicti if the application of that rule resulted in injustice. 188 
One can thus observe that Canadian law is still unclear as to the nature of the exception to 
the lex loci delicti for international torts. To illustrate this uncertainty, two of the exceptions 
provided by Canadian lower courts will be examined in greater detail, namely, the British 
Columbia exception and the Ontario exception. 
a) British Columbia definition 
A wide definition of injustice was provided in the case of Wong v Wei189 where the courts held 
that there is injustice where both parties are from the local forum and there are "clear policy 
differences reflected by the competing"190 laws. 
Examining the judgment itself, one suspects that the British Columbian courts are applying 
the governmental interest analysis approach under the guise of the injustice exception. In 
particular, they held that it would be "unjust 
... 
to apply any law of damages other than that of 
British Columbia to an action involving any British Columbia residents"191 as it is "obvious that 
British Columbia is the only jurisdiction that will be affected by an award of damages. "192 More 
importantly, "the quantitative difference in the amount of damages available in Canada as 
opposed to the amount available in California is so significant that the laws are fundamentally 
incompatible. "193 In essence, the British Columbian courts appear to be saying that California 
has no interest in applying its damages rule to parties who are not Californians and instead, it 
is British Columbian law which has the most interest in the matter. British Columbian law was 
thus applied to the dispute in question. 
1. S See for example, Wong v Lee (2002) 55 OR (3d) 398. 189 (1999) 10 W WR 296. 190 ibid, at [30]. 191 ibid, at [18]. My italics. 
"2 ibid. 
"; ibid, at [19]. Under British Columbia law, there is a cap on non-pecuniary damages. 
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b) Ontario definition 
In Wong v Lee, 194 Feldman JA of the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the Ontario exception 
to the lex loci delicti rule is to be limited to addressing "injustice in exceptional cases "195 In 
particular, he stressed that the fact that all of the parties are from the forum was not enough 
to create an injustice and that the test is whether the differences between the "laws of the 
forums"196 in question are "beyond ordinary"197 "[M]ere differences in public policy"198 would 
not qualify as an injustice. 
Applying the exception, Feldman JA held that there was no injustice in relation to the fact that 
New York law, the lex loci delicti in the case, allows for the recovery of "pecuniary damages 
without a deductible, whereas under Ontario law, this would not be the case"199 even though 
both parties are from Ontario. Applying Ontario law here would merely be "another way of 
applying the public policy of Ontario as defined in its law, and effectively treating the fact that 
all of the parties are from the forum as in itself creating an injustice n200 This formulation of the 
injustice exception was endorsed and applied in Somers v Fournier201 where the Ontario 
Court of Appeal held that the "denial of the opportunity to claim damages by reason of the 
expiration of a limitation period does not constitute injustice sufficient to support an exception 
to the lex loci delicti rule. "202 
What would be sufficient to satisfy the injustice exception laid out in Wong v Lee? One 
example provided for by Feldman JA is where there is "unavailability to an Ontario plaintiff of 
a complete category of claim or cause of action according to the lex fori - the claims of family 
members for damages pursuant to s. 61 of the Family Law Act R. S. O. 1990; n203 a situation 
"` (2002) 55 OR (3d) 398. 
19S ibid. at [12]. 196 ibid. at [ 16]. 
'v' ibid. 
'" ibid. 
1" ibid, at [ 171. 200 ibid. 
201 (2002) 60 OR (3d) 225. 
2Q ibid, at [42]. For other examples on the application of the Ontario injustice test, see also, Britton v O'Callaghan (2002) 62 OR (3d) 95, Roy v North American Leisure Group Inc (2004) 73 OR (3d) 561. 203 Wong v Lee, supra, n. 194, at [ 16]. 
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which occurred in the case of Han/an v Sernesky. 204 This is thus an example of a situation 
where there is an extraordinary difference between the lex fors and the lox loci delicti. 
Accordingly, it appears that in the application of the Ontario exception, foreign laws which do 
not provide for tortious liability in relation to the actions of the defendant unlike the position 
under the lex fori would fall foul of the justice exception. In contrast, foreign laws which impact 
upon the consequences of liability would not be considered unjust. 
Comparing the Ontario exception with the Australian and English common law exceptions, a 
number of points can be made. 
1. Both the Ontario injustice exception and the Australian public policy exception are 
similar in that they do not take into account connecting factors. In contrast, these are 
the key factors taken into account by the English courts in the application of the 
English common law flexible exception. Instead, the focus of the Ontario and 
Australian exceptions is on the nature of the foreign law. However, it Is important to 
note that there are still differences even between these two exceptions. On the one 
hand, the Ontario exception focuses on the differences between the lex loci delicfi 
and the lox fori and if the differences were extraordinary, the exception would be 
satisfied. On the other hand, the Australian public policy exception is invoked when 
the foreign law is manifestly incompatible with fundamental principles of justice and 
morality. Accordingly, it is clear that the Ontario injustice exception is not equivalent 
to the Australian public policy exception as it is unlikely that the example given by 
Feldman JA; "unavailability to an Ontario plaintiff of a complete category of claim or 
cause of action according to the lex fori"205 would fall foul of any Canadian public 
policy categories. 206 
2. From the above, it can be seen that the threshold for the Ontario injustice exception is 
lower than that of the Australian public policy exception. It is probably easier to satisfy 
=a (1998) 38 OR (3d) 479. 20 ibid. 
206 See for example, Castel, Canadian Conflict of Laws (Toronto: Butterworths) (4'" ed., 1997), at 171. "essential public or moral interest" or "conception of essential justice and morality. " 
100 
the English common law flexible exception in comparison with the Ontario exception 
as the litigant only has to establish that the connecting factors to the tortious dispute 
are overwhelmingly in favour of another country's laws. He does not have to show 
that there is an extraordinary difference between the competing laws. 
3. Thirdly, as Feldman JA's utilisation of the Ontario injustice exception involves a 
comparison between the lex fori and the lex loci delicti, it is arguable that a third 
country's law cannot be applied under this exception. Similarly, the Australian public 
policy exception is subject to the same limitation. In contrast, the English common law 
flexible exception is likely to allow for the application of a third country's law. 
2.4.4 England: Part /H of the 1995 Act 
After section 11 of the 1995 Act is used to identify an applicable law, section 12 of that Act 
can be used to displace that law with a different choice of law. Under this section, a complex 
process has to be followed through. First, we have to identify the issues arising for dispute. 
Secondly, we have to identify the factors which connect the tort with the country identified by 
section 11 as well as the factors connecting the tort to any other country. Section 12(2) 
provides for a non-exhaustive list of such factors. Thirdly, we have to determine the 
significance of the above factors and compare them. After this comparison, the applicable law 
under section 11 would only be displaced if it were "substantially more appropriate"207 for the 
law of the other country to determine the issue in question. 208 
Comparing the section 12 exception with the rest of our exceptions in this subsection, a few 
points can be made. 
1. The section 12 exception is similar to the flexible exception in that both require an 
examination of connecting factors. This is in contrast to the Australian and Canadian 
207 Section 12(l), 1995 Act. 208 For the application of section 12, see for example, Roerig v Valiant Trawlers Lid [2002] 1 All ER 961, Edmunds v Simmonds [200111 WLR 1003, The Queen (On the Application of HilalAbdul-Razzaq Ali Al-Jedda) v Secretary of State for Defence [2006] EWCA Civ 327, Trafigura, supra, n. 22. 
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focus on the nature of the foreign law. However, section 12 is "considerably wider 
than the position at [English] common Iaw"209 at least in one sense. For the latter, the 
relevant factors are limited to the occurrence and the parties involved. Section 12, on 
the other hand, includes all factors which connect the tort to a country. However, this 
appears to suggest that policy considerations and state interests cannot be utilised by 
the courts in applying section 12 as they are unrelated to the tort itself. The English 
common law position does appear to allow such considerations as can be seen in 
Johnson v Coventry Churchill International Ltd21° where Kay QC was obviously 
influenced by the fact that English workmen would be best protected by English law 
under the circumstances of the case. Furthermore, he stressed that German law was 
uninterested in either of the parties, as both the employer and the employee are non- 
German citizens. 
2. Once again, the threshold for the Australian public policy exception as well as the 
Ontario injustice exception is higher than that for the section 12 exception as these 
are exceptions not lightly invoked by the Australian and Ontario courts. The 
application of these exceptions often amount to criticisms of a foreign law. It is clear 
there are no such problems in relation to the section 12 exception. However, the 
threshold for its operation is still uncertain. We do know that both the flexible 
exception and the section 12 exception require the "overwhelming weight of 
factors"211 to be with the "country other than the one whose law is applicable under 
the general rule. "212 However, we do not know whether the two exceptions share 
exactly the same threshold. In particular, there are some doubts as to whether 
section 12 could displace Maltese law with English law when applied to the facts of 
Boys V Chaplin. In particular, we do not know whether the statutory exception 
requires all the factors other than the place of the accident to point to the other 
country's law. It cannot be said that this is the case under the flexible exception as 
applied to the facts of Boys v Chaplin as "both parties were temporarily stationed in 
209 North, Fawcett 
, 
supra, n. 2, at 638. 210[1992]3AllER14. 
211 North, Fawcett, supra, it. 2, at 643. 212 ibid. 
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Malta and this was not a fortuitous place of injury. 413 Garland J in Edmunds V 
Simmonds214 has stated that Boys v Chaplin is "still good law"215 even in relation to 
the application of the section 12 exception. In Roerig v Valiant Trawlers Ltd, 216 
however, Waller U appears to suggest that the place of accident should be fortuitous 
before the section 12 exception can be used. 1 2 
3. Finally, section 12 can be used to apply a third country's law as can be seen from the 
wording of the section. 218 It is likely that this is the position under the English common 
law exception as well. In contrast, the Australian and Canadian exceptions do not 
permit the application of a third country's law. 
3. EXAMINING THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE BREAK UP OF COMMONWEALTH 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN RELATION TO TORT CHOICE OF LAW 
From our analysis above, a break up of Commonwealth private international law in relation to 
tort choice of law has clearly occurred in our selected jurisdictions. In particular, the judiciaries 
in Australia and Canada have adopted the lex loci delicti as their tort choice of law rule with 
extremely limited exceptions. In England, the role of the English common law tort choice of 
law regime has been significantly reduced with the enactment of the 1995 Act. It should also 
be noted that even though the Australian and Canadian courts have adopted the lex loci 
delicti rule as their tort choice of law rule, we have established that there is no uniformity 
between the tort choice of law regimes in Australia, and Canada. Singapore provides for an 
interesting contrast as her tort choice of law regime is still that provided for by the English 
common law. All the above would indicate that the phenomenon we are studying in this thesis 
in relation to tort choice of law has occurred to a large extent in our selected jurisdictions. 
It is also important to note that the break up of this particular area of private international law 
213 ibid. 
214 [2001] 1 WLR 1003. 
ibid, at 1010. 216 [2002] 1 All ER 961. 217 ibid, at [12]. 214 Section 12(1 Xb), 1995 Act, "the significance of any factors connecting the tort or delict with another country. " My italics. 
103 
in relation to our selected Commonwealth jurisdictions has not been a modern occurrence in 
that it has been going on for most of the last century. The common law tort choice of law 
regime in Australia, in particular has been moving towards and away from the English 
common law position. In other words, the extent of the Australian divergence from the English 
common law tort choice of law regime can be described as having fluctuated throughout the 
passage of time. The rest of this section will be used to illustrate this point. 
3.1 AUSTRALIA 
For Australia, even though the English common law Phillips v Eyre rule was adopted by the 
High Court of Australia at the beginning of the last century, there was no Australian uniformity 
with the English common law as divergences may have been generated by the Australian 
courts' rejection of the Machado interpretation at this early point in time. It is however 
important to note that these divergences were not in relation to the English common law tort 
choice of law rule itself but with regards to its interpretation, most notably the second limb of 
the Phillips v Eyre rule. There is also some indication that the Australian courts may have 
provided for a double actionability rule before the English courts in the later case of Boys v 
Chaplin. Accordingly, it is arguable that the break up of this particular area of private 
international law is not a recent phenomenon. 
In 1971, the House of Lords in Boys v Chaplin held that the Phillips v Eyre rule was to be 
interpreted as a double actionability rule. An exception was also held to be applicable to this 
rule. It is thus possible to read this change in English law as a shift towards the Australian 
position in relation to the tort choice of law rule although, it must be noted there was no clear 
statement by the High Court of Australia that the Phillips v Eyre rule was to be applied as a 
double actionability rule. The statements supporting this interpretation in the past were obiter. 
Even though there was no clear statement emerging from the High Court of Australia case of 
Breavington on the nature of the Australian tort choice of law rule, a majority of the Justices 
did reject the continued application of the Phillips v Eyre rule. However, in the subsequent 
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cases of Steven v Head and McKain v Miller, the double actionability rule was reinstated by 
the High Court of Australia. While this was certainly a convergence with the English common 
law tort choice of law rule, there was a divergence from the English common law exception to 
that rule, as the majority Justices in these two cases refused to adopt a flexible exception. 
Finally, at the beginning of this century, the Phillips v Eyre rule was abandoned and replaced 
by a lex loci delicti rule in Pfeiffer v Rogerson and Renault v Zhang. Furthermore, the High 
Court of Australia refused to provide for a flexible exception to their tort choice of law rule. In 
particular, they held that no exception was applicable to inter-state torts and for international 
torts, only a public policy exception was available. Recently, another significant contribution 
was made by the High Court of Australia towards the break up of Commonwealth private 
international law in relation to tort choice of law when they held in Neilson v Overseas 
Projects Corporation of Victoria Ltd that renvoi is now part of their tort choice of law rule. 
3.2 CANADA 
For most of the last century, there was uniformity with the English common law position on 
tort choice of law in Canada as the Phillips v Eyre rule and the Machado interpretation were 
adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada. It should however be noted that there was some 
suggestion that the Phillips v Eyre rule in Canada at that time, was a threshold rule. 
When Boys v Chaplin provided for a double actionability rule, there was a Canadian 
divergence from the English common law tort choice of law regime as the Machado 
interpretation was still binding on the Canadian courts due to its endorsement by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Mclean v Pettigrew. The situation in Canada was then further complicated 
by the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Grimes v Cloutier to provide for a two-tiered 
test to avoid the problems generated by the Machado interpretation. Despite these 
divergences, it is notable that the Canadian departure from the English common law position 
was in relation to the interpretation of the Phillips v Eyre rule rather than a rejection of that 
rule itself at this point in time. 
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In 1994, with the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Tolofson v Jensen to abandon 
the Phillips v Eyre rule for a lex loci delicti rule for both inter-provincial and international torts, 
it is clear that the English common law tort choice of law regime is no longer part of Canadian 
law. Furthermore, the flexible exception was rejected by the Suprem Court of Canada. In 
particular, it was held that an exception to the Canadian tort choice of law rule was only 
available for international torts. Some Canadian provincial courts have held that the lex loci 
delicti could be displaced for such torts only if its application resulted in injustice 
It should also be noted that the Canadian tort choice of law regime is different from that of 
Australia's as renvoi does not appear to be part of the Canadian lex loci delicti rule. In 
addition, the courts of these jurisdictions have provided for different exceptions to the tort 
choice of law rule for international torts. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
1. It is unclear whether unknown foreign torts can be examined under the Australian, 
Canadian, Singaporean and English common law tort choice of law regimes. In 
contrast, it is clear that unknown foreign torts can be characterised as "torts" for the 
purposes of the 1995 Act. 
2. In identifying the location of a tort, variations of a broad and discretionary test have 
been employed by the judiciaries in England, Canada and Australia. In relation to the 
1995 Act, two rules are relevant. A place of injury/damage rule is applicable to torts 
involving injury, death and property damage. For all other torts, a 'most significant 
element of the tort' test is used. For Singapore, the courts do not appear to have 
endorsed any general approach for the identification of the place of commission of 
the tort. 
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3. As for the tort choice of law rule, early in the development of tort choice of law in 
Australia and Canada, there have been divergences from the English common law 
interpretation of the Phillips v Eyre rule such as in relation to the second limb of that 
rule and its juridical nature. Most notably, the Australian courts may have interpreted 
Phillips v Eyre as providing for a double actionability rule decades before the decision 
of the House of Lords in Boys v Chaplin. In recent years, both Australian and 
Canadian courts have abandoned the Phillips v Eyre rule for the lex loci delicti. 
Likewise, the 1995 Act has provided for a similar tort choice of law rule. It must 
however be noted that renvoi is part of the Australian tort choice of law rule while it is 
certainly not the case in relation to the section 11 tort choice of law rule. This point 
has not yet arisen in the Canadian courts. In striking contrast, the double actionability 
rule is still the tort choice of law rule in Singapore. 
4. It was only in the later part of the last century that a flexible exception was introduced 
by the House of Lords to the English common law double actionability rule. This 
exception was not popular with the Australian and Canadian superior courts and they 
refused to adopt this exception even when the Phillips v Eyre rule was still part of 
their laws. When the lex loci delicti rule was adopted in these jurisdictions, a 
distinction was drawn between intra-national and international torts. For both 
countries, no exception to their tort choice of law rule was available to intra-national 
torts. As for international torts, the English common law flexible exception was 
conclusively rejected by their highest courts. For Australia, only a public policy 
exception was held to be available whereas for Canada, there is authority for an 
injustice exception. Once again, Singapore has maintained its uniformity with the 
English common law with its adoption of the flexible exception. As for the 1995 Act, 
the section 12 exception is similar to the exception under the English common law. 
S. In short, we can observe that Commonwealth tort choice of law in relation to our 
selected jurisdictions has been well and truly fragmented. In addition, we have also 
noted that the break up of this area of private international law is not a recent 
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occurrence as it has been going on early in the development of tort choice of law in 
some of our selected jurisdictions. In particular, the common law tort choice of law 
regime in Australia has been diverging and converging subsequently with the relevant 
English common law position throughout the last century. 
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUDING REMARKS FOR PART I 
The purpose of Part I of this thesis as was stated in Chapter 1 is to examine the question: 
what is the nature and extent of the break up of Commonwealth private international law with 
the use of two areas of private international law, namely forum non conveniens and tort 
choice of law in Australia, Canada, Singapore and England as illustrations of this 
phenomenon. Specifically, we were to work out whether this phenomenon had actually taken 
place in these jurisdictions and if it had, to what extent it had occurred. We have sought to 
answer these questions in Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis. 
Comparing our findings on forum non conveniens in Chapter 2 with that in relation to tort 
choice of law in Chapter 3, one point we can make with regards to the break up of 
Commonwealth private international law is that this phenomenon has clearly occurred in both 
our selected areas of private international law. The Australian courts have adopted a 'clearly 
inappropriate forum' test for their doctrine of forum non conveniens as opposed to the 'clearly 
more appropriate forum' test in Canada, England and Singapore. For tort choice of law, a 
number of our selected judiciaries have abandoned the English common law Phillips v Eyre 
rule for the lex loci delicti. Does this then mean that this phenomenon is happening in most, if 
not, all areas of Commonwealth private international law? With just two examples in our 
comparative study, more research is necessary to provide for a conclusive answer to this 
question. 
Interestingly, when a comparison of the nature and extent of this phenomenon for tort choice 
of law and that for forum non conveniens in relation to our selected jurisdictions is 
undertaken, we can observe that there are no common elements between the two. In 
particular: 
1. The break up of Commonwealth tort choice of law in our selected jurisdictions is 
greater than the corresponding phenomenon for forum non conveniens. As was 
mentioned above, the Australian and Canadian tort choice of law regimes are in 
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divergence from the relevant English common law position. Even between Australia 
and Canada, their laws on tort choice of law are not identical. Furthermore, in 
England herself, the influence of the English common law on this area of private 
international law has been significantly curtailed as a result of the enactment of the 
1995 Act. It is only Singapore that continues to adhere to the English common law 
tort choice of law regime. 
In contrast, for forum non conveniens, only Australia has provided for a clear 
departure from the English common law doctrine of forum non conveniens with the 
adoption of the 'clearly inappropriate forum' test. Canada and Singapore, on the other 
hand have adopted the English common law 'clearly more appropriate forum' test. 
Even though there are divergences in these jurisdictions from the English common 
law doctrine of forum non conveniens, the 'clearly more appropriate forum' test has 
not been rejected for the adoption of a different test altogether which is the position in 
relation to the Australian doctrine of forum non conveniens. Instead, the divergences 
in Canada and Singapore are only in relation to the application of the 'clearly more 
appropriate forum' test, such as its structure and the sub-rules within it. 
2. We have also observed that the break up of Commonwealth private international law 
in relation to tort choice of law in our selected Commonwealth jurisdictions has not 
been a linear process. In Chapter 3, we described the common law tort choice of law 
regime in Australia as being in a state of flux throughout its development as it has 
been moving towards and away from the English common law position. To illustrate, 
an initial divergence from the English common law Phillips v Eyre rule may have been 
generated by the High Court of Australia's disapproval of the Machado interpretation 
of that approach. There were also some judicial statements at that point in time, 
indicating that the Australian courts may have adopted a double actionability rule. In 
Boys v Chaplin, the Machado interpretation of the Phillips v Eyre rule was rejected 
and a double actionability rule was endorsed by the House of Lords thus indicating a 
possible shift by the English common law towards the Australian position. Yet, after a 
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number of years, the Phillips v Eyre rule was rejected by a majority of the High Court 
of Australia in Breavington v Godleman. This divergence was however short-lived as 
the double actionability rule was subsequently reinstated in McKain v Miller and 
Stevens v Head. Finally, in the recent cases of Pfeiffer v Rogerson, Renault v Zhang 
and Neilson v Overseas Projects Corporation of Victoria Ltd, the lex loci delicti was 
adopted as the Australian tort choice of law rule, thus indicating an Australian 
departure from the English common law tort choice of law regime. 
In comparison, the nature of the break up of Commonwealth private international law 
in relation to forum non conveniens in our selected Commonwealth jurisdictions has 
been relatively straightforward in that we have not seen much movements of the 
relevant law in these countries back towards the English common law position after 
an initial divergence. However, this is not to say that there has been no shift back 
towards the English common law in our selected jurisdictions. In particular, the High 
Court of Australia has rejected the view that the test relating to the transfer of 
proceedings within Australia under the Cross-vesting Acts is the 'clearly inappropriate 
forum' test. Instead, they have held that it is analogous to the 'clearly more 
appropriate' forum test. 
3. We have noted in Chapter 3 that the break up of Commonwealth tort choice of law 
regimes has not been a recent occurrence in that it has been going on for most of the 
last century. One illustration of this is the hostility displayed by the High Court of 
Australia towards the Machado interpretation of the Phillips v Eyre rule at the 
beginning of the 20th century. 
In contrast, our selected judiciaries do not appear to have called for the introduction 
of a forum non conveniens approach for stays of proceedings at a time when the 
English common law position was still the 'oppressive and vexatious' test in St Pierre. 
The break up of this area of private international law only occurred after the decision 
of the House of Lords in the 1980s to introduce a 'clearly more appropriate forum' 
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test. 
Extrapolating from the comparison above, it is possible to suggest that the break up of 
Commonwealth private international law is a complex process in that the nature and extent of 
this phenomenon in one area of private international law may be different from that of 
another. 
Now that we have addressed the question of how the break up of Commonwealth private 
international law in relation to forum non convenfens and tort choice of law has occurred, we 
will proceed in the next part of this thesis to examine the explanations from the cases for this 
phenomenon. 
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PART Il: WHAT ARE THE EXPLANATIONS FROM THE CASE LAW FOR 
THE BREAK UP OF COMMONWEALTH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
IN OUR SELECTED JURISDICTIONS? 
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CHAPTER 5: EXPLANATIONS FOR THE BREAK UP OF COMMONWEALTH 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN RELATION TO THE DOCTRINE OF FORUM 
NON CONVENIENS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 2, we established the existence of a break up of Commonwealth private international 
law in relation to the doctrine of forum non conveniens in England, Australia, Canada and 
Singapore as well as its nature and extent. The next question we must address is: why has this 
phenomenon occurred? 
Looking at the relevant judgments, we can observe that the judges of our selected jurisdictions 
have been influenced by a number of policies, concepts and other wider considerations in their 
decisions on forum non conveniens. In this situation, our judiciaries may not treat these 
considerations in the same way. To illustrate, a policy may be utilised in one jurisdiction but not in 
others as our judiciaries may disagree on whether that consideration should have an impact on 
their doctrine of forum non conveniens. Even if the same concepts such as comity, forum 
shopping and justice were used by these courts in the formulation of their forum non conveniens 
test, the rules that emerge might not be the same. This is because the weight accorded to each of 
these considerations may be different in each jurisdiction. In addition, the reaction of our selected 
judiciaries to these policies and concepts may not be identical. Delving in further, the manner in 
which courts are influenced by their economic, social and political context can have a powerful 
effect on the determination of which of these policies or concepts may be employed, the strength 
of their usage and how they are to work with one another. Again, this interaction between 
considerations may not be the same in our selected jurisdictions. 
Arguably, if our selected judiciaries did not provide for the same treatment of these considerations 
as illustrated above, they might formulate different forum non conveniens approaches. There 
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would thus be a break up of this particular area of Commonwealth private international law. To 
confirm this hypothesis, a systematic analysis of the specific explanations underlying the 
decisions of the courts in our selected jurisdictions to diverge from or converge with the English 
common law doctrine of forum non conveniens is required. The relevant considerations are as 
follows: 
2. Policy explanations 
2.1 Judicial chauvinism and the litigant's right of access to the courts 
2.2 Litigant's right of access to the courts versus the prevention of forum shopping 
2.3 Equal justice and the litigant's right of access to the courts 
2.4 Certainty versus flexibility 
3. Structural explanations 
3.1 Interaction with other areas of private international law: bases of jurisdiction 
3.2 Interaction with public international law: comity 
4. Historical and comparative explanations 
4.1 Historical influence of English judicial precedents 
4.2 Comparative influence of foreign doctrines of forum non conveniens 
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S. Contextual explanations 
5.1 Social and economic context 
5.2 Political context 
Each of these considerations will first be looked at in their own designated sub-sections. 
Specifically, we will examine how they have been utilised by the courts in England, Australia, 
Canada and Singapore in relation to their forum non conveniens tests. After each consideration 
has been discussed, we will move on to address the complex interaction that goes on between 
concepts, policies and other wider considerations in each of our selected jurisdictions in a 
separate section. 
2. POLICY EXPLANATIONS 
2.1 JUDICIAL CHAUVINISM AND THE LITIGANT'S RIGHT OF ACCESS TO THE COURTS 
Historically, English courts have espoused the view that the litigant's "right of access to the 
Queen's court must not be lightly refused"' as "[n]o one who comes to these courts asking for 
justice should come in vain. 2 If a "plaintiff [came] into an English court 
, 
"3 that court would be 
bound "not to refuse to hear his case, or to put him under difficulties in the way of having his 
action brought to a conclusion"4 as it would be an "inadequate performance"5 of the court's duty to 
ie say, "You can to our way of thinking get perfectly satisfactory justice elsewhere. 
The Atlantic Star (HL) [1974] AC 436, at 453. 2 The Atlantic Star (CA) [1973] QB 364, at 381-382. Peruvian Guano Co v Bockwoldt (1883) 23 ChD 225, at 233. 
ibid. 
s The Atlantic Star (HL), supra, n. 1, at 471 per Lord Monis (dissenting). Ibid. 
116 
However, no matter how noble the statement "to no one will we deny justice"7 may sound, it is not 
difficult to work out that the English courts are effectively providing for a "presumption in favour of 
English justice; "8 that they are the best forum for the resolution of legal disputes irrespective of 
how tenuous the connection may be between the litigant/dispute and the forum. This is 
unsurprising as for most of the 20th century the dominant English judicial view was that "English 
justice is superior to that administered in other countries and so ought not to be denied even to 
foreigners. "9 In other words, the declaration that the claimant has a right of access to the English 
courts may be nothing more than a facade for the "parochial or nationalist"10 attitudes of the 
English courts. The result of all this was the approach in St Pierre v South American Stores Ltd: " 
that a stay of proceedings would only be granted if the defendant could show that there had been 
an abuse of that right by the claimant such that there would be injustice done to the defendant. 12 
As time passed, English courts began to regard the St Pierre approach as chauvinistic. In The 
Atlantic Star, 13 Lord Reid criticised the St Pierre test as recalling the "good old days... when 
inhabitants of this island felt an innate superiority over those unfortunate to belong to other 
races. "14 He considered it to be "insular"15 and thus advocated for a more liberal interpretation of 
the phrase "oppression and vexation. "16 To him, "there is no injustice in telling a plaintiff that he 
should go back to his own courts"17 as the English "system of administration of justice"18 was no 
longer "superior to that in most other countries. "19 Similarly, in The Abidin Daver, 20 Lord Diplock 
stated that "judicial chauvinism has been replaced by judicial comity"21 to such an extent that it 
was time to admit that the English common law legal regime on the stay of proceedings is now 
7 ibid, at 472 per Lord Moms (dissenting). : Weiler, Forum Non Conveniens 
- 
An English Doctrine? (1978) 41 Modem Law Review 739, at 742. Schuz, Controlling Forum-Shopping: The Impact ofMacShannon v Rockware Glass Ltd (1986) 35 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 374. 
10 Pryles, Internationalism in Australian Private International Law [1989-1990] 12 Sydney Law Review 96, at 106. 1'[1936] KB 382. 
12 ibid, at 398. 
13 [1974] AC 436. 
' ibid, at 453. 15 ibid. 
1b ibid, at 454. 
17 ibid. 
1e ibid. 
19 ibid. 
m [1984] 1 AC 398. 2) ibid, at 411. 
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"indistinguishable from the Scottish legal doctrine of forum non conveniens. "22 The House of 
Lords in the landmark case of Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd23 has also endorsed 
this view by confirming that a stay of proceedings would only be granted if the 'clearly more 
appropriate forum' test were satisfied. 24 
It is important to note that there has been no complete shift away from judicial chauvinism under 
the English common law doctrine of forum non conveniens as there would still be a presumption 
that the action would be fought in England if the claimant could invoke the jurisdiction of the 
English courts as of right. The English courts may no longer be implying that the English forum Is 
a perfectly good place to litigate claims regardless of the factors connecting the dispute to 
England. However, the current position would still be parochial in the sense that "if there [were] 
no other country which [could] be regarded as being the natural forum for trial, "25 the English 
court would be automatically regarded as the natural forum for the dispute. 
Overall, we can observe that there has been an English common law movement away from 
judicial chauvinism in recent years. Accordingly, the purpose of this subsection is to determine 
whether the views of our selected Commonwealth judiciaries on this matter have contributed to 
the divergences and convergences in relation to their doctrines of forum non conveniens as 
discussed in Chapter 2. 
2.1.1 Australia 
In the High Court of Australia case of Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co Inc v Fay, 26 there 
was no consensus amongst the Justices on the policy of discouraging judicial chauvinism. 
Wilson and Toohey JJ were in agreement with the House of Lords that the protection accorded to 
the litigant's right of access to the English courts under the St Pierre test is chauvinistic and 
u ibid. 
23 [1987] AC 460. 
2' ibid, at 477. 
u Fawcett, Trial in England or Abroad: The Underlying Policy Considerations (1989) 9 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 205, at 217. 26 (1988) 165 CLR 197. 
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should be abandoned. 27 In striking contrast, Brennan J opined that the true principle that should 
govern Australian law on the stay of proceeding is that provided for by Lord Simon in his 
dissenting judgment in The Atlantic Star that: "a plaintiff who founds jurisdiction will not be denied 
a hearing unless he is misusing the forensic process so as to perpetrate injustice. . 213 In response 
to criticisms that support for the claimant's right of access to the Australia courts is 
"chauvinistic, "29 Brennan J countered by stating the "law applied in many other countries 
preserves local jurisdiction even more jealously"30 and that if the Australian judiciary were 
"confident of the quality of justice administered in Australian courts, there would be no reason 
why [they] should defer to other fora, who have it within their power to grant or refuse recognition 
to and enforcement of the judgments of Australian courts according to their municipal laws. "31 He 
thus supported the continued application of the St Pierre test. 32 
In yet another contrast, even though Deane J stated that it is a "basic tenet of [Australian] 
jurisprudence that, where jurisdiction exists, access to the courts is a right"33 and that "it is not a 
privilege which can be withdrawn otherwise than in clearly defined circumstances, "34 he went on 
to adopt a broader definition of oppression and vexation; the approach provided for by the English 
courts at the early stages of the English common law shift away from the St Pierre test towards 
the Spiliada approach. This is clearly a weakening of the litigant's right of access to the Australian 
courts as can be contrasted with Brennan J's reasoning above. In addition, unlike Brennan J, 
there was no response from Deane J on the criticism that judicial adherence to such a right is 
nothing more than judicial chauvinism. Could it be that Deane J has some sympathy for the 
argument that the St Pierre approach is parochial but not to the extent of abandoning the test 
altogether? His decision for a 'clearly inappropriate forum' test instead of the St Pierre test may 
27 ibid, at 212. 2' ibid, at 239, 2' ibid, at 240, 30 ibid. 
31 ibid. 
32 For criticism of this position as chauvinistic, see for example, Pryles, Judicial Darkness on the Oceanic Sun (1988) 62 Australian Law Journal 774, at 782, Briggs, Wider Still and Wider: The Bounds ofAustralian Exorbitant Jurisdiction (1989) 2 Lloyds Maritime 
and Commercial Law Quarterly 216, at 222, 33 Oceanic Sun 
34 ibid. , 
supra, n. 26, at 252. 
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be a compromise between the protection of a litigant's right of access to the Australian courts and 
the rejection of judicial chauvinism altogether. 35 
The above uncertainty was eventually resolved in the case of Voth v Manildra Flour Mill Pt 6 with 
the High Court of Australia's endorsement of Deane J's 'clearly inappropriate forum' test. In 
particular, the appellant's argument that the replacement of judicial chauvinism with judicial 
comity requires the application of a 'clearly more appropriate forum' test was rejected as having 
"little force. "37 However, as it is Deane J's 'clearly inappropriate forum' test that is endorsed by the 
High Court rather than the St Pierre approach, 38 this may be an indication that the High Court is 
not taking the extreme stance provided for by Brennan J in Oceanic Sun. 
In short, it is arguable that the High Court of Australia does not wish to embrace wholeheartedly 
the English common law shift away from the parochial St Pierre test. Instead, they prefer a 
compromise position i. e. the 'clearly inappropriate forum' test to a broader doctrine of forum non 
conveniens as represented by the English common law'clearly more appropriate forum' test. 
2.1.2 Canada and Singapore 
In contrast to the Australian position, Canadian and Singaporean judges are in agreement with 
the English common law view that the law on stays of proceedings should not give effect to 
judicial chauvinism. In Amchem Products Inc v British Columbia (Worker's Compensation 
39 Board), Sopinka J criticised the basis of the St Pierre approach that on the grounds that in a 
climate where litigation is increasingly internationalised, "courts have had to become more 
tolerant of the systems of other countries. "40 The "parochial attitude... that the substantial ends of 
justice would require that this Court should pursue its own better means of determining both the 
35 Thankfully, Gaudron J, the final judge on the case proceeded on a different line of analysis and ventured forth no discernible view 
on this matter. M (1990) 171 CLR 538. 37 ibid, at 560. 38 ibid. 
39 [1993] 1 SCR 897 
40 ibid. at [25]. 
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law and the fact of the case is no longer appropriate"41 in such conditions. Similarly, the 
Singapore Court of Appeal in Eng Liat Kiang v Eng Bak Hern42 chose to endorse the English 
common law doctrine of forum non conveniens as it "[cuts] down local parochialism as regards 
judicial adjudication. 43 Accordingly, this is one explanation for the Canadian and Singaporean 
adoption of a 'clearly more appropriate forum' test. 
It is important to note that the pronouncements in the highest courts of these two jurisdictions that 
there is a presumption of trial in the forum in question unless the defendant can establish a 
clearly more appropriate forum elsewhere leads one to question the extent to which judicial 
chauvinism can be said to have been eradicated in relation to their doctrines of forum non 
conveniens. Similar to the English common law position, there is no complete shift away from 
judicial parochialism with regards to this area of private international law. 
2.2 LITIGANT'S RIGHT OF ACCESS TO THE COURTS VERSUS THE PREVENTION OF 
FORUM SHOPPING 
What is forum shopping? In a neutral sense, a claimant is said to be shopping for a forum when 
he has the option of bringing his action in a number of jurisdictions and he chooses the one 
venue which provides him with the most favourable outcome 44 This phenomenon largely stems 
from a lack of uniformity "in terms both of internal laws and choice of law rules and the procedural 
rules developed by different countries to facilitate the enforcement of these lawsn45 as well as the 
legal climate of a particular jurisdiction such as the "speed and mode of litigation, "46 and "the 
quality and ability of the judiciary and the legal profession. . 47 
" ibid. 
42 [1995] 3 SLR 97. 
" ibid, at 105. See also, Q&M Enterprises Sdn Bhd v Poh Kiat [2005] 4 SLR 494, at [14] 
-[18]. 
4s 
Law Commission Working Paper No. 87 (1984), at para. 3.14. Bell, Forum Shopping and Venue in Transnational litigation, Oxford Private International Law Series (Oxford: Oxford University Press) (2003), at para. 2.07. 47 ibid, at Para 2.04. 47 ibid. 
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In England, respect has historically been accorded to the claimant's choice of forum to the extent 
that it is "often couched in terms of a right. "48 A claimant is said to have "the right to bring an 
action . 49 and that correspondingly, the English courts have a duty "to award him the redress to 
which he is entitled. "50 One consequence of this right is that it encourages litigants to engage in 
forum shopping. This is because, "even though the parties and the case [have] no connection 
with England"51, so long as a writ can be served on the defendant within that jurisdiction, the 
claimant will be able to bring an action against him as a matter of right. 
In the past, the claimant was also aided by the rule that a stay of proceedings would only be 
granted if the defendant could establish that the continuation of those proceedings would be 
vexatious or oppressive. As the words 'oppressive' and 'vexatious' "connote a lack of bona fides 
or an improper motive on the part of the plaintiff, *52 a defendant would "rarely [be] able to bring 
the plaintiffs conduct within the scope of one of these grave allegations even if there [were] 
blatant forum shopping. n53 Accordingly, if a claimant were of the view that litigation in an English 
court offered him certain procedural and substantive advantages, he could easily bring an action 
against the defendant there despite the lack of connecting factors. Furthermore, so long as the 
litigant could invoke the jurisdiction of the English courts, it was said that the courts had "no sort 
of right, moral or legal, to take away from a plaintiff any real chance he may have of an 
advantage. "" This was reflected in the English common law rule that if there were some 
procedural or substantive advantage to the claimant deriving from his action in the English courts, 
"it [would] not [be] right for the other party to say that the bringing of it is vexatious and oppressive 
as against him. "55 
9 ibid. at para. 3.74. 
Peruvian Guano Co. supra, n. 3, at 230. 5° The Atlantic Star (CA), supra, n. 2, at 381 per Lord Denning MR. Pyles, supra, n. 10, at 124. 52 Schuz, supra, n. 9, at 377. 33 ibid. 
34 Peruvian Guano Co, supra, n. 3, at 234. 55 Hyman v Helm (1883) LR 24 ChD 53 1, at 538 
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It can thus be observed that forum shopping for both procedural and substantive advantages was 
regarded as an acceptable practice implicitly "sanctionedi56 by the English courts as "a plaintiff 
could resist an application for a stay of proceedings by demonstrating the efficacy of its forum 
shopping expedition. . 57 In fact, some judicial statements have indicated that English judges were 
positively encouraging such litigant behaviour, the most notorious of these being, Lord Denning's 
declaration at the Court of Appeal stage of The Atlantic Star58 that: 
"[n]o one who comes to [the English] courts asking for justice should come in 
vain... You may call this "forum shopping" if you please, but if the forum is 
England, it is a good place to shop in, both for the quality of the goods and the 
speed of service. . 59 
However, as time passed, English judges began to find such behaviour "undesirable"fi° and this 
led them to weaken the claimant's right of access to the English courts thus resulting in a shift 
towards the identification of the natural forum as the basis for their laws on stays of proceedings. 
That being said, not all the jurisdictions in our comparative study share the same hostility towards 
forum shopping. It is thus the purpose of this subsection to examine the treatment of this policy in 
our selected Commonwealth jurisdictions. 
2.2.1 Australia 
The formulation of the doctrine of forum non conveniens 
Only Toohey and Wilson JJ in Oceanic Sun highlighted the problem of forum shopping as a result 
of applying the St Pierre approach. As for the rest of the judges, this critique of the St Pierre test 
was not mentioned in their decision to reject the formulation of the English common law doctrine 
56 Bell, supra, n. 45, at para. 3.74. s' ibid. 
'" [1973] QB 364. 
59 ibid, at 381-382. 60 The Atlantic Star (HL), supra, n. 13, at 454. 
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of forum non conveniens. This is unsurprising bearing in mind the strong support of Brennan and 
Deane JJ for the policy of allowing "any plaintiff bona fide seeking relief to have unrestricted 
access to the seat of judgment. "61 In other words, the implication here is that they have opted to 
protect the litigant's right of access to the Australian courts rather than to discourage his forum 
shopping. Similarly, in Voth and Renault v Zhang, 62 none of the majority Justices made any 
mention of the policy of discouraging forum shopping. 
However, it is important to note that a vocal minority of the High Court of Australia has continued 
to voice out support for the policy of discouraging forum shopping. Take for example, Renault v 
Zhang. Kirby J in dissent expressed his desire that "[o]ne day Voth may be overruled"63 on the 
ground that it increases forum shopping. Similarly, Callinan J indicated his dislike for the Voth 
approach by pointing out that the "deterrence of forum shopping "64 requires that in general, suits 
should not be determined in a jurisdiction which has, with respect to the relevant events, no real 
connexion with the defendant. To him, "[t]he days have passed since a judge of a common law 
countryn65 could declare his support for forum shopping the way Lord Denning did in The Atlantic 
Star. 
In short, a fierce debate is raging in the ranks of the High Court of Australia as to which policy 
should be utilised in the formulation of their rules on stays of proceedings. For now, it is the 
proponents of the litigant's right of access to the Australian courts who have prevailed. 
Juridical advantages 
In Australia, judicial preference for the policy of protecting the claimant's right of access to the 
Australian courts instead of the policy of discouraging forum shopping has also resulted in 
differences between England and Australia on the treatment of juridical advantages. In particular, 
61 Oceanic Sun, supra, n. 26, at 233. 62 (2002) 187 ALR 1. 
63 ibid, at [96]. 64 ibid. at [194]. 65 ibid. 
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Australian lower courts, in applying the 'clearly inappropriate forum' test have a tendency of 
denying an application for a stay of proceedings if the claimant could establish the loss of a 
legitimate juridical advantage. As was mentioned above, this would encourage litigants to bring 
their actions in the Australian courts if certain procedural or substantive advantages were 
available to them in that forum. This is no longer the case under the English common law. 
It is interesting to note that the Australian position on juridical advantages was heavily criticised in 
the case of Goliath Portland Cement Company Ltd v Bengtell. 66 In particular, counsel for Goliath 
challenged the "contention that the availability of a more favourable limitation law in New South 
Wales was a legitimate personal or juridical advantage"67 upon which Mr Bengtell could rely on 
for his case on the grounds that such an approach would encourage forum shopping. In 
particular, forum shopping was criticised in the following terms: 
"There can be no rule of law without certainty as to the rights and obligations of 
persons under the law. If different consequences could flow from the uncontrolled 
privilege of a party to bring proceedings in different jurisdictions of Australia, this 
would inject a high measure of uncertainty into the law... It would diminish the 
predictability of the application of the law to particular facts. It would interfere in 
the capacity of parties and their insurers to organise their affairs in a rational 
manner... It would effectively destroy decisional harmony and put a premium on 
legal inventiveness in invoking jurisdictions having no other connection or 
relevance save for a beneficial limitation or other procedural regime. "68 
6. (Unreported, New South Wales Court of Appeal, 13 May 1994). 
ibid. 
61 ibid. 
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Counsel for Mr Bengtell then responded by asserting that it was the "privilege of the plaintiffs to 
sue Goliath 
... 
anywhere in Australia they chose; "69 an argument that flows from Voth's emphasis 
on the claimant's choice of forum. 
Interestingly, Kirby P of the New South Wales Court of Appeal (as he then was) was sympathetic 
to Goliath's arguments. He had earlier pointed out in a pre-Voth case that "the prospect of forum 
shopping with success of the plaintiffs endeavour would clearly encourage is one which common 
law principle... should discourage or even defeat. "70 He was also of the view that the Spiliada 
principles with its identification of the natural forum should be endorsed for that very principle. 
However, as he was bound by the decision of the High Court in Voth, he held that he had no 
choice but to adopt a test which is "less favourable to an applicant such as Goliath and more 
favourable to the maintenance of asserted jurisdiction. "7' 
lntra-Australian disputes: section 5(2)(b)(iii) of the Cross-vesting Act 
Under the cross-vesting legislation as enacted in each State of Australia, the "personal 
jurisdiction of each State Supreme Court is cross-vested in every other State Supreme Court. °72 
One problem that may arise from such a scheme is the danger of forum shopping for "[i]f the 
Supreme Court of State X had the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of State Y, why not institute 
proceedings there in pursuit of some real or imaginary advantage, notwithstanding that the 
dispute as such bore no relation to State XT73 The Australian Parliaments were aware of this 
problem as section 5(2) of the Cross-vesting Act which provides for the circumstances in which 
the Supreme Court of one Australian State or Territory can transfer proceedings to another such 
Supreme Court, was introduced to address this issue. 
69 ibid. 
70 ibid. 
71 ibid. 
n Tilbury, Davis, Opeskin, Conflict of Laws in Australia (South Melbourne: Oxford University Press) (2002), at 485. 73 Bankinvest AC v Seabrook (1988) 92 FLR 153, at 165. 
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In particular, in the explanatory memorandum to each State Act, it is stated that courts would 
need to be "ruthless in the exercise of their transferral powers to ensure that litigants do not 
engage in forum-shopping by commencing proceedings in appropriate courts. "74 In the Report of 
the Advisory Committee to the Constitutional Commission on the Australian Judicial System, it 
has also been pointed out that "transfer and removal provisions will ensure that cases are heard 
in the court in whose ordinary jurisdiction they belong"75 and that the "aim of the cross-vesting 
provisions"76 is not to "give litigants a free choice of forum for initiating proceed ings. "77' In other 
words, the purpose of the transfer provisions is to locate the most appropriate forum for the 
dispute in question rather than to protect the claimant's choice of forum. 
As was discussed in Chapter 2, initially, the Australian lower courts were not in agreement on the 
nature of the discretion under section 5(2)(b)(iii) of the Cross-vesting Act, where proceedings 
could be transferred if it were in the interests of justice to do so. One explanation for this lack of 
unanimity is a judicial disagreement as to whether the "litigant invoking the jurisdiction had an 
"la entitlement and the court had a corresponding obligation to exercise jurisdiction. 
On the one hand, Rogers A-JA of the New South Wales Court of Appeal held in the case of 
Bankinvest AG v Seabrook79 that there is no "prima facie presumption that the court, the 
jurisdiction of which was properly invoked, should exercise it"80 with regards to section 5(2) of the 
Cross-vesting Act. The consequence of the warning against forum shopping in the legislative 
material leading up to the enactment of the Act was that full effect should be given by the courts 
to the "imaginative and detailed code for ensuring that throughout Australia disputes are dealt 
with by the one court and that be the court most appropriate for the particular dispute. "81 
'4 Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, HR 2556 (Oct 22 1986). 76 Report of the Advisory Committee to the Constitutional Commission on the Australian Judicial System, (1987), at para. 3.113. 
ibid. 77 ibid. 
71 Bankinvest, supra, n. 73, at 167. 79 (1988) 92 FLR 153. 
so ibid, at 167. 
ibid, at 166. 
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Accordingly, he went on to hold that the Voth approach should "have no role to play in the 
resolution of applications made under the legislation or in its interpretation. "82 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory in the case of 
Waterhouse v Australian Broadcasting Corporation83 chose to base the discretion under section 
5(2)(b)(iil) on the "plaintiffs undoubted right to bring his action in this Court "84 thus providing for 
the application of the Voth test to the Cross-vesting Act. Furthermore, they suggested that in the 
context of an inter-state dispute, a claimant could not be said to have been forum shopping due to 
the close ties of the states and territories within the Australian Federation 85 
For a while, there was uncertainty in this area of the law in Australia. Thankfully, in the recent 
High Court of Australia case of BHP Billiton Ltd v Schultz86 the issue was put to rest with the 
endorsement of the reasoning of the New South Wales court in Bankinvest by the majority 
Justices 87 In particular, they reasoned that the "starting point for a consideration of a transfer 
application under the Cross-vesting Act"88 is not the "Australian forum non conveniens approach, 
which begins from the premise that a court whose jurisdiction has been regularly invoked needs 
to justify a refusal to exercise that jurisdiction. "89 The basis for this is that section 5(2) of the 
Cross-vesting Act "assumes the regular invocation of jurisdiction"90 and accordingly, this act itself 
"does not favour the disposition of a transfer application by refusing it on the basis that to allow it 
could not be in the interests of justice. "91 Instead, the court is "simply applying a statute without 
any kind of presumption as to where the balance of the interests of justice might come down. "92 
82 ibid. 
e3 (1 989) 86 ACTR 1. 
84 ibid, at 18. 
`s ibid, at 17. 86 [2004] HCA 61. 37 ibid, at [13] 
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Specifically, Gummow J pointed out that the Second Reading Speech and the preamble to the 
Cross-vesting Act indicate that "the State Parliament in enacting the Cross-vesting Act, in 
particular the provisions of s5, was concerned to provide a means of ensuring that, by use of the 
transfer mechanism, proceedings be dealt with by the appropriate court. "93 Accordingly, he stated 
that section 5 of the Cross-vesting Act "does not manifest a legislative policy in favour of any 
"sa species of forum shopping... which it is for defendants to displace on a transfer application. 
Callinan J stated that the first paragraph of the recital to the Cross-vesting Act identifies the 
consequences of forum shopping, namely that the Act is enacted to prevent "inconvenience and 
expense"95 that has "occasionally been caused to litigants by jurisdictional limitations in federal 
State and Territory courts. "96 To him, it is clear that "the legislature did, in enacting the Cross- 
vesting Act, indicate that it regarded forum shopping as an evil. n97 Subsequently, he opined that 
there "should be no presumption in litigation in favour of any party"98 and that "it Is wrong to say 
that proceedings should be conducted in the, or indeed any Tribunal because a plaintiff, or for 
that matter a defendant, is likely to have a better chance of winning or more easily winning 
there. "99 Accordingly, he held that the concept of the natural forum should be utilised in the 
interpretation of the statutory requirements for the transfer of proceedings under the Act. 
Therefore, one may argue that it is the replacement of the policy of protecting the litigant's right to 
bring an action in the Australian courts with the policy of discouraging forum shopping that has 
resulted in this particular shift towards the English common law Spiliada approach. 
93 ibid. at [72]. 
" ibid. 
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2.2.2 Canada 
The formulation of the doctrine of forum non conveniens 
In Amchem, Sopinka J pointed out that the law on stays of proceedings "has become of 
increasing modern importance as a result of factors including the greater ease of communication 
and travel; the tendency of courts in many countries to extend their jurisdiction over events and 
persons outside their territory; and a greater awareness of foreign laws and procedures. "10° In 
such circumstances, it is not surprising that there has been an increase in the frequency of 
litigants engaging in forum shopping. He was clearly opposed to such litigant behaviour as he 
stated that even in such an environment, this does not "mean, however that forum shopping is 
now to be encouraged. "101 Instead, he held that the choice of the appropriate forum is to be made 
on the "basis of factors designed to ensure, if possible, that the action is tried in the jurisdiction 
that has the closest connection with the action and the parties and not to secure a juridical 
advantage to one of the litigants at the expense of others in a jurisdiction that is otherwise 
inappropriate. "102 In other words, Canadian courts are to search for the natural forum for the 
dispute in question: "one with which the action has the most real and substantial connection. "103 
Effectively, this is the approach adopted by the English courts to counter the undesirable problem 
of forum shopping: to "draw some distinction between a case where England is the natural forum 
for the plaintiff and a case where the plaintiff merely comes here to serve his own ends. "104 
"In the former, the plaintiff should not be driven from the judgment seat without 
very good reason, but in the latter, the plaintiff should 
... 
be expected to offer 
Amchem, supra, n. 39, at [2]. ibid, at [26]. 102 ibid. 
i03 ibid, at [33]. ß04 The Atlantic Star (HL), supra, n. 13, at 454. 
130 
some reasonable justification for his choice of forum if the defendant seeks a 
stay. If both parties are content to proceed here there is no need to object. "105 
In short, one explanation for the Canadian adoption of the 'clearly more appropriate forum' test is 
that Canadian courts are in agreement with the English courts' view that forum shopping must be 
controlled. 
Juridical advantages 
Under the Canadian doctrine of forum non conveniens, juridical advantages would be relevant to 
the identification of the natural forum if the dispute in question had a real and substantial 
connection with a forum. The explanation for this approach is that "[i]f a party [sought] out a 
jurisdiction simply to gain a juridical advantage rather than by reason of a real and substantial 
connection of the case to the jurisdiction"106 his actions would be condemned as forum shopping. 
If on the other hand, there were a real and substantial connection between the case and a forum, 
the claimant would have a "legitimate claim to the advantages that that forum provides"107 as in 
such circumstances, the claimant would have a "reasonable expectation that in the event of 
litigation arising out of the transaction in question, those advantages [would] be available. "108 In 
contrast, the English courts have held that juridical advantages cannot be taken into account in 
the application of the Spiliada test unless the loss of such advantages to the claimant would bring 
about substantial injustice. 
Why did Sopinka J provide for a departure from the English common law approach on juridical 
advantages? One suspects that the answer lies in his interpretation of the second stage of the 
Spiliada test. As was highlighted in Chapter 2, he appears to have read Lord Goff's decision in 
The Spiliada as allowing judges to take into account juridical advantages in determining whether 
105 ibid. 
106 Amchem, supra, n. 39, at [37]. 107 ibid. 
lo' ibid. 
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a stay of proceedings should be granted. However, Lord Goff has actually held that it is only if the 
loss of a juridical advantage caused substantial injustice to the claimant that a stay would be 
denied. Accordingly, as Sopinka J was of the view that juridical advantages can be taken into 
account under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a 'real and substantial connection' test is 
required to ensure that the litigant is not forum shopping. It is thus submitted that it is the 
combination of a concern for forum shopping and the misinterpretation of the Spiliada test that 
has resulted in this particular Canadian divergence. 
2.2.3 Singapore 
The only indication that the policy of preventing forum shopping is an explanation for the 
Singapore adoption of the English common law doctrine of forum non conveniens is in the case of 
Eng Liat Kiang where the Singapore Court of Appeal implicitly accepted the submissions of the 
counsel that Spiliada was formulated to "prevent forum shopping when the parties had little or no 
connection with the forum in which the case was brought "109 
2.3 EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE LITIGANT'S RIGHT OF ACCESS TO THE COURTS 
One criticism of a judicial adherence to the policy of protecting a claimant's right of access to the 
court he decides to bring his action in as well as the consequence that it has of encouraging 
forum shopping under the St Pierre approach is its "pro-claimant bias. "110 
To elaborate, judicial support for such a policy creates inequality between the parties in that the 
plaintiff is able to "unilaterally 
... 
enhance his prospects of success by his choice of forum""' as 
he is not to be denied his right to sue in the chosen forum. As a "matter of abstract justice, "112 it 
seems "intuitively offensive to notions of procedural fairness that the action goes for trial in the 
109 Eng Liat Kiang, supra, n. 42, at 105. 11D Fawcett, supra, n. 25, at 218. ý1 Bell, supra, n. 45, at para. 3.86. 112 ibid. 
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country thus selected by the plaintiff... [who] chooses the country which suits him best. " 113 
Furthermore, it is also "unfair to defendants, who may be put to unwarranted expense and 
inconvenience in defending actions brought somewhere other than the 'natural' forum of the 
dispute. "114 
Accordingly, the objective of this sub-section is to determine whether this critique of the St Pierre 
test has had an influence on the development of forum non conveniens in our selected 
jurisdictions. In particular, it can be observed that there is some judicial agreement with this policy 
of ensuring greater equality between litigants in some Commonwealth jurisdictions but not in 
others. As a preliminary note, no mention was made of this formulation of justice in the decision 
of the Singapore courts to adopt the English common law doctrine of forum non conveniens. 
2.3.1 Canada 
There is some judicial support for this formulation of justice in the Canadian cases as it was 
pointed out by Sopinka J in Amchem that the "choice of the appropriate forumn115 is not to be 
made in order "to secure a juridical advantage to one of the litigants at the expense of others. "11° 
Rather, it is to be identified on an objective basis: to ensure that the case is tried in the 
"jurisdiction that has the closest connection with the action and the parties. "111 We can observe 
that the language used by the Canadian courts here is similar to that utilised by the English 
courts. 
In particular, the adoption of a doctrine of forum non conveniens by the House of Lords can be 
said to be an attempt to address the pro-claimant imbalance inherent in the St Pierre test. This is 
done by providing for the identification of the "appropriate forum for the trial of the action, i. e. in 
which the case may be tried more suitably for the interests of all the parties and the ends of 
113 ibid. 
14 Guthrie, 'A Good Place to Shop': Choice of Forum and the Conflict of Laws (1995-1996) 27 Ottawa Law Review 201, at 207. 115 Amchem, supra, n. 39, at [26]. 116 ibid. 
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justice""' and not just for the benefit of the litigant who is the first to initiate the action. 
Specifically, it was stated by Lord Goff in The Spiliada, "simply to give the plaintiff his advantage 
at the expense of the defendant is not consistent with the objective approach inherent in Lord 
Kinnear's statement of principle in Sim v Robinow, "19 an important Scottish case on forum non 
conveniens. This is because an approach that enables the mere fact that the plaintiff has a 
legitimate personal or juridical advantage in proceedings in England to be decisive in the court's 
decision to grant a stay of proceedings cannot be seen as "endeavouring to conciliate and 
promote the interests of both [antagonists]. "120 This formulation of justice was further confirmed 
by Lord Goff yet again in the case of De Dampierre v De Dampierre121 where he held that the 
purpose of the Spiliada principle is to "assess the balance of fairness as between the parties, in 
order to consider whether it is appropriate for a stay to be granted. "122 Effectively, one can 
observe that that it is a policy of ensuring greater equality between litigants that has shaped the 
formulation of the doctrines of forum non conveniens in Canada and England. 
However, it is important to note that there is no equal justice between claimants and defendants 
as the doctrine of forum non conveniens in England and Canada is still inherently pro-claimant. 123 
To illustrate, emphasis is accorded to the fact that jurisdiction has been founded as of right in that 
it is up to the defendant to establish that there is a clearly more appropriate forum abroad. Where 
there is no single forum that satisfies this test, there is an "automatic assumption being made that 
England is at least a natural forum for trial. "124 The position would be less biased against the 
defendant if the claimant had at least some obstacles placed in front of him in his invocation of 
the court's jurisdiction. Of course, this is not so as all he needs to do is to serve a claim form on 
the defendant when he was present in the forum in question. Similarly, there is no equality 
between the claimant and the defendant in relation to the Canadian doctrine of forum non 
: I$ Sim v Robinow (1892) 19R665, at 668. My italics. "Spiliada, 
supra, n. 23, at 482. m ibid. 
121 [1988] AC 92. 
n ibid, at 108. My italics. 23 Fawcett, supra, n. 25, at 218-220. 124 ibid, at 218. 
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conveniens as there is a "presumption in favour of the forum selected by the plaintiff which wins 
by default if there is no clearly preferable alternative. "125 
2.3.2 Australia 
The High Court of Australia is not in support of equal justice between litigants as it has opted for 
the protection of the claimant's choice of forum. They have thus provided for jurisdictional rules 
that are heavily slanted against the defendant. 
Interestingly, equal justice has been used as an explanation for the adoption of the Spiliada 
principles in relation to the transfer criteria in section 5 of the Cross-vesting Act. In the High Court 
of Australia case of BHP Billiton, Kirby J pointed out that the phrase 'interests of justice' in the 
section involves "justice to all parties"126 and that it would be "incompatible with [Australian] 
notions of justice to apply the [New South Wales] Cross-vesting Act in a way that favoured the 
rights of one party to litigation over others, rewarding the party selecting the initial venue with 
significant substantive (as distinct from purely procedural) advantages for doing so. "127 
Accordingly, the claimant's own choice of forum must be regarded as "neutral. " 128 Callinan J too 
argued that "there should be no presumption in litigation in favour of any party" 129 and that 
"[c]ourts are required to do equal justice. *130 It is "wrong to say that proceedings should be 
conducted in the, or indeed any Tribunal because a plaintiff, or for that matter a defendant, is 
likely to have a better chance of winning or more easily winning there. "131 It is thus an agreement 
with the policy considerations under the English common law doctrine of forum non conveniens 
that has resulted in this particular Australian shift towards the Spiliada principles. 
125S Par Aerospace Ltd v American Mobile Satellite Corp [2002] 4 SCR 205, at [75]. BHP Billiton, supra, n. 86, at [ 169]. 1: ' ibid. 
29 ibid, at [168]. 
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2.4 CERTAINTY VERSUS FLEXIBILITY 
"Legal certainty requires clear, equal and predictable rules of law which enable 
those who are subject to them to organise their affairs in an orderly manner to 
protect their justified expectations. Equally relevant is the need for flexible and 
just solutions which take into consideration the unique circumstances of each 
case. "132 
Certainty and flexibility are policy objectives fundamental to all legal systems. From the above 
definitions of these concepts, it is axiomatic that the two are participants in an unending struggle 
for "supremacy. "133 On the one hand, it is important that there is a degree of clarity and 
predictability in the law to provide adequate guidance to the courts in determining whether a stay 
of proceedings should be granted and in turn enable legal practitioners to "advise their clients 
with reasonable certainty as to the forum in which they should launch proceedings. "134 On the 
other hand, the doctrine must provide sufficient flexibility for the courts to ensure fairness on the 
facts of each case. A rigid forum non conveniens test would only give rise to arbitrary and unfair 
decisions. Accordingly, Neuhaus has observed that: 
"[i]n different countries and at different times, the one or the other of these twin 
objectives of the law will dominate; there is no permanent solution. Especially 
neither goal can replace the other. '135 
In this sub-section, we will examine the differences between the compromises set between the 
two concepts in relation to the doctrines of forum non conveniens in our selected jurisdictions to 
determine whether this provides for an explanation for any of the divergences in our study. 
132 Castel, Back to the Futures the 'New"Rigid Choice of Law Ru/eforlnterprovincial Torts Constitutionally Mandated? (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 35, at 41. 133 Neuhaus, Legal Certainty versus Equity in the Conflict of Laws (1963) 28 Law & Contemporary Problems 795, at 796. ý3s Voth, supra, n. 36, at 580. 
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2.4.1 Australia 
One explanation for the lack of a "precise and authoritative statement of the principles that should 
be applied in dealing with an application to stay proceedings"136 in Oceanic Sun was that the 
members of the High Court were unable to agree on the balance that should be struck between 
certainty and flexibility in this area of the law. 
On the one hand, Wilson and Toohey JJ were of the view that the St Pierre test "places such a 
tight rein on the discretion of a court" 137that it prevents the courts from dealing "with the problem 
of forum shopping, even in blatant cases. "138 Impliedly, one reason for their endorsement of the 
Spiliada test was that it provides for a higher degree of flexibility. On the other hand, Brennan and 
Deane JJ were hostile to the idea of greater flexibility in the Australian regime on stays of 
proceedings. In particular, there are three reasons as to why they have taken this stance. 
1. First, in Brennan J's view, Australian jurisprudence is "designed to protect the litigant 
against an unnecessarily wide discretionary power»139; "[t]hat system of law is the best 
which leaves least to the discretion of the judge. "14° From this basic principle, he held that 
when a legal right is vested in a litigant, he is "entitled to invoke the State's power to 
enforce it. "141 For that objective, the Australian courts "are at the service of litigants, and 
the rule of law rests on the court's duty to exercise their jurisdiction when litigants invoke 
it. "142 That right should not be "provisionalnt43 and "dependent on a discretionary 
judgment. "'44 
Oceanic Sun, supra, n. 26, at 220. 
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2. Secondly, Brennan J observed that "[i]mplicit in [the Spiliada] approach is the absence of 
fixed guidelines and the consequent uncertainty of the decision in particular cases. "145 
Accordingly, it "can offer little guidance to a judge"146 in determining whether to grant a 
stay of proceedings. Similarly, Deane J was also reluctant to expand the scope of judicial 
discretion to decline jurisdiction, as he believed that "it is likely to lead to increased 
uncertainty for litigants and more litigation about where to litigate. "147 
3. Thirdly, as Deane and Brennan JJ were not in support of the policies advocated by 
Wilson and Toohey JJ such as judicial comity and the discouraging of forum shopping, 
they appear to be of the view that there is no need for a higher degree of flexibility in their 
chosen doctrine of forum non conveniens to take account of these policies. 
Subsequently, when the High Court of Australia was again asked to adopt the Spiliada test in the 
case of Voth, they were in agreement with Brennan and Deane JJ's views on certainty and 
flexibility. In particular, they expressed doubts with the proposition that: 
"[t]o say, in line with the Spiliada approach, that the selected forum is justified in 
refraining from exercising its jurisdiction when it concludes no more that another 
available and competent forum is more appropriate is to acknowledge that a 
court can decline to perform its obligation 
... 
to exercise jurisdiction even though 
it is an appropriate or not inappropriate court. »148 
To them, this is a statement that "is by no means easy to sustain as a matter of legal principle. *149 
It should be pointed out this line of reasoning has in fact been utilised in European countries such 
as Germany, Greece and Italy. For example, in Germany, there are "constitutional difficulties in 
145 ibid. 
146 ibid. 
147 ibid, at 254. ý48 Voth, supra, is. 36, at 559-560. My italics, ibid, at 560. 
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introducing a doctrine of forum non conveniens"150 as there is a "constitutional commitmentn151 
towards guaranteeing a "predictable jurisdiction which must not be manipulated under any 
circumstances. "152 Similarly, the Italian Constitution provides for such a position as well in that the 
provision "no one shall be denied the right to be tried by his natural judge pre-established by 
statute"153 has been relied upon to refuse the adoption of a doctrine of forum non conveniens. In 
other words, the Australian approach is "halfway to the civilian view"154 as it does contemplate a 
grant of a stay of proceedings on a narrow doctrine of forum non conveniens. In contrast, it is 
notable that the courts in the rest of our selected jurisdictions do not seem to find this a difficult 
argument to sustain as they have broadened their discretion in relation to the grant of a stay of 
proceedings without even considering this criticism. 
To conclude, one explanation for the Australian departure from the formulation of the English 
common law doctrine of forum non conveniens is that more weight is attached by the Australian 
courts to the concept of certainty in comparison to flexibility. 
2.4.2 Canada 
Unlike the High Court of Australia in the cases of Oceanic Sun and Voth, no mention of the 
concepts of certainty and flexibility was made by the Supreme Court of Canada in Amchem. 
Implicitly, their decision in Amchem to adopt the 'clearly more appropriate forum' test can be 
regarded as a move towards greater flexibility as that very quality is inherent in that approach. 
However, it is important to note that the compromise between certainty and flexibility for the 
Canadian doctrine of forum non conveniens is not the same as that for the English common law 
doctrine. As was mentioned in Chapter 2, one of the key Canadian divergences from the English 
150 Fawcett, General Report, in Fawcett (ed), Declining Jurisdiction in Private International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press) (1995), 1- 
70, at 23. 131 ibid. 
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common law doctrine of forum non conveniens is the refusal of the Supreme Court of Canada to 
adopt the two stage Spiliada framework. Instead, they provided for a more discretionary approach 
in that the test is simply: is there a more appropriate jurisdiction based on the relevant factors? 
One possible explanation for this decision is that Canadian courts were of the view that the two- 
stage Spiliada test is "overly legalistic; 155 thus preferring a more flexible test with no structural 
limits on the courts to exercise their discretion under the Canadian doctrine of forum non 
conveniens. In contrast, the House of Lords were alert to the dangers of too much flexibility in the 
English common law doctrine of forum non conveniens. In De Dampferre v De Dampferre, Lord 
Goff stated that some "structuring of the approach in cases of forum non convenienS "156 is 
"desirable in the interests of justice"157 as: 
"[i]f this is not so, decisions in particular cases may depend so much on the 
individual reactions of particular judges as to lead to different results in different 
cases, and indeed to results not only unpredictable but so inconsistent as to lead 
to a perception of injustice. w158 
Put another way, Lord Goff was aware of the need for a balance between certainty and flexibility 
in relation to the English common law doctrine of forum non conveniens. He recognised that on 
the one hand, there must be sufficient flexibility to do justice on the facts of individual cases and 
on the other hand, certainty is required by way of a structural framework to ensure that these 
cases are approached consistently. 
In conclusion, one can observe that the Supreme Court of Canada has opted for a compromise 
between flexibility and certainty that is more slanted towards the former. This is thus an 
us Amchem, supra, n. 39, at [36]. 56 De Dampierre, supra, n. 121, at 108. 137 ibid. ý3% ibid. 
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explanation for the structural divergences of the Canadian doctrine of forum non conveniens from 
that of the English common law. 
2.4.3 Singapore 
No discussion of the concepts of certainty and flexibility was made in the decision of the 
Singapore Court of Appeal to adopt the Spiliada test. Impliedly, their acceptance of the 'clearly 
more appropriate forum' test and the Spilfada structure provides some indication that they have 
accepted the balance between certainty and flexibility under the English common law doctrine of 
forum non conveniens. 
3. STRUCTURAL EXPLANATIONS 
3.1 INTERACTION WITH OTHER AREAS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: BASES OF 
JURISDICTION 
As one stage of the private international law process can have an impact on another stage, this 
may be an explanation for the divergences and convergences established in Part I of this thesis. 
In particular, before the doctrine of forum non conveniens is utilised by our Commonwealth 
judiciaries to decline jurisdiction, jurisdiction must first be taken over the dispute in question. If 
there were differences in relation to the bases of jurisdiction in our selected Commonwealth 
countries, this might result in differences between their doctrines of forum non conveniens. 
3.1.1 Wider bases of jurisdiction 
It must be recalled that the situations to which the doctrine of forum non conveniens is applicable 
in Canada and Australia is wider than that in England and Singapore. Not only is the doctrine 
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relevant to "presence-based jurisdiction"159 and "submission-based jurisdiction"160 in Canada and 
Australia, it is also applicable to "assumed jurisdiction"161 where service of process on a 
defendant out of the jurisdiction can be made without leave from the courts 
This divergence stems from the fact that a number of provinces and states in Australia and 
Canada have, by way of legislation, removed the need for judicial permission for a claim form to 
be served on a defendant ex juris. In such circumstances, jurisdiction is taken as of right and it is 
up to the defendant to apply for a stay of proceedings thus extending the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens in these two countries to this category of cases. In contrast, in Singapore and 
England, permission must be obtained from the courts before service ex juris can be made. The 
doctrine of forum non conveniens is therefore not applicable as the courts are asked to establish 
jurisdiction instead of declining it. In other words, it is the differences in the manner in which this 
particular basis of jurisdiction is formulated in our selected jurisdictions in the relevant statutory 
provisions that has resulted in the divergences on this point of comparison. 
3.1.2 Excessively wide bases of jurisdiction 
Presence-based jurisdiction is regarded by the Canadian, Singaporean and English courts as 
being an "excessively wide "162 basis of jurisdiction in that so long as the defendant is present in 
the forum in question, no matter how transient or fortuitous that presence may be, jurisdiction can 
be taken by the courts as of right. Coupled with the St Pierre test in the past, there was "an 
obvious risk of injustice"163 as jurisdiction would not be taken on the basis that the court in 
question was an appropriate if not the most appropriate forum. 
While this position may be tenable in those days under the guise of a policy of protecting the 
claimant's right of access to the courts, it is no longer the case nowadays with the greater 
'59 Muscutt v Courcelles (2002) 60 OR (3d) 20, at [19]. 16D ibid. 
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significance attached to discouraging forum shopping and ensuring greater equality between 
litigants. The situation in Canada is further exacerbated by the fact that there are "few occasions 
when a Canadian court is absolutely precluded from taking jurisdiction over an action"lM as most 
provinces no longer require leave from the courts to serve a claim form on defendants who are 
out of their jurisdiction. The introduction of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in Canada, 
England and Singapore can thus be seen as an "antidote to excessively wider bases of 
jurisdiction. " 165 Put another way, by exercising jurisdiction only if there were no clearly more 
appropriate forum elsewhere, this would help to ensure that the forum in question is implicitly 
appropriate. 
In contrast, the Australian courts do not share the views of the above Commonwealth courts on 
presence based jurisdiction and assumed jurisdiction. Specifically, it must be recalled that in 
Oceanic Sun, Brennan J held that when a legal right is vested in a litigant, he or she is "entitled to 
invoke the State's power to enforce it"166 and that this right should not be "provisional"167 and 
"dependent on a discretionary judgment. "168 Similarly, the High Court of Australia in Voth has held 
that there is an "obligation 
... 
to exercise jurisdiction . 169 when the relevant jurisdictional rules are 
satisfied. 
One possible implication flowing from these comments is that the Australian courts do not 
consider presence-based jurisdiction and even assumed jurisdiction as being too broadly 
formulated for the taking of jurisdiction unlike the rest of the courts in our selected jurisdictions. 
Instead, the objective of their narrower doctrine of forum non conveniens is to ensure that such 
bases of jurisdiction are adhered to. This is thus one explanation for the Australian divergence 
from the formulation of the English common law doctrine of forum non conveniens. 
'64 ibid. 
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3.2 INTERACTION WITH PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: COMITY 
Comity has had an important role in public international law. At times, it has been described as 
'rules of politeness, convenience and goodwill observed by states in their mutual intercourse 
without being legally bound by them "070 "mere courtesies""' in that the concept is only a 
consideration in the decisions of the courts. At others, comity has been used to refer to "binding 
rules of public international law"172 such as the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the rule that 
the "English court should not normally make a determination that a foreign state is in breach of its 
international obligations to a third state. -173 
In private international law, too, we can see its influence on the "development of particular rules 
and attitudes in the resolution of international disputes. "174 For instance, the reason why service 
of a claim form out of jurisdiction is considered to be an exorbitant forum of jurisdiction is that it is 
"necessarily prima facie an interference with the exclusive jurisdiction of the sovereignty of the 
foreign country where service is to be effected 
. 
*175 Accordingly, it is said that "[a]s a matter of 
international comity, ""g service would only be allowed if it were clearly within the spirit of the 
relevant civil procedure rules. 
It is not surprising therefore to see comity utilised as an explanation for the purposes of our 
discussion in this chapter. On the one hand, comity has been employed as an argument for the 
departure from judicial chauvinism in England, Canada and Singapore in relation to their 
doctrines of forum non conveniens. On the other hand, the Australian courts have refused to 
follow suit as they do not share the same views as these countries on this concept. 
10 Collins, Comity in Modern Private International Law, in Fawcett (ed), Reform and Development of Private International Law: 
Essays in Honour of Sir Peter North (Oxford: Oxford University Press) (2002), 89-110, at 95. 
"' ibid, at 96. ýn ibid. 
"n ibid, at 97. 
'74 ibid, at 91. 75 George Monro Ltd v American Cyanamid [1944] KB 432, at 437. 
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3.2.1 Canada 
In Amchem, Sopinka J first provided for a definition of the concept of comity"' by citing La Forest 
J's comments in the case of Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savoye. 18 
"Comity in the legal sense is neither a matter of obligation, on the one hand, nor 
of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which 
one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of 
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, 
and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the 
protection of its laws. "179 
Subsequently, he agreed with Lord Goff in The Spiliada that the law on stays of proceedings is a 
"subject where comity is of importance. "180 He also observed that the English approach has 'gone 
through several stages of evolution tending to a broader acceptance of the legitimacy of the claim 
of other jurisdictions to try actions have connections to England as well as to such other 
jurisdictions. "18' In particular, he appears to be referring to Lord Diplock's comments in The Abidin 
Dever that: 
"the essential change in the attitude of the English courts to pending or 
prospective litigation in foreign jurisdictions that has been achieved step by step 
during the last ten years as a result of the successive decisions of this House in 
The Atlantic Star, MacShannon and Amid Rasheed is that judicial chauvinism 
has been replaced by judicial comity to an extent which I think the time is now 
ripe to acknowledge frankly is, in the field of law with which this appeal is 
171 Amchem, supra, n. 39, at [28]. :n [1990] 3 SCR 1077. 
"' ibid, at 1096. X 8o Amchem, supra, n. 39, at [31]. 191 ibid. 
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concerned, indistinguishable from the Scottish doctrine of forum non 
conveniens. "182 
All this has had a powerful influence on his decision to abandon the St Pierre approach for the 
English common law 'clearly more appropriate forum' test. In other words, it is an "emphasis on 
comity"t83as shared by the English courts in The Abidin Daver and The Spiliada that has 
encouraged the Supreme Court of Canada to be "less forum-centric"184 in the formulation of their 
doctrine of forum non conveniens. 
3.2.2 Australia 
As the proponents of the Spiliada approach in Oceanic Sun, Wilson and Toohey JJ opined that 
the St Pierre principle was "inappropriate to modern conditions"185 as greater importance is now 
attached to "considerations of international comity as the nations of the world become more 
closely related. "186 In such circumstances, they wanted to cut down "local parochialism as regards 
judicial adjudication"187 as this would be "consistent with a spirit of international legal cohesion 
and integration. "'88 
As for the rest of the Justices in Oceanic Sun, there is clearly a disagreement with the English 
courts on the significance of comity to the law on stays of proceedings. In particular, even though 
Deane J acknowledged that the "desire for judicial comity has played a significant role in the 
acceptance of the broader forum non conveniens doctrine in England"189 and that "international 
comity supports the approach that the courts of this country should refrain from hearing actions in 
circumstances corresponding to those in which courts of other countries would refrain from 
182 The Abidin Daver, supra, n. 20, at 411. "' Blom, Reform of Private International Law by Judges: Canada as a Case Study, in Fawcett (ed), Reform and Development of 
Private International Law: Essays in Honour of Sir Peter North (Oxford: Oxford University Press) (2002), 31-49, at 42. 180 ibid. 
res Oceanic Sun, supra, n. 26, at 212. 
ibid. 
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entertaining them on the ground that they should more appropriately be brought in Australia, "190 
he questioned this appeal to comity in the light of "circumstances where some leading western 
countries, particularly in relation to actions by their own residents, decline to observe even the 
judicial restraint shown by common law courts under traditional doctrine. "191 Put another way, he 
seems to be of the view that international comity is only an ideal and in reality, it is not shared by 
all jurisdictions. Under such circumstances, he appears to be saying that there is no need to 
adhere to this concept. 
Brennan J did not mention the concept of comity in his decision to endorse the St Pierre test but it 
is interesting to note his comments that the "established rule does not call for an assessment by 
the courts of this country of the quality of justice administered elsewhere: an assessment which 
would be often of dubious validity, if not a source of grave embarrassment. "192 One can argue 
that in his view, judicial restraint is what comity requires. 
One important point to note is that that Brennan J had misinterpreted the nature of the Spiliada 
test as it is clear that English courts do not compare the justice administered in local courts with 
that administered in foreign courts. Lord Wilberforce, for example has stated in Amin Rasheed 
Corp v Kuwait Insurance Cot93 that it is not appropriate to embark upon a comparison of the 
procedure, or methods, or reputation or standing of the courts of one country as compared with 
those of another. "194 
Both Deane and Brennan JJ's views can be observed in the decision of the majority Justices in 
Voth. First, one explanation as to why the High Court chose to focus on the inappropriateness of 
the Australian proceedings is that there are "powerful policy considerations which militate against 
Australian courts sitting in judgment upon the ability or willingness of the courts of another country 
190 ibid. at 253 
- 
254. 1'1 ibid, at 254. 192 ibid, at 240. 193 [1984] AC 50. 
194 ibid. at 72. 
147 
to accord justice to the plaintiff in the particular case. "195 This is said to be the "principle of judicial 
restraint or abstention. "196 Secondly, Deane J's views on comity were endorsed as in reaction to 
the appellant's argument that judicial comity should replace judicial chauvinism, even though the 
High Court conceded that "it would obviously be desirable in the interests of international comity 
that this Court, in common with the courts of other countries, should adopt a uniform approach"197 
they held that they were not "persuaded that there exists any real international consensus 
favouring a particular solution to the question. Nor are [they] persuaded that any consensus 
exists among countries of the common law world. "198 
To sum up, as the Australian courts do not agree with the judicial views on comity in Canada and 
England, there has been an Australian departure from the doctrines of forum non conveniens in 
these countries. 
3.2.3 Singapore 
The Singapore courts have held that the Spiliada test is a "more liberal approach which cut[s] 
down local parochialism as regards judicial adjudication and attaches greater importance to 
considerations of international comity"199 thus indicating that they are in support of the views of 
the Canadian and English judges on this concept. Recently, Andrew Phang JC has stated in the 
High Court case of Q&M Enterprises Sdn Bhd v Poh Kiat200 that the "importance of international 
comity cannot be underestimated. . 201 As the alternative forum in relation to the application of the 
Spiliada test was the Malaysian courts, he stated that the need to respect comity in this situation 
'" Voth, supra, n. 36, at 559. 
'% ibid. 
ibid. at 560. 
ibid. 
Eng Liat Kiang, supra, n. 42, at 105. See also the comments of VK Rajah J in Peters Roger May v Pinder Lillian Gek Lian (2006] SGHC 39, at [19] and Andrew Phang JC in Q&M Enterprises, supra, n. 43, at [20] 
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was particularly acute as a result of the "[c]ommon geographical, political and even legal ties in 
the past"202 between the two jurisdictions. 
4. HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
4.1 HISTORICAL INFLUENCE OF ENGLISH JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS 
Initially, as was highlighted in Chapter 2, there was no doctrine of forum non conveniens in any of 
our selected Commonwealth jurisdictions. Instead, the St Pierre 'oppression and vexation' test 
was utilised by the judiciaries of these countries to determine whether a stay of proceedings 
should be granted. One key explanation for this uniformity at this point in time is the prevailing 
judicial view that "conformity with the common law as declared in England was desirable. "203 This 
is unsurprising as the legal systems of these jurisdictions are derived from a time when "Great 
Britain was the metropolitan state for many colonies"204 and the Privy Council was entrenched as 
the ultimate court of appeal which vested in Great Britain "sovereign legislative power and 
superintending judicial authority"205 over its dominions. Even when these jurisdictions became 
independent, their courts remained heavily reliant on English judicial precedents as the Privy 
Council was still the final court of appeal for these jurisdictions. This "proclivity"206 of judiciaries to 
"apply unthinkingly the decisions of English courts in a strict positivist, black letter manner . 207 has 
been deplored by numerous academics as it may often result in a "complete denial of justice to 
the parties due to rigid adherence of the court to decisions made on considerations completely 
alien"208 to the social, economic and political context of the jurisdiction in question. It was only 
with the demise of the right of appeal to the Privy Council that these judiciaries become more 
willing to shape their common law to accord with their own "circumstances, needs and values. "209 
202 ibid, at [26]. 203 Mason, Australian Contract Law, (1988) 1 Journal of Contract Law 1, at 2. 2" Tolofson VJensen [1994] 3 SCR 1022, at [48]. 205 ibid. 
206 Palmer, Torts in the Inter-Provincial Conflict of Laws (1959) 17 University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review 1, at 6. a°1 ibid. 
2" ibid. 
209 Mason, supra, n. 203, at 1. 
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Accordingly, one possible explanation for the divergences observed in relation to the various 
doctrines of forum non conveniens in our selected Commonwealth jurisdictions is that the 
influence of English judicial precedents on the courts of these countries has waned in recent 
years. It is thus the purpose of this section to ascertain the veracity of this statement. 
4.1.1 Canada 
English common law was received into Canada by a number of statutes in the 18th century. 210 
Prior to the severance of the link between the Canadian legal system and the Privy Council in 
1949, the Supreme Court of Canada and lower Canadian provincial courts considered 
themselves bound by the decisions of the House of Lords under the doctrine of stare decisis. 21, 
As the key Canadian decision namely Empire-Universal Films Ltd v Rank212 that endorsed the 
English common law St Pierre rule was decided before 1949, one explanation for this uniformity 
is simply that this was the English precedent that Canadian courts were bound to follow. After the 
right of appeal to the Privy Council was abolished in 1949, the St Pierre test remained part of 
Canadian law for the next few decades as the Supreme Court of Canada was not called upon to 
rule on the law pertaining to stays of proceedings until 1993 in the case of Amchem. Therefore, 
even though "forum non conveniens was held by the House of Lords in 1984 to be the law of 
England, [it did not] automatically lead to its becoming the law to be applied"213 in Canada. 
In Amchem, the Supreme Court of Canada endorsed the English common law 'clearly more 
appropriate forum' test. It is important to note that this is not the result of a blind adherence to 
English judicial precedents. Sopinka J did examine the policies and concepts underlying The 
Spiliada before deciding that the Canadian courts should follow these concepts as well. In 
addition, not every aspect of the judgment in The Spiliada was adopted. In particular, Sopinka J 
2ý See Chapter 3, Gail, The Canadian Legal System (Toronto: Carswell) (3rd ed., 1990). ibid, at 58. 212 [1947] OR 775. 21j BCLtd. v Thrifty (1998) 168 DLR (40") 602, at [33]. 
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acknowledged that "there are differences in the language used"214 between the Canadian and 
English common law doctrine due to his rejection of the Spiliada two stage structure. 
4.1.2 Australia 
After the Australian reception of the English common law, decisions of the English courts aside 
from the Privy Council were deemed as "decisions pronounced outside the Australian 
hierarch Y415 and they were only of persuasive authority. Nevertheless, Australian courts were still 
heavily influenced by non-binding English decisions with early nineteenth century statements in 
the High Court of Australia216 declaring that they and all lower Australian courts should follow 
decisions of the House of Lords subject to the ruling of the Privy Council for it provided the final 
settlement of the "law for the Empire. "217 This would of course explain the endorsement of the St 
Pierre test in the High Court case of Maritime Insurance Co Ltd v Geelong Harbor Trust 
Commissioners, 218 that it "rested simply on an acceptance of what Sir Gorell Barnes P had said in 
Logan v Bank of Scotland (No. 2). X219 
Subsequently, the Australian right of appeal to the Privy Council was removed with the Privy 
Council (Limitation of Appeals) Act 1968 and the Privy Council (Appeals from the High Court) Act 
1975 and it was held in Viro v The Queen220 that the High Court was no longer bound by Privy 
Council decisions. However, St Pierre remained very much part of Australian law as there was no 
High Court pronouncement on this case till 1988. At this point in time, the English common law 
had moved on to a doctrine of forum non conveniens. Accordingly, one question arising in the 
214 ei Amchem, supra, n. 39, at [39]. Smith, Pose, Maher, Waller and Derham's Legal Process 
- 
Commentary and Materials (Sydney: The Law Book Company Ltd) 
216 ., 1988), at 151. 
217 
See for example, Webb v Outrim (1907) 4 CLR 356. 
Z 
Smith, Pose, supra, n. 215, at 152. 
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High Court of Australia case of Oceanic Sun was whether the courts in Australia should follow 
this "English development. 421 
On the one hand, Tooley and Wilson JJ were in support of Lord Goffs approach in The Spiliada. 
Like Sopinka J's judgment in Amchem, it is interesting to note that this was not a blind adherence 
to English judicial precedents as these Justices did examine the policies and concepts underlying 
the English common law doctrine of forum non conveniens before making the decision to call for 
222 an adoption of the English common law approach. 
On the other hand, Brennan, Deane and Gaudron JJ chose to reject the English common law 
Spiliada test. Instead, reliance was placed on the Australian authorities on this matter as Deane J 
was of the view that "the statement of principle in Maritime Insurance Co was that of a unanimous 
Court"223 and it had "stood as authority in this country for almost eighty years. "224 Accordingly, he 
held that it would "require strong and clear policy considerations to prevail against the 
considerations of principle and the authority of the long-standing decision in Maritime Insurance 
Co which favour adherence to traditional doctrine. "225 
Gaudron J pointed out that where "developments in the common law of England reflect 
underlying changes which may not be matched in Australian law or society, care must be 
exercised in determining the extent to which changes in the English common law should be 
reflected in the common law of this country. . 226 In particular, he opined that the English common 
law preference for " 'judicial comity' rather than 'judicial chauvinism' Js readily understandable 
when it is borne in mind that England is a member of the European Community, which is not 
merely an alliance of similarly minded sovereign nation states, but a community with its own 
221 Oceanic Sun, supra, n. 26, at 212. 2nibid. 
223 ibid, at 253. 224 ibid. 
223 ibid. 
226 ibidat 263. 
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parliament, its own laws and its own court. "227 It should be noted that Wilson and Tooley JJ were 
opposed to this view, as they did not regard the evolution of English law since The Atlantic Star 
as being dependent on "local considerations such as the incorporation of the United Kingdom into 
the European Economic Community. n228 
Subsequently, in Voth, the majority Justices were clearly in support of Brennan, Deane and 
Gaudron JJ's views on the relevant English judicial precedents as they again pointed out the 
strength of the authority of Maritime Insurance. 229 In addition, they agreed with Deane J's refusal 
to follow the English development as they regarded the "policy considerations-230 underlying the 
Spiliada test as "persuasive but not compelling 
"23' 
Nevertheless, the rejection of the approach in The Spiliada does not necessarily mean that 
English judicial precedents are no longer relied upon by the Australian courts. First, it is 
interesting to note how certain aspects of Lord Gofrs judgment in The Spillada were utilised in the 
application of the Voth principles. For example, it was stated that "the discussion of Lord Goff in 
Spiliada of relevant connecting factors and a legitimate personal or juridical advantage provides 
valuable assistance. "232 Secondly and more importantly, it must be recalled that the 'clearly 
inappropriate forum' test is based on the approach in The Atlantic Star which provided for a 
broader definition of oppression and vexation at the start of the English common law shift towards 
the Spiliada test. Therefore, it is not that no English judicial precedents were utilised in the 
formulation of the Australian doctrine of forum non conveniens; it is that the English courts have 
overruled the case in question. 
u' ibid. 
u` ibid, at 212. 229 Voth, supra, n. 36, at 552-553. 110 ibid. at 560. 231 ibid. 
232 ibid, at 565. 
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4.1.3 Singapore 
Before 1994, under section 5(1) of the Civil Law Act 1988, a Singapore court deciding issues with 
respect to mercantile law had to decide such issues in the same manner as an English court 
unless there were contrary provisions or case law in force in Singapore. Accordingly, it is not 
surprising that the endorsement and adoption of the Spiliada test in the Singapore Court of 
Appeal case of Brinkerhoff Maritime Drilling Corp v PT Airfast Services Indonesia233 was made 
without any discussion of the relevant policies and principles. 
In 1994, Singapore severed its ties with the Privy Council under the Judicial Committee (Repeal) 
Act 1994 and as such, English precedents could no longer bind the decisions of the Singapore 
court. Having said that, the Application of the English Law Act 1993 does provide for the 
continued application in Singapore of common law and rules of equity so far as it was part of 
Singapore law immediately before 12 November 1993, and is applicable to the circumstances in 
Singapore. In other words, Spillada is still the relevant authority on stays of proceedings in 
Singapore at this point in time and only the Singapore Court of Appeal can overrule it. 
In the later Singapore Court of Appeal case of Eng Liat Kiang, counsel for the appellant 
attempted to convince the court that it should "depart from the principles enunciated in 
Spiliada"234 for the "test in Oceanic Sun 
... 
and approved in Voth. "235 In response, LP Thean JA 
held that "[o]n authority and on principle [they] cannot agree"236 as they preferred the Spillada test 
for its "more liberal approach which cut[s] down local parochialism as regards judicial adjudication 
and attaches greater importance to consideration of international comity. "237 Accordingly, even 
though the Singapore courts are still very much influenced by English judicial authority in this 
233 [1992] 2 SLR 776. 23s Eng Lia: Kiang, supra, n. 42, at 105. 
ibid. 236 ibid. 
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area of private international law, one can observe that it is not without any understanding of the 
policies underlying it. 238 
4.2 COMPARATIVE INFLUENCE OF FOREIGN DOCTRINES OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS 
Since the 19th century, there has been a doctrine of forum non conveniens in Scotland in that a 
stay of proceedings can "never be sustained unless the court is satisfied that there is some other 
tribunal having competent jurisdiction, in which the case may be tried more suitably for the 
interests of the parties and for the ends of justice. 239 Similarly, the United States of America has 
provided for such a doctrine as well. 240 These comparative developments were well documented 
in a number of House of Lords cases. Initially, the English courts resisted the introduction of such 
an approach. However, in the case of Abidin Daver, they acknowledged that as a result of the 
modifications made to the St Pierre test in The Atlantic Star and MacShannon v Rockware Glass 
Ltd, 241 the English common law position on the stays of proceedings was "indistinguishable from 
the Scottish legal doctrine of forum non conveniens. "242 Put another way, English judges were 
influenced by the shift towards such a test in Scotland and the United States to adopt a similar 
approach as well. 
Correspondingly, the question arising here in this sub-section is whether the courts of our 
selected jurisdictions have been affected by developments in other common law countries in 
relation to the doctrine of forum non conveniens to adopt or reject the English common law 
'clearly more appropriate forum' test. 
2"e See also Peters Roger May, supra, n. 199, Q&M Enterprises Sdn Bhd, supra, n. 200. 239 Sim v Robinow, supra, n. 118, at 668. See also Longworth v Hope (1865) 3M 1049, Clements v Macaulay (1866) 4M 583. 144 Gull Oil Corp v Gilbert 330 US 501 (1947). 
, A'[1978] AC 795. 242 The Abidin Daver, supra, n. 20, at 411. 
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4.2.1 Canada 
Another explanation for the adoption of the 'clearly more appropriate forum' test in Amchem was 
that the Supreme Court of Canada was of the view that "the law in common law jurisdictions 
is... remarkably uniform"243 on this matter. Specifically, Sopinka J stated that this is an area of the 
law where there is a "broad consensus among major common law jurisdictions. n244 While there 
are differences in the formulation of these rules, "each jurisdiction applies principles designed to 
identify the most appropriate or appropriate forum for the litigation based on factors which 
connect the litigation and the parties to the competing fora. "245 As examples, he pointed out that 
both the New Zealand courts and the United States Federal courts "apply similar principles"246 on 
forum non convenfens. Interestingly, he also observed that the Australian courts "while not 
adopting all of the wording of Spiliada, has enunciated principles that the court acknowledged 
would likely yield the same results in the majority of cases. "247 
4.2.2 Australia 
One reason provided by Wilson and Toohey JJ for their declaration in Oceanic Sun that "the 
Spillada approach should henceforth chart the course for the common law of Australia in relation 
to the inherent jurisdiction of a court to stay proceedings when there is a more appropriate forum 
in a foreign country-248 is that "in an area of the law involving the courts of other countries it is 
expedient to preserve as much consistency as possible between the common law countries. "249 
In particular, they pointed out that the doctrine of forum non conveniens has long been part of the 
law in Scotland and the United States. They also observed that England and Canada have 
rejected the St Pierre test for such an approach as well. 25° 
2" Amchem, supra, n. 39, at [39]. 244 ibid. at [31]. us ibid, at [39]. 
ibid. at [35]. 107 ibid. 
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Deane J acknowledged that "the weight of authority in the common law would seem increasingly 
to favour the acceptance of the broader forum non conveniens discretion"251 and that in this area 
of the law, he recognised that it is "incumbent upon the courts in different jurisdictions to be 
sensitive to each other's reactions [in] 
... 
striving to achieve... a careful analysis and weighing of 
the relevant competing considerations "252 However, he then pointed out that "some leading 
western countries, particularly in relation to actions by their own residents, decline to observe 
even the judicial restraint shown by common law courts under traditional doctrine. "253 Brennan J 
has also stated that the "law applied in many other countries preserves local jurisdiction even 
more jealously. "2M In short, as these two Justices did not think that there was any consensus in 
the common law world on the formulation of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, they were not 
persuaded by this comparative point to adopt the English common law test. 
Similarly, in Voth, the High Court of Australia was not convinced that "there exists any real 
international consensus"255 in this area of private international law. Using the United States of 
America as an example, they pointed out that the US approach differs from the Spiliada test in 
that it is "more favourable to the plaintiff than Spiliada and, perhaps, is closer to the 'clearly 
inappropriate forum' test but differs in that it takes account of the selected forum's administrative 
problems. "256 
It can thus be observed that even though the Australian and Canadian courts were presented 
with the same comparative scene at a point in time when they had to make a decision whether to 
diverge from or converge with the English common law doctrine of forum non conveniens, two 
differing interpretations of that scene were made. The Canadian courts chose to see common law 
jurisdictions 
as having broadly similar doctrines of forum non conveniens whereas, the Australian 
2s1 ibid, at 253. 252 ibid. 
253 ibid, at 254. 2U ibid, at 240. ýs Voth, supra, n. 36, at 560. 56 ibid, at 561. 
judiciaries were of the view that there is no consensus amongst these jurisdictions in relation to 
this area of private international law as there are specific differences between these doctrines. 
4.2.3 Singapore 
For Singapore, the Australian doctrine of forum non conveniens was examined by the Singapore 
courts in the case of Eng Liat Kiang. As they did not agree with the policies underlying the 'clearly 
inappropriate forum' approach, that test was rejected. 257 No mention was made however of the 
developments in other common law jurisdictions on forum non conveniens such as New Zealand, 
Scotland, Canada or the United States. 
5. CONTEXTUAL EXPLANATIONS 
5.1 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT 
The wider social and economic context in which international civil and commercial disputes are 
litigated has been taken into account by some of our selected judiciaries. In particular, this 
consideration has had an impact on the policy decisions made in this area of private international 
law. In this sub-section, we will examine how our selected judiciaries have taken into account the 
increasing globalisation of litigation and the fact that international litigation can be an Invisible 
export in their decisions on forum non conveniens. 
5.1.1 Globalisation of litigation 
Significant technological advances have been achieved particularly in relation to transportation 
and telecommunication in recent decades. There is greater "labour mobility"258 as individuals can 
now travel around the world at lesser time and cost for business purposes. Communication with 
257 Eng Liat Kiang, supra, n. 42, at 105. 258 Bell, supra, n. 45, at para. 1.04. 
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business counterparts has also become less expensive and more convenient especially with the 
creation of the Internet which has enabled parties to negotiate and conduct business deals in 
'cyberspace' with the virtual spaces that it provides as well its facilitation of the electronic transfer 
of funds. Accordingly, as a result of these developments, companies have become more 
globalised as their assets, "commodity portfolios"259 and "geographical spheres of operation"26° 
are increasingly located in a number of different jurisdictions depending on the labour costs and 
infrastructure of the country in question. Furthermore, with an increasing number of free trade 
agreements being signed between individual governments or on a worldwide basis as facilitated 
by international trade organisations, this has meant that "primary and secondary products are 
regularly penetrating new markets. "261 All this has led to the "emergence of a truly global 
economy. "262 
This has serious implications for private international law, as "in a world where daily transactions 
routinely involve multiple countries, litigants are increasingly likely to find themselves embroiled in 
simultaneous contests in several theatres. "263 More and more contracts will now involve parties 
from a number of jurisdictions and in the process of negotiating these international contracts, 
parties will attempt to negotiate for choice of law and jurisdiction clauses that are most beneficial 
to their cause. Product liability cases have become internationalised as the product in question 
may be negligently manufactured in one jurisdiction and may then inflict injury on the victim in 
another. With holiday travel on the rise, accidents may occur more frequently in countries other 
than the claimant's residence. In short, litigation has become globalised as well. 
In light of this phenomenon, pressure was placed on the courts of our selected jurisdictions to 
reject the St Pierre test as it was fashioned in the nineteenth century at a time when international 
civil litigation was a rarity. Its parochial nature and pro-claimant bias in the guise of the policy of 
u'ibid 
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protecting a litigant's right of access to the courts in question and the fact that it served as an 
inducement to the litigants to forum shop was seen as "inappropriate to modem conditions "264 
Accordingly, the purpose of this sub-section is to examine how the courts of our selected 
jurisdictions have interpreted and reacted to this particular social and economic phenomenon. As 
a preliminary note, the Singapore courts have not examined the globalisation of litigation in their 
decisions on forum non conveniens. 
Canada 
Setting the scene for the rejection of the St Pierre approach, Sopinka J highlighted in Amchem 
that the "business of litigation, like commerce itself"265 has becoming "increasingly 
international"266 with the "greater ease of communication and travel. "287 With Increasing "free 
traden268 and the "rapid growth of multi-national corporations"269 he pointed out that it has become 
"more difficult to identify one clearly appropriate forum 270 for litigation. Similarly, with "multiple 
defendants carrying on business in a number of jurisdictions and distributing their products or 
services world wide"271 and plaintiffs residing in different jurisdictions, it is difficult to pinpoint one 
place where the transaction giving rise to the action took place. 
Under such circumstances, Sopinka J stated that courts have to become more tolerant of the 
systems of other countries and that the judicial chauvinism inherent in the St Pierre test can no 
longer be maintained. He also recognised that litigants are likely to engage in forum shopping in 
order to acquire an edge over their opponents where many forums are likely to be suitable 
alternatives for the dispute in question. There is thus a need to ensure that the "action is tried in 
the jurisdiction that has the closest connection with the action and the parties and not to secure a 
U4 Oceanic Sun, supra, n. 26, at 212. 265Amchem, 
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juridical advantage to one of the litigants at the expense of others in a jurisdiction that is 
otherwise inappropriate. "272 Having established the context and the policies that the Canadian 
court should adhere to in relation to such international civil litigation, he went on to endorse the 
'clearly more appropriate forum' test 
To sum up, one can observe that the shift away from judicial chauvinism towards judicial comity 
and the adherence to the policies of discouraging forum shopping and ensuring equal justice 
between litigants in relation to the Canadian doctrine of forum non conveniens Is tied to the 
Supreme Court of Canada's recognition of the increasing globalisation of litigation. 
Australia 
In Oceanic Sun, Gaudron J was of the view that it was the integration of England into the 
European Community that has resulted in the adoption of the 'clearly more appropriate forum'test 
by the English courts. Consequently, he did not regard it as appropriate for the Australian courts 
to endorse that approach. This view was challenged by Wilson and Toohey JJ as they did not 
think that the introduction of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in England can be "ascribed to 
local considerations such as the incorporation of the United Kingdom into the European 
Economic Community. "273 Instead, they were of the view that social circumstances for the entire 
world have changed since the formulation of the St Pierre test in that there has been an 
enormous "transformation in communications and travel. "274 They opined that this has resulted in 
closer ties being developed between the "nations of the world"275 and that a "greater 
importance"276 
should now be attached to "considerations of international comity. "277 
Consequently, they held that the St Pierre principle, "fashioned as it was in the nineteenth 
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century "278 is now inappropriate for modern circumstances particularly since it is "unable to deal 
justly with the problem of forum shopping, even in blatant cases. "279 
Interestingly, when Voth was decided, the High Court of Australia recognised that there has been 
a globalisation of litigation in that the "complexity of modern transnational transactions and 
relationships between parties is such as to indicate that in a significant number of cases, there is 
more than one forum with an arguable claim to be the natural forum. n280 In addition, they even 
acknowledged that from an "international standpoint, a281 there is "much to say for the more 
appropriate forum test"282 to deal with this situation in that it is designed to ensure that litigation 
proceeds in the natural forum. However, instead of focusing on the need for international comity 
between nations and discouraging forum shopping, they held that the internationalisation of 
commercial transactions and disputes has made the Spiliada test "a question by no means easy 
to answer. "283 Instead, they preferred to "discourage the litigation of such a difficult issue as an 
interlocutory question by means of what has been described as a war of affidavits"284 by adopting 
a 'clearly inappropriate forum' test as it avoids the "need to make a comparative judgment"285 
between the laws of two forums. In cases "in which the ascertainment of the natural forum is a 
complex and finely balanced question, the court may more readily conclude that it Is not a clearly 
inappropriate forum. "286 
Even though the above response to the globalisation of litigation has become the dominant view 
in the High Court of Australia, there is again a minority that has continued to advocate the view 
put forth by the Canadian courts. For example, Toohey J in dissent in Voth has pointed out the 
Spiliada test "recognises that in the modem world, particularly in the modern commercial world, 
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there may be more than one forum available to a plaintiff. "287 In these circumstances and "in the 
context of an international dispute, "288 a plaintiff should no longer have "an unrestricted right to 
choose the venue of an action n289 Likewise, in Renault v Zhang, Kirby J expressed the hope that 
"[o]ne day Voth may be overruled and a principle of the common law may be established more 
appropriate to the contemporary circumstances of global and regional disputes in which Australia 
courts, like those of every country, must now operate. 290 Similarly, Callinan J commented that 
"globalisation... required that, in general, suits should not be determined in a jurisdiction which 
has, with respect to the relevant events, no real connexion with the defendant. "291 
5.1.2 Litigation as an invisible export 
England, Canada and Singapore 
It is important to reiterate that even in England, Canada and Singapore, there Is no equal justice 
between litigants in relation to their doctrines of forum non conveniens. If their judiciaries truly 
desired equality between litigants, their forum non conveniens tests would not begin with a 
Presumption in favour of the claimant; it would not be up to the defendant to establish a clearly 
more appropriate forum elsewhere. Instead, it would be something analogous to the "Scots 
Position of neutrality under which there is no presumption in favour of the plaintiff. "292 Accordingly, 
one question we can pose here is: why did these courts adopt such a pro-claimant position? 
Under the English common law, the explanation given by Lord Goff for placing a heavy burden on 
the defendant to show that there is another forum abroad which is clearly more appropriate for 
trial was that "proper regard [must be] paid to the fact that jurisdiction has been founded in 
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England as of right. *293 If there is no clearly more appropriate forum elsewhere, Lord Goff has 
held that he could "see no reason why the English court should not refuse to grant a stay in such 
a case. "294 
Fawcett has pointed out that there are two reasons for allowing trial in England in these 
circumstances. First, it is "undoubtedly a matter of judicial pride that foreign litigants not 
infrequently choose England, and in particular its Commercial Court, as the venue for trial"295 and 
this may have led to an "automatic assumption being made that England is at least a natural 
forum for trial of complex commercial disputes 
. 
P296 Secondly, in today's globalised world 
economy, England has "an economic Interest in trial taking place in England [as there] are 
obvious export benefits to the nation in having an open door policy. "297 Furthermore, people who 
initiate their actions in England are likely to "bring trade to this country as well. "298 It has also been 
commented that this is not "mere "insular pride" but genuine superiority in specialised areas n2ae 
This economic rationale has been endorsed by the Singapore courts. In particular, in the case of 
Q&M Enterprises Sdn Bhd, Andrew Phang JC stated that one reason for the Singapore adoption 
of the 'clearly more appropriate forum' test was that "[w]hen foreigners litigate in [Singapore], this 
forms a valuable invisible export. *300 In Canada, however, there is no indication in Amchem that 
there is support for this line of reasoning. Sopinka J simply stated that he "agree[d] with the 
English authorities that the existence of a more appropriate forum must be clearly established to 
displace the forum selected by the plaintiff. "301 
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Australia 
As for Australia, while the result of a 'clearly inappropriate forum' test would be to encourage 
forum shoppers to initiate their action in Australia and thus bring in litigation as an invisible export, 
it does not appear that the reasoning of the Australian courts on this subject matter is based on 
this particular point. Instead, it seems to be premised on the avoidance of the many problems that 
might arise from the globalisation of litigation as a phenomenon if a broader doctrine of forum non 
conveniens were introduced. 
In addition, it has been said that "Australian jurisdictions are... unlikely to attract international 
forum shoppers by reason of the munificence of their procedural law"302 for a number of reasons 
namely, "[j]uries in civil trials tend to be comparatively modest in their awards, use of contingency 
fees is unethical or unlawful in all Australian jurisdictions, and rules of pre-trial discovery are not 
unduly generous. "303 In other words, Australia simply does not have a reputation of being a centre 
for international civil and commercial litigation. 
5.2 POLITICAL CONTEXT 
5.2.1 Federation 
In Bankinvest AG v Seabrooks, the intention behind the enactment of the cross-vesting scheme 
in Australia was closely relied upon by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in their rejection of 
the Voth principles with regards to the interpretation of the relevant provisions on the transfer of 
proceedings from one Supreme Court of a State or Territory in Australia to another. 
In particular, Kirby P (as he then was) pointed out a number of factors that have "propelled the 
Parliaments 
of Australia into the exceptional machinery provided by the Act and its 
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counterparts. n304 First, he stated that there is the "growing integration of the Australian community 
and economy. "305 Secondly, significant advances in "[t]elecommunications, air transport and other 
developments"306 now "permit readier management and control of litigation started in other 
jurisdictions of Australia than was possible in earlier times. "307 
Similarly, Street CJ commented on the value of the cross-vesting legislation that: 
"[t]he introduction of this scheme is a significant move towards providing 
throughout our nation the services of an integrated court system transcending the 
boundaries, both geographic and jurisdictional, that have in the past obstructed 
the courts in meeting the requirements of the Australian public. "308 
Rogers JA too, opined that Australia has become "more and more one market, and there was 
more extensive movement of people and goods around the nation. "309 In these circumstances, 
"restrictions imposed by State boundaries became more burdensome"310 and "contrary to the 
concept of federalism"311 particularly with the High Court of Australia's view ruling in Laurie v 
Carro/? 12 that "for the purposes of principles of private international law, all other States in 
Australia should be regarded as 'foreign' countries by the courts of a State 
. 
*313 In essence, one 
can observe that these Justices were of the view that the political context of the Australian 
federation has led to the enactment of the Cross-vesting Act. 
Subsequently, the New South Wales Court of Appeal went on to hold that Voth has "no role to 
Play-314 in relation to the interpretation of section 5(2) of the Cross-vesting Act. In particular, the 
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basis of the Voth test; the "prima facie presumption that the court, the jurisdiction of which was 
properly invoked, should exercise itn315 was firmly rejected. In their view, if this presumption were 
accepted, "it would entrench the concept of one Australian jurisdiction being 'foreign' to 
another"316 and "[n]o allowance would be made for the fact that the Australian States are a 
federation. 
. 
317 As for the approach that should be adopted, Rogers JA held that assistance can 
be obtained from the English common law Spiliada test as they are "driven by the same principles 
as the Australian legislation; "318 both the "House of Lords in Spiliada and the Parliaments 
enacting the cross-vesting legislation were responding to the same needs. a319 Obviously, he was 
not referring to the political context that Spiliada was decided in, as England is not a federation. 
Instead, he appears to be saying that the concern with equal justice, judicial comity and the 
prevention of forum shopping in the English cases is particularly relevant to the question of what 
Australian courts should do in a dispute that involves factors connecting it to two or more 
Australian States or Territories. 
In contrast, in Waterhouse v Australian Broadcasting Corporation, one can observe a different 
reaction by the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory to this political consideration. 
Even though Kelly J did recognise that the statement in Pederson v Young320 that "[t]he 
[Australian] States are separate countries in private international law"321 should not be applied 
"too liberally"322 and that the "States and Territories are not entirely foreign to one another, "323 he 
was of the view that this adherence to the policy of protecting a claimant's right of access to the 
Australia courts would not be regarded as "chauvinistic. "324 Furthermore, it implied that "plaintiffs 
were at liberty to choose any one of eight courts in which they might have brought their actions 
[and that they] could hardly have been said to be forum shopping when they made their choice of 
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this Court. "325 Accordingly, it is in Kelly J's view that the Voth principles can be justified in relation 
to Australia's political context. 
When the High Court of Australia in BHP Billiton Ltd v Schultz held that it is the Spiliada principles 
which are relevant to section 5(2) of the Cross-vesting Act, it is notable that their emphasis was 
on policy considerations such as the rejection of the litigant's right of access to the Australian 
courts, discouraging forum shopping and equal justice. There was however no discussion of the 
Australian political context in the case itself. That being said, as the High Court is effectively 
endorsing the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Bankinvest, it is possible to 
infer that they are in agreement with the New South Wales court's reaction to this contextual 
point. 
While Canada is also a federation, it is interesting to note that they have not enacted any 
legislation to deal with disputes of an inter-provincial nature. One possible explanation is that the 
Canadian doctrine of forum non conveniens is sufficiently discretionary and flexible to take 
account of the considerations relevant to the political makeup of Canada unlike the Australian 
situation which is restricted by the 'clearly inappropriate forum' test 
6. INTERACTION BETWEEN THE ABOVE EXPLANATIONS 
When 
analysing the policies, concepts and other wider considerations relevant to the doctrines of 
forum 
non conveniens in our selected jurisdictions in separate categories, one must be careful 
not to lose sight of the fact that they do not exist in isolation in that they can interact with one 
another. For example, the existence and strength of one policy may be dependent on the 
existence and strength of another. If a jurisdiction accorded great significance to the policy of 
discouraging forum shopping, this would indicate a weakening of the policy of protecting a 
litigant's 
right of access to its courts. Such policy decisions may also be influenced by other 
323 ibid. 
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considerations such as the relationship between the doctrine of forum non conveniens and other 
areas of private international law, the fact that other jurisdictions have adopted a similar doctrine 
of forum non conveniens as well as the social, economic and political context that international 
litigation is fought in. In the above sections, we have alluded to this particular aspect of the 
comparative analysis but it is essential that we bring together these observations and present 
them as a coherent whole. 
6.1 CANADA 
In Canada, it is clear from the above comparative study that a number of policies and concepts 
have worked in tandem to weaken the policy of protecting the claimant's right of access to the 
Canadian courts and that this has led to the adoption of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. In 
particular, they are: the policy decision to effect a shift away from judicial chauvinism, 
discouraging forum shopping, greater equality between claimants and defendants and judicial 
comity. 
The reasons why these considerations have been used to dilute the litigant's right of access to 
the Canadian courts are as follows: 
1. First, at a structural level, it has become easier for Canadian courts to take jurisdiction 
over international civil and commercial disputes as of right since in some Canadian 
provinces, leave is no longer required from the courts for the service of a claim form out 
of jurisdiction. Furthermore, as jurisdiction can be established simply by serving a claim 
form on a defendant in a Canadian province, Canadian judges are of the view that 
Canadian bases of jurisdiction are excessively wide and can act as an incentive for 
litigants to forum shop. In such circumstances, a 'clearly more appropriate forum' test 
was adopted to ensure that the relevant dispute would be brought in an appropriate 
forum. 
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2. Secondly, as a matter of comparative law, the Canadian courts have been swayed by the 
fact that other Commonwealth judiciaries have also adopted the English common law 
'clearly more appropriate forum' test. In addition, the Canadian judiciaries may have 
regarded these Commonwealth courts to be in support of the policy considerations 
underlying the English common law doctrine of forum non conveniens. 
3. Thirdly, at the contextual level, Canadian courts are aware that litigation has become 
increasingly globalised and that there is now a higher degree of interaction between 
people and countries all around the world. Under these circumstances, the Supreme 
Court of Canada is of the view that greater emphasis should be placed on judicial comity 
and correspondingly, a shift away from judicial chauvinism was necessary. Furthermore, 
this environment is regarded as conducive to forum shopping thus leading them to 
provide for greater litigant equality in relation to their doctrine of forum non conveniens. 
However, it is important to note that the adherence to these policies is incomplete in the 
sense that there are still elements of judicial parochialism and claimant favouritism in 
relation to the Canadian test. One possible explanation is that the Canadian judiciaries 
are of the view that litigation can be an important export and encouraging claimants to 
bring their actions in Canada can bring enormous benefits to Canada's economy. 
However, it is important to note that there is no confirmation from the relevant cases that 
this economic rationale has been utilised by the Canadian courts. 
As the above interaction of policies, concepts and circumstances in relation to the Canadian 
doctrine of forum non conveniens is similar to that in the relevant English cases, it is unsurprising 
that the Canadian divergence from the English common law in this area is lesser in extent in 
comparison to the Australian position. 
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6.2 AUSTRALIA 
The key explanation as to why the Australian doctrine of forum non conveniens differs from the 
English common law doctrine on a large number of points is that the Australian judiciary does not 
agree with most of the policy choices made by the English courts in this context. In particular, 
there is still a strong Australian adherence to the policy of protecting the claimant's right of access 
to the Australian courts and in conjunction with this policy decision, the majority Justices in the 
relevant High Court decisions appear to be unconcerned with discouraging forum shopping or 
ensuring greater equality between claimants and defendants. Furthermore, as the Australian 
courts regard judicial comity as an ideal rather than a practical reality, they are not compelled by 
the concept to push for a greater reduction of judicial chauvinism in their doctrine of forum non 
conveniens. Consequently, as the emphasis of the Australian doctrine of forum non conveniens is 
on protecting the litigant's right of access to the local courts, there is no need for a flexible test to 
ensure that litigation is conducted in an appropriate forum. 
There are a number of explanations as to why the Australian courts have made the above policy 
decisions. 
1. First, Australian judiciaries do not think that their bases of jurisdiction are excessively 
wide even though they are similar to those in Canada. This is perhaps why unlike the rest 
of our selected jurisdictions, the Australian courts do not see any problems with 
according significant strength to the right of the litigant to have access to the Australian 
courts. Their only concern here is to ensure that the Australian bases of jurisdiction are 
adhered to unless injustice is perpetuated by the actions of the claimant. Accordingly, 
they do not see any need for a high degree of flexibility in their forum non conveniens 
test. 
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2. Secondly, the High Court of Australia does not agree with the Supreme Court of 
Canada's view that Commonwealth jurisdictions have similar doctrines of forum non 
conveniens. Accordingly, they do not see a consensus in the policies adhered to by 
Commonwealth courts in this context. In particular, they do not perceive judicial comity as 
a practical reality as they are of the view that many jurisdictions in the world provide for 
chauvinistic jurisdictional rules. Less weight is thus accorded to this consideration in the 
formulation of the Australian doctrine of forum non conveniens which has allowed 
significant strength to be attached to the claimant's right of access to the Australian 
courts. 
3. Thirdly, even though the Australian courts do acknowledge that litigation has become 
increasingly globalised, their reaction to this phenomenon is very different from the 
Canadian courts. In particular, the focus of their judgments appears to be on avoiding the 
difficulties that might arise from this situation if a broad doctrine of forum non conveniens 
were introduced. Little attention is thus paid to policies such as discouraging forum 
shopping, achieving greater equality between the litigants and judicial comity. 
It is important to note that the above interaction of policies, concepts and wider considerations 
has not been adopted in relation to the principles governing the transfer of proceedings from one 
Australian court to another under the Cross-vesting Act. The reasons provided by the courts for 
this decision is that the political nature of the Australian federation requires adherence to the 
Policies of preventing judicial chauvinism, discouraging forum shopping and inducing greater 
equality between litigants. There is thus a weakening of the claimant's right of access to the 
Australian courts in this context. In turn, this has led to the adoption of a test analogous to the 
'clearly 
more appropriate forum' test in relation to these statutory provisions. 
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6.3 SINGAPORE 
The Singapore doctrine of forum non conveniens is almost identical to the English common law 
doctrine. This is because the Singapore courts are in agreement with the policies underlying the 
English common law clearly more appropriate forum' test. Like the English courts, they are of the 
view that judicial chauvinism should be replaced by judicial comity and that forum shopping 
should be discouraged with regards to their law on stays of proceedings. Furthermore, they have 
provided for a pro-claimant bias in the formulation of their forum non conveniens test as they 
believe that the bringing of international litigation in Singapore by foreigners can be an invisible 
export beneficial to the Singapore economy. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Initially, there was no doctrine of forum non conveniens in our selected jurisdictions as the 
English common law St Pierre test was adopted by the courts in these countries with no 
examination of whether this approach is appropriate for their Individual circumstances. However, 
after the House of Lords provided for a 'clearly more appropriate forum' test, there was no 
automatic endorsement of this approach by the Canadian and Australian courts. This Is because 
there was no longer an acceptance of English judicial solutions at face value in these 
jurisdictions. Instead, there is now a greater willingness on the part of the judiciaries in Canada 
and Australia to adopt a critical analysis of the policies, concepts and other wider considerations 
that are relevant to this area of private international law. As the policy choices made by these 
courts have not concurred with that of the English judges, this has resulted in either the 
modification of the English common law doctrine of forum non conveniens or its rejection 
altogether. 
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In short, it is arguable that the break up of Commonwealth private international law in relation to 
forum non conveniens is the result of differences across our selected jurisdictions in relation to 
the judicial treatment of policies, concepts and other wider considerations. In this chapter, we 
have sought to illustrate this point with reference to our analytical points of comparison as 
established in Chapter 2. Specifically, these differences are as follows: 
1. Even though our selected jurisdictions are of the view that there should be a policy shift 
away from judicial chauvinism, they are not in consensus as to the extent to which such 
judicial attitudes should be abandoned in relation to their doctrines of forum non 
convenlens. On the one hand, it is arguable that the High Court of Australia is of the view 
that the St Pierre test is too insular but not to the extent that it should be abandoned 
altogether. They have thus provided for a compromise position; the 'clearly inappropriate 
forum' test. On the other hand, Canada and Singapore are in consensus with the English 
judicial view that there should be a substantial shift away from judicial chauvinism thus 
necessitating the rejection of the St Pierre approach for a 'clearly more appropriate 
forum' test. 
2. One explanation for the Canadian and Singaporean adoption of the formulation of the 
English common law doctrine of forum non conveniens is that the judiciaries of these 
jurisdictions are of the view that the policy of protecting the litigant's right of access to the 
courts in question should be significantly weakened. Correspondingly, the policy of 
discouraging that litigant's forum shopping should be strengthened. The Australian 
courts, however, do not share such a view as they have continued to accord substantial 
weight to the claimant's right of access to the Australian courts. 
3. It appears that the Canadian adoption of the 'clearly more appropriate forum' test can be 
explained by a Canadian judicial adherence to the policy of ensuring greater equality 
between the litigants in the context of a stay of proceedings. Similarly, this is one 
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explanation provided by the English courts for their weakening of the right of litigants to 
have access to the English courts due to its overly pro-claimant stance. Australia, on the 
other hand, has continued to adhere to the claimant's right of access to the Australian 
courts and has thus provided for a doctrine of forum non conveniens that is more biased 
against the defendant. 
4. Among our selected jurisdictions, there is some judicial disagreement as to the 
compromise that should be set between certainty and flexibility in relation to their 
individual doctrines of forum non conveniens. The Australian courts are not in support of 
the flexibility inherent in the English common law doctrine of forum non conveniens and 
have opted for the more restrictive 'clearly inappropriate forum' test on the grounds that it 
provides more certainty to litigants. While the Canadian courts have adopted the English 
common law 'clearly more appropriate forum' test, they have chosen not to adopt the 
two-stage structure provided for in Spiliada as they appear to be of the view that it is 
overly legalistic. Instead, they prefer a more flexible approach in that the question is 
simply: is there a 'clearly more appropriate forum' elsewhere? As Singapore has adopted 
the Spiliada test and structure, one can assume that they are in agreement with the 
English common law balance between certainty and flexibility. 
5. One explanation for the adoption of the English common law 'clearly more appropriate 
forum' test in Canada and Singapore is that this approach serves as an antidote to 
excessively wide bases of jurisdiction. Australian judges however do not appear to be of 
the view that that such bases of jurisdiction are overly broad. Instead, their doctrine is 
aimed at ensuring that these bases of jurisdiction are adhered to. 
6. On the one hand, comity has been employed as an argument for the departure from 
judicial chauvinism in England, Canada and Singapore in relation to their laws on stays of 
proceedings. On the other hand, the Australian courts have refused to follow suit as they 
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do not think that judicial comity exists to a large extent in the developed world. They may 
also be of the view that comity is best served by judicial restraint, i. e. focusing on the 
suitability of the local Australian forum in question rather than an inquiry into the 
appropriateness of the alternative foreign jurisdiction. 
7. The key explanation for the lack of a doctrine of forum non conveniens in Australia, 
Canada and Singapore in the early stages of their legal evolution was their adherence at 
that time to English judicial precedents and English solutions. Subsequently, even though 
the English common law 'clearly more appropriate forum' test was adopted by the 
Canadian and Singaporean courts, it is notable that this is not an unthinking adherence to 
the relevant English authorities as these judiciaries did examine the policies and 
concepts underlying the English common law Spi/iada test before endorsing that 
approach. In sharp contrast, the Australian courts do not consider the utilisation of 
English judicial precedents as appropriate for the Australian context as they are of the 
view that the English common law doctrine of forum non conveniens is based on a 
separate set of social and political circumstances. 
8. In recent decades, Commonwealth jurisdictions have generally adopted forum non 
conveniens approaches to deal with the application for a stay of proceedings. This 
broadly uniform comparative scene has been used by the Canadian courts to justify their 
adoption of the English common law'clearly more appropriate forum' test. In contrast, the 
Australian judiciaries emphasised the differences between the doctrines of forum non 
conveniens in common law jurisdictions to refuse a shift towards a broader forum non 
conveniens test as provided for in Canada, Singapore and England. 
9. Underlying the Canadian support for a shift from judicial chauvinism towards judicial 
comity, a policy of discouraging forum shopping and greater equality between litigants, is 
the view that international civil and commercial litigation has become increasingly 
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globalised and that these policies and concepts are now necessary for these modern 
conditions. Even though the Australian courts are aware of this particular social and 
economic phenomenon, they have not reacted in the same manner as the Canadian 
courts. Instead, they seemed to be fixated on the problems that might occur if a broader 
doctrine of forum non conveniens were adopted in such circumstances. 
10. In conjunction with the growing globalisation of the world economy and thus International 
litigation, the English courts have for many years regarded litigation as an invisible 
export, one that can bring enormous benefits to their country's economy. It is clear that 
the Singaporean endorsement of the English common law presumption in favour of trial 
in the local forum is a result of this view. It is however unclear as to whether this is so in 
relation to the Canadian doctrine. The tenor of the Australian judgments, on the other 
hand, seems to be more on the protection of Australian bases of jurisdiction and avoiding 
the difficulties that may arise from a broader doctrine of forum non conveniens In today's 
globalised conditions rather than on a policy of attracting international litigation. 
11. The fact that Australia is a federation has led law-makers to enact the cross-vesting 
legislation so as to facilitate the transfer of proceedings from the Supreme Court of one 
State or Territory to another. This consideration has persuaded the High Court of 
Australia to reject the Voth test for the Spiliada approach in relation to the interpretation 
of the relevant statutory requirements for allowing such transfers of proceedings. In 
particular, they regard the policies of discouraging forum shopping and equal justice as 
necessary for the Australian political context. As Canada is already adhering to these 
policies under their broader doctrine of forum non conveniens, the fact that she is a 
federation has not made its way into the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Canada in 
relation to the formulation of its doctrine of forum non conveniens. 
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12. Looking at the list of explanations laid out above, it is clear that there is a whole range of 
influences on the decisions to diverge from or converge with the English common law 
doctrine of forum non conveniens in our selected jurisdictions. It is important to note that 
these considerations do not operate in isolation and that they can Interact with one 
another. In particular: 
a. With regards to Canada, a shift away from judicial chauvinism for judicial comity, 
the policy of discouraging forum shopping as well as ensuring greater equality 
between litigants has been particularly influential on the Supreme Court of 
Canada's decision on forum non conveniens. These policy considerations are 
deemed necessary as litigation has become increasingly globalised. As the 
above interaction of policies and other wider considerations in the Canadian 
cases is similar to that in the relevant English decisions, the Canadian doctrine of 
forum non conveniens is similar to the English doctrine. 
b. As for Singapore, it is again a combination of policies and concepts, namely 
discouraging forum shopping and judicial comity, that has led to the weakening of 
the litigant's right of access to the Singapore courts and thus the endorsement of 
the English common law doctrine of forum non conveniens. The retention of the 
pro-claimant bias in the 'clearly more appropriate forum' test Is the result of a 
judicial view that litigation can be an invisible export to the Singapore economy. 
c. As for Australia, it is clear that there has been a marked Australian divergence 
from the English common law doctrine of forum non conveniens as there is little 
agreement between the Australian and English courts on the relevant policies, 
concepts and principles in this area of private international law. In general, the 
Australian judges do not agree with the extent of the English common law shift 
away from judicial chauvinism. There is little discussion of forum shopping and 
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equality between claimants and defendants by the majority judges in the key 
High Court of Australia cases on stays of proceedings. They disagree strongly 
with the increased flexibility in the English common law doctrine of forum non 
conveniens thus opting for a more restrictive 'clearly inappropriate forum' test. 
They see judicial comity as an ideal rather than a practical reality. Even though 
they do acknowledge that litigation has become increasingly internationalised, 
they are more concerned with the problems resulting from the application of a 
broader doctrine of forum non conveniens. 
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CHAPTER 6: EXPLANATIONS FOR THE BREAK UP OF COMMONWEALTH 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN RELATION TO TORT CHOICE OF LAW 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to continue our analysis of the break up of Commonwealth tort 
choice of law in Chapter 3 by examining the explanations for this phenomenon. As was brought 
out in our discussion of the same issue in Chapter 5, differences in the judicial treatment of 
policies, concepts and other wider considerations relevant to this area of private international law 
have resulted in the development of diverging forum non conveniens approaches in our selected 
jurisdictions. To examine whether this proposition is equally applicable to tort choice of law, the 
methodology adopted in Chapter 5 will be used in this chapter as well. 
In particular, the considerations utilised by the courts of our selected jurisdictions in diverging 
from or converging with the English common law tort choice of law regime are as follows: 
2. Policy explanations 
2.1 Certainty and flexibility 
2.2 Choice of law justice and judicial chauvinism 
2.3 Equal justice 
2.4 Uniformity of judicial decisions 
2.5 Forum shopping and litigant convenience 
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3. Structural explanations 
3.1 Interaction with the substantive law of torts 
3.2 Interaction with public international law: territoriality and comity 
3.3 Interaction with other areas of private international law 
4. Historical and comparative explanations 
4.1 The historical influence of English judicial precedents 
4.2 The influence of foreign tort choice of law regimes 
S. Contextual explanations 
5.1 Economic and social context 
'S. 2 Political context 
Two preliminary points must be made here. First, besides the views of our selected judiciaries on 
these explanations, we will also be looking at the reasoning of the Law Commissions and the UK 
Government with regards to their decision to provide for Part Ill of the Private International Law 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995. In other words, we will be going beyond an analysis of the 
common law tort choice of law regimes for this chapter. Once again, we see this as necessary for 
a complete picture of the tort choice of law situation in England. Secondly, aside from a policy of 
adhering to English judicial precedents, the Singapore courts have not provided any explanations 
for following the English common law tort choice of law regime. 
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2. POLICY EXPLANATIONS 
2.1 CERTAINTY VERSUS FLEXIBILITY 
At the initial stages of tort choice of law development in our selected jurisdictions, there was little 
judicial discussion of certainty and flexibility in relation to the divergences and convergences that 
resulted then. However, as time passed, especially in the last decade or so, this position was 
reversed as judiciaries reformed their tort choice of law regimes depending on their views on 
where the compromise between the two concepts should be set. 
2.1.1 Tort choice of law rule 
In general, the Australian and Canadian courts as well as the Law Commissions are In support of 
a lox loci delicti rule as it is "clear, simple and certain"' and Its results are easily predictable. 2 
Similarly, there is no problem of uncertainty and unpredictability with the English common law 
double actionability rule. 
However, because of the decision in Neilson v Overseas Projects Corporation of Victoria3 to 
include renvoi as part of the Australian lex loci delicti rule, some certainty in the Australian tort 
choice of law regime has been sacrificed. This is because Australian courts must, in addition to 
the application of the lex loci delicti, identify the foreign country's choice of law rules and its 
attitude to renvoi'4 before the applicable law can be located. 
To elaborate, it is often difficult to obtain reliable information on whether a foreign country has a 
doctrine of renvol especially, if the court of that country has not provided for any conclusive 
Law Commissions Working Paper No. 87 (1984), at para. 4.56. For Australia, see Pfeffer v Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503, at (83], Renault 
v Zhang (2002) 187 ALR 1, at [66]. For Canada, see Tolofson v Jensen [1994] 3 SCR 1022, at [44]. 2 Working Paper, ibid 
1 
[2005] I ICA 54. 
Mercantile Mutual Insurance (Australia) Lid v Neilson (2004) 28 WAR 206, at [48]. (Supreme Court of West Australia). 
182 
pronouncements on that doctrine 
.5 In addition, depending on whether the doctrine of renvoi 
in 
Australian tort choice of law is single or double renvoi, further uncertainty may be generated. 
Double renvoi would pick up "the foreign court's substantive law, choice of law rules and renvoi 
rule "6 such that if the foreign court "also applies double renvol, the forum court is denied a 
certainty of result because of the potential for an endless oscillation backwards and forwards. "7 
Moreover, even though single renvol does provide for some certainty of result in that it stops at 
the reference by the foreign court back to the lex fors or another country's law, the forum court will 
be applying a law when it regards the "law of another country [as] more appropriate to determine 
the matter. "8 It is thus interesting to note that the High Court of Australia has chosen to side-step 
this Issue. 
2.1.2 Exception to the tort choice of law rule 
In Red Sea Insurance Co Ltd v Bouygues SA, 9 Lord Wilberforce's exception to the tort choice of 
law rule in Boys v Chaplin10 was endorsed by the Privy Council. They first stated that they 
recognised: 
"the conflict which exists between, on the one hand, the desirability of a rule 
which is certain and clear on the basis of which people can act and lawyers 
advise and, on the other, the desirability of the courts having the power to avoid 
injustice by introducing an element of flexibility into the rule. "" 
Subsequently, the Privy Council provided for a balance between the policies of certainty and 
flexibility by agreeing with Lord Wilberforce's view that "[t]he general rule must apply unless clear 
3 See for example, In re Duke of Wellington (1947] Ch 506. Similarly, it was not clear in Neilson, supra, a. 3 as to whether China has a doctrine 
of renvot. 7 Lu, Ignored no more: Renvot and International Torts Litigated in Australia (2005) 1 Journal of Private International Law 35. Ibid. at 58. 
ibid. 
[1995] 1 AC 190. ýý 119711 AC 356. 
Red Sea. supra, n. 9, at 206. 
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and satisfying grounds are shown why it should be departed from"'Z thus indicating a compromise 
slanted more towards certainty but still with a degree of flexibility to do justice in the individual 
case. However, not all our selected judiciaries were satisfied with this balance and this has 
resulted in divergences from the English common law exception. 
England: Part 111 of the 1995 Act 
In relation to the English statutory tort choice of law regime, the Law Commissions declared in 
their Working Paper on tort choice of law that its objective Is "ideally to select the law which In all 
the circumstances it would be most appropriate to apply. "13 Accordingly, this would necessitate a 
"balance between certainty and refinement"'° where the former would have to be sacrificed in 
certain situations to give effect to that purpose. However, the Law Commissions pointed out that 
the new tort choice of law regime should still "possess a high degree of certainty. "15 Hence, their 
final position in the Working Paper was to further refine the lex loci delicti rule which would 
provide the "most appropriate law"1e in many cases with an exception so as to ensure that the 
selection of an "appropriate system of law in as high a proportion of cases as possible. "' 
Furthermore, the exception was to displace the lex loci delicti only if a threshold requirement Is 
met: 18 that the occurrence and the parties must have an Insignificant connection with the locus 
delicti and a substantial connection with another country's law before the lex loci delictl can be 
replaced by another law. 19 
It is interesting to note that there has been a gradual shift towards 'refinement' with the whittling 
down of the above threshold in the Law Commissions' Report as well as the introduction of 
depecage in the Proceedings of the Special Public Bill Committee. When the Law Commissions' 
12 ibid. 
13 
N 
Working Paper, supra, n. 1, at para. 4.16. 
is ibid. at para. 4.18. br 
161d. ibid. at para. 4.59. 
ibid, at para. 4.18. 
19 ibid. at para. 4.122. ibid. at para. 4.123. 
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Report was released, the threshold was watered down and all that was required for the exception 
to operate was a substantial connection with another country's law-20 The explanation provided 
for this lowering of the threshold21 was that the former threshold and its balance between 
certainty and refinement would prevent: 
"the displacement of the law selected by the general rules where there Is some 
significant connection with this law even though there is a much stronger 
connection with another law. "22 
This balance was further shifted when the Special Public Bill Committee decided in favour of 
introducing depecage to the section 12 exception23 which was rejected previously by the Law 
Commissions, as it would introduce too much uncertainty. 24 After these changes were made, it is 
interesting to note that the section 12 exception has become very similar to the English common 
law flexible exception. 
Canada 
In To/ofson v Jensen, 25 La Forest J declared that the "underlying principles of private international 
law are order and fairness"26 and that "order comes first"21 as a "precondition to justice 
. 
"28 As 
Castel has commented, "these expressions are merely other ways of describing the general 
objectives of legal certainty and flexibility. "29 It is thus clear that the Canadian judiciary is In 
agreement with the Law Commissions as well as the Privy Council in Red Sea Insurance that 
m law Com No. 193 (1990), at para. 3.11. 
_ý ibid. 
ibid. 
24 HL Paper 36 (1995), Part 11, at col. 31. 
23 
Law Com No. 193 (1990), at para. 3.52. 
26 
[1994] 3 SCR 1022. 
ibid. at [57]. 27 
28 
ibid. 
fbfd. ý9 Castel, Back to the Future! Is the 'New" Rigid Choice of Law Rule for Interprovincial Torts Constitutionally Mandated? (1995) 33 Osgo je Hall Law Journal 35, at 41. 
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certainty is more important than flexibility. However, one question remains: do they share the 
same compromise between the two concepts? 
Concerning inter-provincial torts, La Forest J held that "[o]ne of the main goals of any conflicts 
rule is to create certainty in the law"30 as it "promotes settlement"31 of tortious disputes. "Any 
exception adds an element of uncertainty"32 which would then inhibit that settlement. He is also 
"unconvinced"33 that flexibility to apply a law other than the lex loci delicti could "better [meet] the 
demands of justice, fairness and practical results. "34 In his view, justice in the Individual case is 
simply an indication that the "court does not approve of the law that the legislature having power 
to enact it within its territory has chosen to adopt"35 preferring "forum notions of public policy or 
justicea36 instead. He considers this "underlying rationale of the "justice" theory-37 to be a blatant 
violation of the territoriality principle, a concept which will be examined in a later sub-section In 
this chapter. In essence, he is of the opinion that optimum certainty should be pursued In the 
Canadian federal context with no exception attached to a clear and simple tort choice of law rule, 
as flexibility in a tort choice of law regime will only be misused In an application of domestic 
notions of justice. 
La Forest J's hostility towards individual justice is also directed at international torts as he stated 
in general terms at the beginning of his critique of the English common law tort choice of law 
regime, that the rules themselves are based on a "sense of 'fairness' about the specific case; "38 a 
reaction "which seems to be born of a disapproval of the rule adopted by a particular 
jurisdiction 
. 
"39 However, when he addressed the question of whether an exception should be 
available to the lex loci delicti rule for international torts, he conceded that over-emphasis on 
certainty in this context could result in rigidity and possibly injustice. Again, a strong preference 
30 Tolofson, supra, n. 25, at [65]. 
3= ibid. at [66]. (bid, at [65]. 
"ibid, 
at [57]. 35 ibid, at [54]. 35 ibid, at [57]. M ibid, at [55]. 
3, ibid. ibid. at [36]. 39 Ibid. 
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for certainty is indicated in his judgment as he remarked that he could "imagine few cases"40 
where an exception would be necessary. Unfortunately, he did not elaborate on these cases. 
Some courts, notably the British Columbia Supreme Court, have provided for a degree of 
flexibility in their use of the interest analysis to work out whether the lex fori should be applied 
instead of the lex loci delicti. 41 In contrast, in Wong v Lee42 and Somers v Fourier, 43 the Ontario 
Court of Appeal has held that the justice exception should only be available in exceptional 
cases" to "recognise and give effect to the policy behind the enunciation of the rule [in Tolofson], 
which emphasises the importance of certainty in the choice of law rules. "45 An indication that their 
compromise between certainty and flexibility is more slanted towards the former than that by the 
English courts and the drafters of the 1995 Act is provided by their statement that the exception is 
"necessary only in a very unusual case"46 where the lex for/ and the lex loci delicti are "beyond 
ordinary differences. 47 
Australia 
In the High Court of Australia case of McKain v Miller, 48 the flexible exception was jettisoned by 
the majority judges on the grounds that it generates uncertainty, 49 a view that was continued in 
Pfeiffer v Rogerson50 with specific reference to inter-state torts. In particular, the use of a flexible 
rule with terms such as "real and substantial"51 or "most signiflcantn52 was not seen as being 
capable of giving "sufficient guidance to courts, to parties or to those, like insurers, who must 
41 ibid, at [50]. 
42 
Wong v Wei (1999) 45 CCLT (2d) 105, at [ 18]. 
43 
(2002) 58 OR (3d) 398. 
M 
(2002) 60 OR (3d) 225. 
4s 
Wong v Lee, supra, n. 42, at [ 16]. 
1bid, at [12]. 47 ibid, at [16]. 47 ibid. 
4 (1991) 174 CLR 1. 
ibid. at 38-39. 31 (2000) 203 CLR 503. 
32 
ibid, at [79]. 
ibid. 
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order their affairs on the basis of predictions about the future application of the rule. "53 Such 
exceptions would only "led to very great uncertainty"54 with the consequence of increasing the 
cost to parties, insurers and society at large. "55 One can observe that this is the same reason 
given by the Supreme Court of Canada for its decision not to have any exceptions to the tort 
choice of law rule for inter-provincial torts. 
In relation to international torts, the English common law flexible exception was rejected by the 
High Court of Australia in Renault v Zhang. 56 No clear explanation was given for this decision 
except that the "reasoning and conclusion in Pfeiffe? '57 that there should not be a flexible 
exception for inter-state torts should be extended to international torts. In other words, it appears 
that this exception was again rejected because it was seen as too uncertain. Confirmation came 
in Neilson where Gummow and Hayne J held that the flexible exception was rejected as it was 
too uncertain. 
A public policy exception to the lex loci delicti rule for international torts was provided for by the 
High Court of Australia in Renault possibly because they were of the view that it would provide 
certainty to Australian tort choice of law, as it would only be applied In exceptional circumstances. 
One must be reminded of Carter's warning that the abolition of the lex for! may Increase "resort 
and actual resort"58 to public policy as an escape device thus introducing "new sources of 
uncertainty and unpredictability. "59 
To sum up, the Australian rejection of the English common law flexible exception is the result of a 
stronger preference for certainty by the Australian courts in comparison to the English courts. 
This is also why the Australian and Canadian positions on the exception to their tort choice of law 
53 ibid. 53 ibid. 
ss ibid. 
s7 (2002) 187 ALR 1. 
58 
ibid, at [75]. 
59 
Carter, Choice of Law in Tort and Delict, (1991) 107 Law Quarterly Review 405, at 408. ibid. at 409. 
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rule are similar as it is arguable that their courts share similar views on the policy of ensuring 
(egal certainty. 
2.2 CHOICE OF LAW JUSTICE AND JUDICIAL CHAUVINISM 
In the process of reforming the English tort choice of law regime, the concept of 'choice of law 
justice' was referred to by the Law Commissions. In particular, they were of the view that a 
distinction must be drawn "between justice at the substantive level and justice at the choice of law 
level. "60 Substantive tort law which represents a forum's "ideas of justice 
,, 
61 Is entirely appropriate 
for cases that involve "no foreign element. "62 However, in the converse situation, It may be in the 
interests of justice to apply a foreign law even if that law differs drastically from the lex fora as it 
would be "wrong to permit the wrongdoer to be subjected to liability"63 under the lex for! simply 
because "the claimant chose to bring his action In the United Kingdom. "4 The "automatic 
application of the lex fort'65 may thus work an injustice for a claimant "whose only chance of 
recovery may for reasons beyond his control"66 lie In suing in a forum which does not impose any 
liability for the activities of the defendant. 
Up until this point, we can observe that our discussion of choice of law justice is negative in 
nature as we are merely saying that if a tortious dispute requires the involvement of private 
international law, it would be unjust to apply domestic notions of justice. In other words, the main 
concern here is that a tort choice of law regime should not give effect to judicial chauvinism. Even 
though choice of law justice was not explicitly referred to in the Australian and Canadian cases, it 
Is interesting to note that the judiciaries of both countries have utilised the concept of 
parochialism in their divergence from the double actionability rule. Nonetheless, it will be seen 
below that positive definitions of what justice would require at the choice of law level have been 
ö king Paper, supra, n. 1, at para. 3.5. ib* 
62 
a 
ibid. 
64 ibid. at para. 3.8. 
6s 
ibid. 
ibid, at para. 427. 66 Ibid. 
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provided by the Law Commissions in relation to the tort choice of law rule itself. This has not been 
done in the relevant Australian and Canadian cases. 
2.2.1 Tort choice of law rule 
England: Part III of the 1995 Act 
The Law Commissions were of the view that the lox for/ limb of the Phillips V Eyre8' rule should be 
abandoned as it enables the courts to "give judgment according to its own ideas of justice? '68 
This was said to be against choice of law justice as it "bears a parochial appearance. "69 
Furthermore, the Law Commissions saw no reason why this position "should prevail In the field of 
tort and delict but not in other fields. "70 
While their call for the abolition of the lex for! was based on the removal of judicial chauvinism 
from tort choice of law, a positive definition of what justice should entail in a tort choice of law 
scenario was provided for by the Law Commissions in relation to their decision to adopt a lex loci 
delicti rule. In particular, they considered that if one party to the dispute is "independently 
connected with the locus delicli71 which in practice is likely, it is right that he should be "able to 
rely on his own local law for his rights and be subject to such liabilities as are prescribed by that 
law. '72 This is because: 
"the legal position of a person who, in his own country, acts or is affected by an 
act, or takes part in a transaction, should not be adversely affected by a foreign 
element... which it was not open to him to avoid. *73 
61 18701 L6 QB 1. 
by 
Boys v Chaplin, supra, n. 10, at 400. 
A ibid. at 387. Working Paper, supra, n. 1, at para. 3.5. 72 ibid, at para. 4.57. n ibid. 
73 ibid. 
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In other words, the fundamental injustice to be avoided here is the "arbitrary diminution"74 of rights 
based on factors which are "unforeseeable and, in the context, immaterial. 075 To elaborate, in 
most circumstances, one party to the dispute is likely to be from the locus delicti and he would 
have conducted his own affairs on the premise that his own law would apply to whatever litigation 
he is involved. Yet simply because the other party is not from the locus delicti, a tort choice of law 
regime which accords a significant role to the lex fora would deprive him of his remedy or impose 
liability upon him. The residence of the parties is not of "an exculpatory nature"76 as the parties to 
the dispute cannot be said to be responsible for this factor or to possess the power to prevent its 
occurrence. The statutory lex loci delicti rule under section 11 of the 1995 Act was thus adopted, 
as it was capable of addressing the above concerns. 
Canada and Australia 
In Tolofson, La Forest J alluded to the dichotomy between substantive justice and choice of law 
justice with his criticism that the evolution of the English common law tort choice of law rule with 
its inclusion of the lex forl was based on the judiciary's "disapproval of the rule adopted by a 
particular jurisdiction"" as it "involves a court's defining the nature and consequences of an act 
done in another country. "78 In his view, courts should not engage In that kind of Interest 
balancing"79 as a "system of law built on what a particular court considers to be... fair 
... 
does not 
bear the hallmarks of a rational system of law. "80 Tort choice of law Is "structural"81 in nature. 
Accordingly, it should not take into consideration, domestic notions of justice. In other words, La 
Forest J is of the view that the Phillips v Eyre rule is parochial and should be abandoned. 
7s 3a 
i 
tTey, Choice of Law in Tort: a Justice Based Approach (1982) 2 Legal Studies 98, at 103. Ib 
76 . Ibid. 
Tolo 
79 fson, supra, n. 25, at [36]. tbid, at [47]. go ibid. at (36]. i0 ibid. 
ibid. 
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Similarly, the Australian courts have observed that the first limb of the Phillips v Eyre rule favours 
a "stringent domestic policy"82 and that in the tort choice of law context, there are "no compelling 
policy considerations"83 which require an "exceptional role to be accorded to the substantive 
domestic law of the forum. "M In their view, the lex fori limb was "intended to operate as a 
technique of forum control"85 and in this time and age, such matters should be dealt with directly 
under a public policy exception. 
To sum up, one explanation for the Canadian and Australian divergence from the English 
common law is that the courts in these jurisdictions are of the view that the double actionability 
rule is parochial and that a shift from that position is necessary. In relation to their adoption of the 
lex loci delicti rule, no mention of choice of law justice was made by these judiciaries. 
2.2.2 Characterisation: unknown foreign torts 
According to the Law Commissions, the characterisation of unknown foreign torts as 'torts' under 
the 1995 Act is "an inevitable consequence of getting rid of the rule in The Halley. "" Hence, the 
reasons for including unknown foreign torts within the ambit of that statutory regime are 
inextricably linked to the explanations for the rejection of the lex for. In particular, they argued 
that a bar on unknown foreign torts would indicate an English classification of torts and thus an 
English perception of what actions should incur liability simply because the case was brought in 
an English court. As Dr North has commented in the Proceedings of the Special Public Bill 
Committee, to do so would be to give effect to a "very nationalistic view. """ 
82 Re an ult, supra, n. 56, at [53]. 
841 id, at [55]. 
s 
ibid. 
ibid. at [60]. 6 IlL Paper 36 (1995), Part I, at 39 per Dr North. The Halley (1868) LR 2 PC 193. ýý HL Paper 36 (1995), Part I, ibid. 
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The strength of this rationale is evident from the Government's rejection of the United Kingdom 
proviso. 88 The Law Commissions, in response to the comment that the English common law tort 
choice of law regime has the advantage of preventing the "courts from attaching conclusive 
significance to foreign laws having radically different purposes"89 from English law, Introduced a 
proviso to allow a person acting within a part of the United Kingdom in accordance with English 
law, to avoid liability under a foreign law which might "reflect substantially different purposes from 
our own law. "90 The implication of the proviso in relation to unknown foreign torts was that even 
though such torts are deemed to fall within the scope of the 1995 Act, they would not be applied if 
the defendant acted in the United Kingdom. In providing for such a proviso, it Is submitted that the 
Law Commissions were of the view that protection under English notions of justice should be 
extended to defendant-actors in the United Kingdom even though to do so, would be to weaken 
the choice of law justice rationale. 
The Government, however, responded with a reassertion of the basic justification by stressing 
that the United Kingdom proviso would "reintroduce the nationalistic attitude which the law 
commissions are otherwise seeking to obviate"91 and thus with that criticism, they rejected the 
Proviso. In other words, it appears that they are refusing any weakening of the choice of law 
justice rationale in this context. 
2.3 EQUAL JUSTICE 
According to the Law Commissions, "another injustice"92 generated by the double actionability 
rule is that it is "considerably to the advantage of the wrongdoer. w93 In particular, the claimant has 
It Law Com No. 193 (1990), at para. 3.16, "where the act or omission which gives rise to the cause of the action occurs in the United Kingdom, including those cases where loss or damage occurs abroad as a result of conduct which occurs in the United Kingdom, the 11W of the relevant part of the United Kingdom shall apply " ibid. at para. 2.10. 91 ibid, at para. 3.16. 
fz 
Hansard, (HL) 6 Dec 1994, Vol. 837, col. 833. 
9, 
Working Paper, supra, n. 1, at para. 3.8. ibid. 
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the "worst of both laws"94 as he has to satisfy both the lex loci delicti and the lex fori in order to 
succeed in his claim whereas the alleged wrongdoer can simply rely on any of the defences 
available under the two laws to avoid liability. 95 In short, he can "never succeed to a greater 
extent than is provided for by the less generous of the two systems of law concerned. "96 
The consequences of the double actionability rule are also unfair to the claimant. In most cases, 
"a plaintiff will [want to] sue in its own jurisdiction"97 as it is the "natural Instinct to sue at home 
where the advisers are, where the law is familiar, and there is no question of security for costs. "98 
However, under the double actionability rule, particularly in circumstances where the lex fort does 
not impose any liability on the wrongdoer in contrast to the lex loci delictl, the claimant would be 
compelled to bring his action in another jurisdiction most likely, the locus delicti. This seems 
terribly unfair to the claimant, as he has to be subjected to the expense and trouble of suing In 
another country and be deprived of the protection of his own judicial system. 
In addition, with the European rules on recognition and enforcement In place, all the double 
actionability rule does is to require the litigant to "go through a foreign court, possibly that may 
have jurisdiction, and then have enforceability" In the English courts "under rules which are 
pretty generally in favour of enforcement. "10° At the end of the day, the claimant will have his 
remedy but the process by which he obtains it Is expensive and arduous. Furthermore, In the 
worst case scenario, if the jurisdiction he is compelled to bring his action In Is not part of the 
European Union, he may be left without a remedy as "although he may in theory have a choice of 
forum, he may in practice have no such choice if the wrongdoer or his assets are located"101 in 
England. Therefore, particularly in the case of an English plaintiff, it Is regarded as preferable that 
such actions be brought in the English courts in accordance with English "notions of justice and 
' Boys v Chaplin, supra, n. 10, at 405 per Lord Pearson. % Working Paper, supra, n. 1, at para. 3.8. Ibid. at para. 3.9. 98 HL 
ibi 
Paper 36 (1995), Part 1, at 69 per Sir Lawrence Collins. 
'bid. at 9 per Lord Mackay (the Lord Chancellor then). 
Working Paper, supra, n. 1, at para. 4.27. 
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procedure. "102 Accordingly, it is an adherence to the policy of ensuring equal justice between 
litigants which has led the Law Commissions to call for the abolition of the double actionability 
rule. 
Interestingly, in Australia, equal justice was cited as an explanation for discouraging forum 
shopping. In particular, Kirby J in Neilson, stated that the 'law must be even-handed in its 
operation. It must be just to defendants as well as plaintiffs. "103 Accordingly, this is 'a reason why 
a party should not normally be able to pick and choose the applicable law (and thus in many 
cases the outcome) according to the forum selected by that party for the commencement of 
proceedings. "104 In other words, he is of the view that there is a need to adhere to the policy of 
discouraging forum shopping by ensuring the uniformity of judicial outcomes regardless of the 
forum the action is litigated in so as to do equal justice between the parties to the dispute. This 
line of reasoning led him to hold that renvoi is part of the Australian tort choice of law rule. 
In contrast, the Singaporean and Canadian judiciaries have not considered this concept in the 
relevant cases. 
2.4 UNIFORMITY OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
Many conflict scholars have ventured forth the view that "a measure of uniformity in the judicial 
settlement of disputes no matter where there are litigated"105 Is an important goal of conflict of 
laws. They have thus criticised the Phillips v Eyre rule for bringing about a situation where the 
judicial result would depend on the forum that the action is brought in. To elaborate, if a court 
must apply its own law, the lex for! "in deciding the existence, extent or enforceability of rights and 
obligations, "106 but the courts of another jurisdiction would not give effect to those rules, "the 
103 HL Paper 36, (1995), Part 1, at 73 per Sir Lawrence Collins. 
ýoýIVeiLron, supra, n. 3, at [173]. 
ios 
fbid 
See for example, Hancock, Torts in the Conflict of Laws: the First Rule in Phillips v Eyre (1940) 3 University of Toronto Law JOurnal 400. 06 Pei er. supra, n. 50, at [17]. 
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existence, extent or enforceability of the parties' rights and obligations will differ according to 
where the litigation is conducted. 007 Accordingly, one possible explanation for the divergences in 
our selected jurisdictions from the English common law tort choice of law rule is that their 
judiciaries are of the view that greater importance should be accorded to the policy of ensuring 
the uniformity of judicial decisions in comparison to the position under the English common law. 
England: Part ! ll of the 1995 Act 
One explanation given by the Law Commissions for the adoption of the lex loci delictl rule Is that it 
would "promote uniformity"108 in two ways. First, as a matter of comparative law, the lex loci delicti 
is a "widely accepted choice of law rule»109 and there would thus be a certain degree of uniformity 
in the decisions across countries which use the same tort choice of law rule. Secondly, the lox 
loci delicti would provide for the same judicial result as that of an "action brought in the country 
where the tort or delict occurred"10 as the courts there are likely to apply their own lex fort. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the Law Commissions have cast doubt upon the efficacy 
of this policy by pointing out that: 
"uniformity of result can never be wholly achieved without agreement, as regards 
foreign countries and in the absence of such agreement it is not possible to do 
more than bear this factor in mind. "111 
It is thus submitted that the other rationales offered by the Law Commissions for their decision to 
adopt the lex loci delicti are probably stronger. In addition, it should be noted that immediately 
after the Law Commissions made clear their views on uniformity in the Working Paper, they 
stated that "renvol, will in principle, be excluded"112 from the 1995 Act. 
107 
101 
tbid. 
9Working Paper, supra, n. 1, at para. 4.59. 
ibid. 
:. ibid. 
. 12 
ibid, at para. 4.22. 
ibid. at para. 4.23. 
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Canada 
The Supreme Court of Canada in Tolofson has commented that the nature of the Canadian 
Constitution requires that an act committed in one part of Canada be given the same legal effect 
throughout the country and they thus held that this consideration "militates strongly in favour of 
the lex loci delicti rule"113 for inter-provincial torts. 
Even though La Forest J's description of the policy of ensuring uniformity of judicial outcomes 
above is based on Canada's constitutional arrangements, he held that it is equally applicable to 
the international context. In particular, he chose to overrule Mclean v Pettigrew114 on the ground 
that if the Phillips v Eyre rule was applied, in practice, it would mean that the "courts of different 
countries would follow different rules in respect of the same wrong. " 15 The key difference 
between this policy for the inter-provincial and international context is that instead of a 
constitutional basis to this policy objective in the latter situation, La Forest J focused on the 
consequence of forum shopping which he argued would arise if the policy were not adhered to. ' 16 
Australia 
In Breavington v Godleman, "' one reason for Wilson and Gaudron JJ's decision to endorse a lox 
loci delicti rule was that "one set of facts occurring in a State would be adjudged by only one body 
of law and thus give rise to only one legal consequence, regardless of where in the 
Commonwealth the matter fell for adjudication. "118 However, it is interesting to note that in Mckain 
v Miller, "9 a majority of the Justices in that case chose not to attach much weight to this policy. 120 
113 
n" 
10 son, supra. n. 25, at [70]. 
, Is[ 1945] 2 DLR 65. 
116 
Tolojson, supra, n. 25, at [47]. 
ibid. 17 
j (1988) 169 CLR 41. ibid, at 98. 
: 20 
(1992) 174 CLR 1. 
ibid. at 36. 
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Accordingly, this is one possible reason why the double actionability rule was reinstated in that 
case 
Subsequently, the policy of ensuring uniformity of judicial outcomes was again accorded 
significant strength by the High Court of Australia. In particular, bearing in mind the nature of the 
Australian federation, 121 the High Court of Australia held in the case of Pfeiffer v Rogerson that 
Australian tort choice of law rules should provide "uniformity of outcome no matter where in the 
Australian federation a matter is litigated. "122 As the Phillips v Eyre rule could not give effect to 
this policy, it was replaced by the lox loci delicti rule. 
Similarly, for international torts, a majority of the High Court of Australia in Neilson was of the 
view that the "object of a choice of law rule is to avoid differences in outcomes according to 
selection of forum. "123 To fulfil this purpose, it was necessary to "have an Australian court decide 
the... case in the same way as it would be decided . 124 in the place where the tort was committed. 
They thus confirmed their decision in Renault v Zhang to adopt the lex loci delicti rule and in 
addition, they held that renvol is part of that tort choice of law rule. Like the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Tolofson, even though the federation argument does not extend to international torts, 
the High Court has stated that the policy of uniformity was necessary to discourage forum 
shopping. 
A few points can be made here. First, while the Canadian courts are in agreement with the 
Australian courts that the policy of ensuring uniformity of judicial outcomes is necessary to 
discourage forum shopping, it is important to note that the treatment of this policy by the two 
judiciaries is not the same. In particular, all that the Canadian courts did to give effect to the policy 
of uniformity was to provide for a forum-neutral lex loci delictl rule. This meant that so long as the 
court of the jurisdiction where the tort is committed applies its own law to the dispute in question, 
ui 
122 
leiffer, supra, n. 50, at [44]. 
123 ibid. 
eilson, supra, n. 3, at [13] per Gleeson C. I. See also, at [89] 
-[91] per Gummow and Hayne JJ, at [172]-[174] per Kirby J and at [271 1 per Heydon J. 24 
'bid, at [13]. 
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the application of the lex loci delicti would provide for decisional harmony. The Canadian courts 
have not however gone as far as to state that they want to decide a tortious dispute as if it is 
decided in that foreign court. If the foreign court chooses to apply a law other than their domestic 
tort law to the relevant dispute, the application of the Canadian tort choice of law rule would not 
provide for uniformity. The decision in Neilson to include renvoi as part of the Australian lex loci 
delicti rule was to ensure that there would be decisional harmony in such circumstances as well. 
It is thus clear that the emphasis on uniformity in the Australian courts is greater than the 
Canadian courts in relation to their tort choice of law rules. 
Secondly, it is interesting to note that before Neilson was heard by the High Court of Australia, 
the Supreme Court of West Australia was of the view that the lex loci delicti should be taken to 
exclude the private international law of that jurisdiction as that would "promote certainty and 
predictability, »125 This, they stated, was a conclusion that flowed from the decision In Renault; that 
the "selection of the lox loci delicti as the source of substantive law meets one of the objectives of 
any choice of law rule, the promotion of certainty in the law., 126 When Neilson was decided by the 
High Court of Australia, one issue arising was whether certainty or uniformity should be adhered 
to in circumstances where these two policies are in conflict. In particular, a strong judicial 
adherence to the policy of ensuring uniformity of judicial outcomes would necessitate the use of 
the doctrine of renvol, a move that would generate uncertainty. 
On the one hand, Gleeson. CJ and Kirby J were of the view that the key objective of their tort 
choice of law regime was to ensure uniformity of judicial outcomes thus Indicating that certainty 
should be sacrificed to some extent to give effect to that policy. 127 On the other hand, Gummow 
and Hayne i argued that there is no clash between the two policies as to "take no account of 
What a foreign court would do when faced with the facts of [the] case does not assist the pursuit 
its Mercantile Mutual Insurance, supra, a. 4, at [48]. 
127 
Renault, supra, n. 56, at [66]. Neilson, supra, n. 3, at [13] per Gleeson CJ, at [171-[174] per Kirby J. 
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of certainty and simplicity. "728 This is because to omit renvoi from the Australian tort choice of law 
rule would require "the law of the forum to divide the rules of the foreign legal system between 
those rules that are to be applied by the forum and those that are not. "129 This would in turn force 
the forum to "impose on a foreign legal system, which must be assumed is intended to constitute 
an integrated system of interdependent rules, a division which that system may not make at 
all. "730 The "pursuit of certainty and simplicity"131 would not be aided in such circumstances. 
2.5 FORUM SHOPPING AND LITIGANT CONVENIENCE 
In the tort choice of law context, the emphasis on the lex tort under the Machado132 Interpretation 
of the Phillips v Eyre rule has been criticised as encouraging forum shopping as lt allows a 
claimant to by-pass his natural forum so as to bring his action in some "alien forum which would 
give him relief or benefits which would not be available to him In his natural forum. '"' 
Accordingly, one explanation for the decision of the House of Lords in Boys v Chaplin to accord 
more weight to the lex loci delicti by adopting a double actionability rule was to discourage this 
situation from occurring. 
However, there are some who view the English common law tort choice of law rule as going too 
far with its adherence to this policy as under this rule, claimants have to satisfy both the lox loci 
delicti and the lex for! in order to succeed in their claim. This has made the English courts an 
unattractive forum to litigate tortious disputes for both English and foreign claimants. It Is because 
of this disagreement that divergences have emerged in our selected jurisdictions. On a different 
note, some of our selected jurisdictions are against a flexible exception to their tort choice of law 
rules, as they believe that it would encourage litigants to engage In forum shopping. 
129 ibid, at [94]. X30 ibid. 
31 
10 ibid. 
172 
ibid. 
133 
Machado 
v Fantes [1897] 2 QB 231. Boys v Chaplin, supra, n. 10, at 401 per Lord Pearson. 
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2.5.1 Tort choice of law rule 
England: Part 111 of the 1995 Act 
In the Law Commissions Working Paper, the prevention of forum shopping was cited as one of 
the reasons for their proposed departure from the double actionability rule. 134 At first sight, this 
comment seems odd, as the double actionability rule does not encourage forum shopping. 
Litigants still have to satisfy the requirements of the ! ex ! oci delicti even if the lex for! is more 
beneficial to their claims. On closer scrutiny, it is apparent that the Law Commissions were not so 
much concerned with litigants using the English courts as a possible venue. Rather, they were 
worried about the converse; that the potential claimant may be influenced by the double 
actionability rule to litigate his claim In another forum thus increasing forum shopping as a "global 
activity. "l35 To curb such litigant behaviour, the Law Commissions went on to call for the adoption 
of the forum-neutral lox loci delicti as the statutory tort choice of law rule. 136 
Interestingly, no mention of forum shopping was made in the subsequent Law Commissions 
Report in relation to the abolition of the double actionability rule. However, one cannot take from 
this an indication that forum shopping no longer has any impact on the 1995 Act. Instead of the 
previous focus on forum shopping as a global activity, it is possible to observe a certain 
willingness on the part of the Law Commissions and the Special Public Bill Committee137 to 
dissect the concept of forum shopping in order to distinguish between acceptable and 
unacceptable forum shopping. To elaborate, the double actionability rule does help to discourage 
forum shoppers who exploit choice of law rules to obtain a beneficial result for their action. 
However, beyond that, it also discourages forum shoppers who prefer the English legal system 
for its procedures, the famous impartiality of its judges or its "considerable experience with many 
ýs Working Paper, supra. n. 1, at para. 3.14. 
ibid. 
137 
ibid at para. 4.59. ý See for example, 11L Paper 36 (1995), Part I, at 8 per Lord Mackay, at 73 per Sir Lawrence Collins. 
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aspects of commercial litigation. "138 The actions of this second category of forum shoppers are 
considered acceptable by the Law Commissions and the Special Public Bill Committee as in their 
view, the abolition of the lex fori is part of the "process of intemationalisation'139 where litigants 
can bring their foreign cause of action in any country they desire for their own convenience 
subject to the satisfaction of the relevant jurisdictional rules. 
Arguably, this is not a view shared by the English courts in relation to the English common law 
tort choice of law regime. Although this is not explicit in their judgments, it is submitted that their 
views are likely to concur with Lord Wilberforce's comments In the Proceedings of the Select 
Public Bill Committee that disputes closely linked to a foreign country should be litigated there140 
even if it is more convenient to do so in the English courts. 
Canada 
Initially, forum shopping was used primarily in the Canadian courts as a critique of the forum- 
centric Mclean v Pettigrew rule. Most notably, Morden JA's reinterpretation of Mclean in Grimes v 
Cloutier'`' can be construed as a response to the forum shopping of the claimant in question. 
Subsequently, in adopting the lex loci delicti as Canada's tort choice of law rule, La Forest J 
commented that the Mclean rule would, in practice, mean that "the courts of different countries 
would follow different rules In respect of the same wrong and invite forum shopping by 
litigants. "142 This problem is particularly acute in a federal state like Canada due to the "constant 
mobility between the provinces as well as similar legal regimes "143 
As was mentioned above, it is clear that both the double actionability rule and the lex loci delicti 
discourage forum shopping and in Tolofson, it was the latter which was chosen. Did the policy of 
119 Guthrie A Good Place to Shop: Choice of Forum and the Conflict of Laws (1995-1996) 27 Ottawa Law Review 201, at 222. 
+40 
HL Paper 36 (1995), Part 1, at 73 per Sir Lawrence Collins. 
+bid, at 73 per Lord Wilberforce. "If it is privacy in the law of France then let them go and sue in France. " 141 (1989) 61 DLR (0) 505. The claimant in that case wanted Ontario law to apply as it would award her with a greater amount of damages. 
42 
143 
Tolojson, supra, a. 25, at [47). +ýýIbid. 
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discouraging forum shopping play a part in that choice? For the 1995 Act, the selection of the lex 
loci delicti in divergence from the double actionability rule was designed to encourage "acceptable 
forum shopping. " 144 There is some indication of a similar view in Tolofson as La Forest J 
commented that a consequence of the removal of the lex foci limb of the double actionability rule 
is that: 
"individuals need not in enforcing a legal right be tied to the courts of the 
jurisdiction where the right arose, but may choose one to meet their 
convenience. "145 
Australia 
As was seen in the Canadian context, forum shopping was employed as a criticism of the 
Australian tort choice of law emphasis on the lex fori146 and in due course, these comments were 
endorsed unanimously by the High Court of Australia in Breavington, at least in relation to inter- 
state torts. However, with regards to the choice of law regime Australian law should adopt to 
address this problem, there was no judicial consensus. In Breavington, a narrow majority of the 
High Court adopted a lex loci delicti rule. However, in the subsequent High Court cases of 
McKain and Stevens v Head, 147 the double actionability rule was restored. 
In Pfeiffer, even though the lex loci delicti rule was adopted for inter-state torts, only one Justice 
based his decision on forum shopping. In particular, Kirby J rejected the view that forum shopping 
is a "means of furthering the ends of material justice"148 at least as far as inter-state torts are 
concerned as he did not regard it as reasonable that such a choice, made unilaterally by the 
initiating party, should materially alter that party's substantive legal entitlements to the 
144 GuUuie, supra, n. 138, at 224. 143 Tolofson, supra. n. 25, at [40]. 
: 44'7 
See for example, Corcoran v Corcoran [1974] VR 164. 
144 
(1993) 176 CLR 433. 
Pfeiffer, supra, n. 50, at [128]. 
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disadvantage of its opponents. "149 In his opinion, forum shopping would be 'obstructive to the 
integrity of a federal nation, the reasonable expectations of those living within it and the free 
mobility of people, goods and services within its border. "t50 This was also the case for the 
adoption of the lex loci delicti rule for international torts in Renault v Zhang as Kirby J was again 
the only judge who based his decision on forum shopping. 15' 
Is forum shopping an explanation for the Australian divergence from the English double 
actionability rule? Unlike the Law Commissions and the Canadian courts, neither Kirby J nor the 
rest of the Justices in Pfeiffer made any mention of litigant convenience In their decision to 
endorse the lex loci delicti. In light of this, it is arguable that the policy of discouraging forum 
shopping is merely an explanation for a departure from the former forum-centric tort choice of law 
rules as represented by Machado v Fontes. 
Nonetheless, in Neilson, the policy of discouraging forum shopping was an important 
consideration in the decision of the High Court of Australia to include renvol as part of the 
Australian tort choice of law rule. In particular, Kirby, Gummow and Hayne JJ were of the view 
that the application of the lex loci delicti rule would encourage forum shopping "if the forum were 
to choose to apply only some of the law of that foreign jurisdiction"152 as that would "permit a 
party to gain some advantage by litigating in the courts of the forum, rather the courts of the 
jurisdiction 
whose law provides the governing law. "153 To prevent this situation from arising, it was 
necessary to introduce the doctrine of renvol to ensure that "as far as possible, the rights and 
obligations of the parties should be the same whether the dispute Is litigated In the courts of that 
foreign jurisdiction or is determined in the Australian forum. 0154 In comparison, the Law 
Commissions 
and the Canadian courts do not appear to be concerned with discouraging such 
litigant behaviour. 
ý ibid. 
131 ibid. 
,,,, 
Renault, supra, n. 56, at [118]. IVeiLfon, supra, n. 3, at [91] per Gummow and Hayne JJ. See also, at [172] per Kirby J. Is4 
IS4 ibid, at [91]. ibid, at [90]. 
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2.5.2 Exception to the tort choice of law rule 
Canada 
Forum shopping was a crucial consideration in La Forest J's decision In Tolofson that no 
exception be available to apply another jurisdiction's law in the inter-provincial context. In his 
view, "[a]ny exception adds an element of uncertainty, and leaves the door open to a resourceful 
lawyer to attempt to change the application of the law. "155 The Introduction of a flexible rule may 
thus "encourage frivolous cross-claims and joinders of third parties"56 In order to locate a factual 
matrix that would satisfy the flexible exception. In other words, La Forest J Is of the view that any 
avenue available to apply a law other than the lox loci delicti would enable litigants and their 
advisors to exploit these lacunas to achieve a result beneficial to their cause. Furthermore, he Is 
"unconvinced"157 that it is inherently just that the law of the parties' common residence should 
apply, particularly In the inter-provincial context. For international torts, the above considerations 
are arguably weaker as La Forest J does concede that a limited degree of flexibility to apply the 
lex for! may be required to do justice in exceptional circumstances, even though to do so, In 
accordance with his reasoning, would be to allow litigants to engage in some form of forum 
shopping. 
In comparison, the Law Commissions do not consider the section 12 exception under the 1995 
Act to be an incentive to litigants to forum shop. Likewise, the English courts do not share this 
view as well in relation to the flexible exception. One explanation is that the English courts have a 
different definition of what constitutes acceptable forum shopping. In particular, they consider 
there to be forum shopping when it is the natural forum that is by-passed. 
153 
lofson, supra, n. 25, at [65]. 
ibid. at [64]. 137 ibid, at [57]. 
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"What is envisaged in Lord Pearson's definition is a polarised situation where all 
the connections are with one country (the natural forum) and there are no 
substantial connections with the country selected for trial (the alien forum). ' 158 
The corollary of this definition is: where the parties are from England and the remaining 
connections aside from the place of commission of the tort are with England, the natural forum 
would be England. Accordingly, the application of the flexible exception to apply English law 
would not be considered as forum shopping by the English courts as the plaintiff cannot be said 
to have avoided the natural forum. In contrast, La Forest J has a different definition of what is 
considered unacceptable forum shopping: to him, the place of commission and not the natural 
forum is the key reference point and any attempt to convince the judiciary to apply another 
country's law would be denounced as forum shopping. This difference would explain the 
Canadian divergence from the English common law flexible exception. 
Australia 
In Breavington v Godleman, it was held that there should not be an exception to the tort choice of 
law rule for inter-state torts as this allowed for the continuing possibility that "one set of facts 
occurring within Australia could give rise to different legal consequences depending on the venue 
of the action; "'S9 a situation which would only act as an "incentive to forum shopping. "'fi° This Is of 
course a view shared by La Forest J in Canada. 
Subsequently, in Pfeiffer, the High Court, again refused to adopt an exception for Inter-state torts. 
However, only Kirby J was explicit in the use of forum shopping as an explanation for this 
divergence from the English common law exception with his comments that a "variable rule»181 
would allow parties to manipulate the results of the proceedings to their own advantage. Similarly, 
is 
Fawcett, Forum Shopping 
-Some Questions Answered (1984) 35 Northern Ireland Law Quarterly 141. 
160Pryles, The Law Applicable to Interstate Torts: Farewell to Phillips v Eyre? [19891 Australian Law Journal 158, at 169. 
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Breavington, 
supra, n. 117, at 114. Pfeiffer, supra, n. 50, at [ 129]. 
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for the rejection of the flexible exception for international torts in Renault, Kirby J was the only 
member of the High Court of Australia to base his decision to do so on the grounds that any 
departure from the lex loci delicti would result in forum shopping. In other words, he appears to 
share La Forest J's views that so long as a law other than the lex loci delicti is applicable to the 
dispute in question, it would encourage litigants to engage in unacceptable forum shopping. This 
is of course in sharp contrast to the views of the Law Commissions and the English courts. 
3. STRUCTURAL EXPLANATIONS 
3.1 INTERACTION WITH THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF TORTS 
A State's substantive tort law can have an impact on its tort choice of law regime. For example, a 
common argument employed by the Law Commissions and the courts of our selected 
jurisdictions in advocating for a divergence from the double actionability rule is that the law of tort 
is no longer seen as having a "punitive deterrent or "admonitory" function. "182 Instead, It Is viewed 
as compensatory and more concerned with distributive justice rather than retributive. As it can no 
longer be regarded as "closely allied to the criminal law, *163 the lox for! Is considered Irrelevant. 
Although, the English judiciary has not commented upon this matter In relation to the double 
actionability rule, their refusal to abandon the lex fort may be construed as a judicial disagreement 
with the above view. It may be that Briggs' view of torts as standing halfway between criminal and 
contract law is the prevailing doctrine In the English courts. 164 
In relation to the rules on identifying the place of commission of a tort, differences in opinions with 
regards to the objective of tort law in our selected Commonwealth jurisdictions has led to 
divergences from the English common law position on this point of comparison. 
16 Working Paper, supra, n. 1, at para. 3.3. For Australia, see for example, Renault Y Zhang, supra, a. 56, at [43H60], Neilson, supra, n. 3, at [100]. For Canada, see for example, Tolofson, supra, n. 25, at [36]. : 63 
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3.1.1 Identifying the place of commission of the tort 
England: Part ill of the 1995 Act 
In endorsing the place of injury/death rule as the solution to the problem of identifying the place of 
commission of torts involving personal injury or property damage, the Law Commissions 
emphasised that the purpose of substantive tort law is to "provide a means whereby the 
equilibrium between the claimant's interests and the wrongdoer's interests may be maintained 
and, if upset, readjusted. "1ss Since it is the claimant's interest that is detrimentally affected, the 
Law Commissions were of the view that the law of the place where the claimant was harmed 
should be applied. 
In contrast, no discussion of the objectives of substantive tort law was made in Metall und Rostoff 
AG v Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Inc168 where the Distillers substance test'67 was adopted as 
the English common law rule for locating the place where a tort is committed. All that was 
mentioned was that 
'[a]doption of such a test avoids the mechanical solution Inherent in an outright 
choice between the place of acting and the place of harm. It is also sufficiently 
flexible to take account of factors such as the nature of the tort alleged to have 
been committed and the material elements of the relevant tort, and will, without 
undue rigidity, enable the court to locate the tort in one place for choice of law 
purposes. "'8 
For other torts particularly torts which do not require any proof of damage, the Law Commissions 
have conceded that they may not conform to the objective of addressing harm done to the 
66 
Working Paper, supra, n. 1, at para. 4.70. 
67 
[1990] 1 QB 391. 
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Distillers Co (Biochemicals) Ltd v Thompson [1971] AC 458. Metall, supra, n. 166, at 444. 
208 
Claimant and in such cases, they may properly be regarded as "admonitory"169 rather than 
4 compensatory. "10 Consequently, the focus placed upon such torts for the purposes of identifying 
their place of commission would be the conduct of the wrongdoer. However, in an acceptance of 
the English Court of Appeal's rationale in adopting the Distillers substance test in Metall, the Law 
Commissions commented that, beyond personal injury and property damage torts, there Is a 
higher chance that these other torts will involve complex facts where there is "no single place of 
conduct and no single place of result. ""' Identifying the place of the defendant's conduct and the 
place where the claimant is harmed may become Increasingly difficult as well. Bearing these 
considerations in mind, the Law Commissions decided that a discretionary rule would be the best 
way to address these concerns. 
Canada and Australia 
As for the Canadian position, no discussion of the purposes of substantive tort law was made in 
relation to the approach developed in Tolofson to identify the place of commission of a tort. La 
Forest J simply highlighted the "thorny issues"172 involved in locating the place where a multi- 
state tort is committed much like what the Law Commissions did in coming up with the section 
11(2)(c) approach. 
Likewise, for Australia, all that was said in Dow Jones & Company Inc v Joseph Gutnick173 In 
relation to the Distillers substance test was that "(a)ttempts to apply a single rule of location""' 
have been unsatisfactory as the rules pay Insufficient regard to the different kinds of tortious 
Claims that may be made. "15 In other words, the High Court of Australia is also of the view that it 
169 
Working Paper, supra, n. 1. at para. 4.74. 
ibid. 72 ibid, at para. 4.84. ý7, Tolofson, supra, n. 25, at [43]. 
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is "impracticable"176 to construct a rule which would identify the locus delicti with certainty in every 
case. 
Accordingly, one can observe that the emphasis placed on the purpose of domestic tort law in 
relation to torts involving personal injury, death and property damage has led the Law 
Commissions to propose a place of injury rule for such torts. In contrast, the Australian, Canadian 
and English common law rules on identifying the place of the tort were not formulated with these 
considerations in mind. 
3.2 INFLUENCES FROM PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: TERRITORIALITY AND COMITY 
The principle of territoriality provides that each state has "exclusive jurisdiction within its own 
territories; ""' a fact given credence by public international law. In its earlier incarnation, as the 
basis for the vested rights theory, it was savagely criticised for its numerous flaws178 and was 
thoroughly discredited. Yet, in recent years, it is possible to observe its resurgence in Australian 
- 
and Canadian tort choice of law; albeit not in the form traditionally associated with "vested rights 
thinking""a but one closely connected with comity, a concept we have examined in Chapter 5. In 
particular, the territoriality principle has been used by a number of our selected courts as an 
argument for their departure from the English common law tort choice of law rule as well as its 
exception. As a preliminary note, there was no mention of the territoriality principle by the Law 
Commissions and the Singapore courts in relation to their tort choice of law regimes. 
1.7' 
Working Paper, supra, n. 1, at para. 4.86. Tolofson, supra, n. 25, at [43]. 17,22. See for example, North, Fawcett, Cheshire and North's Private International Law (London: Butterworths) (13° ed., 1999), at 20 22 
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3.2.1 Tort choice of law rule 
Canada 
The territorial principle was used in the case of Grimes v Cloutier as a critique of the traditional 
Anglo-Canadian rule In Mclean for its lex fori emphasis: that it was "essentially an extra-territorial 
extension of the law of the forum to conduct in another province. "80 In particular, it was held that 
as the Canadian polity is one of 'comity between provinces, "181 to ignore the Quebec legislation 
would be an "officious intermeddling with the legal concerns of a sister province. "182 Accordingly, 
Mclean was limited to its facts and a two-tiered tort choice of law regime was developed by the 
Ontario courts in that case. 
Subsequently, Tolofson was decided with La Forest J adopting the territoriality principle as the 
theoretical foundation of the modern Canadian tort choice of law regime. In reformulating 
Canadian tort choice of law, La Forest J highlighted the principle of territoriality as the "underlying 
reality"183 in which choice of law rules should operate and stated that the concept of comity would 
require states to respect the exercise of territorial sovereignty of a particular state and not 
interfere 
with what that "state chooses to do within those limits. "84 As the Mclean rule "involves a 
court's defining the nature and consequences of an act done in another country, "185 this "flies 
against the territoriality principle. "186 The English double actionability rule is subject to this 
criticism as well as the first limb of the rule would bar a claim so long as there Is no liability under 
the lex for!. In line with these considerations, he concluded that it is "axiomatic"187 that the new 
choice of law rule should be the lex loci delicti rule. 
181 Crimes, 
supra, n. 141, at [41]. ibid, 
iaz ibid, at 55 24 ? blofson, 
supra, n. 25, at [37]. 
ibid. 
1B6 tbid, at [47]. 
ýibid: 97 ibid. at [43]. 
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There is, though, a difference in the formulation of the territoriality principle depending on whether 
the tortious dispute is inter-provincial or international in nature. For the former, it is the nature of 
Canada's federal system, its "constitutional arrangements 
-a single country with different 
provinces exercising territorial legislative jurisdiction"' 88 and the need for choice of law rules to 
conform to the territorial limits imposed upon provincial legislative power by the Canadian 
Constitution rather than comity per se that requires a judicial adherence to the territorial principle. 
Both versions of the territoriality principle would still provide for the lex loci delicti as the tort 
choice of law rule. 
Australia 
In Phillips v Eyre, Willes J commented that "the civil liability arising out of a wrong derives its birth 
from the law of the place, and its character is determined by that law. "89 As a critique of the 
Machado interpretation of the Phillips v Eyre rule, the Australian courts have Inferred from this 
statement that it probably did not occur to Willes J that anyone would construe the judgment as 
"indicating that an act which in no circumstances imposed any liability in the foreign country might 
found an action in England. "190 Instead, they suggested that the true Interpretation of the Phillips v 
Eyre rule might be the double actionability rule. 
In Breavington, the territoriality principle was utilised by some members of the High Court of 
Australia in their decision to adopt the lex loci delicti rule as the Australian tort choice of law rule 
for inter-state torts. In particular, Deane J held that the determination of the applicable law could 
be found either in the "territorial confinement"19' of a State law or "in the case of multi-State 
circumstances, in the determination of predominant territorial nexus. "192 He thus rejected the 
Phillips 
v Eyre rule and its various interpretations as it ignored the nature of the Australian 
119 ibid. at [70]. 
ýý pbillips v Eyre. supra, n. 67, at 28. g Tarawa 
v Howard smith Co. Ltd [1910] VR 509, at 527. 91 
192 
Breavington, 
supra, n. 117, at 125. ibid. 
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Federation with its "undue preference for the substantive law of the forum. *193 It can be noted that 
this analysis of the territorial principle and its relationship with the Australian federation bears a 
"marked similarity to that of La Forest J. "194 
In the later case of McKain v Miller, it is interesting to note that territoriality was ignored by the 
High Court of Australia as can be seen from their decision to reintroduce the lex for! to the 
Australian tort choice of law rule with their reinstatement of the Phillips v Eyre rule. More 
importantly, in Pfeiffer v Rogerson, even though the majority Justices stated that the application 
of a /ex loci delicti rule for inter-state torts would "recognise and give effect to the predominant 
territorial concern of the statutes of State and Territory legislatures, 0185 they commented that: 
"[r]esort to notions of sovereignty, however, suffers no sure and simple basis for 
preferring one choice of law rule to another. Especially is that so in a federal 
system, like Australia, where "sovereignty" is shared between the federal, State 
and Territory law areas, each with its own legislature and its own distinct 
democratic process. "" 
In other words, unlike the Canadian courts, the Australian courts do not appear to be attaching 
much weight to the territoriality principle in their decision to diverge from the English common law 
Phillips 
v Eyre rule in relation to inter-state torts. The explanation for this difference can be found 
in the political make up of the two countries, a point which will be dealt with in a later sub-section. 
As for international torts, the comity-based territorial analysis utilised by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Tolofson has been relied upon by the High Court of Australia to adopt the lex loci 
delicti as the Australian tort choice of law rule. 197 
193 
194 ibrd. 
194 
Walsh, 
supra, n. 179, at 106. 
ý% plei(jer supra, n. 50, at [86]. 
197 ibid. at [74]. Renault, 
supra, n. 56, at [63] 
- 
[64]. 
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3.2.2 Exception to the tort choice of law rule 
Canada 
Generally, La Forest J saw the application of an exception to the /ex loci delicti as an expression 
of disapproval by the forum's court in relation to the "law that the legislature having power to 
enact it within its territory has chosen to adopt. "198 However, as the territoriality principle would 
require the respect of that legislature's exercise of its sovereign powers, particularly in relation to 
residents of that jurisdiction, he was unconvinced of the arguments for an exception. It may be 
unfortunate that a claimant would receive higher compensation if the tort had occurred in another 
jurisdiction but these differences he commented are a "concomitant of the territoriality 
principle. "199 
In relation to inter-provincial torts, La Forest J has held that the existence of an exception to the 
lex loci delicti "might well give rise to constitutional difficulties"20° as a provincial court, In applying 
another law to the lex loci delicti, would be going against the limits imposed on that court by the 
Canadian Constitution. Furthermore, he added that he does not foresee that his decision will 
create much difficulty in the inter-provincial context as "many areas of law in Quebec and the 
other provinces are not so dissimilar; "201 the provinces are ultimately part of the federation of 
Canada. He thus held that no exception to the lex loci delicti Is available for such torts. 
As the territoriality principle for international torts is premised on comity and not constitutional 
imperatives, La Forest J's concession that a justice exception may be available to the lax locl 
delicti for such torts is enlightening as it implies that comity is not the only principle for tort choice 
of law in this context. In particular, there may be instances where a strict adherence to territoriality 
and comity would cause injustice to the parties involved. Nevertheless, it is clear that significant 
I" 7'olofson, 
supra, n. 25, at [57]. 
ibid. 
m1 ibid, at [72]. 
ibid. at [70]. 
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weight has been attached to the territoriality principle in this context as La Forest J has said that 
he "can, however, imagine few cases where [the exception] would be necessary. "202 
Australia 
In contrast, the territorial principle was not utilised by the High Court of Australia In their decisions 
on the exception to the lex loci delicti for both international and inter-state torts. 
3.3 INFLUENCES FROM OTHER AREAS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
One criticism of recent Commonwealth reforms of tort choice of law regimes is that they are often 
made with little consideration of their impact on "other areas of the Conflict of Laws"203 and that 
this has led to a gross distortion of the nature of the subject as a whole. 204 These comments are 
astute but it does not mean that there has been no discussion whatsoever of the various stages 
of Private international law in the development of Commonwealth tort choice of law regimes. In 
Particular, some of our Commonwealth tort choice of law regimes have been influenced by the 
formulation of their own rules on jurisdiction. 
3.3.1 Brussels I Regulation and the abolition of the lox for! 
One explanation provided by Lord Mackay (the Lord Chancellor then) in advocating for the 
abolition of the /ex fori and the corresponding characterisation of unknown foreign torts as 'torts' 
for the 1995 Act is that no purpose is served by the retention of the ! ex for!. 
To elaborate, the claimant can simply bring his action in the courts of another European state 
whose laws are more likely to impose liability, so long as he satisfies the jurisdictional rules 
mz ibid at 50 203 
204 
Harris, Choice of Law in Tort 
- 
Blending in with the Landscape of the Conflict of Laws? (1998) 61 Modem Law Review 33, at 34. 
'bid, at 55. 
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provided for by the Brussels I Regulation. 205 Under this Regulation, a person domiciled in a 
contracting state may be sued in another contracting state "in matters relating to tort, delicti or 
quasi delicti206 provided that that contracting state is the "place where the harmful event 
Occurred. "207 The European Court of Justice has held that 'tort' should be given an autonomous 
meaning and that it covered "all actions which seek to establish the liability of a defendant and 
which are not related to contract within the meaning of Art 5(1). "208 This definition is extremely 
broad and would conceivably include most, if not all, torts unknown to English domestic law. If 
jurisdiction is established under the Regulation, the resulting judgment would be directly 
enforceable in the English courts. In that case, the English tort choice of law process would be 
irrelevant to the claimant. This is, of course, subject to certain exceptions209 but it is clear that 
mere differences between English and foreign substantive tort law would not be sufficient to 
trigger those exceptions. 
In comparison, it is obvious that the Brussels I Regulation cannot be an explanation for the 
Australian and Canadian divergences from the double actionability rule as these countries are not 
Part of the European Union. 
3.3.2 Forum non convenlens and the lox for! 
In Tolofson, La Forest J was of the view that the first limb of the Phillips v Eyre rule is one relating 
to jurisdiction rather than choice of Iaw; 210 a rule analogous to the Mocambique2" rule that 
NCommon law courts will not normally entertain proceedings relating to title to foreign land 
. 
"Z'2 
With the recent developments in Canadian law on jurisdiction, La Forest J was of the view that a 
lex for! requirement in Canadian tort choice of law may no longer be necessary as the jurisdiction 
2 HL Paper 36 (1995), Part 1, at 9 per Lord Mackay. 
207 
Article 5(3), Brussels I Regulation. 
iid. 
201 Kaljeis v Schroder [1988] ECR 5565, at 5585. 
210 
See Articles 34,35 and 45, Brussels l Regulation. 
21.7blofson, supra, n. 25, at [26]. 
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Brtdsh South Africa Co v Companhia de Mocambique [1893] AC 602. North, Private International Law Problems in Common Law Jurisdictions (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) (1993), at 156. 
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of Canadian courts is already confined to matters where there is jurisdiction simpliciter: a "real 
and substantial connection"21 with the forum. Accordingly, he opined that claims which do not 
incur liability under Canadian substantive tort law may be a "factor better weighed in considering 
the issue of forum non conveniens"214 rather than dealt with by a lex fort limb at the choice of law 
stage. 
Likewise, the High Court of Australia has held that the purpose of the lex for! in the Phillips v Eyre 
rule is best reflected in the jurisdictional context rather than at the tort choice of law stage. In 
Particular, where the forum" does not provide curial relief of the kind provided by the law of the 
State or Territory in which the events occurred 
, 
P215 in certain cases, the courts will find that the 
forum is clearly inappropriate and will thus stay the proceedings. However, if there are other 
reasons indicating that the forum is appropriate, it would be difficult to hold that the litigant's claim 
should be rejected simply on the ground that "there would not be a remedy if the events 
happened"216 
within the forum. 
This argument was repeated in Renault for international torts where the High Court stated that the 
lox fori limb "was intended to operate as a technique of forum control . 217 and that the question is 
really about public policy. They then went on to hold that: 
"[i]t is sufficient to say that, should a question arise as to whether public policy 
considerations direct that an action not be maintained in Australia, that question 
is appropriately resolved as a preliminary issue on an application for a permanent 
stay of proceedings. "218 
213 S ee Chapter 2 of this thesis for the discussion ofjurisdiction simpliciter. 
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It should also be noted that in Renault, one reason for the rejection of the English common law 
flexible exception was that the majority Justices were of the view that "[q]uestions which might be 
caught up in the application "219 of such an exception "may often be subsumed in the issues 
presented on a stay application, including one based on public policy grounds. "22° 
In short, one explanation for the removal of the lex for! from the tort choice of law rule in Canada 
and Australia is that the judiciaries in these countries are of the view that the issues necessitating 
the application of the lex for! should be dealt with at the forum non conveniens stage rather than 
at the tort choice of law stage. 
4. HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
4.1 HISTORICAL INFLUENCE OF ENGLISH JUDICAL PRECEDENTS 
In this section, we will examine the treatment of English judicial precedents by the courts of our 
selected jurisdictions. 
Canada 
As Mclean v Pettigrew was decided before 1949,221 one explanation for the Canadian 
endorsement of the Phillips v Eyre rule is simply that at this point in time, the Supreme Court of 
Canada was bound by the decisions of the House of Lords under the doctrine of stare decisis. 
However, it is important to note that as Machado v Fontes is an English Court of Appeal case, 
there was no compulsion on the Supreme Court of Canada to endorse the Machado 
interpretation 
of the Phillips v Eyre rule in Mclean. Therefore, this decision cannot be attributed 
ibid 2 19 
iý at [731. ibid. 
221 
'Mclean v Pettigrew, supra, n. 114. The Canadian right of appeal to the Privy Council was abolished in 1949. 
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to a technical adherence to English precedents. Instead, there appears to be a policy of adopting 
English judicial solutions even if they do not bind the Canadian courts as a matter of Iaw. 222 The 
problem with this position is that most conflicts cases in Canada tend to arise in the inter- 
provincial context and since the relevant English tort choice of law rule was devised for 
international torts, the application of English approaches in such circumstances may result in an 
"improper decision. "223 In Hancock's words, this is a "blind adherence to a verbal formula without 
any regard for policies or consequences. "224 
After 1949, the Machado version of the Phillips v Eyre rule remained part of Canadian law for 
some time, as the Supreme Court of Canada was not called upon to rule on this matter till 1995. 
When Machado was overruled by the House of Lords in Boys v Chaplin, there was a Canadian 
divergence from the English common law tort choice of law rule as Canadian lower courts were 
still bound by Mclean. Subsequently, in Grimes v Cloutier, the Phillips v Eyre rule was heavily 
criticised by the Ontario courts and the judicial solution then was to confine Mclean to its facts. In 
other words, the Ontario courts had manoeuvred themselves into a position where they had the 
freedom to adopt whatever tort choice of law rule they saw fit for situations that do not fall within 
the scope of the Mclean test However, instead of undertaking a careful examination of whether 
the double actionability rule is suitable for the Canadian context, they simply adopted that 
approach. Once again, we can observe a judicial willingness to follow English authorities to 
resolve the dispute at hand. 
It was only in Tolofson that one can argue that the policy of ensuring uniformity with the English 
common law has been considerably weakened. In particular, La Forest J pointed out the "social 
conside rations"225 that "militated in favour of the English rule"226 are all gone now and hence, 
there is no reason for the Canadian courts to continue their adherence to the Phillips v Eyre rule. 
In other words, he is saying that it is time to construct Canadian tort choice of law rules in 
211, Palmer, Torts in the Inter-Provincial Conflict of Laws (1959) 17(1) University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review 1, at 12. 223 ibid, at 6. 224 Hancock, Torts in the Conflict ofLaws (Chicago: Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, Callaghan & Co. ) (1942), at 89. us Tolofson, supra, n. 25, at [481. n6 ibid. 
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accordance with the Canadian context as ready-made English solutions can no longer be seen as 
suitable for Canadian needs in all circumstances. This declaration of judicial independence can 
thus be regarded as an explanation for the divergences effected by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in that case. 
Australia 
Similarly, the Phillips v Eyre rule was first endorsed by the High Court of Australia as Australian 
courts were effectively bound by the decisions of the House of Lords subject to the judgments 
pronounced by the Privy Council. However, as Machado is an English Court of Appeal case, 
Australian courts were free to ignore it and ignore it they did, as it is highly unlikely that Machado 
was part of Australian law with the hostility displayed towards its interpretation of the Phillips v 
Eyre rule by the High Court of Australia. Furthermore, in Koop v Bebb, 227 the High Court may 
have provided for a double actionability rule almost thirty years before the House of Lords in Boys 
v Chaplin. 
It is possible to argue that Australian adherence to English judicial precedent is not as strong as 
the Canadian judiciaries' at least in relation to this point of comparison. The Australian judiciaries 
appear to be more willing to undertake a critical examination of the relevant English common law 
rules at this point in time. However, it is important to note that their analysis is still rooted more in 
the question of whether Machado was supported by the English authorities that precede it rather 
than a discussion of whether the rule is appropriate for the Australian context 228 
Even though the Australian right of appeal to the Privy Council was effectively removed in 1975, 
the Phillips v Eyre rule remained very much part of Australian law as there was no High Court 
pronouncement on tort choice of law till 1988. The first substantial challenge to that rule came in 
227 (1951) 84 CLR 629. 228 Varawa. supra, n. 190, at 523 per Hodges J. There is "doubt as to whether that judgement [Machado v Fontes] is consistent with 
that of Willes J in Phillips v Eyre. " Koop v Bebb, ibid, at 642-643 per Dixon, Williams, Fullagar, Kitto JJ. After examining past English authorities, they pointed out that these judgments fall short of supporting the doctrine of Machado vFontes. " 
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the case of Breavington. Two of the Justices who supported the double actionability rule based 
their decisions primarily on the doctrine of stare decisis. 229 However, the remaining Justices 
displayed recognition of the "freedom and the responsibility-230 they now possess in the 
"moulding"231 of Australian law as they engaged in an examination of whether the English rule 
was suitable for the Australian context. What followed was, of course, a bewildering range of 
rationales invoked to support their individual approaches. However, regardless of this 
"considerable cleavage of opinion 
, 
»232 one thing is clear; the relevant English judicial precedents 
on tort choice of law were not accepted at face value by a majority of the High Court judges. 
In McKain v Miller, though, the Phillips v Eyre rule was reinstated by the High Court of Australia. 
Despite a detailed discussion of why an approach based on the Australian Constitution should be 
rejected 233 no explanation was given for their decision to re-adopt the Phillips v Eyre rule. It is 
possible to read this case as a resurgence of Australian adherence to English judicial solutions. 
Thankfully, this was temporary as the Phillips v Eyre rule was rejected and replaced by the lex 
loci delicti rule in the case of Pfeiffer v Rogerson for inter-state torts. Most notably, the High Court 
of Australia stressed that "Phillips v Eyre was given in a context far removed from that of the 
Australian federal compact"234 and that it was an "inappropriate borrowing from English law. "235 it 
may be natural enough in "colonial and post-colonial times"2 36 to adopt an "unquestioning 
acceptance of English jurisprudence that occurred in the days of Empire. 237 However, with the 
ruling of the High Court in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 238 the "common law of 
Australia must adapt to the Constitution"239 in order to provide practical solutions to particular 
legal problems which occur in the federal system. 
229 Breavington, supra. n. 117. See the judgments of Dawson J and Toohey J. 230 Finn, Commerce, the Common Law and Morality (1989) 17 Melbourne University Law Review 87, at 90. 231 ibid. 
232 Pryles, supra, n. 159, at 162. 233 McKain, supra, n. 48, at 34-37. 234 
235 
Pfeiffer. supra, n. 50, at [22]. s ibid at [109]. 236 ibid, at [110]. 237 ibid. 
238 (1997) 145 CLR 96. 
239 Pfeiffer, supra, n. 50, at [34]. 
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The lex loci delicti rule was adopted for international torts in Renault and again, we can observe a 
greater willingness on the part of the Australian judiciary to examine the nature of the English 
common law rules in order to determine whether they should continue to follow English 
precedents on tort choice of law. In particular, the lex fori limb of the Phillips v Eyre rule was 
analysed for its "purpose and function "240 and it was eventually abolished on the ground that it 
favoured a "stringent domestic policy. "241 The rule may have been relevant in England "a century 
and a half agon242 but today, it can no longer be supported "as anything more than an arbitrary 
rule. 243 
In short, one explanation why the Australian tort choice of law regime is so different from that of 
the English common law is that English judicial precedents no longer exert a powerful influence 
on Australian judges. 
Singapore 
Similar to the situation in Canada and Australia, the endorsement of the Phillips v Eyre rule in the 
Singapore case of RJ Sneddon v AG Shafe244 in 1947 was the result of the doctrine of stare 
decisis. After Singapore severed its ties with the Privy Council in 1994, the Singapore courts first 
faced a tort choice of law case in Goh Chok Tong v Tang Liang Hong. 
245 Even though English 
judicial precedents could no longer bind the decisions of the Singapore court, the Singapore High 
Court simply endorsed the English common law double actionability rule without providing any 
explanations for their decision aside from a statement that: 
240 Renault, supra, n. 56, at [49]. 241 ibid, at [53]. 242 ibid. 
243 ibid. 
244 [1947] 1 MLJ 197. 
245 [1997] 2 SLR 641. 
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"[t]he present law in Singapore on the applicable choice of law rule is based on a 
passage from the judgment of Willes J in Phillips V Eyre °zas 
This unquestioning adherence to English judicial precedents can again be seen in relation to the 
Singapore Court of Appeal's decision in Parno v SC Marine Pte Ltd. 247 Once again, no 
explanation was given for the adoption of the double actionability rule. Arguably, the Singapore 
courts are still heavily reliant on English precedents for their tort choice of law rules and this 
would form a powerful explanation for their uniformity with the English common law double 
actionability rule. 
4.2 INFLUENCE OF FOREIGN TORT CHOICE OF LAW REGIMES 
With the waning influence of English judicial precedents on Australian and Canadian tort choice 
of law regimes, the judiciaries in these countries have taken greater notice of other foreign 
models of tort choice of law regimes particularly from Europe and United States. Similarly, the 
Law Commissions have undertaken a survey of the tort choice of law regimes in several foreign 
jurisdictions. Accordingly, it is the purpose of this section to examine the use of comparative law 
in the decisions of our selected jurisdictions to diverge from the English common law tort choice 
of law regime. 
4.2.1 Tort choice of law rule 
England: Part l/l of the 1995 Act 
As a matter of comparative law, when the Law Commissions published their findings in their 
Working Paper, they cited Lord Wilberforce's comments in Boys v Chaplin that the Phillips v Eyre 
246 ibid, at [68]. 247 [1999] 4 SLR 579, at [36]. 
223 
rule was hardly found "outside the world of the English-speaking common law. "248 In particular, 
their research indicated that none of the European systems of law aside from Hungary provided 
for the involvement of the lex for! in their tort choice of law rule249 and instead, it is the lex loci 
delicti that "forms the basis of the choice of law rule . 250 in these countries. It was also noted that 
under the United States' Second Restatement, there is a concession that "in many cases the lex 
loci delicti will be the appropriate law to apply, or at least to take as a starting point. . 251 
With all this comparative support for the lex loci delicti, it is unsurprising that the Law 
Commissions have chosen to adopt this rule for their statutory tort choice of law regime. In 
addition, one practical explanation given for this decision is that the adoption of the lex loci delicti 
would promote uniformity as "the results of an action in the United Kingdom on a foreign tort or 
delict would therefore tend to be the same as if the action had been brought"252 in these 
countries. 
Canada 
The fact that most jurisdictions "favoured exclusive reference to the lex loci , 253 was also a 
consideration in the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Tolofson to adopt the lex loci 
delicti. Specific reference was made to the memorandum to the Hague Convention on Traffic 
Accidents that signatories of the Treaty have mostly "ruled in favour of recourse in principle to the 
lex loci actus in cases of automobile collisions occurring abroad. Q54 The United States support for 
the /ex loci delicti was also "attested"255 to with La Forest J's discussion of Babcock v Jackson. Zý 
248 Boys v Chaplin. supra, n. 10, at 387 per Lord Wilberforce. 249 Appendix to the Law Commissions Working Paper No 87 (1984), at 280 
-291. Working Paper, supra, n. 1, at para. 4.55. 231 ibid. 
252 ibid, at para. 4.59. 253 Tolojson, supra, n. 25, at [45]. 254 ibid. 
253 ibid. 
2.56 12 NY 2d 743 (1963). 
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More importantly, the Australian case of Breavington has had a very strong comparative influence 
on the judgment in Tolofson. La Forest J clearly regarded that the Australian jurisprudence on this 
matter must be "accorded considerable weight"257 as: 
"so much of [Australia's] history and [its] social, practical and constitutional 
environment is of a nature akin to those with which [the Canadian courts] are 
faced in dealing with conflict of laws within [Canada]. . 258 
Key passages in Breavington were cited by La Forest J, in particular, the support of various 
Australian Justices for the "underlying policy considerations"259 of uniformity. To him, this policy is 
"surely relevant in the development of common law rules for choice of lawn260 within the Canadian 
federation. 
One point to note is that when Tolofson was decided by the Supreme Court of Canada, the 
decision to reject the double actionability rule in Breavington was overruled by the High Court of 
Australia in Stevens v Head and McKain v Miller. Yet these subsequent cases were absent in La 
Forest J's judgment. Was this omission an oversight on the part of La Forest J or was it deliberate 
so as to achieve the conclusion he wanted? The answer is not immediately discernible from the 
case itself. 
Australia 
Similarly, some reliance was placed on the global trend towards the lex loci delicti in Australian 
tort choice of law cases. In relation to inter-state torts, the High Court of Australia pointed out in 
Pfeiffer that in "Europe, reference has usually been made to the lex loci delicti as the law 
2S7 Tolofson, supra, n. 25, at [68]. 2sa ibid. 
259 ibid. 
260 ibid, at [69]. 
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governing delictual liability. "261 Furthermore, even though the proper law of the tort was utilised by 
some courts in the United States, the majority Justices observed that recently, "there has been a 
revival of support for the lex loci delicti. "262 
With regards to international torts, the majority of Justices in Renault were impressed by La 
Forest J's reasoning in Tolofson as the explanations provided for their adoption of the lex loci 
delicti rule were supported with quotations of key passages from that case 263 In particular, they 
agreed with the criticisms levelled at the lex fors limb of the Phillips v Eyre rule in Tolofson as well 
as La Forest J's utilisation of the territoriality principle to justify a departure from the English 
double actionability rule. 
4.2.2 Exception to the tort choice of law rule 
England: Part 111 of the 1995 Act 
To establish the case for an exception in the English statutory tort choice of law regime, the 
experiences in the United States with regards to the "universal application, without exception, of 
the /ex loci delictt"264 was used by the Law Commissions to illustrate the inadequacy of such a 
rule to cope with all the unpredictable circumstances in which tort and delicti cases arise. Most 
notably, after examining a number of American cases, they highlighted the possible 
circumvention of the lex loci delicti rule with the use of escape devices. 265 Ultimately, this was to 
emphasise the need for flexibility and thus an exception to the lex loci delicti rule. In addition, the 
Law Commissions also observed "a trend away from a rigid lex loci delicti rulen266 in many 
European jurisdictions and were clearly influenced by this comparative phenomenon to do so 
likewise. 
261 Pfeifer. supra, n. 50, at [74]. 
ibid, at [77]. 263 Renault, supra, n. 56, at [63] 
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Canada 
In considering whether an exception should be available to the lex loci delicti, La Forest J in 
Tolofson examined the United States approach: the proper law of the tort which accords 
"controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which, because of its relationship and contact with 
the occurrence and the parties has the greatest concern with the issue raised in the litigation. "267 
He pointed out its "obvious defect"268 
- 
its "extreme uncertainty"269 as well as the tendency of 
judges to apply the lex fori with it and subsequently decided against endorsing such an exception 
for Canadian tort choice of law. 
La Forest J also referred to the Hague Convention on Traffic Accidents, even though Canada has 
not signed up to that Treaty. Under the Convention, the lex fori was to be applied "where all 
parties involved in the accident are from the forum 
. 
"270 Again, La Forest J was not convinced of 
the efficacy of such an exception in the tort choice of law context. In particular, the reason 
provided in the memorandum to the Convention was that the exception helps to guard 
sovereignty and it is thus considered "appropriate that in an accident involving only residents of a 
single country, that country should apply its law to the resolution of disputes without regard to the 
place where the tort took place. "27 With regards to the federal context, La Forest J regarded the 
sovereignty argument as relevant only to the international context and he fails to "see its 
application within a single country. . 272 In relation to the international sphere, he stated that such 
an exception is "not without its problems and does not appear to afford [Canada] most of the 
advantages that Europeans may gain from it. "2'3 
267 Tolofson, supra, n. 25, at [53]. 26' ibid, at [54]. 269 ibid. 
270 ibid, at [61]. 271 ibid, at [62]. 272 ibid. 
273 ibid. at [67]. 
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It can thus be observed that the Supreme Court of Canada has opted not to follow the general 
trend towards a less rigid lex loci delicti rule. Despite that, as La Forest J's comments on the 
exception for international torts were obiter and he did not actually define the exception in 
Tolofson itself, this legal vacuum has allowed some Canadian lower courts to draw implicit 
support from the more flexible exceptions in other jurisdictions274 
Australia 
Similarly, in Pfeiffer, the High Court of Australia undertook an analysis of the American proper law 
approach flowing from the Second Restatement before concluding that an exception to the lex 
loci delict! rule for inter-state torts was unnecessary. They pointed out that although, the approach 
has achieved widespread use in America, recently, there has been a "revival of support for the lox 
loci delicti'275 and that the governmental interest analysis (the technique used to locate the law 
which has the most significant connections with the parties or events) "has been doubted. "276 
Furthermore, they highlighted the difficulties of determining the significance of connecting factors. 
They also observed that the exception is often a guise to give effect to the American court's 
homing instinct. Likewise, for international torts, the Australian courts have refused to be 
influenced by the American approach for the same reasons. 277 
5. CONTEXTUAL EXPLANATIONS 
5.1 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONTEXT 
5.1.1 Free movement of persons, wealth and skills 
Canada 
274 See for example, Hanlan v Sernesky (1998) 41 CCLT (2d) 168. 276 Pfeiffer, supra, n. 50, at [77]. 
ibid. 
277 Renault, supra, n. 56, at [75 
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Underlying the Supreme Court of Canada's concern with territoriality and litigant convenience is 
an awareness that the Canadian tort choice of law regime must respond to the modern mobility of 
persons, wealth and skills, a consequence of the numerous "advances in transportation and 
communication 
.. 
278 To elaborate, in Tolofson v Jensen, aside from the concept of comity between 
nations, one other explanation for respecting "the territorial limits of law under the international 
legal order"279 is that it is necessary to "accommodate the movement of people, wealth and skills 
across state lines. n280 How does territoriality achieve this aim? According to La Forest J, the 
application of the /ex loci deficti, the natural tort choice of law rule that flows from the application 
of the territoriality principle will facilitate the "convenience"281 of litigants: 
'Tc]onsequently, individuals need not in enforcing a legal right be tied to the 
courts of the jurisdiction where the right arose, but may choose one to meet their 
convenience. "282 
Conversely, a forum-centric tort choice of law regime would cause litigant inconvenience for it 
may "force or persuade litigants who are within the territorial jurisdiction of the court to sue 
elsewhere even though it may be more convenient"283 for them to sue in that court. This would 
inhibit the mobility of litigants as in the situation where the lex for! does not recognise the cause of 
action the claimant is relying upon, he would be compelled to sue in the jurisdiction which 
provides him with that claim. La Forest J's attempts to minimise the role of the lex fori in the 
Canadian tort choice of law regime must thus be seen in the light of this rationale. 
One interesting question arising from the use of this rationale is: why must the free movement of 
persons, wealth and skills be encouraged? The only clue we have in Tolofson is that it aids in the 
27 To%json. supra, n. 25, at [48]. 279 ibid. at [37]. 230 ibid. 
291 ibid, at [40]. 292 ibid. 
2U ibid, at [51] 
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"emergence of a global economic order"284 but the case does not explain exactly how that is 
accomplished. As Tolofson is a continuation of La Forest J's attempt to place Canadian private 
international law on a unified theoretical basis, it is necessary for us to examine another landmark 
case in Canada, namely, Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savoye285 which deals with the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. 
In that case, a more thorough discussion of litigant mobility was undertaken. Specifically, after 
stating that the purpose of private international law is to "facilitate the flow of wealth, skills and 
people across state lines in a fair and orderly manner, "286 La Forest J cited a key passage287 from 
one of Yntema's articles that: 
"[i]n a highly integrated world economy, politically organized in a diversity of more 
or less autonomous legal systems, the function of conflict rules is to select, 
interpret and apply in each case the particular local law that will best promote 
suitable conditions of interstate and international commerce. "288 
Applying this to the Canadian context, he pointed out that the business community of Canada 
"operates in a world economy"289 and that private international law rules that accommodate 
litigant mobility has now become "imperative"290 especially in light of the "obvious intention of the 
Canadian Constitution to create a single country. "291 This is because the "mobility of Canadians 
across provincial lines [is necessary] to foster economic integration so as to create a common 
market. "292 
294 ibid, at [44]. Zeh [ 1990] 3 SCR 1077. 
ibid, at [31]. Z" ibid, at [32]. 21 Yntema, Objectives of Private International Law (1957) 35 Canadian Bar Review 721, at 741. 289 Morguard, supra, n. 285, at [34]. 290 ibid. 
291 ibid, at [36]. 292 ibid. 
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In other words, what La Forest J appears to be saying is that, with the "rapid evolution of a 
globalised world economy, "293 it is essential for Canadian private international law rules to 
"reinforce the efficient internal operation . 294 of their "federalised economy"295 so as to "enhance 
the competitiveness of that economy in a globalised international marketplace. "296 One way of 
doing this is to structure Canadian tort choice of law such that it does not overly inhibit the 
mobility of litigants in the federation. 
Australia 
In Pfeiffer, Kirby J examined the "[i]ncreased mobility of persons, goods and services"297 in the 
inter-state context and pointed out that: 
"[i]n Australia, the consideration of the mobility of people goods and services 
within a federation therefore encourages both the broadest possible access to 
the available courts within the unified Judicature of the nation and the adoption of 
a choice of law rule which helps to promote an identical outcome for the parties 
substantive rights, wherever in that nation those rights fall to be determined by a 
court of law. "298 
He opined that the existence of the lex fors in a tort choice of law scheme would only interfere with 
the above objectives and thus provided for the rejection of the Phillips v Eyre rule in the inter- 
state context. As the lex loci delicti rule would help to provide for uniformity of judicial decisions so 
as to encourage the free movement of persons, wealth and skills, Kirby J held that it should be 
adopted as the Australian tort choice of law rule. 
293 Herbert, The Conflict of laws and Judicial Perspectives on Federalism: A Principled Defence of Tolofson v Jensen (1998) 56 University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review 3, at 35. 294 ibid. 
295 ibid. 
296 ibid. 
297 Pfeiffer, supra, n. 50, at [ 125]. 299 ibid, at [130]. My italics. 
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Nonetheless, it is important to note that this consideration was not mentioned by the rest of the 
Justices in Pfeiffer. Some doubt must thus be cast on its strength as an explanation for the 
divergences effected in that case. 
However, there is no such problem in relation to the Australian tort choice of law rule for 
international torts as La Forest J's reliance on the "modern phenomenon of the movement of 
people, wealth and skills across state lines"299 to justify his adherence to the territoriality principle 
in Tolofson was endorsed by a majority of the High Court of Australia in Renault v Zhang. 300 
England: Part 111 of the 1995 Act 
In relation to the 1995 Act, it is important to note that the /ex fora was considered a threat to the 
Law Commissions' vision of a "united world, a global world"301 where litigants can bring their 
actions in any country they prefer for their own convenience subject to the satisfaction of the 
relevant jurisdictional rules. The rejection of the English common law double actionability can thus 
be interpreted as a move to encourage litigant mobility. 
Unlike the Canadian courts, the Law Commissions did not link litigant convenience to the 
promotion of appropriate circumstances for international commerce and trade. However, there is 
still an economic dimension to their analysis in that they are of the view that the removal of the lox 
fori would encourage more litigants to bring their actions in the English courts famous in the world 
for its procedures, impartial judges as well as its "considerable experience with many aspects of 
commercial litigation. "302 This is thus an indication that the invisible export argument as 
mentioned in Chapter 5 has been utilised by the Law Commissions in their deliberations on Part 
l// of the 1995 Act. This is not however an argument that can be inferred from the relevant 
Canadian and Australian cases. 
299 Neilson, supra, n. 3, at [ 100] per Gummow and Hayne JJ. 300 Renault, supra, n. 56, at [61]-[65]. 301 HL Paper 36 (1995), Part 1, at 72 per Lord Wilberforce. 302 Guthrie, supra, n. 138, at 222. 
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5.2 POLITICAL CONTEXT 
For tort choice of law, states or provinces in Australia and Canada have traditionally been 
regarded as independent sovereign jurisdictions with no distinction drawn between torts that 
occur in the inter-provincial sphere or in the international arena. In recent years, "a sense of 
... 
nationhood came somewhat belatedly to the... judiciary "303 in Canada and Australia and a view 
that a federation is ultimately "one country and one nation"304 emerged in the Australian and 
Canadian courts. In particular, the Phillips v Eyre rule was attacked for its "inappropriateness"305 
in tackling the issues and problems arising from intra-national tort disputes. No such view has 
however arisen in the English courts in relation to intra-UK disputes. 
It is clear from the above sub-sections that the Australian and Canadian courts are of the view 
that uniformity and territoriality should be adhered to in relation to their tort choice of law regimes 
for intra-national torts as states or provinces within these federations cannot be seen as foreign to 
one another. One can thus observe that the political context of these two countries have been 
employed in a general sense. 
At a different level, as the nature of the Australian and Canadian federation is established by their 
individual constitutions, their judiciaries have accorded some importance to specific constitutional 
provisions in their decision to reform their respective tort choice of law regimes for intra-national 
torts. One important example is the 'full faith and credit' clause. In Australia, federal jurisdiction 
has also been employed as a consideration in the formulation of the Australian tort choice of law 
rule. 
303 Davis, John Pfeiffer Pry Ltd v Rogerson: Choice of Law in Tort at the Dawning of the 21' Century (2000) 24 Melbourne University Law Review 982, at 990. 4 Breavington, supra, n. 117, at 78. 305 Pfeil er, supra. n. 50, at [ 109]. 
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5.2.1 Full faith and credit provision 
Australia 
The recognition that the Phillips v Eyre rule is not an appropriate borrowing from English law with 
regards to the inter-state context has led the Australian judiciary to embark on a search for 
principles to guide them in the creation of a suitable tort choice of law regime. One source of 
inspiration is section 118 of the Australian Constitution which provides that: "[f]ull faith and credit 
shall be given, throughout the Commonwealth, to the laws, the public Acts and records, and the 
judicial proceedings of every State. " 
In particular, the key question the High Court of Australia had to address in a number of cases 
was whether the 'full faith and credit' clause had a substantive effect on the Australian tort choice 
of law regime or whether it was procedural; merely "directing the courts of the several states and 
territories to take judicial notice of the laws, records and judgments of their sister states and 
territories. i306 In addition, if the answer is positive for the former, what is the exact nature of that 
substantive effect? In response to these questions, the Australian Justices are clearly divided on 
their answers. Accordingly, the purpose of this section is to highlight the different interpretations 
of this provision. 
a) Section 118 as procedural 
Those who view section 118 as procedural regard the provision as relevant only after the 
Australian tort choice of law rules have identified the applicable law. In the words of Dawson J in 
Breavington, the clause "affords no assistance where there is a choice to be made between 
conflicting laws. "307 It is only when that choice has been made that the 'full faith and credit' clause 
Nygh, Conflicts of Laws within a Federation: Anderson v Eric Anderson (Radio and TV) Pty. Ltd [1966] Australian Yearbook of International Law 35, at 40. 307 Breavington, supra, n. 117, at 150. 
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can be used to compel the forum to apply that law thus effectively removing from the forum, the 
residual power of public policy. 308 It is thus clear that this interpretation would give no role to the 
clause as an explanation for the Australian divergences except in relation to the rejection of a 
public policy exception to the tort choice of law rule in the inter-state context. 
b) Section 118 as substantive: territoriality 
Some Australian Justices disagree with the procedural interpretation of the 'full faith and credit' 
clause and have opted for one which "mandated a change to the common law choice of law 
rule"309 for inter-state torts. In particular, Deane J in Breavington observed that the Australian 
Constitution "divides legislative competence horizontally as between the Commonwealth and the 
states and vertically as between the states and the territories. "310 He then went on to state that 
integral to this constitutional scheme is section 118, which can be used to resolve conflict 
between state laws on the basis that "as between the States and in the absence of some 
overriding territorial nexus, legislative competence with respect to what happens within the 
territory of a particular State lies with that State. n311 Therefore, because of this provision, the laws 
made within one State must be recognised and applied in the courts of other States. It can thus 
be observed that section 118 has been used to establish a constitutional basis for Deane J's 
support of the territorial principle. 
Deane J's argument, however, is subject to a serious flaw. There is no requirement under 
Australian law that an Australian state must have a "predominant territorial nexus before it can 
legislate extraterritorially. "312 Instead, the reality is: under the Cross-vesting Act, Australian 
constitutional doctrine allows States "to extend the reach of their legislation to interstate activities 
and conduct even if the subject matter nexus is a remote and general one and even if the result is 
3" ibid. at 81 per Mason CJ. 709 Davis, supra, n. 303, at 991. 710 Nygh, Full Faith and Credit. A Constitutional Rule for Conflict Resolution (1991) 13 Sydney Law Review 415, at 422. 311 Breavington, supra, n. 117, at 137. 312 Nygh, supra, n. 310, at 430. 
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to subject persons to the conflicting laws of more than one state. "313 Consequently, his analysis 
holds no weight in the Australian federation context. It has thus been suggested that it is this 
"reasoning that persuaded a differently-constituted majority of the High Court to later abandon the 
lex loci delicti rulen314 in McKain and Stevens. 
In Pfeiffer v Rogerson, the lex loci delicti rule was reinstated and the question which now arises 
is: did Deane J's interpretation of section 118 play a part in the High Court's decision to diverge 
from the double actionability rule? Unfortunately, what emerged from the majority judgement in 
that case was a regurgitation of all the key interpretations of the section devoid of any clear 
indication as to the view that the High Court was in support of. On the one hand, the majority 
Justices commented that it "may well be"315 that section 118 is procedural. On the other hand, 
they stated that it "may also be that"376 section 118 suggests that: 
"[t]he constitutional balance which should be struck in cases of intranational tort 
claims is one which is focused more on the need for each State to acknowledge 
the predominantly territorial interest of each in what occurs within its territory. 017 
Ultimately, the High Court did not consider it "necessary "318 to resolve the uncertainty surrounding 
section 118 and its link with territoriality and therefore, this would indicate that the strength of this 
explanation for the divergences effected in Pfeiffer is doubtful, to say the least. 
c) Section 118 as substantive: uniformity of judicial outcomes 
In essence, Wilson and Gaudron JJ in Breavington agreed with Deane J that section 118 is 
substantive in nature and that it prevailed over State laws and legislatures. Their focus was not 
313 Walsh, supra, n. 179, at 106. 314 ibid. 
3: s Pfeifer, supra, n. 50, at [63]. 76 ibid, at [64]. 317 ibid. 
319 ibid at [65] 
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on territoriality. Instead they emphasised that the section necessitated the consequence that "one 
set of facts occurring in a State would be adjudged by only one body of law and thus give rise to 
only one legal consequence, regardless of where in the Commonwealth the matter fell for 
adjudication. . 319 In other words, they are of the view that section 118 provides a constitutional 
basis for the policy of ensuring the uniformity of judicial outcomes. 
Interestingly, in reinstating the double actionability rule in McKain v Miller, a new majority In the 
High Court chose to disregard uniformity as a guiding policy in Australian tort choice of law as 
they were of the view that the nature of the federation encouraged diversity instead. 
"Yet it is of the nature of the federation created by the Constitution that the States 
be distinct law areas whose laws may govern any subject matter subject to 
constitutional restrictions and qualifications. The laws of the States, though 
recognised throughout Australia, are therefore capable of creating disparities in 
the legal consequences attached in the respective States to the same set of 
facts. "32° 
Accordingly, section 118 was not seen as "eliminating the differential operation of State laws»321 
and thus could not be used to "prescribe the selection of the lex loci delicti 322 in the manner 
advocated by Wilson and Gaudron JJ. 
As the reaction of the High Court of Australia in Pfeiffer v Rogerson to this interpretation of 
section 118 can only be described as equivocal, it is simply unclear as to whether section 118 
can be considered the source for their support of the policy of ensuring uniformity of judicial 
outcomes within Australia. An Australian commentator has suggested that Wilson and Gaudron 
JJ's views on uniformity have: 
319 Breavingion, supra, n. 117, at 98. 320 McKain, supra, n. 48, at 36. 321 ibid. 
322 ibid. at 37. 
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"further developed so that it is no longer necessary to employ a direct 
constitutional command, supposedly discernible in the words of s 118 or other 
constitutional norms, in order to achieve the result that her Honour favours and to 
endorse her conception of unity. "323 
Canada 
It is important to note that even though there is no 'full faith and credit' clause in the Canadian 
Constitution, there is some discussion of the provision in Tolofson. In particular, the comments 
made on section 118 of the Australian Constitution in Breavington were referred to by La Forest 
J. He pointed out that even though the two jurisdictions adhere to different theories concerning 
their "constitutional arrangements, »324 the policies flowing from the High Court of Australia's 
interpretation of that clause are still relevant to the Canadian tort choice of law regime for inter- 
Provincial torts. Thereafter, he held that: 
"[t]he nature of our constitutional arrangements -a single country with different 
provinces exercising territorial legislative jurisdiction 
- 
would seem to me to 
support a rule that is certain and that ensures that an act committed in one part 
of this country will be given the same legal effect throughout the country. 325 
It can be observed that the focus of La Forest J's analysis is on the policies of certainty and 
uniformity as derived from the Australian interpretation of their 'full faith and credit' clause rather 
than the clause itself. 
323 Taylor, The Effect of the Constitution on the Common Law as Revealed by John Pfeiffer v Rogerson (2002) 30 Federal Law Review 69, at 88. 
324 Tololson, supra, n. 25, at [69]. 325 ibid, at [70]. 
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In addition, it must be noted that no provision of the Canadian Constitution was relied upon by La 
Forest J. In particular, when he went into the specifics of the Canadian Constitution, he was very 
"careful in his choice of words. "326 He highlighted the "largely unexplored nature "327 of the 
"interplay of choice of law rules and constitutional imperativesn328 and held that it was preferable 
not to engage in a comprehensive discussion of its role in informing his decision on Canadian tort 
choice of law rules. Instead, he felt that it was safer to "avoid devising a rule that may possibly 
raise intractable constitutional problems. n329 
Arguably, all this appears to indicate that La Forest J "may not be ready to entrench the lex loci 
delicti in the Constitution "330 as yet. He is only willing to permit "constitutional values to influence 
the development of the common law rather than allowing constitutional rights to determine (or 
disfigure) the content of the common law. "331 
5.2.2 Federal jurisdiction 
For all its importance to tort choice of law for inter-state torts, we must not ignore the fact that 
Pfeiffer V Rogerson was ultimately a case decided under the "distinct non common law concept of 
federal jurisdiction"332 where the "authority to adjudicate"333 is "derived from the [Australian] 
Constitution 
. 
334 and not from the states themselves. In such circumstances, the High Court has 
held that Australia is to be regarded as a single law area where jurisdiction is exercised in 
Australia and not in a State or Territory and does not entail any choice between the laws of 
competing jurisdictions. Taking all this into consideration, the High Court saw the application of 
the double actionability rule as "unusual"335 as it would result in the situation where the "outcome 
326 Castel, supra, n. 29, at 64. 32 Tolofson, supra, n. 25, at [71]. 328 Castel. supra, n. 29, at 64. 329 Tolofson. supra, n. 25, at [72]. 330 Castel, supra, n. 29, at 64. 331 Taylor, supra, n. 323, at 76. 132 Gummow J, Full Faith and Credit in Three Federations (1994-1995) 46 South Carolina Law Review 979, at 984. 377 ibid, at 985. 3" ibid. 
335 Pfeffer, supra. n. 50, at [59]. 
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of an action for tort may be affected significantly by where the court sits. "336 This is thus one 
reason why the Phillips v Eyre rule was rejected by the High Court of Australia in this case. 
At first sight, as litigation under such jurisdiction does not involve choice of law issues, federal 
jurisdiction would appear to be irrelevant as an explanation for the Australian divergence from the 
double actionability rule in relation to non-federal jurisdiction. On closer scrutiny of the judgment, 
however, one can observe that the High Court has provided for a link between federal and non- 
federal jurisdiction. In particular, the majority judges considered it undesirable to restrict the 
reconsideration of tort choice of law rules in federal jurisdiction as: 
"[o]rdinarily, the question whether a matter falls within federal jurisdiction will 
depend on the identity of the parties or their State of residence, not the events 
which are said to give rise to tortious liability. For example, the rights of a plaintiff 
who is struck by a motor vehicle should not differ according to whether it was 
driven by an employee of the Commonwealth or by a private individual. So, too, 
they should not differ according to whether it was driven by a person resident in 
the same State or by a person resident in a different State. n337 
In other words, as the High Court, "with justification, could see no reason for different approaches 
to be taken depending on whether a matter arose in federal or no federal jurisdiction, *338 the tort 
choice of law rules for non-federal jurisdiction were made to conform to the approach under 
federal jurisdiction. 
336 ibid. 
337 ibid, at [60]. 376 Davis, supra, n. 303, at 998. 
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5.2.3 Conclusions on the political context in Australia and Canada 
From the above sub-sections, it is submitted that Gary Davis is surely right to conclude that the 
"joint judgment refrains from providing a constitutional solution"339 and that by elimination, federal 
jurisdiction has become the "convenient linchpin for reforming the common law generally "340 in 
relation to Australian tort choice of law for inter-state torts. 
For Canada, no specific constitutional provision was utilised by Supreme Court of Canada in their 
formulation of the Canadian tort choice of law regime for inter-provincial torts. Arguably, the 
political context in Canada was employed only in a general sense to justify the weight attached to 
the concepts of territoriality and uniformity in their decision to depart from the English common 
law tort choice of law regime for intra-national torts. 
6. INTERACTION BETWEEN THE ABOVE EXPLANATIONS 
In this section, the interaction between the above policies, concepts and other wider 
considerations will be examined with specific reference to the tort choice of law rule and its 
exception. 
6.1 CANADA 
6.1.1 Tort choice of law rule 
There are a number of explanations for the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada to reject the 
English common law double actionability rule for a lex loci delicti rule. The lex fori limb of the 
English common law tort choice of law rule was seen as parochial and would thus be a violation 
of the territoriality principle as it enabled a court to define the nature and consequences of an act 
179 ibid. at 996. 30 ibid, at 998. 
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committed in another sovereign country. The application of this tort choice of law rule would not 
provide for uniformity, as judicial outcomes would be dependent on the forum that the action is 
brought in. The public policy objectives of the lex fori limb of the double actionability rule were 
also considered to be better met at the forum non conveniens stage. 
Removing the lex fori from the Canadian tort choice of law rule and retaining the lex loci delicti 
was thus seen as the solution to these problems. Furthermore, the lex loci delicti rule has the 
advantage of providing for certainty and predictability in judicial decisions. It also discourages 
forum shopping by ensuring uniformity of judicial outcomes. Litigant convenience would also be 
promoted under this rule. As a matter of comparative law, the Canadian courts were also 
influenced by the fact that many jurisdictions in the world apply a lex loci delicti rule. 
Why did the Canadian courts adhere to these policies and concepts? The answer to this question 
is dependent on whether the tort is committed on an inter-provincial or international basis. 
Inter-provincial context 
I. Underlying the Supreme Court of Canada's concern with territoriality and litigant 
convenience is the view that the Canadian tort choice of law regime should encourage 
the free movement of persons, wealth and skill across provinces. The economic rationale 
for encouraging litigant mobility is that with the rapid globalisation of the world economy, 
it is essential for Canadian private international law rules to reinforce the internal 
operations of Canada's economy so as to enhance its competitiveness in a global 
market. 
2. As Canada is a federation, adherence to a number of policies and concepts were thought 
to be necessary as a result of this political consideration. In particular, since Canada is 
effectively one country and one nation; it could not be said that its provinces are foreign 
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to one another, it was felt that an act committed in one part of this country should be 
given the same legal effect throughout the country. Furthermore, as each province in 
Canada exercises its own legislative jurisdiction, this meant that the different provincial 
courts have to respect the territorial limits imposed upon provincial legislative power by 
the Canadian Constitution. 
International context 
1. As Canada's political context is obviously irrelevant to the formulation of the Canadian 
tort choice of law rule for international torts, there must be a different reason for an 
adherence to the territoriality principle in this context. In particular, the Canadian courts 
were of the view that it is the concept of comity between nations that requires them to 
respect the exercise of territorial sovereignty of a particular state and not interfere with 
what that state chooses to do within its territorial limits. 
2. There is some indication that the Supreme Court of Canada was also concerned with 
encouraging the free movement of persons, wealth and skill outside of Canada to 
promote the growth of international trade and commerce in today's globalised economy. 
Accordingly, the use of the territoriality principle and the policy of encouraging litigant 
convenience in the formulation of the Canadian tort choice of law rule for international 
torts can be linked to this social and economic consideration. 
6.1.2 Exception to the tort choice of law rule 
As for the exception to the tort choice of law rule in Canada, in general, the Canadian courts were 
against the English common law exception as they felt that it provided for too much flexibility and 
thus uncertainty. To them, this would encourage forum shopping, as litigants are likely to make 
use of this exception to avoid the lex loci delicti. Furthermore, allowing the courts discretion to 
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apply a law other the lex loci delicti would be a violation of the territoriality principle as there is a 
danger that Canadian courts would utilise that exception whenever they disapproved of the lex 
loci delicti. 
Specifically, in relation to inter-provincial torts, no exception was provided for the lex loci delicti 
rule as the Supreme Court of Canada was of the view that a provincial court, in applying another 
law to the lex loci delicti, would be going against the limits imposed on that court by the Canadian 
Constitution. The strength of the territoriality principle here is thus based on Canada's political 
context. 
For international torts, as the territoriality principle in this context is now based on comity rather 
than the Canadian Constitution, an exception was held to be available to the lox loci delicti rule in 
exceptional circumstances. This was because the strict application of the lex loci delicti may give 
rise to injustice to the parties in some instances and if such situations should arise, the Canadian 
courts were of the view that considerations of justice should take precedence over comity. 
6.2 AUSTRALIA 
6.2.1 Tort choice of law rule 
The explanations provided for the Australia divergence from the English common law double 
actionability rule by the Australia courts are largely similar to that utilised by the Canadian courts 
in that policies and concepts such as judicial chauvinism, uniformity, forum shopping and 
territoriality were utilised by both courts to abandon the Phillips v Eyre rule for the lex loci delicti. 
The interaction between these considerations is similar in both countries as well. 
However, that is not to say that there are no differences whatsoever in the judicial treatment of 
the relevant considerations in these jurisdictions. First, territoriality was not an important 
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consideration in the decision of the High Court of Australia to provide for a lex loci delicti rule for 
inter-state torts. Secondly, the High Court of Australia does not appear to be concerned with 
promoting litigant convenience in the relevant cases. Thirdly, it is important to recall that renvol is 
part of the lex loci delicti rule in Australia while it is not yet the case in Canada. Arguably, this is 
because the Australian courts have attached significant weight to the policy of ensuring uniformity 
of judicial outcomes whereas in Canada, this has not been done. In addition, the reason for 
according such weight to uniformity in Australia was that the Australian courts wanted to 
discourage litigants from avoiding, not only the lex loci delicti but also the private international law 
rules of the place where the tort was committed. There is no indication in the Canadian courts 
that they intend to stop the activities of such forum shoppers. 
What are some of the reasons for the above policy decisions by the Australian courts? 
Inter-state torts 
1. For inter-state torts, there is some indication that the policy of ensuring uniformity of 
judicial decisions was adhered to by the High Court of Australia in order to encourage the 
free movement of persons, goods and services within the Australian federation. However, 
as this argument is utilised by only one Justice in the case of Pfeiffer v Rogerson, its 
strength is questionable. The rest of the Justices in that case have stated that the policy 
of uniformity is linked directly to the fact that Australia is a federation; that the very nature 
of Australia's political context requires an act committed in one Australian State or 
Territory be given the same legal effect throughout the country. 
2. Another point to note is that the territoriality principle does not hold much weight in the 
jurisprudence of the Australian courts for inter-state torts as the Australian Cross Vesting 
Acts has resulted in a situation where sovereignty is shared between the federal, State 
and Territory law areas. In comparison, the territoriality principle is accorded significant 
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strength in relation to the Canadian tort choice of law rule as each province in Canada 
has its own legislative sovereignty. 
International context 
As for international torts, the territoriality principle can be utilised by the High Court of Australia in 
their decision to adopt the lex loci delicti rule as it is based on comity between nations. For the 
policy of ensuring uniformity of judicial outcomes, the Australian courts have indicated that this is 
to encourage litigant mobility as a global phenomenon. 
One can observe that the interaction between these considerations is the same as that in the 
relevant Canadian cases. One reason for this situation is that the Australian courts were heavily 
influenced by the judgment of La Forest J in Tolofson v Jensen in their decision to adopt the lex 
loci delicti rule in the case of Renault v Zhang. 
6.2.2 Exception to the tort choice of law rule 
On the exception to the tort choice of law rule, it is again a strong preference for certainty instead 
of flexibility that has led the Australian courts to reject the English common law flexible exception 
for both inter-state and international torts. Similar to the Canadian reasoning, it is because they 
were of the view that flexibility would encourage forum shoppers to manipulate the factual matrix 
so as to avoid the application of the lex loci delicti. Another reason why the exception was 
rejected in Australia is that the concerns requiring the application of a law other than the lex loci 
delicti were thought to be better considered at the stage of any application for a stay of 
proceedings. Interestingly, there was no mention of the territoriality principle in the discussion of 
the High Court of Australia on the exception. 
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Specifically, for international torts, even though injustice may be the result of the application of the 
! ex loci delicti in exceptional cases, the Australian courts do not appear to be concerned with this 
consequence. Their focus is on the problem on forum shopping as stated above. Therefore, 
unlike the Canadian tort choice of law regime, there is no injustice exception available to the lex 
loci delicti rule. 
6.3 ENGLAND: PART Ill OF THE 1995 ACT 
6.3.1 Tort choice of law rule 
In relation to the 1995 Act, the Law Commissions, the Special Public Bill Committee and the UK 
Government were of the view that the English common law double actionability rule should be 
rejected as it is parochial and would not do equal justice between claimants and defendants. 
Furthermore, there is little point to the retention of the lex for! in the English common law tort 
choice of law rule as claimants can simply obtain a judgment in another European country and 
reap the benefit of automatic recognition and enforcement in the English courts under the 
Brussels I Regulation. 
As for the decision to apply the law of the place where the tort was committed, it was said that 
this rule would provide for certainty and choice of law justice. It would also promote litigant 
convenience and ensure that the most appropriate law would be identified in most cases. Another 
consideration is that most European jurisdictions have such a tort choice of law rule as well. As 
the drafters of the 1995 Act have not attached much weight to the policy of ensuring uniformity of 
judicial outcomes, they have not gone as far as the Australian courts in declaring that renvol is 
part of their tort choice of law rule. 
One reason why the Law Commissions saw a need to promote litigant convenience was that they 
wanted to encourage litigant mobility. There is also an economic dimension to this decision in that 
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the removal of the lex fori limb of the double actionability rule would encourage more litigants to 
bring their actions in the English courts. There is thus some indication of the invisible export 
argument in this context. 
6.3.2 Exception to the tort choice of law rule 
As for the section 12 exception in the 1995 Act, the Law Commissions were of the view that a 
balance should be struck between certainty and flexibility in order to locate the most appropriate 
law to the tortious disputes. If the lex loci delicti is incapable of generating such a result, the 
exception with its flexibility would be applied to do so. This is in sharp contrast to the Canadian 
and Australian courts as their focus is clearly not on obtaining justice in the individual case. 
Instead, it is to discourage forum shopping. 
6.4 SINGAPORE 
No explanation was provided by the Singapore courts for their decision to adopt the Phillips v 
Eyre rule and the flexible exception. It is likely that the reason for this uniformity with the English 
common law tort choice of law regime is a strong adherence by the Singapore courts to English 
judicial solutions. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
As was the case in Chapter 5, we have sought to establish in this chapter that the break up of 
Commonwealth private international law in relation to tort choice of law in our selected 
jurisdictions is the result of differences across these countries on the treatment of policies, 
concepts and other wider considerations. In particular, the following are the differences we have 
brought out from our analysis in this chapter. They are as follows: 
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1. As the objective of the English statutory tort choice of law regime is to identify the most 
appropriate law to apply to cross border tortious disputes, a compromise between certainty 
and flexibility was seen as necessary. Australia and Canada, in contrast, consider the 
purpose of their tort choice of law schemes to be the generation of certainty for litigants. 
2. In general, the judiciaries and legislators in our selected jurisdictions see a need for a shift 
from judicial chauvinism and this has led to them to conclude that the English common law 
double actionability rule, in particular its lex fori limb should be abandoned. Only the Law 
Commissions attempted a positive definition of choice of law justice in their adoption of the 
lex loci delicti. No such concept was employed by the Australian and Canadian courts. 
3. One powerful critique of the double actionability rule is that it is biased against the claimant 
as he has to satisfy the requirements of the lex for! and the lex loci delicti before he can 
succeed in his claim. The defendant need only rely on the defences of either law to avoid 
liability. Furthermore, in circumstances where the lex fors does not impose any liability for the 
harm done against him, the claimant will be forced to travel to another jurisdiction in order to 
bring an successful action against the wrongdoer. This inconvenience Is considered by the 
Law Commissions to be an injustice to the claimant and it thus forms an important 
explanation for the rejection of the English common law double actionability rule in relation to 
the 1995 Act. In contrast, there was no reliance on this line of reasoning in the Australian 
and Canadian rejection of the double actionability rule. 
4. The Canadian and Australian judiciaries are of the view that their tort choice of law regimes 
should give effect to the policy of ensuring the uniformity of judicial outcomes and the lex loci 
delicti is seen as the best rule to give effect to this policy. However, the Australian courts 
appear to have attached greater weight to uniformity in comparison to the Canadian courts. 
In particular, the Canadian courts have not gone as far as to say that they want to decide a 
tortious dispute as if it is decided in the foreign court. In contrast, the Law Commissions have 
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stated that it is extremely difficult to attain uniformity of judicial outcomes particularly in the 
international context. Accordingly, this policy was only a mere consideration in the decision 
of the Law Commissions to provide for a lex loci delicti rule. 
5. The Law Commissions have advocated a departure from the double actionability rule to 
encourage litigant convenience. This would also have the effect of encouraging forum 
shopping based on a jurisdiction's legal climate and procedures as opposed to its choice of 
law rules. The Supreme Court of Canada has adopted the lex loci delicti for these reasons 
as well. It is however not a consideration in the relevant decisions of the High Court of 
Australia. Instead, the Australian courts were concerned with forum shoppers aiming to avoid 
the private international law rules of the forum where the tort is committed. Renvoi was thus 
introduced to prevent such activity by litigants. As for the exception to the tort choice of law 
rule, one reason why the flexible exception was rejected by the Australian and Canadian 
courts is that they were of the view that it would encourage forum shopping. The Law 
Commissions and the English courts, on the other hand do not share such a view. 
6. As a result of their analysis of the purpose of substantive tort law in relation to torts involving 
personal injury, death and property damage, the Law Commissions provided for a place of 
harm rule to identify the place of commission of these torts. As there is no such examination 
of domestic tort law in our selected judiciaries, no such rule was provided. 
7. Unlike the English statutory tort choice of law regime, Canadian tort choice of law was 
constructed with territoriality and comity as its key theoretical foundations. The High Court of 
Australia has been heavily influenced by the views of La Forest J in Tolofson particularly in 
relation in international torts and has reformed its tort choice of law regime on similar terms. 
It follows that the similarities between the Australian and Canadian tort choice of law regimes 
for international torts can be attributed to their adherence to territoriality. 
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8. Most of the jurisdictions selected for this study have considered other areas of private 
international law in the formulation of their tort choice of law regimes. In particular, the 
Canadian and Australian judiciaries are of the view that the purposes behind the /ex fori limb 
of the double actionability rule are better met at the forum non conveniens stage. In contrast, 
there has been no mention of this consideration by the Law Commissions and the English 
courts. Instead, the Law Commissions do not see much point to the retention of the lex for! 
limb under the English common law double actionability rule as claimants can avoid its 
operation under the European rules on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. 
This is obviously irrelevant to the Australian and Canadian courts. 
9. Canada's initial adoption of the English common law tort choice of law approach can be 
attributed to an adherence to English judicial precedents and solutions. Interestingly, the 
Australian courts are more independent early on in the evolution of their tort choice of law 
regime, as can be seen from their criticism of the Machado Interpretation of Phillips v Eyre 
rule at the beginning of the last century. In recent years, a critical analysis of the Phillips v 
Eyre rule was undertaken by the courts in Australia and Canada as they recognised that 
English judicial solutions may not be appropriate for their individual circumstances, values 
and needs. This eventually led to the rejection of the double actionability rule In these 
countries. As for the Singapore tort choice of law regime, there is still a strong adherence to 
English judicial precedents with the Singapore court's adoption of the Phillips v Eyre rule and 
the flexible exception. 
10. Judges and legislators of our selected jurisdictions have sought guidance from other 
countries in the formulation of their tort choice of law regimes. For example, they were 
influenced by the fact that most countries are using the lex loci delicti as their tort choice of 
law rule in their decisions to diverge from the English common law double actionability rule. 
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11. Generally, one explanation for the adoption of the lex loci delicti rule by the Australian courts 
and the Canadian courts is that they are of the view that tort choice of law regimes should 
help facilitate the free movement of goods, wealth and skills across state lines in order to 
promote suitable conditions for international commerce and trade. 
12. It is clear that the political nature of the Australian and Canadian federation has been utilised 
in a general sense by the judiciaries of these countries in the relevant cases on tort choice of 
law. Specifically, for Australia, despite the apparent use of the full faith and credit clause, 
closer scrutiny of the judgments have revealed the ambivalence of the Australian courts 
towards this provision. Instead, it is the concept of federal jurisdiction that has influenced 
them in their decision on the tort choice of law rule for inter-state torts. In contrast, no 
specific constitutional provision was utilised by the Supreme Court of Canada in the 
formulation of their tort choice of law rules for inter-provincial cases. 
13. From the list of explanations laid out above, it is possible to see which of these policies and 
concepts were emphasised or omitted in the individual jurisdictions. One must remember 
that there is a whole range of influences on the decisions to diverge from or converge with 
the English common law tort choice of law regime and it is the fact that some explanations 
are used in one jurisdiction and not in others and that the adherence to some of these 
policies are of varying strengths in the different jurisdictions which has given rise to the many 
tort choice of law divergences in our study. 
a. For Singapore, English judicial precedent still exerts a powerful influence on her tort 
choice of law regime. This is thus the primary explanation for her uniformity with the 
English common law tort choice of law scheme. 
b. With regards to Canada, a number of policies and concepts namely discouraging 
judicial chauvinism, preventing forum shopping, ensuring uniformity of judicial 
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outcomes, legal certainty and the territoriality principle have been influential on the 
Supreme Court of Canada's reform of the Canadian tort choice of law regime. 
Generally, in the view of the Canadian courts, adherence to these considerations is 
necessary to facilitate litigant mobility and convenience especially in the inter- 
provincial context so as to boost the internal efficiency of the Canadian economy. It 
is also to respect the concept of comity between nations. Specifically for inter- 
provincial torts, the Canadian courts have held that these policies and concepts are 
essential as Canada is a federation. 
C. As for Australia, the policies and concepts employed by the Canadian courts were 
also relied upon by the Australian courts in their decisions on tort choice of law. 
However, there are some differences between the treatment of these considerations 
by the courts of these two jurisdictions. First, territoriality was not accorded much 
weight in the decisions of the High Court of Australia to provide for a lex loci delicti 
rule for inter-state torts. Secondly, the Australian courts do not appear to be 
concerned with litigant convenience. Thirdly, there is a stronger adherence to the 
policy of uniformity in the Australian courts in comparison to the Canadian position 
and this has led the High Court of Australia to provide for renvol as part of the 
Australian tort choice of law rule. In general, these policy decisions were made by 
the Australian courts to encourage the free movement of persons, wealth and skills 
to facilitate international trade and commerce and for comity between nations to be 
respected. Similar to the Canadian position, the nature of the Australian federation 
has been influential on the relevant Australian decisions on inter-state torts. 
However, as the prevailing Australian constitutional doctrine provides for the sharing 
of sovereignty between federal, State and Territory law areas, the territoriality 
principle does not hold much weight for inter-state torts. This is in contrast to 
Canada where each province has its own legislative sovereignty. 
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d. Similarly, the drafters of the 1995 Act were concerned with the policies of 
discouraging judicial chauvinism, promoting litigant convenience, ensuring equal 
justice between litigants and doing choice of law justice. It is interesting to note that 
territoriality and uniformity were not given much weight in their deliberations, unlike 
the position in Canada and Australia. In addition, there is a focus in the 1995 Act on 
identifying the most appropriate applicable law for the tortious dispute in question by 
striking a balance between certainty and flexibility. In contrast, the emphasis in 
Australia and Canada is on ensuring legal certainty for litigants. In the view of the 
Law Commissions, these policies and concepts are considered necessary for the 
promotion of litigant mobility so as encourage more litigants to bring their actions in 
the English courts as an invisible export. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUDING REMARKS FOR PART 11 
In Part I of this thesis, we established that there has been a break up of Commonwealth 
private international law in relation to tort choice of law and forum non conveniens and that 
interestingly, the nature and extent of this phenomenon is not the same between these two 
areas of private international law. The purpose of Part II of this study is to work out from the 
relevant cases in England, Australia, Canada and Singapore the explanations for this 
phenomenon. 
At a general level, as was brought out from our analysis in Chapters 5 and 6, one key 
explanation for the break up of Commonwealth tort choice of law and forum non conveniens 
in our selected jurisdictions is that there are differences in the judicial treatment of policies 
and other wider considerations relevant to these areas of private international law in our 
selected jurisdictions and this has led to the divergences established in Part I of this thesis. 
As regards our specific findings in Chapters 5 and 6, it is possible to analyse them at two 
different levels. First, we can compare and contrast the individual considerations utilised by 
our selected judiciaries in relation to forum non conveniens and that for tort choice of law. For 
example, we can examine whether the utilisation of the policy of discouraging forum shopping 
in relation to tort choice of law is the same as that for forum non conveniens in each of our 
selected jurisdictions. Secondly, we can make a general comparison of these considerations 
as a whole between our selected areas of private international law. To illustrate, we can 
determine whether our selected judiciaries are generally in agreement on the relevant policies 
and concepts for forum non conveniens and tort choice of law. 
Comparing the individual considerations utilised by our selected jurisdictions for 
forum non conveniens and tort choice of law 
Examining the considerations utilised by our selected judiciaries in their decisions on forum 
non conveniens and tort choice of law, it is clear that some of these matters are peculiar to 
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the area of private international law that we are looking at. For example, substantive tort law 
is a consideration unique to tort choice of law. Likewise, the litigant's right of access to the 
courts is only examined in relation to forum non conveniens. Nevertheless, there are factors 
common to both of our selected areas of private international law such as judicial chauvinism, 
forum shopping, certainty, flexibility, equal justice, comity and the federation context. 
Comparing the judicial treatment of these individual considerations for tort choice of law with 
that in relation to forum non conveniens for each of our selected jurisdictions, it is interesting 
to note that our selected judiciaries have not been consistent on this point. To elaborate: 
1. For Australia, one reason for the rejection of the English common law double 
actionability rule was that the lex fori limb of that tort choice of law rule was 
considered parochial. In comparison, for the formulation of the Australian doctrine of 
forum non conveniens, the High Court of Australia chose not to accord much weight 
to this consideration thus providing for a 'clearly inappropriate forum' test that is 
premised on the concepts of 'oppression' and 'vexation. ' In Singapore, the 
endorsement of the English common law'clearly more appropriate forum' test was to 
reduce judicial chauvinism but in relation to tort choice of law, no criticism that the 
first limb of the English common law Phillips v Eyre rule was parochial, was made by 
the Singapore courts. The Canadian courts, on the other hand, have been consistent 
in treating the policy of discouraging judicial chauvinism as an important 
consideration for both our selected areas of private international law. 
2. The Australian courts refused to adopt the English common law 'clearly more 
appropriate forum' test as they were of the view that it was too uncertain. Similarly, 
certainty was accorded considerable strength in relation to the Australian tort choice 
of law regime particularly in the decision of the Australian courts not to have an 
exception to the Australian tort choice of law rule for intra-national torts and only a 
very limited exception for international torts. The Canadian courts, on the other hand 
were in favour of flexibility for their doctrine of forum non conveniens with their 
rejection of the Spiliada structure. In contrast, huge emphasis was placed on certainty 
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and predictability in relation to their tort choice of law regimes. This resulted in 
exceptions to the Canadian tort choice of law rule which are similar to that under the 
Australian position. No discussion of the certainty vs. flexibility debate for these two 
areas of private international law was made in the Singapore courts. 
3. Discouraging forum shopping is an important policy utilised by the Canadian courts in 
their decisions on forum non conveniens and tort choice of law. For Australia, 
enormous weight was attached to this policy in relation to their tort choice of law 
regime particularly in the decision of the High Court of Australia to provide for renvoi 
as part of their /ex loci delicti rule. Interestingly, their doctrine of forum non 
conveniens has the opposite effect of encouraging forum shopping due to its 
emphasis on the inappropriateness of the local forum. Reducing forum shopping was 
a reason for the Singapore court's adoption of the 'clearly more appropriate forum' 
test but this policy was not looked at in relation to their decision to endorse the 
English common law tort choice of law regime. 
4. For the doctrine of forum non conveniens in Canada, the policy of doing equal justice 
between claimants and defendant was one of the explanations for the adoption of the 
'clearly more appropriate forum' test by the Supreme Court of Canada. However, this 
policy was not examined by the Canadian courts in relation to their tort choice of law 
regime. The Australian doctrine of forum non conveniens is clearly in favour of the 
claimant as the claimant's right of access to the Australian courts has been accorded 
significant weight. However, for the Australian tort choice of law regime, equal justice 
was one reason cited by some members of the High Court of Australia for the 
inclusion of renvoi as part of their tort choice of law rule. The Singapore courts have 
not examined this concept in relation to their doctrine of forum non conveniens as 
well as their tort choice of law regime. 
5. The Australian courts have utilised the concept of comity as an explanation for why 
territoriality should be respected in relation to their tort choice of law rules for 
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international torts. Strangely, for forum non conveniens, some members of the High 
Court of Australia were of the view that comity between nations is just an ideal and 
not a practical reality. For Canada, comity was adopted by the Supreme Court of 
Canada as the theoretical basis for Canadian private international law. This is why 
the concept was an important consideration in the Canadian decisions on forum non 
conveniens and tort choice of law. As for Singapore, while adherence to judicial 
comity is one explanation for the adoption of the 'clearly more appropriate forum' test 
by the Singaporean courts, this concept was not examined in relation to the 
Singapore tort choice of law regime. 
6. For Canada's tort choice of law regime, the political nature of the Canadian federation 
has led their courts to provide for a distinction between intra-national and 
international torts. This is however not the case for their doctrine of forum non 
conveniens. In contrast, such a distinction has been drawn in relation to both these 
areas of private international law in Australia as a result of this political consideration. 
It is quite clear from the above comparison that our selected Commonwealth judiciaries have 
not been consistent in their treatment of considerations relevant to private international law as 
a whole across the different stages of the conflict of laws process. One policy may be an 
important consideration in the decision of a Commonwealth court in relation to their doctrine 
of forum non conveniens but it may then be ignored with regards to tort choice of law. Why is 
this so? 
One explanation is that Commonwealth courts tend to decide on the policies, concepts and 
circumstances relevant to a particular area of private international law in isolation with little 
examination of the considerations underlying an earlier stage of the conflict of laws process. 
Of our selected jurisdictions, only the Canadian courts have made some attempt at providing 
some congruity between the policies adhered to in relation to their doctrine of forum non 
convenfens and tort choice of law regime particularly in their decision to provide for comity as 
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a unifying element for their private international law rules. The Australian and Singapore 
courts have clearly not done so explicitly in relevant cases. 
Another possible explanation is that some of our selected Commonwealth courts may have 
implicitly provided for some form of balance between the considerations in different areas of 
conflict of laws such that if a policy is attached little weight in one area of private international 
law, considerable weight may be accorded to it in another area of private international law. 
For example, Briggs has suggested that the reason for the introduction of renvoi to the 
Australian tort choice of law regime was because the High Court of Australia has "sharply 
curtailed its power to prevent forum shopping"' in relation to the Australian doctrine of forum 
non conveniens which "leaves little in the court's armoury to prevent a claimant forum 
shopping (i. e. inappropriately bringing) his or her claim in tort to an Australian court 
. 
"2 In order 
for an Australian court to discourage such litigant behaviour in relation to cross-border tort 
disputes, they have to "dispose of a claim arising out of a foreign tort as nearly as possible to 
the manner in which a judge at the locus delicti would have adjudicated it"3 as this would 
make forum shopping pointless. In other words, as little weight was attached to the policy of 
discouraging forum shopping in relation to the Australian doctrine of forum non conveniens, 
the Australian courts had to accord this policy with considerable significance with regards to 
their tort choice of law regime. 
Comparing the judicial treatment of considerations relevant to forum non convenlens 
in general with that in relation to tort choice of law 
Moving on the reasons for the differences between the nature and extent of the break up of 
Commonwealth tort choice of law in our selected jurisdictions from that in relation to forum 
non conveniens, from our analysis in Chapters 5 and 6, it is clear that there are differences 
between the judicial treatment of considerations in relation to tort choice of law in our selected 
Briggs, The Meaning and Proof of Foreign Law: Neilson v Overseas Projects [2006] Uoyds Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 1, at 2. 2 ibid, at 3. 3 ibid. 
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jurisdictions as a whole in comparison to that with regards to forum non conveniens. In 
particular: 
1. For forum non conveniens, as the Canadian and Singaporean courts are generally in 
agreement with the English judiciaries on most of the policies, concepts and other 
wider considerations relevant to this area of private international law, they have 
adopted the English common law 'clearly more appropriate forum' test. While there 
are some differences in the judicial treatment of these considerations between these 
countries, they were not significant enough to convince the Canadian and 
Singaporean judges to reject the 'clearly more appropriate forum' test altogether. 
Instead, the divergences effected by these judiciaries were limited to various aspects 
of the English common law approach. The Australian courts, on the other hand are 
largely opposed to the policy choices made by the English courts thus leading them 
to adopt the 'clearly inappropriate forum' test. 
In contrast, there is more diversity in the judicial treatment of policies and other wider 
considerations relevant to tort choice of law regimes in our selected jurisdictions. In 
particular, the Australian and Canadian judiciaries as well as the Law Commissions in 
the United Kingdom do not agree with the policies and considerations embodied by 
the English common law tort choice of law regime and have thus provided for 
diverging approaches to reflect their differences of opinion. Neither do they agree 
entirely with one another on these matters. Interestingly, the Singapore courts do not 
appear to have considered the policies and concepts underlying the English common 
law tort choice of law regime. Their decision to maintain uniformity with the English 
common law seems to be based on a strong adherence to English judicial 
precedents. 
Accordingly, one can observe that it is because of a sharper diversity of views in our 
selected jurisdictions in relation to the considerations relevant to a tort choice of law 
regime that the break up of this area of Commonwealth private international law has 
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occurred to such a large extent. In comparison, as there are two Commonwealth 
judiciaries namely, the Canadian and Singaporean courts that are in agreement with 
the English courts on most of the considerations relevant to the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens, the break up of this area of private international law in relation to our 
selected jurisdictions has not been as comprehensive as the phenomenon in relation 
to tort choice of law. 
2. In Part I of this thesis, we observed that fluctuations in the extent of the divergences 
from the English common law position on tort choice of law have occurred in relation 
to our selected jurisdictions, most notably Australia. Looking at the policies and 
concepts that have influenced the decisions of the courts of these countries while 
these movements in their tort choice of law regimes are taking place, it is possible to 
see that the judicial treatment of these considerations in our selected jurisdictions 
have changed as time goes by. 
To illustrate this point, take for example, the evolution of the Australian tort choice of 
law regime. In Breavington v Godleman, the policy of ensuring uniformity of judicial 
outcomes especially in a federation context was an important consideration in the 
decision of a majority of the High Court of Australia to reject the Phillips v Eyre rule 
thus bringing about a divergence from the English common law position on tort 
choice of law. Subsequently, in Mckain v Miller however, the majority Justices in that 
case held that disparities in legal outcomes depending on the State or Territory In 
Australia that the action is brought in is the hallmark of a federation. Accordingly, the 
policy of uniformity was not seen as an obstacle to the reinstatement of the double 
actionability rule. In Pfeiffer v Rogerson, uniformity was again accorded significant 
weight in the reasoning of the High Court of Australia, a decision that flowed from the 
nature of the Australian federation. This has thus led to another rejection of the 
English common law Phillips v Eyre rule in Australia for intra-national torts. 
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As for forum non conveniens, there has been little movement back towards the 
English common law after the initial divergences from the English common law 
doctrine of forum non conveniens in our selected jurisdictions. In comparison with the 
situation for tort choice of law, it is notable that the judiciaries in these countries have 
not differed much on their treatment of policies and wider considerations relevant to 
the grant of a stay of proceedings as time goes by. 
3. Generally, for most of the last century, there was a strong adherence to English 
judicial precedents in our selected jurisdictions in that English common law private 
international law approaches were adopted by the judiciaries in these countries with 
little or no discussion of relevant policies, concepts and other wider considerations. 
Forum non conveniens is a good example of this and this is thus one reason why the 
break up of this area of private international law as we have pointed out in Part I of 
this thesis is a recent occurrence. 
For tort choice of law however, while the relevant English judicial precedents were 
mostly followed by the Canadian and Singaporean courts, this was not the case for 
Australia. In particular, even though the English common law Phillips v Eyre rule was 
endorsed by the High Court of Australia, we have seen that they were unhappy with 
the Machado interpretation of that rule early on in the development of their tort choice 
of law regime. Most notably, they were of the view that that interpretation went 
against the territoriality principle. This, as was highlighted in Chapter 6, may have led 
them to interpret the Phillips v Eyre rule as a double actionability rule before the 
House of Lords in Boys v Chaplin. In other words, as early as the beginning of the 
last century, the High Court of Australia was already in divergence from the English 
courts on some of the policies and concepts relevant to a tort choice of law regime. 
This is thus an explanation why the break up of Commonwealth tort choice of law had 
occurred at such an early point in time in comparison to the phenomenon for forum 
non conveniens 
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We have now provided for an analysis of the break up of Commonwealth private international 
law in relation to forum non conveniens and tort choice of law with regards to our selected 
jurisdictions as well as the explanations from the cases for this occurrence. In the final part of 
this thesis, we will examine the question of how these Commonwealth countries should react 
to this phenomenon. 
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PART III: HOW SHOULD OUR SELECTED JURISDICTIONS REACT TO 
THE BREAK UP OF COMMONWEALTH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW? 
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CHAPTER 8: HOW SHOULD OUR SELECTED JURISDICTIONS REACT TO THE 
BREAK UP OF COMMONWEALTH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
RELATION TO FORUM NON CONVEN/ENS AND TORT CHOICE OF LAW? 
1. INTRODUCTION 
From our analysis in Part I of this thesis, it is clear that Australia and Canada have contributed 
towards the break up of Commonwealth private international law in relation to forum non 
conveniens and tort choice of law as their judges have effected a considerable number of 
divergences from the relevant English common law positions on these matters. In striking 
contrast, there is uniformity with the English common law approaches on these areas of 
private international law in Singapore. 
In Part II, we observed that in recent years, the Australian and Canadian judges have become 
increasingly aware of the limitations of the English common law approaches on forum non 
conveniens and tort choice of law in that these tests were given in a context far removed from 
the social, economic and political circumstances in Australia and Canada. In response, they 
have undertaken a critical analysis of the policies, concepts and principles relevant to these 
areas of private international law to determine which of these considerations are most 
appropriate for their individual circumstances. As some of these policy decisions do not 
concur with that of the English courts, this has resulted in either the modification of the 
English common law private international law approach in question or its rejection altogether. 
In other words, it is the differences in the judicial treatment of policy, structural, historical, 
comparative and contextual considerations in these Commonwealth jurisdictions from that of 
the English courts that has resulted in the Australian and Canadian divergences from the 
English common law doctrine of forum non conveniens and tort choice of law. The Singapore 
courts, in contrast, are still heavily influenced by English judicial precedents particularly In 
relation to their tort choice of law regime. This is the reason why they have continued to apply 
the English common law approaches on our selected areas of private international law. 
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In this chapter, we will address the final question for this thesis namely: how should our 
selected Commonwealth jurisdictions respond to the break up of Commonwealth private 
international law in relation to forum non conveniens and tort choice of law. To examine this 
issue in a structured and analytical manner, we will first undertake a critical examination of the 
key arguments in the diversity versus harmonisation debate. Subsequently, we will ask 
whether there should be some form of harmonisation of forum non conveniens and tort choice 
of law for our selected countries on a worldwide, regional or Commonwealth basis or whether 
the national development of these areas of private international law in these jurisdictions 
should be encouraged. 
2. DIVERSITY VERSUS HARMONISA TION 
We will now examine the key arguments in the debate between the advocates of diversity and 
those of harmonisation, in the field of private international law. It is Important to note that our 
analysis here is of general application to all Commonwealth jurisdictions and in some 
circumstances, all countries regardless of their legal systems. Nonetheless, to illustrate the 
relevance of these arguments to the subject matter of our thesis, specific reference will be 
made to the forum non conveniens and tort choice of law approaches in our selected 
Commonwealth jurisdictions when appropriate. 
2.1 DIVERSITY 
2.1.1 Arguments in support of diversity in Commonwealth private International law 
First, the initial uniformity in Commonwealth common law was the result of a "slavish 
adherence to [English judicial] precedents"' by Commonwealth judges. These judicial 
solutions were fashioned by English judges who had no familiarity with the conditions in these 
jurisdictions. In those early days, the English courts were probably unconcerned with 
identifying the most appropriate legal rules for all Commonwealth jurisdictions; it is much 
1 Hiller, The Law-Creative Role of Appellate Courts in the Commonwealth (1978) 27 International nd Comparative Legal Quarterly 85, at 104. 
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more likely that they were only concerned with formulating the best approaches for England. 
This is the case in our comparative study as the 'clearly more appropriate' forum test for 
granting a stay of proceedings and the Phillips v Eyre tort choice of law rule were devised by 
English judges with no consideration whatsoever of the circumstances in Australia, Canada 
and Singapore. And so the argument arises that a more critical judicial examination of the 
Commonwealth jurisdictions' unique social, economic and political circumstances would have 
the advantage of ensuring more optimal approaches for that Commonwealth jurisdiction in 
question. This is because "local judges with their fingers on [that] jurisdiction's pulse are in the 
best position to make informed decisions as to the most appropriate direction for the common 
law in that particular jurisdiction. "2 
One important point to note is that even though there has been a more critical examination of 
policies and circumstances relevant to their own jurisdictions by the judiciaries in Australia 
and Canada in relation to the formulation of their approaches on forum non conveniens and 
tort choice of law, it is not possible to say with complete certainty that the tests that they 
devised are necessarily the best for their jurisdiction even though these judges are obviously 
well placed to decide on them. For instance, it is questionable whether the 'clearly 
inappropriate forum' test is suitable for Australia particularly in today's "contemporary 
circumstances of global and regional disputes in which Australian courts, like those of every 
country, must now operate. "3 However, it should be noted that Australian law on stays of 
proceedings is still evolving as can be seen from the recent rejection of the Voth test by the 
High Court of Australia in relation to the Cross-vesting Act. Perhaps, in the near future, there 
will be a modification of the Australian doctrine of forum non conveniens to take account of 
Australia's position in the global economy. It should also be noted that Commonwealth judges 
are still in a better position to decide on the formulation of their own private international law 
approaches in comparison to the English judges. 
Secondly, it has been observed that "Courts across the Commonwealth now look not just to 
England but inter se, for guidance, and indeed from time to time the English courts 
2 Clarke, The Privy Council, Politics and Precedent in the Asia-Pacific Region (1990) 39 International and Comparative Legal Quarterly 741, at 746. My italics. 3 Renault v Zhang (2002) 187 ALR 1, at [96] per Kirby J. 
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themselves look overseas for guidance as to the true state of the common law of England, 
even where persuasive English authority exists. "4 As such, from a Commonwealth wide 
perspective, diversity in Commonwealth common law encourages a "plurality of 
approach[es]"5 to deal with difficult legal issues which can be a "positive benefit"6 to the 
common law as a whole. Indeed, it has been said that the "discovery of new and better ways 
of solving legal problems"7 will always attract the "interest and admiration"8 of other 
jurisdictions. 
To elaborate, when there are no domestic authorities directing them on complex issues in the 
common law, Commonwealth courts can rely on judicial precedents in other Commonwealth 
countries where such issues have been "sharpened for decision by the reasoning and sense 
of values of Courts and writers who have already broken the ground a9 The High Court of 
Australia's reliance on the Supreme Court of Canada's decision on tort choice of law in 
Tolofson to adopt the lox loci delicti rule is one example of this. Even "when there are 
domestic solutions but these are old and unsatisfactory in dealing with contemporary 
problems, "10 courts can refer to experiences in these foreign Commonwealth jurisdictions to 
adopt a more modern approach. This is especially so in cases where Commonwealth 
"countries have in a sense become specialists in certain areas of the (common) law. "" The 
content of these laws would "set the standard for development"12 and would thus be "available 
for export. n13 Australian judges can claim to be experts on tort choice of law litigation as owing 
to the federal nature of their country; there has been a higher frequency of such cases arising 
in the Australian courts in comparison to the English position. It is thus unsurprising that the 
House of Lords' decision to adopt the double actionability rule was based to some extent on 
the fact that the Australian courts had arguably endorsed that approach beforehand. In all, it 
4 Clarke, supra, n. 2, at 752. 
6s 
Martin, Diverging Common Law 
- 
Invercargill goes to the Privy Council (1997) 60 Modem Law Review 94, at 101. Cooke, Divergences 
- 
England, Australia and New Zealand (1983] New Zealand Law Review 297, at 301. 7 Hiller, supra n. I at 111. e ibid. 
9 Cooke, supra n. 6, at 300. Orucu, The United Kingdom as an importer and Exporter of Legal Models in the Context of Reciprocal Influences and Evolving Legal Systems in UK Lawfor the Millennium Comparative Law Series, No. 19 (1998), compiled by the United 
Kingdom National Committee of Comparative Law, 206 
- 
243, at 218. 2 : Hiller, supra n. 1, at 110. ýý ibid. 
13 ibid. 
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is arguable that there are enormous "gains that a national body of law can achieve by learning 
and borrowing from the experience"14 of another country. 
It should also be noted that "one can learn without borrowing"15 as "a conscious rejection by 
one country of a principle, rule, application or interpretation found appropriate in another may 
be the result of or occasion for a clearer articulation of the national policy goals by the judges 
of the former. "16 The rejection of the Spiliada test for the clearly inappropriate forum test by 
the High Court of Australia is a good illustration of this as in the relevant Australian cases on 
this subject matter, the Australian judges found themselves compelled to explain why they 
chose such a narrow approach for their law on stays of proceedings. 
2.1.2 Arguments against diversity in Commonwealth private international law 
First, a legal relationship would be "regulated in a contradictory way on either side of 
Pyrenees, of the Alps, of the English Channel, or the Carpathians"" if choice of law regimes 
differ across jurisdictions. The different Commonwealth tort choice of law regimes selected for 
our study would clearly have this effect particularly when the policy of ensuring uniformity of 
judicial outcomes is only accorded significant weight by the High Court of Australia. In this 
situation, there would be unequal treatment between parties involved in cross-border-litigation 
which may in turn encourage litigants to act "opportunistically, such as by claiming a default 
and filing suit in a jurisdiction known for its eccentric rules and practices. "18 The doctrine of 
forum non conveniens in England, Singapore and Canada would act to some extent to 
discourage such litigant behaviour although, this is clearly not the case for Australia with its 
'clearly inappropriate forum' test. 
" ibid, at 86. 
.s ibid. 
16 ibid. 
17 Sacco, Diversity and Uniformity in the Law (2001) 49 American Journal of Comparative Law 171, at 179. 1e Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in International Commercial Law (1999) 39 Virginia Journal of International Law 743, at 746. 
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Similarly, differences in jurisdictional rules may lead to a number of different courts taking 
jurisdiction over the same dispute which could result in the "duplication of litigation"19 as well 
as the "generation of multiple conflicting decisions. "20 Even though the bases of jurisdiction in 
our selected jurisdictions are largely the same, jurisdiction is taken if a claim form is served on 
a defendant who is present in forum in question; this does not prevent a multiplicity of 
proceedings as different parties to the dispute may be 'tagged' in different Commonwealth 
jurisdictions. Furthermore, with the removal of the requirement to seek leave from the courts 
for the service of a claim form out of jurisdiction in Australia and Canada, it has only become 
easier for the courts in these countries to take jurisdiction as of right. Accordingly, the 
pressure is on the doctrine of forum non conveniens to resolve the problems that may arise in 
such circumstances. However, significant differences between our selected jurisdictions in 
relation to this area of private international law can again hamper the success of this doctrine 
in this context. 21 
Secondly, diversity in private international law forces litigants to study the differing conflict 
rules of all courts that might have jurisdiction in a case. Commonwealth tort choice of law is a 
good illustration of this as can be seen from the numerous divergences from the English 
common law tort choice of law regime in our selected jurisdictions. Similarly, not only do 
litigants have to compare the doctrines of forum non conveniens in Australia and England, 
they have to be careful not to be caught out by the subtle differences between the 'clearly 
more appropriate forum' tests in England, Canada and Singapore. For example, there are 
significant differences between the treatment of juridical advantages in Canada and England 
in relation to their doctrine of forum non conveniens. In all, litigants may find it difficult to 
anticipate the law applicable to their dispute with any reasonable certainty and this would 
have an impact on the predictability of the outcome of their case. In such circumstances, 
parties will not have any clear idea of their situation and as such, they may find it hard to 
reach a settlement on their dispute. 
19 Duncan, Jurisdiction to Make and Modify Maintenance Decisions- The Quest for Uniformity in Einhorn, Siehr (eds), Intercontinental Cooperation through Private International Law 
- 
Essays in Memory of Peter E. Nygh (The Hague, The Netherlands: TMC Asser Press) (2004), 89-106, at 103. 20 ibid. 
21 It must be noted that specific rules under the various doctrines of forum non conveniens in our selected jurisdictions have been 
constructed to address the problem of parallel or related actions abroad and in the local forum. Unfortunately, there is again diversity in relation to these rules and as such, multiplicity of actions can still arise. 
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Thirdly, in the eyes of business parties, all the above inconveniences of diversity in private 
international law are considered to be legal risks which they have to "invest in ways to protect 
themselvesn22 from. This would obviously increase the cost of cross-border litigation and may 
cause businesses to turn away from "otherwise profitable transactions. "23 Business 
confidence in the stability of transactions and legal relationships would thus suffer as a result 
of this. In economic terms, these risks are regarded as "obstacles to cross-border trade and 
movement of persons"24 across jurisdictions which hamper "national and international 
economic growth 
. 
n25 This point is certainly relevant to our selected Commonwealth 
jurisdictions and other Commonwealth countries in general. 
Fourthly, in the hope of "capturing the benefits"26 of cross-border litigation for a jurisdiction, 
judges may formulate rules which may "lead to the promulgation of lax standards. "27 In private 
international law terms, the concern here is that there may be a rush towards, for example a 
rule which allows for courts to take jurisdiction over disputes on grounds which have little to 
do with whether the dispute has any connection with the forum in question so as to attract 
litigation as an invisible export. This can be observed in our comparative study of the different 
doctrines of forum non conveniens in our selected jurisdictions. In particular, the English and 
Singaporean judiciaries have adopted the 'clearly more appropriate' forum test which is 
loaded in favour of trial in the local forum in question. As we have discussed in Chapter 5, it is 
arguable that the key explanation for this presumption is that they wanted to reap the 
economic benefits from increased international litigation in their courts. 
u Stephan, supra, n. 18, at 746. 23 ibid. 
24 Dickinson, Cross-Border Torts in EC Courts 
-A Response to the Proposed "Rome II" Regulation [2002] European Business Law Review 369, at 371. 2' Tetley, Uniformity of International Private Maritime Law- The Pros, Cons and Alternatives to International Conventions - How to Adopt an International Convention (2000) 24 Tulane Maritime Law Journal 775, at 798. 26 Ogus, Competition between National Legal Systems: A Contribution of Economic Analysis to Comparative Law (1999) 48 International and Comparative Legal Quarterly 405, at 416. 27 ibid. 
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2.2. HARMONISATION 
2.2.1 Arguments in support of harmonisation in Commonwealth private international 
law 
First, "uniform [private] international law"28 is said to "promote international trade and 
investment"29 by removing a number of the disadvantages of diversity in private international 
law as discussed above. To elaborate, harmonisation of conflict of law rules would "assist in 
making commercial and financial dealings... more predictable"30 as litigants embarking on 
cross-border litigation would only have to look at a single set of rules. It would also ensure 
that the same law is applied irrespective of the country in which the decision is given. 
Similarly, harmonisation of jurisdictional rules may help to prevent a multiplicity of 
proceedings from arising as well as to lower "existing obstacles to transfrontier judgment 
enforcement. "3' All this is said to reduce "transaction costs"32 and provide "stability In 
international commercial relations"33 thereby resulting in the "[r]eduction of legal risk"34 for 
business parties. At a global level, harmonisation of private international law would thus be a 
"boon to international commerce"35 and would "contribute substantially to creating conditions 
that foster both national and international economic growth. "36 
This argument in favour of harmonisation can be seen in relation to a number of Hague 
Conventions. Take for example, the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. The 
key objective of this convention is to "promote international trade and investment through 
enhanced judicial cooperationn37 by the use of uniform rules that provide certainty and ensure 
Zs Tetley, supra. n. 25, at 798. 29 Preamble to the Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements. 10 Legal Developments 
- 
The Hague Conference on Private International Law, Paper prepared for the Commonwealth Secretariat by Hans van Loon, Secretary General of the Hague Conference, SOLM (04) 12, 
tt '/ www thecoinmonwealth oroJsharcd asp files/uploadcdfiles/27079329 7580-40F7 A3FI-80C19F37ED9D_solmdoc4 pdf, 
at [25). 
3 'Black, Commod ing Justice for Global Free Trade: The Proposed Hague Judgments Convention (2000) 38 Osgoode Hall 
Law Journal 237, at 243. 12 Hans van Loon, supra n. 30, at [25). 33 Stephan, supra, n. 18, at 746. 34 ibid. 
31 Tetley, supra, n. 25, at 798 36 ibid. 
37 Preamble to the Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements. See also, the Hague Convention of 22 December 1986 on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, the Plague Convention of 1 July 1985 on 
the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition. 
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the "effectiveness of exclusive choice of court agreements between parties to commercial 
transactions and that governs the recognition and enforcement of judgments resulting from 
proceedings based on such agreements. "38 Likewise, it is stated in the Preamble to the 
Hague Convention of 5 July 2006 on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect of 
Securities held with an Intermediary that it would "facilitate the international flow of capital and 
access to capital markets" and be "beneficial to States at all levels of economic development. " 
Secondly, harmonisation may result in the "substitution of better rules for those extant in the 
legal systems of individual states. "39 'Better' here does not mean rules for the benefit of the 
individual jurisdiction's circumstances and needs. Instead, we are looking at rules that benefit 
the region targeted for harmonisation with respect to "some normative social goal, such as 
redistributive justice or enhancing economic welfare. n4o For example, for a number of Hague 
Conventions, such goal would be that of promoting international trade and commerce. In 
particular, Castel has praised the work of the Hague Conference on Private International Law 
that its work is "scientific and impartialn41 and that the discussion between important players 
"usually results in the adoption of very constructive solutions to the problems under study. "42 
He has also observed that the "discourse employed in hammering out Hague conventions 
was that of lawyers pursuing principled solutions, not of states engaged in horse trading. "43 
While his comments may be outdated and may no longer be an apt description of what goes 
on today, the point that can be made here is that harmonisation initiatives can lead to better 
rules if the right conditions are present 44 
A related point is that "[c]ooperative rulemaking by representatives of many states"45 In a 
harmonisation exercise may solve collective action problems that deter Individual states from 
enacting optimal rules n46 An ideal choice of law regime would "specify clear and 
precise... rules to allocate the authority to resolve legal claims to the jurisdiction with the 
38 Preamble to the Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements. 39 Stephan, supra, n. 18, at 748. 40 ibid. 
41 Black, supra, n. 31, at 264. 42 Castel, Canada and the Hague Conference on Private International Law: 1893-1967 (1967) 45 Canadian Bar Review 1, at 7. 
" Black, supra, n. 31, at 264. N The Hague conventions on international child abduction and international adoption are said to be good examples of this. See Black, supra, n. 31, at 265. 43 Stephan, supra, n. 18, at 749. 46 ibid. 
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greatest interest in each transaction. n47 It would also "discourage discrimination against 
foreign claimants. "48 However, "absent coordination among states, "49 it is said that each 
nation will naturally have an "incentive to adopt rules that, on the margin, favour nationals 
over foreigners. n50 And so the argument goes, an "international regime might increase overall 
welfare by giving every state a stake in a system that eliminates such discrimination. "51 That 
being said, harmonisation of private international rules may not be necessary to achieve 
these goals. In our discussion of the evolving tort choice of law regimes and doctrines of 
forum non conveniens in England, Canada and Singapore, we have observed that there has 
been a natural shift towards more liberal rules on these matters. While, the Voth test in 
Australia does smack of judicial chauvinism, it is notable that in recent years the High Court of 
52 Australia has modified some aspects of that approach to make it less parochial. 
2.2.2 Arguments against harmonisation in Commonwealth private international law 
First, harmonisation has been criticised as reflecting a "misguided view that the world would 
be a better place if that amalgam of cultural, social, economic, and sometimes spiritual or 
religious factors which we call law had not developed in such markedly diverse ways in 
different societies. i53 Such reactions to legal diversity, it is argued, may simply be a "disguised 
form of cultural imperialism, where one vision of law becomes the new, international vision, 
and gradually marginalises or eliminates the other. *54 Those who voice out this opposition 
also point out that with the plurality of solutions generated by diversity in laws, when there is a 
significant change in international values and needs, there would be "wide possibilities for 
experimentation, transplant and so on. 55 However, with harmonisation, lawmakers would be 
forced to search for a new solution from only one perspective such that the "chances of 
effective innovations would be much reduced. "56 
47 ibid. 
41 ibid. 
49 
ibid. 
S0 ibid. 
51 ibid. 
52 See for example, the test in relation to the cross vesting legislations in Australia in Chapter 2. 53 Evans, Uniform Law: a Bridge too Far? (1994) 3 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 145, at 146. 5' Tetley, supra, n. 25, at 804. 5° Sacco, supra, n. 17, at 180. 56 ibid. 
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Secondly, one of the most powerful arguments put forth by opponents of harmonisation is that 
the "compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard"57 as the 
final harmonised legal product may be the result of "political manoeuvring rather than the 
work of the careful legal draftsman. "58 The drafting of the relevant instrument may not be 
directed at formulating the best possible rule for the jurisdictions in question. Instead, it may 
be aimed at ensuring consensus from the different states in relation to the final-product. This 
criticism of harmonisation is further strengthened by the very nature of conflict of laws itself. 
Commenting on the work of Hague Conference of Private International Law, Reese has 
pointed out that "it is very difficult to formulate satisfactory rules of conflict of laws"59 due to 
the "vastness of the subject"60 and the fact that many areas of private international law 
"remain relatively unexplored. "61 Furthermore, different jurisdictions will already have their 
"own approaches to and preconceptions of the subject"62 and they will be reluctant "to agree 
to any complete departure from their existing rules and principles. "63 Any harmonisation 
initiative is likely to be "in the nature of a compromise which, not being completely satisfactory 
to any state, may never come into force for lack of the necessary ramifications and even if it 
does, may not work well in practice. n64 This is why, according to Reese, the Hague 
Conference has had little success in dealing with topics such as the "enforcement of foreign 
judgments, adoption, and the law governing traffic accidents, product liability, agency and 
marriage. "65 
Thirdly, another problem with harmonisation is that the finished product may "lack coherence 
and consistency"66 and may even Introduce uncertainty where no uncertainty existed 
37 Board of Education v Barnette (1942) 319 US 624, at 641. ß8 Crawford, Carruthers, Conflict of Loyalties in the Conflict of Laws: The Cause, the Means and the Cost of ffarmonisatlon (2005] Juridical Review 251, at 275. See also, Girsberger, The Hague Convention on Indirectly held Securities - Dynamics of the Making of a Modern Private International Law Treaty in Einhorn, Siehr (eds), Intercontinental Cooperation through Private 
International Law 
- 
Essays in Memory of Peter E. Nygh (The Hague, The Netherlands: TMC Asset Press) (2004), 139-153, at 150-152. 
59 Reese, The Hague Conference on Private International Law: Some Observations (1985) 19 The International Lawyer 881, at 884. 
60 ibid. 
61 ibid. 
62 ibid. 
63 ibid. 
64 ibid. 
65 ibid, at 885. 66 Hobhouse, International Conventions and Commercial Law: The Pursuit of Uniformity (1990) 106 Law Quarterly Review 530, 
at 533. 
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before. i67 On the one hand, the wording of the relevant instruments may be too broad or too 
vaguely worded such that they can only provide a "general guide to decisions"68 which will of 
course defeat the very purpose of ensuring uniformity in private international law. This would 
normally occur when there is difficulty reaching an agreement on the final text of the relevant 
law. On the other hand, the drafting of the relevant harmonisation instruments may be too 
precise such that the "provisions would compel the courts to reach unfortunate results in 
situations that either are known or, although currently unforeseen, would fall within their literal 
scope of application 
. 
49 In particular, the reduction of legal risks arising from cross-border 
litigation by the process of harmonisation of private international law would entail "[g]reater 
clarity in legal rules [which] means providing more precise instructions covering a greater 
number of eventualities. "70 This, however, has its costs. As these rules become "more exact 
and all-encompassing, "71 they may "cramp the relationships they govern with excessively 
detailed requirements. "72 This may "lead to outcomes that parties to a transaction would like 
to avoid. "73 Legal certainty may be achieved but only at the price of inflexibility and 
arbitrariness, consequences that may be damaging to cross-border commerce as well. 
3. ANALYSIS: HARMONISATION OR NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF FORUM NON 
CONVENIENS AND TORT CHOICE OF LAW IN RELATION TO OUR SELECTED 
COMMONWEALTH JURISDICTIONS? 
From our above discussion of the diversity versus harmonisation debate, it is clear that there 
are strong arguments for the national development of forum non conveniens and tort choice 
of law in our selected Commonwealth jurisdictions. However, we have also seen that this 
would give rise to its own set of difficulties as well. 
Nevertheless, the answer is not in an adoption of the English common law approaches on 
forum non conveniens and tort choice of law by Australian, Singaporean and Canadian 
67 ibid. 
' Reese, supra, n. 59, at 885. 6' ibid, at 885-886. 70 Stephan, supra, n. 18, at 747. 71 ibid. 
n ibid. 
73 ibid. 
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judges for the following reasons. First, the English common law rules on private international 
law are devised by judges who are unfamiliar with conditions in our selected Commonwealth 
jurisdictions. These rules are formulated purely for English circumstances and needs and 
therefore uniformity with the relevant English common law may not necessarily produce the 
best approach for these countries. Secondly and more importantly, there has been an 
"increasing Europeanisation of [English] private international law. n74 Various aspects of 
English common law private international law now reflect or will reflect "underlying changes 
which may not be matched"75 in the society of our selected Commonwealth countries. It is 
thus essential that care be exercised in determining the extent to which the English common 
law should continue to influence the law in these countries. Accordingly, even if there Is a 
policy of strict adherence to English judicial precedents on private international law matters in 
a Commonwealth jurisdiction, for example, Singapore, she will eventually have to develop 
these areas of private international law "unaided by English decisions at common law. "76 
Under these circumstances, there are two remaining alternatives available to our selected 
jurisdictions: the negotiation and drafting of conventions to harmonise the relevant areas of 
private international law or to leave things as they are now: the national development of 
private international law regimes. 
3.1 HARMONISATION OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS AND TORT CHOICE OF LAW IN 
RELATION TO OUR SELECTED COMMONWEALTH JURISDICTIONS 
In an ideal world, the various inconveniences arising from diversity in private international law 
such as uncertainty, unpredictability or the lack of uniformity of judicial outcomes would be 
mitigated by the harmonisation of private international law on a worldwide, regional or 
Commonwealth basis. More importantly, unlike uniformity with the English common law, the 
coming together of interested parties to draft a convention on our selected topics of private 
international law would mean that it is not entirely up to English judges with their inherent 
74 Fawcett, The Europeanisation of Private International Law: The SignificanceforSingapore [ 1997] 1 Singapore Journal of International and Comparative Law 69. 
's Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co Inc v Fay (1988) 165 CLR 197, at 263. 76 Fawcett, supra, n. 74, at 84. 
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limitations as discussed above to devise conflict of law rules. Instead, there would hopefully 
be a proper impartial discussion on the most appropriate private international law rule for 
nations within the relevant grouping with reference to a social or economic objective. In the 
process of working out the relevant rules, elements of parochialism and discrimination against 
foreigners in conflict of law rules would also be addressed. Nonetheless, it must be 
acknowledged that diversity has an important role to play in the development of laws by 
encouraging the discovery of new and better ways of solving legal problems. 
In the view of this author, if it can be shown that there is a need for certainty and uniformity in 
a particular area of private international law for achieving a worthy social or economic goal, 
diversity should be sacrificed for it. This view is subject to a number of qualifications. First, a 
convincing case must be put forth for uniformity. In relation to jurisdictional rules and In 
particular, forum non conveniens, harmonisation is probably desirable for the promotion of 
international trade and commerce. 77 However, the case is somewhat weaker in relation to tort 
choice of law as it is not entirely clear whether its diversity in different jurisdictions would be a 
significant obstacle to cross-border trade as its interaction with international commerce and 
trade is arguably peripheral unlike contract choice of law. It is thus unsurprising that attempts 
are seldom made to harmonise this area of private international Iaw. 78 Secondly, even if the 
case for harmonisation is made out, we have noted in earlier sections that the advantages of 
harmonisation are often perceived and may not be easily realised. 
We will now examine the progress of harmonisation in relation to our selected areas of private 
international law on a worldwide, regional and commonwealth scale with specific reference to 
our selected Commonwealth jurisdictions. This is to paint a realistic picture of the difficulties 
involved in such projects. As a preliminary note, any harmonisation of forum non convenfens 
rules normally forms part of a project to unify jurisdictional rules as a whole. 
r See for example, the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments, the Brussels l Regulation, the 1984Inter- American Convention on Jurisdiction in the International Sphere for the Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments. 7' There have been earlier attempts. See the Hague Convention of 4 May 1971 on the Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents, the Hague Convention oft October 1973 on the Law Applicable to Product Liability. Few jurisdictions have ratified these 
conventions. 
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3.1.1 Harmonisation on a worldwide basis 
Obviously, a worldwide convention ratified by major commercial jurisdictions and trading 
partners would provide for the advantages flowing from the harmonisation of private 
international law as mentioned above at a global level. Nonetheless, there are significant 
obstacles hampering the realisation of these advantages due to the massive scale of such a 
project. In particular, negotiators will have to reconcile a wide range of private international 
law regimes which may be fundamentally different from one another. Compromises, as part of 
the drafting process will have to be sought. Under such circumstances, the chances of 
formulating the best possible private international law approach for the purpose of achieving a 
social or economic objective would be greatly diminished. In the worst case scenario, the 
differences between the various private international law approaches may simply be too 
complex for a compromise to be reached. 
The key international organisation which has conducted such harmonisation of private 
international law rules is the Hague Conference on Private International Law. Canada, 
Australia and England are member states of this organisation. Even though Singapore is not 
a member of the Hague Conference, she has signed up to a number of Hague Conventions 
such as the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad on Civil and Commercial 
Matters. Accordingly, any attempts by the Hague Conference to harmonise our selected 
areas of private international law would obviously be of great interest to these countries. 
On jurisdictional rules (including forum non conveniens), the Preliminary Draft Convention on 
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters79 was produced by the 
Hague Conference in October 1999. Unfortunately, no consensus was reached in relation to 
its text8° and it was decided eventually that this harmonisation project was to proceed on a 
more modest scale by its limitation to "certain areas on which an agreement still seems 
79 For more details about the Draft Hague Convention, see for example, Von Mehren, Drafting a Convention on International Jurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign Judgments Acceptable World-Wide: Can the Vague Conference Project succeed? (2001) 49 American Journal of Comparative Law 191, Brand, Comparative Forum Non Conveniens and the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments (2002) 37 Texas International Law Journal 467, O'Brian Jr, The Hague Convention on Jurisdiction 
and Judgments: The Way Forward (2003) 66 Modem Law Review 491. 8° Brand, supra, n. 79, at 492. An Interim Text on the Convention was subsequently produced in 2001 but it is "full of 
alternatives, variations and bracketed language; indicating failure to agree on many specific matters. " 
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possible. "81 In relation to tort choice of law, conventions such as the Hague Convention on 
the Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents and the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Product Liability have been adopted by the Hague Conference. However, few countries have 
ratified them due to perhaps a lack of interest in such projects. 
A few points can be made here in relation to the work of the Hague Conference. 
1. Especially on a worldwide scale, there are significant difficulties in reaching 
consensus between states in relation to the harmonisation of private international law 
where "national ideas of justice, social purpose, or public order/policy"82 may be so 
different that the countries involved "may not be ready for uniform ideas. "83 In relation 
to the Draft Hague Convention, it has been observed that the "difficulties that the 
negotiators at the Hague have faced are largely the result of differences over 
appropriate jurisdictional reach"84 as the "range of countries and cultural and legal 
traditions make consensus on a wide range of required and prohibited bases of 
jurisdiction unfeasible.. 85 
While one may assume that the question of the adoption of the common law doctrine 
of forum non conveniens in the draft convention was one of the issues where a 
consensus was difficult to reach based on the "dramatic"86 differences between the 
common law and civil law approaches to jurisdiction, this was surprisingly "one of the 
areas of early compromise in the Hague Conference negotiations "87 In particular, the 
Draft Hague Convention provides for a "limited form of forum non conveniens"88 in 
that the court first seised can "suspend its proceedings if 
... 
it is clearly inappropriate 
for that court to exercise jurisdiction and if a court of another state has jurisdiction and 
81 O'Brian, supra, n. 79, at 492 referring to the Preliminary Result of the Work of the Informal Working Group on the Judgment Project, Preliminary Document No. 8. The Hague Convention oj30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements has emerged from this. 
82 Tetley, supra, n. 25, at 801. B3 ibid. 
' Silberman, Comparative Jurisdiction in the International Context: Will the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention be Stalled? (2002-2003) 52 DePaul Law Review 319, at 348. B3 ibid. 
Brand, supra, n. 79, at 492. 87 ibid. 
98 O'Brian, supra, n. 79, at 501. 
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is clearly more appropriate to resolve the dispute. "89 While this bodes well for the 
harmonisation of forum non conveniens on a worldwide scale, it should be noted that 
this compromise was achieved by providing for a "test considerably narrower than 
that used in most common law jurisdictions"90 in that the litigant has to satisfy both the 
Australian 'clearly inappropriate forum' test and the English 'clearly more appropriate 
forum' test for the courts to decline jurisdiction. In other words, consensus on the text 
of the provision was reached only by formulating a test that allows the courts to stay 
the proceedings in "exceptional circumstances "91 In addition, it must not be forgotten 
that forum non conveniens forms but one component of the rules on jurisdiction and 
that difficulties in harmonisation may lie in other aspects of these rules. 
Indeed, the key disputes on the drafting of the convention are said to be "primarily 
between proponents of the European approach expressed in the Brussels 
Regulation and the United States which favours its own somewhat unique approach 
to issues of jurisdiction. 92 There has been a "constitutionalization of jurisdictional 
rules in the United States via the Due Process Clause"93 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution which meant that "the rules of required 
jurisdiction adopted in a proposed convention cannot impair the due process rights of 
the defendant as understood in the US Supreme Court's most recent 
jurisprudence. "94 These "constitutional limits... stress the relationship between the 
individual defendant and the forum"95 which is in sharp contrast to the approach of 
civil law countries "where the focus is on the relationship between the dispute and the 
forum and usually carries no constitutional overlay. "96 As the American delegates to 
the Hague considered the Supreme Court's case law to be 'non-negotiable #97 and the 
European countries were unwilling to give in to a number of the United States' 
29 Article 22, Draft Hague Convention. 90 O'Brian, supra, n. 79, at 501. 91 Article 22, Draft Hague Convention 92 O'Brian, supra, n. 79, at 492-493. 93 Silberman, supra, n. 84, at 330. 94 ibid. 
ibid. 
% ibid. 
97 Juenger, A Hague Judgments Convention? (1998) 24 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 111, at 118. 
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demands on the various grounds of jurisdiction, the Draft Hague Convention was not 
adopted by the Hague Conference. 
2. In the attempt to reach consensus among diverse jurisdictions especially at a 
worldwide level, the advantages of harmonisation may be diluted by the negotiating 
process itself. This can be observed in the attempts to reconcile the legal and political 
differences between the United States and the European countries on jurisdictional 
rules in relation to the Draft Hague Convention. After much negotiation, it was 
concluded that the draft judgments convention could not be in the form of a double 
convention; a convention that "prescribes both rules of jurisdiction and rules of 
recognition of judgments, and with certain exceptions requires that all judgments 
based on permitted bases of jurisdiction be recognised and enforced"98 as the 
negotiating parties at the Hague were not able to agree on a definitive list of permitted 
bases of jurisdiction. Such a convention would clearly provide for the advantages of 
certainty, predictability and the uniformity of judicial outcomes as if the basis of 
jurisdiction employed by a particular judiciary is not within that list, the judgments 
pronounced as a result of it will simply not be recognised and enforced by another 
court. In fact, this was said to be the type of convention that most members of the 
Hague wanted for the Draft Hague Convention' but to accommodate the United 
States' refusal to budge on their views on jurisdictional rules, there was a shift 
towards a mixed convention; "one that had both jurisdictional rules and recognition 
rules but that did not require recognition and enforcement of all judgments that were 
based on permissible grounds of jurisdiction. "100 
In particular, the Draft Hague Convention provides for three lists of grounds for 
jurisdiction. First, there is the white list which provides for mandatory bases of 
jurisdiction where "each country is required to take jurisdiction if one of these grounds 
is present "101 Secondly, "courts are generally forbidden from exercising 
O'Brian, supra, n. 79, at 498. 
ibid. 
'0° ibid. 
ßo1 ibid. 
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jurisdiction"102 on the grounds specified in the black list. Thirdly, the grey list provides 
for grounds where "courts may exercise jurisdiction. n103 Essentially, this final list is 
there for bases of jurisdiction where consensus cannot be reached as to whether they 
should be placed in the white or the black list. In other words, in the attempt to 
achieve consensus between the different jurisdictions in relation to the drafting of the 
relevant convention, the advantages flowing from harmonisation such as certainty, 
predictability and the uniformity of judicial outcomes had to be sacrificed to some 
extent. It is important to note that even so, no consensus was reached in relation to 
the text of the Draft Hague Convention as the negotiating parties at the Hague were 
unable to agree on the scope of the grey list itself. 104 
3. It has been observed that "Hague Conferences tend to be dominated by the 
European countries"105 and that they will 'naturally press for Hague Conventions 
which are similar to harmonised European rules °106 In particular, European countries 
already enjoy "the benefit of a well-functioning regional arrangement"" In relation to 
jurisdictional rules, the Brussels I Regulation and it has thus been pointed out the 
"very presence of this group Is bound to complicate negotiations in The Hague "'°8 
Indeed, the Brussels I Regulation has had a 'strong and pervasive effect"109 on the 
Draft Hague Convention as the "European Union countries displayed an increasing 
tendency towards block voting"110 in relation to the negotiation of the draft convention. 
Of course, the Draft Hague Convention is not entirely based on the Brussels I 
Regulation as to accommodate the diverse range of different legal systems and 
jurisdictional regimes, departures from the structure and content of Brussels I 
Regulation had to be made. Nonetheless, under such circumstances, one must still 
query whether this harmonisation project provides for the best private international 
law approach on a worldwide scale since it is one that is heavily influenced by the 
102 ibid. at 499. 103 ibid. My italics. 
t0' For a more comprehensive discussion of double conventions and mixed conventions, see Von Mehren, Enforcing Judgments Abroad: Reflections on the Design of Recognition Conventions (1998-1999) 24 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 17. 105 Fawcett, supra, n. 74, at 89. 106 ibid. 
107 Juenger, supra, n. 97, at 116. t08 ibid. 
109 Von Mehren, supra, n. 79, at 202. 110 ibid. 
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interests of the European countries. There appears to be no impartial search for 
constructive solutions to private international law problems at an international level. 
4. Another concern is that unlike the Brussels I Regulation, "there will not be a single 
court performing the role of the Court of Justice of the European Communities of 
assuring uniformity of interpretation""' of the Draft Hague Convention. Accordingly, 
even if the text of the Convention could be agreed upon by the different Member 
States, the advantages of harmonisation in particular, the uniformity of judicial 
outcomes would still be adversely affected if divergent approaches were taken by 
different jurisdictions on its application. 
3.1.2 Harmonisation on a regional basis 
Particularly in relation to jurisdictional rules, we have observed that there are significant 
obstacles faced by the Hague Conference In relation to the worldwide harmonisation of our 
selected areas of private international law. One question that can be posed here is: Is the 
harmonisation of private international law rules on a regional basis a more realistic project to 
undertake in relation to our selected jurisdictions especially since the scale of the project is 
relatively smaller? 
In relation to Canada, one would ask whether there should be some inter-American 
harmonisation of private international law under the auspices of the Organization of American 
States. In particular, the Inter-American Juridical Committee of the OAS has had some 
success with such harmonisation. A convention was produced on jurisdictional rules namely 
the 1984 Inter-American Convention on Jurisdiction in the International Sphere for the 
Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments. It was adopted to aid in the interpretation of the 
1979 Inter American convention on the Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and 
Arbitral Awards. 11' However, it is notable that common law jurisdictions belonging to the OAS 
III O'Brian, supra, n. 79, at 503. 112 For a discussion of the two Inter-American conventions, see for example, Siqueiros, Enforcement of Foreign Civil and Commercial Judgments in the Mexican Republic [ 1986] Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 149, Amado, 
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such as the United States and Canada have not ratified either of these conventions. As for 
Singapore, the Association of South East Asian Nations is the relevant regional grouping. 
Even though it has been declared that it is in the "interests of ASEAN countries to work 
towards a convergence of their laws as much as possible to facilitate trade and commerce 
amongst themselves in order to make ASEAN more attractive to foreign direct 
investments, "' 13 little progress has been made in relation to the harmonisation of private 
international law rules in this region despite calls to do so by some commentators. 114 In 
particular, with regards to jurisdictional rules, it has been said that the "prospects for a 
harmonised ASEAN legal regime and uniform laws similar to that found in the European 
Union remain, for the moment somewhat bleak. "115 Similarly, for Australia, no convention has 
been produced by the Pacific Islands Forum on the harmonisation of private International law 
in that region. Furthermore, the Political, International and Legal Affairs Division of this Forum 
does not appear to be in the process of implementing any such programmes. In short, none of 
our selected jurisdictions have ratified any conventions in relation to the harmonisation of 
private international law rules in their respective regions and that it is only the OAS which has 
actually produced a number of conventions on this subject matter. 
Arguably, the obstacles arising in the context of worldwide harmonisation of private 
international law are still very much relevant to the harmonisation of such rules on a regional 
basis. Most importantly, there is still significant diversity in legal systems in the relevant 
regional groupings. For example, in ASEAN, Malaysia, Brunei and Singapore are common 
law jurisdictions whereas Indonesia and Thailand are civil law jurisdictions. The Philippines 
has a "hybrid common law/civil law system"116 and Vietnam has a legal system which Is based 
on "communist legal theory and French civil law. " 17 Obviously, there would be significant 
difficulties in reconciling the private international law rules of these jurisdictions. It should also 
be pointed out that one reason why common law jurisdictions such as the US and Canada 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments inLatin American Countries: An Overview and Update (1990-1991) 31 Virginia Journal of International Law 99. 
°3 Joint Press Statement, Seventh ASEAN Senior Law Officials Meeting (2001)10-11 September 2001, Singapore, 
http: 1Lwww a censer or. /5650 
, 
at [4). 
"" See Gautama, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments and ArbitralAwards in the ASEANReglon (1990) 32 Malaya Law Review 171, Koh, Foreign Judgments in ASEAN-A Proposal (1996) 45 International Comparative and Legal Quarterly 844. 
Koh, ibid, at 859. 116 ibid, at 846-847. 
117 ibid. 
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have not ratified the 1984 Inter American Convention on Jurisdiction in the International 
Sphere for the Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments is that the Inter-American 
Juridical Committee at the time of the drafting of the convention wanted to restrict the 
"unification work"118 to Latin America and had made "no effort to make them acceptable also 
to the United States"119 perhaps because of the difficulties in reconciling the common law 
rules in the US on jurisdiction and the civil code approaches of the other Latin American 
jurisdictions. 
It has been said that successful harmonisation of laws is likely to occur "between states with 
significant commercial relations with each other"720 as they are more willing to look beyond 
their differences in terms of their legal systems and individual circumstances so as to facilitate 
the growth of cross-border trade and commerce between them. Within the above regional 
groupings, there is certainly a high degree of economic co-operation between the relevant 
jurisdictions and one may thus assume that this would aid In the harmonisation of private 
international law rules in these regions. Nevertheless, as the lack of significant progress In 
such harmonisation demonstrates, "economic integration and commercial ties alone do not 
assure success"121 in harmonising private international law. To Illustrate, one suggested 
reason for this situation in relation to ASEAN Is that its focus is on facilitating economic 
activity rather than "economic Integration. x122 In particular, ASEAN nations are wary of 
integration along the lines of the European Union which has as its "ultimate goal 
... 
a 
"Community of Nations, an economic and political union 123" as this is seen as a 'loss of 
sovereignty. "124 Accordingly, they are unlikely to embark on an ambitious project such as a 
"multilateral jurisdiction and judgments Convention"125 which requires 'considerable trust 
between Contracting States"126 to negotiate and draft. However, it is Important to note that 
ASEAN is still in its early stages of development and that it 'cannot be expected to launch Into 
118 Nadelmann, Clouds over international Efforts to Unify Rules of Conflict of Laws (1977) 41 Law & Contemporary Problcros 
54, at 79. 
119 ibid. 
130 Gaa, Harmonization of International Bankruptcy Law and Practice: Is it Necessary? Is it Possible? (1993) 27 The 
International Lawyer 882, at 896. 121 ibid. 
u Koh, supra, n. 114, at 857. 23 ibid. 
'24 Joint Press Statement, Seventh ASEAN Senior Law Officials Meeting (2001) 10-11 September 2001, Singapore, 
htt p Hwww aseansec org/S65n at [4]. 125 Fawcett supra, n. 74, at 89. 126 ibid. 
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a comprehensive programme of... legal harmonisation as yet. 127 As time passes, with greater 
expansion in economic co-operative activities within ASEAN, there may be more political will 
to embark on projects harmonising private international law in the region. Indeed, in the 
recent 2005 Meeting of ASEAN Law Ministers, a Working Group has been established to 
work on an Agreement on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra Judicial Documents amongst 
ASEAN Member Countries. 128 
3.1.3 Harmonisation on a Commonwealth basis 
Another option available to our selected Commonwealth jurisdictions is to participate In the 
harmonisation of our selected areas of private international law on a Commonwealth basis. 
One question must be posed here: what is the relevant organisation to conduct such 
harmonisation? In 1964, the Commonwealth Secretariat was established to assist 
Commonwealth jurisdictions "consisting of a variety of races and representing a number of 
interests and points of view, to exchange opinions in a friendly, informal and Intimate 
atmosphere. P129 In particular, Commonwealth Prime Ministers at that time were of the view 
that the Commonwealth Secretariat "should develop as a unifying element within the 
Commonwealth"130 particularly in relation to international and economic affairs. To aid this 
organisation in the performance of its functions, one of the departments set up within it Is the 
Legal and Constitutional Affairs Division whose objectives are to "foster the legal framework In 
Member Countries so as to achieve international peace and order, global and economic 
development and the rule of international law"131 and to "monitor and participate In areas of 
evolving and developing law, thus being responsive to the needs of the Member Countries In 
these areas. "132 Towards these ends, the LCAD organises yearly meetings of Law Ministers 
from Commonwealth jurisdictions which consider "legal problems of common interest"733 and 
model legislation developed to aid countries in addressing these issues. Accordingly, the 
127 Koh, supra, n. 114, at 859. 
_28 Joint Communique of the 6th ASEAN Law Ministers Meeting, Ha Noi, Viet Nam, 19-20 September 2005, 
b"i2,1/www. ascansce. omJI7738. htnI at [9]. 
"9 Agreed Memorandum on the Commonwealth Secretariat (1965) Cmnd. 2713, at [4]. 170 ibid, at [14]. 131 See the Mission Statement of the LCAD at hhtp"//www thecommonwealth orgfemnlates/Intcrnal. asp? Node1D'38064. 132 ibid. 
133 Dale, The Modern Commonwealth, Commonwealth Law Series (London: Butterworths) (1983), at 78. 
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LCAD would appear to be the most appropriate organisation to undertake the harmonisation 
of Commonwealth private international aw 
However, it is important to note that in 1977, Commonwealth Law Ministers decided that 
"rather than develop their own competence in intra-Commonwealth private international law, 
they would work with the Hague Conference. *134 In particular, the Commonwealth Law 
Ministers were of the view that such integration of private international law would occur at the 
expense of global co-ordination and co-operation *135 and they wanted to avoid "any such 
potential conflict. "136 This decision has meant that the LCAD Is more involved in the 
negotiations of new Hague Conventions for the harmonisation of private international law on a 
worldwide basis rather than in the harmonisation of Commonwealth private international 
law. 137 
In light of the failure of the negotiating parties at the Hague to reach an agreement on the text 
of the Draft Hague Convention, it is submitted that this decision of the Commonwealth Law 
Ministers should be reconsidered at least in relation to jurisdictional rules. In particular, 
harmonisation of private International law rules on a Commonwealth basis would be easier to 
accomplish in comparison to their harmonisation on a worldwide or regional scale as 
Commonwealth jurisdictions share the same common law background. There would be no 
"clash of legal different cultures"138 as delegates involved in the negotiations would 'speak the 
same (legal) language"139 and would use "the [same] law making techniques. "140 Certainly, 
such "similarity in legal principles and legal systems can enhance efforts to harmonise... laws 
and practices. *141 
However, the following points must be noted 
"' Commonwealth Action in the Field of Private International Law, Paper by the Commonwealth Secretariat at the Meeting of Commonwealth Law Ministers and Senior Officials, Accra, Ghana, 17-20 October 2005, LMM(05)21, klip; //www thec mmonwealth org/shared asp files/uploadedfiles/D4CE789F 3814-42F3 8DCB 
A47F49FBC478_Imm0521. pdf, at [1]. 
"s Hans van Loon, supra, n. 30, at [6]. 176 ibid. 
137 Dale, supra, n. 133, at 78. 
. 38 Girsberger, supra, n. 58, at 150-15 I. 119 ibid. 
140 ibid. 
141 Gaa, supra, n. 120, at 896. 
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1. First, we must not underestimate the fact that there are still significant social, 
economic and political differences between these countries and that these 
considerations may still hamper any harmonisation attempts. In our comparative 
study, we have seen how these differences have resulted in different judicial 
treatment of policies and thus differences in the formulation of forum non conveniens 
and tort choice of law in our selected jurisdictions. Any convention on these areas of 
private international law will have to reach a compromise between different 
Commonwealth jurisdictions on such policies. The general observation that "where 
different approaches to jurisdiction operate in different systems, where both are 
supported by principle and where both seem to work well in practice and give 
satisfaction within their respective contexts, it may be extremely difficult to reach 
consensus on a uniform approach"142 is still applicable here. Even though our 
comparative research is limited to the judicial perception of policies and 
circumstances and it may not necessarily be the case that these considerations will 
be seen in the same way during the negotiations on a draft convention since the 
players involved are not confined to members of the various Commonwealth 
judiciaries, it is interesting to note that the Commonwealth Law Ministers in their 2005 
Meeting in Accra, Ghana were of the view that there is enormous difficulty "reaching a 
similar level of agreement between countries which do not have the geographical 
contiguity, developed internal market and strong legal and political institutions of the 
EU. "143 They have thus stated that it would be "unwise to devote resources to a 
search for agreed bases of jurisdiction to be adopted by Commonwealth countries. *144 
2. Secondly, the increasing interaction between English common law private 
international law and European law may have an enormous impact on any proposed 
conventions on Commonwealth private international aw. In particular, if the proposed 
142 Duncan, supra, n. 19, at 104. tos Commonwealth Action in the Field of Private International Law, Paper by the Commonwealth Secretariat at the Meeting of Commonwealth Law Ministers and Senior Officials, Accra, Ghana, 17-20 October 2005, LMM(05)21, 
http"//www thecommonwealth org/ hs ared asp 
-i 
plopdedfles/D4CE7R9F 3$14-2Fi 8DCB A47F49FBC478 m0 21 pof, at [ 16]. 
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Rome l/ Regulation does become law, that may prevent England from entering into a 
Commonwealth convention on tort choice of law unless other Commonwealth 
jurisdictions can be convinced to sign up to a convention that is identical to Rome ll. It 
is of course doubtful that this will occur as it is unlikely that Rome 11 will be considered 
appropriate for Commonwealth nations since it is based on a completely different 
"political, economic and legal background 
. 
"145 In such circumstances, it may be 
necessary that Commonwealth jurisdictions contemplate the harmonisation of tort 
choice of law without England's involvement. This then begs the question of whether 
there is any point to the harmonisation of Commonwealth private international law 
when England, with which other Commonwealth jurisdictions have very significant 
trade and commercial relations is missing from the process itself. There Is at least no 
such difficulty in relation to forum non conveniens as in general, the Brussels I 
Regulation does not apply to defendants who are not domiciled In a member state. 146 
In such circumstances, the English bases of jurisdiction and the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens would still be relevant. 
3. Thirdly, similar to the situation under the Hague Conventions, there is no 
Commonwealth entity analogous to the European Court of Justice to rule on the 
interpretation of conventions harmonising private international law rules on a 
Commonwealth scale. As we have seen in our comparative study, the judiciaries of 
our selected jurisdictions have their own views on forum non conveniens and tort 
choice of law and they may not necessarily agree with the compromises reached in 
the relevant Commonwealth conventions. There is a danger then that they may 
interpret the provisions differently so as to give effect to their own policy views on the 
subject matter. The whole point of harmonising Commonwealth private international 
law would be defeated in such circumstances. 
1`s Fawcett, supra, n. 74, at 88 in relation to the Rome / Convention. 146 Article 4, Brussels I Regulation. 
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3.1.4 Other means of harmonisation: Model Laws? 
It can be observed that the convention is the key instrument employed by the organisations 
mentioned above for their harmonisation of forum non conveniens and tort choice of law. That 
however is not the only way to bring about harmonisation. Model laws have been utilised by 
for example, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law147 in their 
harmonisation of private international law. Accordingly, one question which arises here Is: 
should model laws be used instead of conventions to harmonise our selected areas of private 
international law? 
What are the differences between model laws and conventions? A model law is "created as a 
suggested pattern for law-makers in national governments to consider adopting as part of 
their domestic legislation. "148 In "[i]ncorporating the text of the model law into its system, a 
State may modify or leave out some of its provisions x149 This approach is dependent on the 
"persuasive power of example, whereby those States which demonstrate their willingness to 
make voluntary changes to their laws in the interests of improving the workings of [their legal 
regimes] can generate a steady momentum of support which, given time and experience, 
should induce more States to overcome their initial reluctance to participate. 0150 In contrast, a 
convention is an "instrument that is binding under international law on States and other 
entities with treaty-making capacity that choose to become a party to that instrument "151 The 
"possibility of changes being made to the uniform text by the States parties (normally referred 
to as "reservations") is much more restricted. 0152 In other words, "participating States must 
commit themselves to intrusive legal obligations"t53 which may be "difficult for them to 
accept. "'TM Accordingly, the key difference between the two instruments is that in relation to 
model laws, States are "at liberty to incorporate into their domestic laws to the extent that they 
'47 The best example of the UNCITRAL's use of model laws is the UNCITRAL Mode! Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. 18 http: //www. uncitral. org/uncitral/enluncitraltexts_faq. html. 
"' Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Mode! Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, hU; //www-iii lohai %orpanizations/uncitr4VmodeL aw pdf#search=%22Guide%20to%20Enactment%20oP/o20the%20UNC 
LRAL%2OMnciel%ýflt aw%200n%2ocmce-R ýe/o2O SOIVCnCj%22, at ý12ý. 150 Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law, Oxford Private International Law Series (Oxford: Oxford University Press) (2°d ed., 2005), at para. 8.04. 
'5'http: //www. uncitral. org/uncitral/en/uncitral texts faq. html. 132 Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. 
J-JCAL%ZUMOdeJ%2ULaw%2nnn%2OCmss Borde1% 2pInsolycncy%22, at (12]. 
is3 Fletcher, supra, n. 150, at para. 8.04. 
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themselves consider acceptable, and in whatever form best accords with the traditions and 
process of [their legal] system. "155 The benefit of such flexibility is that it would be easier for 
negotiators from different legal, social, economic and political backgrounds to reach a 
consensus on the model law in comparison to a convention. If they do not agree with certain 
aspects of the model law, their jurisdictions can simply choose not to adopt the relevant rules 
as part of their individual private international law regimes. 
Obviously, all this would mean that the "degree of, and certainty about, harmonisation 
achieved through a model law is likely to be lower than in the case of a convention. "56 In 
addition, it is inevitable that there will be a "lack of uniformity in terms of the elements selected 
for internal enactment by the States which choose to participate"157 as well as In relation to 
the "approach followed by domestic courts and officials when Interpreting and applying the 
particular version of the model law as enacted by the State in which they function. "1S8 This is 
of course a problem for conventions as well. The only difference is that the "broad margin of 
self-determination conceded to any State which elects to adopt the model law"159 would 
indicate that these problems are more significant In relation to model laws. 
In an ideal world, conventions would be preferred to model laws as they provide for a much 
higher degree of certainty and predictability in comparison to the latter. However, as our 
discussion of the Draft Hague Convention has revealed, the reality of the situation is that 
these advantages are not easily achieved for various reasons; the most Important of which is 
the difficulty in reconciling the disparities that exist between jurisdictions In terms of their legal 
culture and their policies and approaches towards private International law. In areas of private 
international law where such difficulties are significant, "producing a [convention] to which all 
participating states will commit themselves under terms requiring full reciprocity, and also 
uniformity and consistency in matters of application"160 may simply be Impossible. Under 
these circumstances, a model law approach can be a "[l]ess ambitious, but more practicable, 
us ibid. 
is6 Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
ýKAL/o20Mode1%20 w%20on%2OCross-Bordci%201nsolyency%a22, at [12]. 
"' Fletcher, supra, n. 150, at para. 8.05. 158 ibid. 
139 ibid. 
160 ibid, at para. 8.03. 
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solution. "161 As it is arguably easier for negotiators to come to an agreement on the drafting of 
a model law on private international law, at least this approach can provide some degree of 
harmonisation. Naturally, the degree of incorporation of a model law into a jurisdiction's legal 
system would differ but if enough states participate in its adoption, these states will eventually 
"develop a corpus of mutually compatible legislative provisions"162 and will thus be able to 
reap some of the advantages of harmonisation. Accordingly, it is submitted that international 
bodies such as the Hague Conference should look into the use of model laws as a "short-to- 
medium term"' 63 solution to the problems arising from diversity in jurisdictional rules. 
3.1.5 Conclusion for the harmonisation of forum non conveniens and tort choice of law 
In relation to our selected Commonwealth jurisdictions 
It is clear that the Hague Conference's efforts in harmonising jurisdictional rules on a 
worldwide basis have largely been unsuccessful and accordingly, the use of the Draft Hague 
Convention is not an option for our selected Commonwealth jurisdictions. As for regional 
harmonisation, there has generally been a lack of interest and political will in embarking on 
such projects by the relevant organisations, namely ASEAN, OAS and the Pacific Islands 
Forum. The problems faced by the Hague Conference in harmonising jurisdictional rules are 
applicable in this context as well despite the differences in the scale of the project. Arguably, 
harmonisation of jurisdictional rules on a Commonwealth basis would stand the best chance 
of success for our selected Commonwealth countries but this would require the 
Commonwealth Law Ministers to reconsider their decision to leave the harmonisation of 
private international law to the Hague Conference. In other words, the prospects for the 
harmonisation of jurisdictional rules at any level remain for the moment, unpromising. It 
should also be noted that there has been no interest in the harmonisation of tort choice of law 
regimes aside from the conventions on product liability and traffic accidents produced by the 
Hague Conference in the 1970s. 
16' ibid, at para. 8.05. 
X62 ibid. at para. 8.14. 163 ibid. at para. 8.04. 
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3.2 NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS AND TORT CHOICE OF 
LAW IN OUR SELECTED COMMONWEALTH JURISDICTIONS 
As it is highly unlikely that there would be any successful attempts at harmonising forum non 
conveniens and tort choice of law in the near future, we are left with the default position of ad 
hoc development of these areas of private international law in our selected Commonwealth 
jurisdictions. 
While our Commonwealth courts must address the disadvantages of diversity In private 
international law, these criticisms should not be overstated. Generally, it Is Important to note 
that when we refer to diversity in Commonwealth private international law, it does not mean 
that every Commonwealth jurisdiction will have a different approach to a specific area of 
private international law. In particular, some commentators have argued that the "process of 
looking outward 
... 
for inspiration... may well result in a valuable integration or harmonisation of 
law on a Commonwealth or broader scale"164 or at least "uniformity among those faced with 
similar problems. "165 This is said to arise from the "borrowing of principle and precedent 
among 
... 
members of the Commonwealth" 66 by the "notable process of cross-pollination. " 187 
In economic terms, it has been said that in the competition for cross-border trade and 
investment with the increasing "globalisation of markets and the elimination of barriers to 
trade, " 68 lawmakers may be motivated to import or imitate rules from another jurisdiction If 
those rules "better meet the preferences of [market] actors"169 in comparison to their old rules 
thus inducing "some convergence"10 In certain jurisdictions 'towards least-cost legal 
principles. " 71 In other words, by encouraging diversity in Commonwealth private international 
law, there may be a shift towards uniformity in the form of an optimal rule at least in 
jurisdictions with similar social, economic and political circumstances. This particular 
argument can be substantiated to some extent by our comparative study. For Instance, we 
have observed that Australia and Canada's tort choice of law regimes are similar to one 
'6' Hiller, supra, n. 1, at 86. 
'63 ibid. at 111. 66 ibid, at 109. 
167 ibid, at 108. 
:" Ogus, supra, n. 26, at 408. 1b9 ibid, at 409. 170 ibid, at 415. X71 ibid. 
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another. Both adhere to the lex loci delicti and both have narrow exceptions to it. Arguably, 
this convergence of tort choice of law regimes is the result of judges in Australia and Canada 
opining that both jurisdictions have similar circumstances; they are both federations and 
therefore, they should learn from each another's experiences in the formulation of their tort 
choice of law rules. While in recent months the doctrine of renvoi was introduced into the 
Australian tort choice of law rule by the High Court of Australia thus resulting in a significant 
divergence from the relevant Canadian position, it is entirely possible that the Supreme Court 
of Canada may rely on this Australian decision to include renvoi as part of the Canadian tort 
choice of law rule in the near future. 
Obviously, such convergences would not remove all the disadvantages inherent in the 
national development of Commonwealth private international law but they should go some 
way in alleviating them. There is however one key argument that we have to examine in 
greater detail which is that such diversity in Commonwealth private international law will "lead 
to the promulgation of lax standards. "12 In our comparative study, we have examined the 
'invisible export' argument that has led England and Singapore to provide for a presumption in 
favour of trial in the local courts in their doctrine of forum non conveniens. While this Is 
obviously a classic case supporting this criticism of diversity in legal regimes, it is important to 
note that things were worse in the past. In particular, the St Pierre test was so parochial that a 
stay of proceedings would only be granted if the defendant can establish oppression or 
vexation on the part of the claimant. The doctrines of forum non conveniens in Singapore and 
England have clearly shifted away from that extreme position which implies a degree of self 
restraint on the part of their judiciaries. 
Accordingly, to facilitate the evolution of Commonwealth private International law towards 
greater uniformity in the form of sound and principled rules, our selected Commonwealth 
courts must be more "outward-looking and ready to borrow than ever before. "13 They must be 
"familiar with the growth of [private international] law in other parts of the world'174 and 
172 ibid, at 416. 173 Hiller, supra, n. 1, at 117. 174 ibid, at 118. 
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"especially within the Commonwealth "15 They must also determine whether the solutions 
devised in these jurisdictions are appropriate for their individual circumstances values and 
needs. This has clearly been the case in Australia and Canada as seen from our comparative 
study. There is however limited reliance on comparative private international law in the 
formulation of these areas of private international law in Singapore; a situation that should be 
remedied. 
Under these circumstances, the Leuven/London Principles on Declining and Referring 
Jurisdiction in Civil and Commercial Matters1e as formulated by the International Law 
Association's Committee on International Civil and Commercial Litigation can be of 
assistance. In particular, these principles are not In the "form of a draft model law, still less a 
draft international convention. "177 All they do is to provide for a "general approach for the 
resolution of 
... 
problems"18 arising in the context of international civil and commercial 
litigation. It is meant to "assist courts and law reformers, both at a national and international 
level, by giving guidance as to potential solutions. x179 Sadly, no such principles have been 
provided for tort choice of law. 
On the principles themselves, it is important to note that they "do not determine the rules of 
original jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters. "180 Instead, they deal with the 
circumstances in which a court should decline jurisdiction such as where there is lis 
pendens'81, related actions'82 as well as in cases where a court Is "satisfied that the 
alternative court is the manifestly more appropriate forum for the determination of the merits 
of the matter, taking into account the interests of all the parties, without discrimination on 
'7s ibid. 
16 These principles were adopted by the International Law Association Conference in London in 2000. 
'n International Law Association London Conference (2000), Committee on International Civil and Commercial Litigation, 
Third Interim Report: Declining and Referring Jurisdiction In International Litigation, httpilwww. ila- 
ha o pdf/Civil%20&%20Commercial%20Litigation/CommUtigation pdf#search=%22Third%20[nterim%20Renort%3A%20 
clinine%20and%20Referring%2OJurisdiction%2Oin%20lntemational%2OLitigation%22. at [40]. 1° ibid. 
"s ibid. 
180 Principle 1.2, Leuven/London Principles. See, Annexure to Third Interim Report: Declining and Referring Jurisdiction In 
International Litigation, htt2: //www. ila- 
b4. org df/Civil°/20&°*2OCommercial%20Litigation/CommLitigation pdf#seanch %22T]iird%20lnterim%20Rrnort%3A%20D 
cclining%20and%20Referring%20Jurisdiction%20in%201ntemational%20Liti gat on%22 
"' Principle 4.1, ibid. 
182 Principle 42, ibid. 
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grounds of nationality. "783 In other words, the principles provide for a specific formulation of 
the doctrine of forum non conveniens. In addition, these principles also introduce the concept 
of referring jurisdiction in that a procedure is provided to transfer litigation to the alternative 
court when the "originating court"184 decides to decline jurisdiction. This process is to address 
the concern that some jurisdictions have with declining jurisdiction "namely the prospect that it 
could lead to a denial of justice in which a plaintiff is left without an effective forum in which to 
secure relief. "185 The adoption of such a referral system by Commonwealth jurisdictions can 
thus go a long way in addressing the policy concerns of the High Court of Australia with 
regards to the litigant's right of access to a judicial system. 
As these principles were drafted in an academic setting unlike the negotiations under the 
Hague Conference where a certain degree of political horse-trading was taking place, it 
appears that there was at least a proper attempt In identifying the best approach to the 
problems faced by litigants in the context of international litigation. In particular, the 
International Law Association's Committee on International Civil and Commercial Litigation 
took a "functional approach 186 by examining the "way In which issues of declining jurisdiction 
actually arise in international litigation and the practical problems which arise for litigants In 
the conduct of cases which span national boundaries. "187 
It is submitted that our selected Commonwealth judiciaries should seriously consider these 
principles and work out how they can guide them In the formulation of their doctrines of forum 
non conveniens. In general terms, there would be a shift towards greater uniformity In the 
various Commonwealth doctrines of forum non conveniens if more Commonwealth judges 
rely on these principles. If there is sufficient consensus amongst Commonwealth jurisdictions 
on them, the principles can even be adopted as a convention. Furthermore, such 
harmonisation may extend beyond Commonwealth countries as these principles are equally 
applicable to civil law jurisdictions. In particular, these principles were prepared by a 
187 Principle 4.3, ibid. 
'" Principle 5.6, ibid. 
18' Third Interim Report, supra, n. 177, at [46]. t' ibid, at [39]. 187 ibid. 
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Committee composed of experts from both civil law and common law jurisdictions and a 
consensus was actually reached amongst them in relation to it. 
4. CONCLUSION 
To sum up, on the question of how our selected Commonwealth jurisdictions should react to 
this phenomenon, while the view of this author is that the harmonisation of jurisdictional rules 
and in particular, the various doctrines of forum non conveniens can probably be justified on 
the grounds of promoting international trade and commerce, it is much more difficult to 
identify a social or economic objective for tort choice of law. It is also important to note that 
there are significant legal, social, economic and political obstacles hampering the 
harmonisation of private international law at the worldwide, regional or Commonwealth level 
and currently, the prospects for such projects of which our selected jurisdictions may be 
involved in, are unpromising. As such, we are left with the default position: the national 
development of our selected areas of private international law in each of our chosen 
Commonwealth jurisdictions. While there are disadvantages inherent in such a phenomenon, 
it is arguable that their significance can be reduced as our Commonwealth jurisdictions learn 
from one another's experiences as well as from other Commonwealth countries to adopt 
similar principles at least among Commonwealth nations with similar social, economic and 
political circumstances. 
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION TO THE THESIS 
As set out in Chapter 1, the objective of this thesis is to undertake a critical analysis of the 
break up of Commonwealth private international law in Australia, Canada, Singapore and 
England with reference to two areas of private international law namely the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens and tort choice of law. To examine this phenomenon in a structured manner, 
we have divided this thesis into three parts with the following questions corresponding to each 
of these sections: 
1. Part 1: What is the nature and extent of the break up of Commonwealth private 
international law in our selected jurisdictions? 
2. Part If: What are the explanations from the case law for the break up of Commonwealth 
private international law in our selected jurisdictions? 
3. Part III: How should our selected jurisdictions react to the break up of Commonwealth 
private international law? 
A brief summary of our findings for these questions will now be provided in this final chapter. 
I. PART l: WHAT IS THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE BREAK UP OF 
COMMONWEALTH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN OUR SELECTED 
JURISDICTIONS? 
It is clear from our analysis in Part I of this thesis that there has been a break up of 
Commonwealth private international law in relation to both forum non conveniens and tort 
choice of law in our selected Commonwealth jurisdictions. For the former, the Australian 
courts have adopted a 'clearly inappropriate forum' test whereas the English, Canadian and 
Singaporean judiciaries have provided for a 'clearly more appropriate forum' test. As for the 
latter, the English common law Phillips v Eyre rule is no longer part of the law in Australia and 
Canada. The Singapore courts, however are still utilising that approach. 
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While the phenomenon has clearly occurred in both of our selected areas of private 
international law, it is interesting to note that the nature and extent of the break up of 
Commonwealth private international law for forum non conveniens is different from that in 
relation to tort choice of law in our selected jurisdictions. In particular: 
1. The break up of Commonwealth tort choice of law in our selected countries is much 
more comprehensive when compared with the corresponding phenomenon for forum 
non conveniens. Most of our selected judiciaries have abandoned the English 
common law Phillips v Eyre rule whereas the 'clearly more appropriate forum' test is 
still the adopted approach in most of our selected jurisdictions. 
2. We have noted in our comparative study that the break up of Commonwealth private 
international law in relation to tort choice of law in our selected jurisdictions has not 
been a linear process. In particular, we described the Australian tort choice of law 
regime as being in a state of flux in that it has been moving towards and away from 
the English common law position throughout its development. This is clearly not the 
case for the doctrines of forum non conveniens in our selected jurisdictions. 
3. The break up of Commonwealth private international law in relation to tort choice of 
law has not been a recent occurrence in that it has been going on for most of the last 
century in some of our selected jurisdictions. In relation to forum non conveniens, the 
break up of this area of private international law only occurred after the introduction of 
the 'clearly more appropriate forum' test in England in the 1980's. 
In short, the break up of Commonwealth private international law is a complex process In that 
the nature and extent of this phenomenon in one area of private international law may be 
different from that of another. 
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2. PART I!: WHA T ARE THE EXPLANA TIONS FROM THE CASE LAW FOR THE BREAK 
UP OF COMMONWEALTH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN OUR SELECTED 
JURISDICTIONS? 
In Part 11 of this thesis, we undertook a critical analysis of the explanations in the relevant 
cases for the divergences from the English common law in Australia, Canada and Singapore 
in relation to their doctrines of forum non conveniens and tort choice of law regimes. We 
noted that the Singapore courts have largely maintained their uniformity with the English 
common law position on our selected areas of private international law as arguably, English 
judicial precedents are still exerting a powerful influence on Singapore judges in their 
adjudication of these matters. In contrast, this is no longer the case in Australia and Canada. 
A long list of policy, structural, historical, comparative and contextual considerations has been 
taken into account by the courts in these jurisdictions in their decisions whether to diverge 
from the relevant English common law private international law approach. 
In general, from our analysis of these considerations, one reason for the break up of 
Commonwealth private international law in relation to forum non conveniens and tort choice 
of law in our selected jurisdictions is that there are differences in the judicial treatment of 
policies, concepts and other wider considerations relevant to these areas of private 
international law in these countries. 
To elaborate, if the judicial treatment of considerations relating to an area of private 
international law in a Commonwealth jurisdiction is similar to that adopted by the English 
courts, the resulting divergences are often fairly small. The Canadian doctrine of forum non 
conveniens is a good illustration of this. As the Canadian courts are in agreement with the 
English courts on most of the considerations relevant to this area of private international law, 
they have adopted the 'clearly more appropriate forum' test albeit with some modifications. In 
contrast, if the judicial treatment of policies, concepts and circumstances in any 
Commonwealth jurisdiction were significantly different from that of the English courts, the 
judiciaries in these two countries would be likely to provide for differing private international 
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law approaches. This can be observed in relation to the tort choice of law regimes in Australia 
and Canada where there is a clear departure from the English common law position. This is 
also the case for the Australian doctrine of forum non convenfens. In particular, the High 
Court of Australia did not support the policy decisions made by the English courts in relation 
to the 'clearly more appropriate forum' test. They thus adopted a different approach; the 
'clearly inappropriate forum' test as they were of the view that it better reflected the policies 
that they wanted adhered to for Australian circumstances, values and needs. 
On a separate note, in Part I of this thesis, we observed that there are differences between 
the nature and extent of the break up of Commonwealth tort choice of law in our selected 
jurisdictions and that in relation to forum non conveniens. In Part II, we have established that 
this is due to the corresponding differences between the judicial treatment of considerations 
relevant to tort choice of law and that with regards to forum non conveniens in our selected 
jurisdictions. To elaborate: 
1. For forum non conveniens, most of our selected courts are generally in agreement 
with the English judiciaries on the policies, concepts and other wider considerations 
underlying the 'clearly more appropriate forum' test. In contrast, there is less 
consensus amongst our selected jurisdictions on the considerations relevant to tort 
choice of law. This is why the break up of Commonwealth tort choice of law is greater 
in extent than the break up of Commonwealth forum non conveniens. 
2. Fluctuations in the extent of the divergences from the English common law position 
on tort choice of law has occurred in our selected jurisdictions, most notably in 
Australia as the judicial treatment of considerations relevant to this area of private 
international law has changed in these countries as time goes by. However, for the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens, it is notable that the judiciaries in our selected 
jurisdictions have not differed much on their treatment of the policies and 
considerations relevant to this area of private international law after the introduction 
of that doctrine in England. There has thus been little movement back towards the 
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English common law after the initial divergences from the English common law 
doctrine of forum non conveniens in these jurisdictions. 
3. Generally, for most of the last century, English common law private international law 
approaches were adopted by the judiciaries in our selected countries with little 
discussion of the relevant policies, concepts and other wider considerations. Forum 
non conveniens is a good example of this and this is thus one reason why the break 
up of this area of private international law is a recent occurrence. In contrast, as 
early as the beginning of the last century, the High Court of Australia was already in 
divergence from the English courts on some of the considerations relevant to tort 
choice of law. This is thus an explanation why the break up of Commonwealth tort 
choice of law has occurred at such an early point in time in comparison to the 
phenomenon for forum non conveniens. 
3. PART Ill: HOW SHOULD OUR SELECTED JURISDICTIONS REACT TO THE BREAK 
UP OF COMMONWEALTH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW? 
With increasing diversity in Commonwealth private international law in relation to forum non 
convenfens and tort choice of law, our selected Commonwealth jurisdictions have to decide 
on how they should respond to this phenomenon. Should they participate actively in projects 
to harmonise these areas of private international law on a global, regional or Commonwealth 
basis or should they leave things as they are now; the individual development of these laws in 
the various Commonwealth jurisdictions? 
In Chapter 8, we established that there are strong arguments for either harmonisation or 
diversity in Commonwealth private international law. Harmonisation in an ideal world would 
provide for certainty, predictability and uniformity in judicial outcomes, all of which would help 
in the promotion of international trade and commerce. It would also result in the formulation of 
better private international law rules for the benefit of the region targeted for harmonisation. In 
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contrast, diversity has the advantage of encouraging a plurality of approaches to deal with 
difficult legal private international law issues. 
In general, it is the view of this author that if a convincing case for uniformity and certainty can 
be established for a particular area of private international law for the purpose of achieving a 
worthy social or economic goal, we should be willing to sacrifice diversity and its advantages 
for it. Harmonisation of jurisdictional rules of which the doctrine of forum non conveniens is a 
component part is said to be desirable for the promotion of international trade and commerce. 
This argument is however somewhat weaker in relation to tort choice of law. It is thus 
unsurprising that few attempts have been made to harmonise this area of private international 
law. 
There is also an issue of whether harmonisation can actually be achieved. In Chapter 8, we 
examined the progress of the harmonisation of jurisdictional rules on a worldwide, regional 
and Commonwealth basis in order to paint a realistic picture of the difficulties involved in such 
projects. One key hurdle faced by the relevant decision makers regardless of the scale of the 
harmonisation project is the difficulty in reaching consensus between states with different 
national ideas of justice, social objectives and public policy. As they do not appear to be able 
to overcome this problem, we have concluded that the prospects for the harmonisation of 
jurisdictional rules at any level remain for the moment, unpromising. As for tort choice of law, 
there has been no interest in the harmonisation of tort choice of law regimes in relation to our 
selected Commonwealth jurisdictions aside from the conventions on product liability and 
traffic accidents produced by the Hague Conference. 
As the harmonisation of tort choice of law and jurisdictional rules has been largely 
unsuccessful, we are left with the default position of ad hoc development of private 
international law rules in individual Commonwealth jurisdictions. Such diversity will of course 
give rise to various inconveniences such as uncertainty, unpredictability and the lack of 
uniformity in judicial outcomes. However, it is important that these criticisms are not 
overstated. As more Commonwealth judiciaries and lawmakers look towards other 
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Commonwealth countries for innovative solutions to private international law problems that 
are more relevant to their individual circumstances and needs, there may be a shift towards 
uniformity in the form of an optimal private international law rule in Commonwealth 
jurisdictions with similar social, economic and political circumstances. This will certainly go 
some way in alleviating the problems resulting from the break up of Commonwealth private 
international law. 
To facilitate the evolution of Commonwealth private international law towards such uniformity, 
Commonwealth jurisdictions must be encouraged to be more outward looking and be ready to 
adopt alternative approaches to private international law if they perceived them as 
appropriate to their circumstances and needs. They must thus be familiar with private 
international law developments in other jurisdictions particularly within the Commonwealth. 
This has been the case in Australia and Canada. There is however, limited reliance on 
comparative private international law in Singapore and it is submitted that this situation should 
be remedied. The Leuven/London Principles on Declining and Referring Jurisdiction in Civil 
and Commercial Matters can be a useful guide to Commonwealth judges in the development 
of their jurisdictional rules. Sadly, there are no such principles available for tort choice of law. 
4. FINAL COMMENTS 
This thesis has identified a growing phenomenon, the break up of Commonwealth private 
international law and the problems that may arise from it. It has explained from the relevant 
cases how this occurrence came about and examined the responses that can be made 
towards it by Commonwealth jurisdictions. 
At one level, this thesis can provide Commonwealth courts in our selected jurisdictions and 
more generally with a better understanding of the policies, concepts and other wider 
considerations underlying the development of forum non conveniens and tort choice of law so 
that they are able to determine which of these policies they should adhere to for their own 
individual jurisdictions' circumstances, values and needs. At a wider level, it is hoped that this 
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thesis will alert Commonwealth jurisdictions and the Commonwealth Secretariat to the break 
up of Commonwealth private international law so that steps can be taken to determine their 
responses particularly when diversity in such laws can have a material and adverse effect on 
international trade and commerce. 
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